S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XIX.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XIX

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 473-474.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 473-474.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

DUB. I.

DOUBT I

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit:  In primo statu fuit corpus hominis animale.  Animale enim denominatur ab anima, ergo omne corpus habens animam potest et debet dici animale; sed corpus gloriosum est huiusmodi:  ergo animale dici potest.  Qualiter ergo dividitur animale contra spirituale?  Si tu dicas, quod anima nominat ibi vitam carnalem, sicut dicitur Ioannis duodecimo:3  Qui amat animam suam perdet eam; sed tali modo vivere est reprehensibile:  ergo videtur, quod tale corpus non competeret statui innocentiae.

In this part are the doubts concerning (Master Peter’s) text, and first there is asked concerning this which he says:  In the first state the body of man was animal.  For “animal” is denominated from “soul” [anima], therefore every body having a soul can and ought to be called “animal”; but a glorious body is of this king:  therefore it can be called “animal”.  Therefore in what kind of manner is “animal” divided against “spiritual”?  If you say, that “soul” names there the carnal life, just as is said in the twelfth (chapter of the Gospel of St.) John:3  He who loves his own soul shall loose it; but to live in such a manner is reprehensible:  therefore it seems, that such a body would not suit [competeret] the state of innocence.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod nomen generis aliquando appropriatur ei quod pro sui incompletione vel imperfectione non addit nomen speciale;4 unde, sicut animal appropriatur bestiis, et dicuntur bestiae esse animalia, sic animale, dictum ab anima, appropriatur quodam modo his quae habent animam cibativam.  Et ideo voluit Augustinus appellare corpus animale, id est corpus alimoniis egens; et iste modus dicendi attenditur, secundum quod animale venit ab anima.  Et patet responsio ad obiecta.  —   Alio modo posset dici, licet minus proprie, quod animale veniret ab hoc, quod est animal, et cum animal approprietur bestiis, diceretur corpus animale,5 id est bestiis simile.  Erat autem Adam in sua conditione, quantum ad corpus, consimilis bestiis in hoc, quod indigebat refici cibis; quantum ad mentem vero erat in honore et bestiis dissimilis.  Sed quia, cum in honore esset, non intellexit, immo peccavit; ideo comparatus est iumentis insipientibus et similis factus est illis,6 ut non solum ipse et eius posteri bestiis essent similes indigentia cibi, sed etiam in bestialitate et appetitu mentis.  Et sic patet, pro quanto dicitur Adam habuisse corpus animale, et quomodo dividitur contra spirituale.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that the name of a genus is sometime appropriated to that which, in virtue of its incompletion and/or imperfection, one does not add the name of a species [nomen speciale];4 wherefore, just as “animal” [animal] is appropriated to the beasts, and beasts are said to be “animals” [animalia], so “animal”, said of the soul, is appropriated in a certain manner to those which have a cibative soul (i.e. a soul prone to eat). And for that reason (St.) Augustine wanted to name the body an “animal”, that is a body needing nourishments; and this manner of speaking is attained, according to which “animal” [animal] comes from “soul” [anima]. And the response to the objections is clear.  —  It could be said in another manner, though less properly, that “animal” comes from that, which is an animal, and since “animal” is appropriated to the beasts, the body5 was said (to be) “animal”, that is similar to the beasts. Moreover Adam, at his foundation, was, as much as regards (his) body, completely similar to the beasts in this, that he needed to be refected with (diverse) foods; but as much as regards (his) mind he was in honor and dissimilar to the beasts.  But because, when he was in honor, he did not understand, nay he sinned, for that reason he was made equal [comparatus] to the foolish beasts of the field and was made similar to them;6 so that he himself and his posterity [eius posteri] would be not only similar to the beasts according to the indigence of food, but also in the beastliness [bestialitate] and appetite of (their) mind.  And thus it is clear, to what extent [pro quanto] Adam is said to have had an “animal” body, and in what manner (“animal”) is divided against “spiritual”.

DUB. II.

