S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXII.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXII

ARTICULUS III.

 

Quaestio I.

ARTICLE III

 

Question 1

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 769-771.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 769-771.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

ARTICULUS III.

 

De aequitate divini iudicii in infusione et punitione animae.

ARTICLE III

 

On the equity of the Divine Judgment in the infusion and punishment of the soul.

Consequenter quaeritur de tertio, videlicet de aequitate divinae iustitiae, secundum quam animam tali carni infundit, ex qua contrahit reatum aeternae damnationis.  Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Consequently there is asked concerning the third (Article), namely concerning the Divine Justice, according to which He infuses the soul into such a flesh, out of which it contracts a liability [reatum] for eternal damnation.  And about this two (questions) are asked.

Primo quaeritur, utrum Deus illam maculam, quam anima contrahit, de iustitia debeat sibi2 imputare.

First there is asked, whether God in [de] justice ought to impute that stain to the soul, which it2 contracts.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum deceat divinam iustitiam tali carni sociare.

Second there is asked, whether it befits [deceat] the Divine Justice to associate (it) with such a flesh.

QUAESTIO I.

 

Utrum illam maculam, quam anima contrahit ex carne, debeat Deus ipsi imputare.

QUESTION 1

 

Whether God ought to impute that stain to the soul, which it contracts out of the flesh?

CIRCA PRIMUM sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum illam maculam, quam anima contrahit ex carne, debeat Deus sibi imputare.  Et quod non, videtur.

ABOUT THE FIRST (the argument) is advanced thus and there is asked, whether God ought to impute that stain to the soul, which it contracts out of the flesh.  And it seems, that (He should) not.

1. Augustinus in libro de Duabus Animabus contra Manichaeos:3  « Reum teneri quemquam, quia non facit quod facere non potest, summae iniquitatis et insaniae est ».  Si igitur anima parvuli in suo ortu habere non potest iustitiam, videtur, quod nullo modo sit ei originalis macula imputanda.

1. (St.) Augustine (says) in the book On the Two Souls against the Manicheans:3 « That someone be held liable [reum], because he did not do that which he cannot do, belongs to the highest iniquity and insanity ».  If, therefore, the soul of a little one cannot have justice in its rising, it seems, that in no manner is the original stain to be imputed to it.

2. Item, sicut gloria respicit meritum, sic etiam poena respicit demeritum; sed meritum proprie consistit circa actum, ergo et demeritum:  ergo nihil imputandum est alicui pro demerito, quod non sit ex actu proprio.

2. Likewise, just as glory looks back to merit, so too punishment looks back to demerit; but merit consists properly about an act, therefore demerit (does) too:  therefore nothing is to be imputed to anyone as a demerit, which is not out of his own act.

3. Item, in eo quod inest alicui naturaliter, nec est laudandus quis nec vituperandus;4 sed talis culpa inest parvulo ex naturali coniunctione animae et carnis:  igitur pro illa nec est parvulus laudandus nec vituperandus:  igitur macula illa, quam contrahit, non debet sibi imputari ad poenam.

3. Likewise, in that which is in anyone naturally, one is neither to be praised nor blamed; but such a fault is in a little one out of the natural conjunction of soul and flesh:  therefore for that the little one is not to be praised nor blamed:  therefore, that stain, which it contracts, ought not be imputed to it for punishment [ad poenam].

4. Item, pronior est Deus ad miserendum, quam sit homo; sed homo alium habet excusatum ex impossibilitate, nec punit eum qui non est rationis capax:  si ergo talis conditio reperitur in parvulo, videtur, quod nihil quod sit in ipso, debeat ei imputari a Domino.

4. Likewise, God is more prone to be merciful, than man is; but a man holds an other excused on account of an impossibility, nor does he punish him who is not capable of reason:  if, therefore, such a condition is found in the little one, it seems, that nothing which is in him, ought to  be imputed to him by the Lord.

