|
S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis |
St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio |
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum |
Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences |
|
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis |
of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris |
|
SECUNDI LIBRI |
BOOK TWO |
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXIV. |
COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXIV |
|
ARTICULUS II.
Quaestio II. |
ARTICLE II
Question 2 |
|
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
|
Latin
text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
|
|
QUAESTIO II.
Utrum malum sit in bono sibi opposito. |
QUESTION 2
Whether evil is in the good opposed to it? |
|
SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum malum sive malitia sit in bono sibi opposito. Et quod sic, videtur. |
SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether evil or malice [malitia] is in the good opposed to it. And it seems, that (this is) so. |
|
1. Augustinus in Enchiridio3 « Cum mala et bona nullus ambigat esse contraria, non solum simul esse possunt, sed mala omnino sine bonis et nisi in bonis esse non possunt ». Hic expresse habetur, quod mala sunt in bonis sibi oppositis. |
1. (St.) Augustine in (his) Enchiridion (says):3 « Though no one disputes [ambigat] that evils and goods are contraries, they can be not only together, but evils can not be entirely without goods and naught but in goods ». Here there is expressly had, that evils are in goods opposed to them. |
|
2. Item, Augustinus:4 « In his contrariis, quae bona et mala vocantur, deficit regula dialecticorum, qua dicunt, nulli rei simul inesse contraria »; sed constat, quod non deficeret, nisi mala essent in bonis sibi oppositis: ergo etc. |
2. Likewise, (St.) Augustine (says):4 « In those contraries, which are called good and evil, the rule of dialectics fails, by which they say, that contraries are in no thing together »; but it is established, that it would not fail, except if evils were in goods opposed to them: ergo etc.. |
|
3. Item, malum dicitur quod corrumpit;5 sed non corrumpit nisi illud, in quo est, et ei bono opponitur, quod corrumpit: ergo videtur, quod malum sit in bono sibi opposito. |
3. Likewise, an “evil” is said (to be) that which corrupts;5 but it corrupts naught but that, in which it is, and it is opposed to that good, which it corrupts: therefore it seems, that evil is in the good opposed to it. |
|
4. Item, servitus opponitur libertati; sed peccatum, quod facit hominem servum, proprie inest homini secundum voluntatem et liberi arbitrii libertatem: ergo videtur, quod malum substantificari habeat in bono sibi opposito.6 |
4. Likewise, slavery [servitus] is opposed to liberty; but the sin, which makes a man a slave, is in man properly according to (his) will and the liberty of (his) free judgment [liberi arbitrii]: therefore it seems, that evil has to be substantiated [substantificari] in a good opposed to it.6 |
|
CONTRA: 1. Dionysius in libro de Divinis Nominibus:7 « Malum non est existens neque in existentibus »; sed omne bonum est de genere existentium: ergo malum non est in bono: ergo nec in bono sibi opposito. |
ON THE CONTRARY: 1. (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite) in (his) book On the Divine Names (says):7 « Evil is not existent nor in existents »; but every good is of the genus of existents: therefore evil is not in the good: therefore neither in the good opposed to it. |
|
2. Item, virtus et vitium opponuntur, et « tantum unum uni opponitur »;8 si ergo vitium non est in virtute, ergo nec est in bono sibi opposito, nec etiam cum illo. |
2. Likewise, virtue and vice are opposed, and « the one is opposed only to one »;8 if, therefore, vice is not in virtue, therefore neither is it in the good opposed to it, nor even (is it) with it. |
|
3. Item, regula dialecticorum est vera et necessaria, ergo non fallit in aliqua materia; nam si fal- / -leret . . . |
3. Likewise, a rule of dialectics is true and necessary, therefore it does not deceive in any matter; for if it / deceived . . . |
|