DOUBT II

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit:  Quod habebat corpus mortale et immortale.  Cum enim mortale et immortale sint opposita, videtur, quod duo opposita simul et semel inessent eidem.7  —  Item, animal essentiali divisione dividitur per mortale et immortale, sicut per rationale et irrationale.  Si ergo impossibile est, animal simul et semel esse rationale et irrationale, impossibile est, esse mortale et immortale.

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says:  That he had a mortal and an immortal body.  For since the mortal and the immortal are opposites, it seems, that two opposites were at one and the same time [simul et semel] in the same.7  —  Likewise, according to an essential division, ‘animal’ is divided through ‘mortal’ and ‘immortal’, just as (it is divided) through ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’.  If, therefore, it is impossible, that an animal be at one and the same time rational and irrational, it is impossible, that (a body) be mortal and immortal.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod immortale dupliciter dicitur.  Uno modo, prout privat actum et aptitudinem moriendi; et sic dicitur immortale . . .

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that “immortal” is said in a twofold manner.  In one manner, insofar as it deprives the act and aptitude of dying; and thus the “immortal” is said . . .

3  Vers. 25.

4  Sive cui propter sui incompletionem vel imperfectionem non datur nomen speciale.  —  Pro incompletione vel imperfectione cod. T a secunda manu completione vel perfectione; cod. aa quod per sui completionem vel perfectionem.  Proxime post in Vat. et edd. 3, 4 desiderantur verba:  appropriatur bestiis . . . dictum ab anima.

5  Cod. cc et ed. 1 corpus eius animale.  Mox cod. O ante conditione adiicit prima.

6  Psalm. 48, 13.  —  De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 82. m. 2. seq.; B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 13. q. 78; S. Thom., hic circa lit. et Aegid. R., hic dub. 3. lit.

7  Quod est impossibile; de quo cfr. supra pag. 100, nota 1.  —  De ratione seq. cfr. Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 2, ubi haec:  Differentia est animalis immortale, eo quod animalium alia mortalia, alia immortalia. Cfr. et Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Differentia.

3  Verse 25.

4  Or to that which on account of its incompletion and/or imperfection is not given a special name.  —  For incompletion and/or imperfection [incompletione vel imperfectione] codex T by a second hand has completion and/or perfection [completione vel perfectione]; codex aa has which through its completion and/or perfection [quod per sui completionem vel perfectionem].  Immediately afterwards, in the Vatican edition and in editions 3 and 4, there are wanting the words:  appropriated to the beasts, . . . said of the soul [appropriatur bestiis . . . dictum ab anima].

5  Codex cc and edition 1 have his body [corpus eius].  Next codex O before foundation [conditione] adds first [prima].

6  Ps. 48:13.  —  On this Doubt, cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 82, m. 2 f.; Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Summa, p. II, tr. 13, q. 78; St. Thomas, here on the text and Giles the Roman, here in Doubt 3 on the text.

7  Which is impossible; concerning which cf. above d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 3, p. 100, footnote 1.  —  On the following reason, cf. Aristotle, Topics, Bk. IV, ch. 2, where these (words are found):  The immortal is a difference of the animal, by this that some of the animals (are) mortal, others (are) immortal.  Cf. also Porphyry, On the Predicables, ch. “On Difference”.

p. 474

quod non est potens mori; et hoc modo directe opponitur ei quod est mortale, et impossibile est esse circa idem.  Alio modo, prout privat actum solum; et tunc dicitur immortale, id est potens non mori; et hoc modo mortale et immortale non habent oppositionem, quoniam « potentiae rationales et illae quae rationalibus subiiciuntur, sunt ad opposita »;1 et ideo, licet actus sint oppositi, potentiae tamen non sunt oppositae.  —  Et sic patet responsio ad illa obiecta; procedunt enim, secundum quod immortale privat potentiam.  Et si tu obiicias, quod « potentiae distinguuntur per actus »,2 et ita, si actus sunt oppositi, et potentiae similiter; dicendum, quod illud habet locum in potentiis naturalibus puris; vel si in aliis potentiis locum habet, intelligitur de actu, qui circumplectitur totam potentiam.  Cum autem potentia est ad opposita, unus illorum actuum potentiam totam non circumplectitur.3