SED CONTRA:  1. Actuale peccatum reddit hominem indignum, propter hoc quod est ibi privatio alicuius boni, quod deberet inesse; sed originale peccatum in hoc communicat cum actuali, quia in eo est privatio alicuius boni, quod deberet inesse, utpote originalis iustitiae:  ergo originale peccatum facit eum in quo est, dignum esse poena.  Sed omne tale est a iusto iudice imputandum:  ergo etc.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:  1. Actual sin renders a man unworthy, on account of this, that there is a privation in that (act) of some good, which ought to be in (it); but original sin in this communicates with actual (sin), because in the former there is a privation of some good, which ought to be in (the act), as for example (the privation of) original justice:  therefore original sin causes him in whom it is, to be worthy of punishment. But every such is to be imputed by a just judge:  ergo etc..

2. Item, originale, sicut prius5 probatum est, malum culpae est; sed culpa deordinat universum, nisi subsequatur poena, in qua ordinetur, secundum quod vult Augustinus:  ergo si divina iustitia non debet dimittere aliquid inordinatum in universo, debet igitur punire originale peccatum in quocumque reperiatur, sive in parvulo, sive in adulto.

2. Likewise, original (sin), just as has been proved before,5 is an evil of fault; but fault disorders the universe, unless punishment follows after (it), in which (punishment the universe) is ordered (anew), according to what (St.) Augustine would (have):  therefore, if the Divine Justice ought not forgive something inordinate in the universe, It ought, therefore, to punish original sin in whomsoever it be found, whether in a little one, or in an adult.

3. Item, iustum est, quod Deus ab omni anima exigat honorem sibi debitum:  cum igitur pulcritudo imaginis in creatura rationali spectet ad honorem Dei, Deus a quacumque creatura rationali exigit illam pulcritudinem.  Sed qui iuste exigit aliquid ab aliquo, si caret illo, recte imputat ei ad poenam:  si ergo quicumque habet originale peccatum, caret illa pulcritudine, quam anima deberet habere; ergo omni tali debet imputari ad poenam a summa iustitia.6

3. Likewise, it is just, that God exact [exigat] from every soul the honor due Him:  therefore, since the beauty of (His) image in the rational creature pertains to the honor of God, God requires [exigit] that beauty from whatsoever rational creature.  But he who requires something justly from anyone, if he lacks that, rightly imputes that to him for punishment:  if, therefore, whosoever has original sin, lacks that beauty, which the soul ought to have; therefore every such ought to be imputed for punishment by the Most High Justice.6

4. Item, sicut secundus Adam fuit exemplum obediendi, sic primus Adam fuit exemplum praevaricandi, sicut Apostolus7 innuit:  ergo sicut habens imaginem secundi Adae est dignus gloria, sic habens imaginem primi est dignus poena.  Sed omnis qui regeneratur in baptismo Christi, hoc ipso quod habet imaginem Christi, videlicet gratiam baptismalem, reputatur a Deo dignus gloria aeterna, quamvis nihil . . .

4. Likewise, just as the Second Adam was an example of obeying, so the first Adam was an example of prevaricating, just as the Apostle7 indicates [innuit]:  therefore, just as one having the image of the Second Adam is worthy of glory, so one having the image of the first is worthy of punishment.  But everyone who is regenerated in the Baptism of Christ, by this very (thing) that he has the image of Christ, namely the baptismal grace, is reputed by God worthy of eternal glory, even though he will have done / nothing . . .

2  Intellige:  animae.

3  Cap. 12. n. 17:  Peccati reum tenere quemquam, quia non fecit quod facere non potuit, summae iniquitatis est et insaniae.

4  Cfr. supra pag. 113, nota 8.

5  Dist. 30. a. 1. q. 1. seq.  —  Sententia Augustini, quae mox memoratur, habetur III. de Lib. Arb. c. 9. n. 26. et c. 15. n. 44. nec non de Natura boni, c. 7. seqq.  —  Cfr. I. Sent. d. 46. q. 6.  —  Circa finem arg. cod. cc et ed. 1 omittunt igitur.

6  Cfr. Anselm. I. Cur Deus homo, c. 13. seqq.

7  Rom. 5, 14. et 19.

2  Understand: the soul [Trans. note:  Here the Latin sibi, is taken according to the Medieval syntax, as referring to the soul, though in classical Latin it would refer grammatically to God. This difficulty is not apparent in the English translation, due to the necessity of transposing subject and pronoun between clauses.]

3  Chapter 12, n. 17:  To hold anyone liable for sin, because he did not do what he could not do, belongs to the height of iniquity and insanity.

4  Cf. above d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, p. 113, footnote 8.

5  Distinction 30, a. 1, q. 1, f..  —   The sentence of (St.) Augustine, which is next cited, is had in his On Free Will, Bk. III, ch. 9, n. 26, and ch. 15, n. 44, and also in On the Nature of the Good, ch. 7, ff..  —   Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 46, q. 1.  —  Near the end of the argument, codex cc and edition 1 omit therefore [igitur].

6  Cf. (St.) Anselm (of Canterbury), Cur Deus homo, ch. 13, ff..

7  Romans 5:14,19.

 

p. 770

 

boni vel mali fecerit:  ergo per oppositum, omnis qui generatur ab Adam, cum hoc ipso gerat imaginem eius, debet a divina iustitia reputari indignus gloria et reus poena.

done / nothing of good and/or evil:  therefore per oppositum, everyone who is generated from Adam, since he bears by this very (fact) his image, ought to be reputed by the Divine Justice unworthy of glory and liable to punishment [reus poena].

CONCLUSIO.

 

Divinam sapientiam, potentiam et iustitiam decet imputare animae culpam, quam contraxit ex carne.

CONCLUSION

 

It is fitting that the Divine Wisdom, Power and Justice impute to the soul the fault, which it contracted out of the flesh.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod absque dubio Deus imputat originale peccatum ipsis parvulis in demeritum, quia in reatum poenae, saltem poenae damni.  Hoc autem exigit divinae potentiae altitudo et sapientiae pulcritudo et iustitiae rectitudo.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that, without a doubt, God imputes original sin unto the demerits of the little ones themselves, because (He imputes it) as a liability for punishment, at least for the punishment of damnation [poenae damni].  Moreover the Height of the Divine Power and the Beauty of (the Divine) Wisdom and the Rectitude of (the Divine) Justice require [exigit] this.

Altitudo divinae potentiae hoc exigit, ob quam Deus semper debet quaerere gloriam suam et honorem; et ideo, si anima rationalis honorem Deo non reddit, cum in se non habeat decus imaginis divinae, per quod Deus honorari habet; necesse est, quod Deus dedecus culpae recompenset in decorem iustitiae.1  —  Pulcritudo etiam sapientiae hoc requirit, quia non patitur aliquid turpe vel inordinatum reperiri intra universum. Et quoniam omne peccatum, sive sit actuale, sive contractum, est « privatio modi, speciei et ordinis »;2 necesse est, quod inordinationem naturae recompenset Deus per ordinem poenae, ut sic pulcritudo universi ex nulla parte remaneat deturpata.  —  Rectitudo etiam divinae iustitiae hoc requirit, quia Deus id a creatura exigit, quod ei dedit.  Quoniam igitur Dues humanam naturam in primo homine iustam fecerat, voluntatis iustitiam non solum a primo parente, sed etiam ab omnibus posteris, in quibus natura illa reperitur, debet exigere.  In quocumque igitur est illius iustitiae carentia, merito sibi imputatur a divina iustitia.  Et hoc est quod dicit Anselmus in libro de Conceptu virginali, capitulo vigesimo octavo:3  « Dicendum est, quod aliter Deus erga infantes debeat agere, et aliter homo.  Nam homo non debet exigere a natura quod sibi non dedit et quod sibi non debetur; nec iuste redarguit homo hominem cum culpa nasci, sine qua ipse non exstitit, et de qua non nisi per alium sanatur.  Deus vero recte exigit a natura quod ipse dedit, et quod sibi iuste debetur ».  Sic ergo patet, quod decet Deum culpam imputare animae, quam contraxit ex carne.  Hoc enim exigit tam potentia, quam sapientia, quam etiam iustitia.  Ideo concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