(to be) that which is not able [potens] to die, and in this manner it is directly opposed to that which is “mortal”, and it is impossible that (these) be about the same.  In another manner (it is said), insofar as it deprives the act alone, and then one is said (to be) “immortal”, that is not able to die; and in this manner the “mortal” and “immortal” do not have an opposition, since « rational powers and those which are subject to rational (powers), are for opposite (things) »;1 and for that reason, though the acts are opposed, yet the powers are not opposed.  —  And in this manner the response to those objections is clear; for they proceed, according to which the “immortal” deprives the power.  And if you object, that « powers are distinguished through acts »,2 and thus, if the acts are opposed, the powers (are) also similarly; it must be said, that that has a place in pure, natural powers, and/or if it has a place in other powers, it is understood of the act, which embraces [circumplectitur] the whole power.  But when a power is for opposed (acts), one of those acts does not embrace the whole power.3

DUB. III.

DOUBT III

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod post peccatum corpus factum est mortuum.  Mortuum enim et vivum opponuntur privative:  ergo si corpus Adae post peccatum vivebat, falsum est dicere, quod motuum erat.  Si tu dicas, hoc esse dictum, quia necessitati moriendi erat adstrictum; pari ratione, cum haberet necessitatem ad putrefactionem, deberet dici, corpus Adae esse putrefactum.

Likewise is asked concerning this which (Hugo of St. Victor) says, that after sin (his) body was made dead.  For ‘dead’ and ‘living’ are opposed privatively:  therefore if the body of Adam lived after (his) sin, it is false to say, that it was dead.  If you say, that this has been said, because it had been constrained [erat adstrictum] to a necessity of dying; for an equal reason, since it had a necessity for putrefaction, it ought to have been said, that the body of Adam was putrefied.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in decimo tertio libro de Civitate Dei,4 mortuum potest esse nomen vel participium.  Secundum quod est participium, sic significat, mortem infuisse, quia est participium praeteriti temporis; et tunc dicitur esse aliquis mortuus, in quo mors prius fuit.  Secundum autem quod est nomen, sic denominat aliquem non solum a morte, quae infuit, sed etiam a morte, quae inest, sicut dicitur aliquis albus ab albedine, quae inest.  Et quoniam mors nihil aliud dicit quam tendentiam ad non-esse, et homo continue ad non-esse tendit post lapsum; hinc est, quod continue est in morte, et ideo continue potest dici mortuus.  Et ideo dicit Apostolus,5 quod corpus mortuum est propter peccatum.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that, just as (St.) Augustine says in the thirteenth book On the City of God,4 mortuum can be a name [nomen] and/or a participle [participium].  According to which it is a participle, it signifies thus, that (the body) was in death, because (“died” [mortuum]) is a participle of the past tense; and then one is said to have died [esse mortuus], in whom there is death beforehand.  But according to which it is a name (i. e. the adjective “dead”), it thus denominates  someone not only by the death, which was in (him), but also by the death, which is in (him), just as someone is said (to be) “white” from the whiteness, which is in (him).  And since “death” [mors] means nothing other than a tendency to not-being, and man tends continually to not-being after the fall; hence it is, that he is continually in a death, and for that reason he can be said (to be) continually “dead”.  And for that reason the Apostle5 says, that the body is dead on account of sin.

Quod ergo obiicitur, quod mortuum et vivum opponuntur; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod mortuum simpliciter privat vivum, hoc est, secundum quod dicit actualem separationem sive terminum corruptionis.  Quando autem dicit ordinem ad illum terminum, non opponitur de se, sed ratione eius, ad quod ordinat, quia ordinat ad oppositum vitae; sed sic simul possunt stare, immo necesse est, simul esse cum vita praesenti.  Et ideo signanter participium huius verbis morior est anomalum6 nec tenet formationem aliorum participiorum praeteriti temporis, sicut dicit Augustinus.