The Height of the Divine Power exacts [exigit] this, since [ob quam] God ought always to seek His own Glory and Honor; and for that reason, if a rational soul does not render honor to God, since it does not have the ornament [decus] of the divine image in itself, through which (ornament) God has to honor (it); it is necessary, that God recompense the disgrace of (its) fault [dedecus culpae] unto the ornament of (His) Justice.1  —  The Beauty of (the Divine) Wisdom also requires [requirit] this, because It suffers nothing foul and/or inordinate to be found within the universe. And since every sin, whether it be actual, or contracted, is « a privation of measure, beauty [speciei] and order »;2 it is necessary, that God recompense the inordinacy of nature through the order of punishment, so that in this manner the beauty [pulcritudo] of the universe might remain befouled in no part.  —  The Rectitude of the Divine Justice also requires this, because God exacts that from a creature, which He gave it.  Therefore, since God made human nature just in the first man, He ought to exact the justice of will not only from the first parent, but even from all (his) descendents, in whom that nature is found.  Therefore, in whomsoever there is a lack of that justice, there is worthily imputed to it (an eternal punishment) by the Divine Justice.  And this is what (St.) Anselm says in the book On the Virginal Conception, in the twenty-eighth chapter:3  « It must be said, that towards infants God ought to act in one manner, and man in another.  For man ought not exact from a nature what he has not given it [sibi] and what is not due him [sibi]; nor does a man justly reprove [redarguit] a man to be born with a fault, without which he himself never existed, and from which he is healed not but through another.  However, God rightly exacts from a nature what He Himself gave (it), and what justly is owed Him ».  Therefore, in this manner it is clear, that it is fitting [decet] that God impute the fault to the soul, which it contracted out of the flesh.  For both (His) Power, and Wisdom, and even (His) Justice exact this.  For that reason, the reasons, which show this, are to be conceded.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium de verbis Augustini in libro de Duabus Animabus, dicendum est, quod ratio ista dupliciter deficit.  Primo quidem, quia ex malo intellectu auctoritatis procedit.  Augustinus enim loquitur de impossibilitate, quae inest simpliciter homini ex natura, non de ea, in quam homo intrusus est per voluntatem et culpam, sicut supra distinctione vigesima octava4 positum fuit exemplum de servo eunte ad nundinas.  Haec autem impossibilitas servandi rectitudinem iustitiae non fuit indita homini ex conditione naturae, sed potius intrusa fuit ex voluntaria transgressione Adae.  —  Secundo etiam deficit in assumtione,5 pro eo quod Deus non imputat parvulo peccatum originale ex hoc, quod non facit quod facere non potest, sed ex hoc, quod non habet quod habere debet.  Et hoc bene imputatur homini, secundum illud Lucae:6  Omni habenti dabitur, et abundabit; non habenti vero etc.  Et Apostolus dicit, quod ignorans ignorabitur.  Et eiectus fuit7 homo a nuptiis non solum propter enormitatem actualis praevaricationis, sed etiam propter carentiam vestis nuptialis, qua quia caret homo in originali conceptus, nisi vestiatur in baptismate, non permittitur aulam superni regis intrare, exigente hoc illius supernae aulae dignitate.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected unto the contrary from the words of (St.) Augustine in the book On Two Souls, it must be said, that that reckoning is deficient in a twofold manner.  First, indeed, because it proceeds from a bad understanding of the authority.  For (St.) Augustine speaks of the impossibility, which is in man simply on account of (his) nature, not of that, into which man has intruded through (his) will and fault, just as was posted above in the Twenty-Eight Distinction4 concerning the market-place [ad nundinas].  Moreover this impossibility of keeping the rectitude of justice was not endowed to man from the foundation of (his) nature, but intruded (into it) on account of the voluntary transgression of Adam.  —  Second, it also is deficient in (its) assumption,5 in virtue of this, that God does not impute original isn to a little one on this account, that he does not do what he cannot do, but on this account, that he does not have what he ought to have.  And this (sin) is rightly imputed to man, according to that (verse of the Gospel of St.) Luke:6  To everyone having it shall be given, and shall abound; but to the one not having etc..  And the Apostle says, that the ignorant shall be ignored.  And the man was ejected7 from the wedding-feast not only on account of the enormity of (his) actual prevarication, but also on account of (his) lack of the wedding garment, which man conceived in original (sin) lacks, because, unless he is clothed in Baptism, he is not permitted to enter into the Court [aulam] of the Supernal King, since the dignity of that Supernal Court requires this.