What, therefore, is objected, that the “dead” and the “living” are opposed; it must be said, that (this) is true, according to which the “dead” simply deprives the “living”, that is, according to which (“dead”) means the actual separation or terminus of corruption.  But when it means an order to that terminus, it is not opposed of itself, but by reason of that, to which it orders (itself), because it orders (itself) to the opposite of life; but thus they can stand together, nay it is necessary, that they be together with the present life.  And for that reason the participle of this verb morior (i.e. “to die”) is markedly anomalous [anomalum]6 and does not have the formation of the other participles of the past tense, just as (St.) Augustine says.

DUB. IV.

DOUBT IV

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit:  Sumeret de ligno vitae, quo perfecte immortalis factus, cibi alimenta ulterius non requireret.  Contra hoc est:  quod est corruptibile non potest dare incorruptionem; sed fructus illius ligni vitae erat corruptibilis; aliter non posset manducari et digeri:  ergo non poterat homini praebere perfectam immortalitatem.  —  Item, aut ille fructus convertebatur in corpus humanum, aut non.  Si non:  ergo non reficiebat nec sustentabat; si sic:  ergo erat eiusdem naturae cum carne reliqua:  ergo videtur, quod immortalitatem praestare non poterat.

Likewise is asked concerning this which (St. Augustine) says:  He might take of the Tree of Life, (and) having been made perfectly immortal by which, require no further nourishments for himself.  Against this is (this argument):  ‘what is corruptible cannot give incorruption; but the fruit of that Tree of Life was corruptible; otherwise it could not be chewed and digested:  therefore it could not proffer to man a perfect immortality.  —  Likewise, either that fruit was converted into human flesh [corpus humanum], or not.  If not:  therefore it did not refect [reficiebat] and did not sustain (him); if so:  therefore it was of the same nature with the rest of flesh:  therefore it seems, that it could not guarantee immortality.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod illud lignum vitae dicitur ab Augustino7 potuisse praestare perfectam immortalitatem, non quia propria virtute posset corpus hominis facere incorruptibile, cum hoc sit solius potentiae divinae; sed quia virtute sibi data habebat ad hoc disponere, et divina virtus illi ligno tanquam sacramento assisteret, quae immortalitatem perficeret.  —  Et quod lignum vitae hanc posset habere virtutem, ut ad immortalitatem disponeret, satis patet in multis similibus.  Multa enim sunt aromata, ut myrrha et balsamus, quae corpus hominis diu a putrefactione conservant. Quod vero ratione divinae virtutis assistentis diceretur corporibus illis immortalitatem praebere, simile habetur in Sacramentis, quae dicuntur conferre gratiam, quamvis non ipsam gratiam creent, sed divina virtus ipsis assistens, sicut melius in quarto libro8 explicari habeat.  Sic et in proposito intelligendum est, cum lignum vitae esset primis hominibus in Sacramentum, sicut dicit Augustinus.9

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that that Tree of Life is said by (St.) Augustine7 to have been able to guarantee a perfect immortality, not because it could by its own virtue make the body of man incorruptible, since this belongs to the Divine Power alone; but because by a virtue given to it, it had (an ability) to dispose (one) to this, and the Divine Virtue assisted that Tree as a sacrament, which perfected immortality.  —  And that the Tree of Life was able to have this virtue, to dispose (one) to immortality, is sufficiently clear in many similar (things).  For there are many aromatics, such as myrrh and balsam, which conserve man’s body from putrefaction for a long time.  However, that it was said to proffer their bodies immortality by reason of the Divine Virtue assisting, the similar is had in the Sacraments, which are said to confer grace, even though they do not create the grate itself, but the Divine Virtue assisting them (does), just as has to been explained better in the Fourth Book.8  Thus too must it be understood in the proposed, since the Tree of Life was for the first men as a Sacrament, just as (St.) Augustine says.9

1  Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 3. et 10. (VIII. c. 2. et 5.).