2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod demeritum respicit actum; dicendum, quod sicut parvuli habentes gratiam digni sunt vita aeterna, pro eo quod illam gratiam habent8 per Sacramenta Christi, qui eis vitam aeternam sua gratia et passione promeruit, ita quod alia est gratia in parvulis quam in Christo:  sic et in proposito intelligendum est, quod maculam peccati contrahit anima ex sua generatione in ipsa propagatione, et hoc ab ipso Adam, qui ex actu suo naturam humanam foedavit.  Et ideo in ipso dicimur peccasse et demeruisse, et per eius inobedientiam peccatores constituti esse.9  Alia tamen est in nobis culpa, quam fuerit in ipso; habet tamen haec rationem demeriti ab illa, ex qua processit.  Et hoc est quod dicit Anselmus de Conceptu . . .

2. To that, however, which is objected, that demerit respects an act; it must be said, that just as little ones having grace are worthy of eternal life, in virtue of this, that they have8 that grace through the Sacraments of Christ, Who merited eternal life for them by His grace and Passion, such that the grace in little ones is other than (that which is) in Christ:  so too must it be understood in the proposed, that the soul contracts the stain of sin out of its own generation in the (act of) propagation itself, and this from Adam itself, who befouled human nature from his own act.  And for that reason we say that “we have sinned and have demerited in him”, and that “we have been constituted sinners through his disobedience [inobedientiam]”.9  Yet the fault in us is other than it was in him; yet the latter has (its) reckoning of demerit from the former, out of which it proceeded.  And this is what (St.) Anselm says On the Virginal / Conception, in the twenty-seventh chapter: . . .

1  Hic S. Doctori illa verba August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 15. n. 44, ante oculus versata esse videntur:  Nullo autem temporis intervallo ista [peccatum et poena peccati] dividuntur . . . ne vel puncto temporis universalis pulcritudo turpetur, ut sit in ea peccati dedecus sine decore vindictae.

2  Secundum August., de Natura boni, c. 4.  Cfr. infra d. 35. a. 2.

3  In testimonio ex Anselmo allato textus originalis pro debeat agere exhibet exigit quid debeant agere, deinde pro sibi non dedit lectionem ipse non dedit, tum nascitur pro exstitit et circa finem post ipse dedit adiungit ei.

4  Dub. 3.  Augustinus obiectionem hic factam ipse solvit I. Retract. c. 15. n. 6, ubi ait:  Cur ergo parvuli tenentur rei?  Respondetur, quia ex eius origine tenentur, qui non fecit quod facere potuit, divinum scilicet servare mandatum.  Cfr. etiam supra d. XXVIII. lit. Magistri, c. 3.

5  Sive in minori, quae habetur in 1. arg. scilicet:  Si igitur anima parvuli etc.

6  Cap. 19, 26, ubi Vulgata pro non habenti vero legit ab eo autem qui non habet.  —  Seq. textus est I. Cor. 14, 38:  Si autem ignorat, ignorabitur.

7  Edd. adiiciunt Matthaei 7. (perperam pro 22, 12. seqq.); edd. 3, 4 interserunt Matthaei 7. Glossa; Vat. inter verba Et eiectus interiicit Glossa in Matthaeo.

8  Cum codd. F O (T a secunda manu) adiecimus habent, quod in Vat. desideratur.  In cod. aa secunda, sed antiqua manus textum sic transformavit:  gratiam per sacramenta Christus eis etc.

9  Rom. 5, 12. 19.

1  In this passage, the words of (St.) Augustine, On Free Will, Bk. III, ch. 15, n. 44, seem to lay before the eyes of the Seraphic Doctor:  But by no interval of time are these (i. e. sin and the punishment for sin) divided . . . lest either beauty of the universe be befouled by a point of time, such that there be in it the disgrace of sin without the ornament of vengeance.

2  According to (St.) Augustine, On the Nature of the Good, ch. 4.  Cf. below d. 35, a. 2.

3  In the testimony cited from (St.) Anselm the original text exhibits requires what they ought to do [exigit quid debeant agere] for ought to act [debeat agere], then has the reading he himself did not give (it) [ipse non dedit] for he did not give it [sibi non dedit], and is never born [nascitur] for never existed [exstitit] and near the end after He himself gave [ipse dedit] it adjoins it [ei].