2  Secundum Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.).  —  Cod. S. addit et actus per obiecta.

3  Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 88. m. 4; Petr. a Tar., et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit; Aegid. R., hic. dub. 2. lit.

4  Cap. 11. n. 2.

5  Rom. 8, 10.

6  Graece anwmalon i. e. inaequale sive irregulare.  De anomalia grammatici agunt et quidem illa verba vocant anomala, quae inaequaliter sive irregulariter declinatur vel coniungantur, quorum contraria analoga nominatur.  —  Verba August., quae hic respiciuntur, exstant XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 11. n. 2, et sic sonant:  Ab eo quod est oritur, fit verbum praeteriti temporis:  ortus est; et si qua similia sunt, per temporis praeteriti participia declinantur.  Ab eo vero quod est moritur, si quaeramus praeteriti temporis verbum, responderi adsolet:  mortuus est U littera germinata.  Sic enim dicitur mortuus, quomodo fatuus, arduus, conspicuus, et si qua similia, quae non sunt praeteriti temporis, sed quoniam nomina sunt, sine tempore declinantur.  Illud autem quasi ut declinetur, quod declinari non potest, pro participio praeteriti temporis ponitur nomen.  —  De hoc dubio cfr. S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., hic circa lit., Aegid. R., hic dub. 4. et 6. lit.

7  Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 5. et 6.

8  Dist. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 4.  —  Pro divina virtus ipsis assistens cod. O divina virtus existens in ipsis.

9  Libr. VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 4. n. 8:  Erat ei ergo in lignis ceteris alimentum, in illo autem Sacramentum.  —  Cfr. lignis ceteris alimentum, in illo autem Sacramentum.  —  Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 2. et a. 3. q. 1; Aegid. R., hic dub. 7. lit.

1  Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. IX, texts 3 and 10 (Bk. VIII, chs. 2 and 5).

2  According to Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. II, text 33 (ch. 4).  —  Codex S adds and acts through objects [et actus per obiecta].

3  Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 88, m. 4; (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Middleton, here on the text; Giles the Roman, here in Doubt 2 on the text.

4  Chapter 11, n. 2.

5  Rom. 8:10.

6  In the sense of the Greek anwmalon, i.e. unequal or irregular.  Grammarians (of the Latin language) speak of anomalies, and indeed they call those nouns or verbs “anomalous”, which are declined and/or conjugated unequally or irregularly, whose contraries are named “analogous” (nouns or verbs).  —  The words of (St.) Augustine, which are referred to here, are extant in (his) On the City of God, Bk. XIII, ch. 11, n. 2, and sound thus:  “From that which oritur (i. e. “it arises”) is, a verb of the past tense is made:  ortus est (i. e. “it has arisen”); and there are similar (verbs), (their) participles are declined through the past tense.  But from that which moritur (i. e. “he dies”) is, if we seek the verb of the past tense, it is customary to respond:  mortuus est (i. e. “he has died”), with an additional “u”. For thus mortuus is said in the manner of fatuus, arduus, (and) conspicuus, and if (there are) similar (words), which do not belong to the past tense, but are in fact nouns, they are declined without a tense.  Moreover that (which) is as if to be declined, which cannot be declined, is given the name of a participle of the past tense.”  —  On this doubt, cf. St. Thomas, (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Middleton, here on the text; Giles the Roman, here in Doubts 4 and 6 on the text.

7  See here the text of Master (Peter), chs. 5 and 6.

8  Distinction 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 4.  —  For the Divine Virtue assisting them [divina virtus ipsis assitens] codex O has the Divine Virtue existing in them [divina virtus existens in ipsis].

9  On a Literal Exposition of GenesisΈ Bk. VIII, ch. 4, n. 8:  There was for him, therefore, nourishment in all the other trees, but in that one a Sacrament.  —  Cf. above a. 2, q. 2, and a. 3, q. 1; Giles the Roman, here in Doubt 7 on the text.

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