4  Doubt 3.  (St.) Augustine himself solves the objection made here in his Retractations, Bk. I, ch. 15, n. 6, where he says:  Therefore, why are little ones held (to be) liable?  One answers, that they are held (to be such) on account of (their) origin from him, who did not do what he could have done, namely, keep the Divine mandate.  Cf. also the text of Master (Peter), above in d. XXVIII, ch. 3.

5  Or in the minor, which is had in the 1st argument, namely:  Therefore, if the soul of a little one etc.

6  Chapter 19:26, where the Vulgate reads but from him who does not have [ab eo autem qui non habet] for but to the one not having [non habenti vero].  —  The following text is 1 Cor. 14:38:  But if one ignores, he shall be ignored.

7  The editions adjoin Matthew, chapter 7 [Matthaei 7.], faultily, instead of Mt. 22:12 ff.; editions 2 and 4 insert Matthew, chapter 7, according to the Gloss [Matthai /. Glossa]; the Vatican edition interjects according to the Gloss on Matthew [Glossa in Matthaeo] between the words And the man [Et eiectus].

8  With codices F and O (T by a second hand) we have added they have [habent], which is wanting in the Vatican edition.  In codex aa, the second, but ancient, hand has transformed the text thus:  that Christ by His Passion and Death merited this grace for them through the Sacraments: eternal life [gratiam per sacramenta Christus eis etc.].

9  Romans 5:12,19.

 

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virginali, capitulo vigesimo septimo:1  « Originale peccatum aliud intelligere nequeo in parvulis, nisi ipsam factam per inobedientiam Adae iustitiae debitae nuditatem, per quam omnes sunt filii irae, quoniam et naturam accusat spontanea quam fecit iustitiae desertio; nec personas excusat impotentia recuperandi, quam comitatur beatitudinis nuditas, ut, sicut sunt sine omni iustitiae rectitudine, ita sint absque omni beatitudine ».

On the Virginal / Conception, in the twenty-seventh chapter:1  « I am unable to understand original sin in little ones (to be something) else, but the very nudity of due justice wrought through the disobedience of Adam, through which all are sons of wrath, since the spontaneous (nudity), which (his) forsaking [desertio] of justice wrought, accuses the nature; nor does (their) impotence of recovering (his justice) — which (impotence) the nudity of beatitude accompanies — excuse (individual) persons from being thus without all beatitude, just as they are without all rectitude of justice ».

3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod non est aliquis laudandus vel vituperandus pro eo quod ei naturaliter inest; dicendum, quod si intelligatur de natura instituta, nec est laudandus nec vituperandus, nec apud Deum nec apud homines, quia ipse Deus naturam instituit nec debet culpare quod fecit.  Si vero intelligatur de eo quod naturaliter inest secundum statum naturae lapsae; sic dico, quod non est homo apud homines vituperandus, sicut dicit Anselmus, et habitum est in responsione, quia homines quantum ad talia pares sunt; nec debet homo quod non dedit ab homine exigere.  Apud vero Deum, qui aliter naturam instituit, vituperandus est, quia in se non habet quod Deus iuste ab ipso exigit.2  Illud igitur verbum Philosophi, quod dicit, quod pro naturalibus nec laudamur nec vituperamur, aut est intelligendum de naturalibus quantum ad naturae institutionem, aut si de aliis intelligatur, hoc intelligitur quantum ad iudicium humanum, non quantum ad iudicium divinum.

3. To that, however, which is objected, that no one is to be praised and/or blamed in virtue of that which is naturally in him; it must be said, that if (this) be understood of nature as instituted, one is neither to be praised nor blamed, neither before God nor among men, because God Himself established the nature and He ought not fault what He made.  However, if it be understood of that which is naturally in (a man) according to the state of lapsed nature; thus I say, that a man is not to be blamed among men, just as (St.) Anselm says, and (as) is had in the Response, because men, as much as regards such (things), are equals; nor ought a man require [exigit] from a man what he has not given (him).  But before God, Who established the nature in another manner, he is to be blamed, because he does not have in himself (that) which God justly requires from him.2  Therefore that verse of the Philosopher, which says, that we are neither praised nor blamed for natural (things), either must be understood of natural (things) as much as regards the institution of nature, or if it be understood of other naturals, this is understood as much as regards human judgment, not as much as regards Divine Judgment.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod pronior est Deus ad miserendum quam homo; dicendum, quod verum est, pro eo quod plenam misericordiam praestat ei cui sibi placuerit misereri; nihilominus tamen districtissime iudicat, sicut ex illo verbo colligitur in Matthaei duodecimo:3  De omni verbo otioso reddent homines rationem in die iudicii.  Unde multa sunt peccata, quae apud homines tolerantur et non puniuntur, utpote sunt spiritualia et interiora, de quibus oportebit in die iudicii nos reddere rationem.  Misericordia enim viam iustitiae non praecludit.

4. To that which is objected last, that God is more prone to show mercy than man (is); it must be said, that (this) is true, in virtue of this, that He guarantees [praestat] full mercy to him whom it pleases Him to show mercy; yet nevertheless He judges in a most detailed manner [districtissime], just as is gathered from that verse in the eleventh (chapter of the Gospel of St.) Matthew:3  For every idle word men shall render account on the Day of Judgment.  Wherefore there are many sins, which are tolerated among men and are not punished, such as spiritual and interior ones, of which it shall be necessary [opportebit] for us to render an account on the Day of Judgment.  For mercy does not preclude the way of justice.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Duae huius articuli quaestiones intime cohaerent.  In 1. quaest. peccatum originale consideratur sub ratione culpae, quae a capite seu stipite generis humani per moralem quandam imputationem transit in animas posterorum.  In 2. quaest. vero agitur de hoc, quod Deus cum infecta carne uniat animam ab ipso creatam.  Exceptis Petro a Tart. et Richard. a Med., alii Commentatores una quaestione comprehendunt utrumque problema, tractantes vel primum (ut S. Thom. et Richard) vel secundum.   Plerumque autem iidem tantum unum alterumve argumentum ponunt ex pluribus a nostra Doctore allatis.

I. The two Questions of this Article are intimately coherent.  In the 1st Question original sin is considered under the reckoning of a fault, which passed over from the head or trunk of the human race into the souls of (his) offspring through a certain moral imputation.  But in the 2nd Question one deals with this, that God unites the soul created by Him with infected flesh.  Excepting (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Middleton, the other Commentators comprehend each problem under one question, treating either the first (as do St. Thomas and Richard) and/or the second.  But very many of the same only posit one or the other argument out of the many brought forward by our Doctor.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 4. in solut. obiector.  —  S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2.  —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2. 3.  —  Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1, a. 4. q. 2.  —  Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 2.  —   Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

II. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 106, m. 4, in the solution of the objections.  —  St. Thomas, here in q. 2, a. 2.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, aa. 1, 2, and 3.  —   Richard of Middleton, here in a. 3, q. 1; a. 4, q. 2.  —  Giles the Roman, here in q. 2, a. 2.  —  (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 4.

1  Textus originalis sic sonat:  Hoc peccatum, quod originale dico, aliud intelligere neque in eisdem infantibus, nisi ipsam, quam supra posui, factam . . . quam fecit in Adam iustitiae desertio.  Nec personas excusat, ut dictum est, recuperandi impotentia, quam comitatur beatitudinis quoque nuditas, ut, sicut sunt sine omni iustitia, ita sint etc.

2  Cfr. August., I. Retract. c. 15. n. 6. seq.  —  Dictum Philosophi iam supra notavimus pag. 113, nota 8.

3  Vers. 36:  Dico autem vobis, quoniam omne verbum  otiosum, quod locuti fuerint homines, reddent rationem de eo in die iudicii.

1  The original text sounds like this:  Nor am I able to understand this sin, which I call “the original one”, (to be) another one in the same infants, but that one, which I posited above, wrought . . . which the forsaking of justice in Adam wrought.  Neither does the impotence of recovering (that justice) — which (inability) the nudity of beatitude also accompanies — excuse persons, as has been said, from being without . . . just as they are without all justice. [Trans. note:  Here St. Anselm calls the absence and deprivation of beatitude the “nudity of beatitude”, likening it to the deprivation of the wedding garment.]

2  Cf. (St.) Augustine, Retractations, Bk. I, ch. 15, n. 6, f..  —  The saying of the Philosopher we have noted already, above in d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, p. 113, footnote 8.

3  Verse 36:  But I say to thee, that every idle word, which men will have spoken, they shall render an account of that on the Day of Judgment.

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