3 Cap. 14. n. 4. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 5. 4 Enchirid. c. 14. n. 4, ubi textus originalis voci regula adiungit illa et subinde voculae simul praemittit duo. 5 Ut dicit Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 20. Cfr. infra d. 35. per totam. 6 Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 20: Tenetur (crateitai) autem et hoc [malum] boni participatione et substantificat (ousioi) et suimet privationem bonum tota sui participatione. [Translatio Scoti Erig.]. — De maiori vide supra d. 25. p. I. q. 1. In minori respicitur illud Ioan. 8, 34: Omnis qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. Cfr. Rom. 6, 6. 20. — Pro et liberi arbitrii edd., excepta 1, per liberi arbitrii. 7 Cap. 4. § 20. in fine et in princ. § 21. et §34. 8 Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 17. (IX. c. 5.) et I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 10. (c. 3.). |
3 Chapter 14, n. 4. Cf. the text of Master (Peter), here in ch. 5. 4 Enchiridion., ch. 14, n. 4, where the original text reads that rule [illa regula] and then two contraries [duo simul]. 5 As (St.) Dionysius says, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, § 20. Cf. below d. 35, throughout. 6 (St.) Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, § 20: Moreover, this (evil) is also bound (crateitai) by participation in the good and the good also substantiates (ousioi) the former’s privation by its own entire participation (Latin translation of Scotus Erigena). — On the major (of the argument) see above d. 25, p. I, a. 1. In the minor (of the argument) there is a reference to Jn. 8:34: Everyone who works sin, is a slave of sin [Omnis qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati]. Cf. Rom. 6:6,20. — For and the liberty [et liberi arbitrii etc.] the editions, except edition 1, have through the liberty [per liberi arbitrii]. 7 Chapter 4, § 20, at the end, and at the beginning of §21, and §34. 8 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. X, text 17 (Bk. IX, ch. 5) and On Heaven and the World, Bk. I, text 10 (ch. 3). |
p. 813
|
fal- / -leret in una sola materia, repudianda esset tanquam falsa. Si igitur ars dicit, quod « unum oppositum non est in altero nec cum altero circa idem »,1 et bonum malo opponitur; ergo malum non est in bono sibi opposito. |
it / deceived in one matter only, it would have to be repudiated as false. If, therefore, the art (of dialectics) says, that « one opposite is not in the other nor with the other about the same (thing) »,1 and “good is opposed to evil”; therefore evil is not in the good opposed to it. |
|
4. Item, si malum potest esse in bono sibi opposito, ergo ab ipso non expellitur; et si non expellitur a suo opposito, videtur, quod non expellatur ab aliquo; et si a nullo expellitur, semper manet: ergo si aliquis semel est malus, semper est malus. Quodsi hoc est falsum, restat, quod et2 primum. |
4. Likewise, if evil can be in the good opposed to it, therefore it is not expelled by it; and if it is not expelled by its opposite, it seems, that it is not expelled by anything; and if it is expelled by nothing, it remains always: therefore if anyone is once evil, he is always evil. Wherefore if this is false, it remains, that the first (is) also.2 |
|
CONCLUSIO.
Et fides et ratio dictat, nihil esse ita malum, quin habeat aliquid de bono. |
CONCLUSION
Both the Faith and reason dictate, that there is nothing so evil, that it does not have something of the good. |
|
RESPONDEO: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod bonum in creatura dicitur per ordinationem ad summum.3 Unde bonum dicitur quod est ordinatum in finem. Ordinatio autem tria respicit: aut ipsum ordinabile, aut illud secundum quod est ordinabile, aut illud per quod ordinatur. Et secundum hoc triplex reperitur in nobis bonum, scilicet bonum, quod est ordinabile, et hoc est naturale; et bonum, per quod ordinatur, et hoc est virtus vel gratia; et bonum, secundum quod natura ordinabilis est a gratia, et hoc est habilitas media. |
I RESPOND: For an understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that the “good” in a creature is said through (its) ordination to the High (Good).3 Wherefore the “good” is said (to be that), which has been ordered unto the End. But an ordination respects three (things): either the very one able to be ordered [ipsum ordinabile], or that according to which it is able to be ordered, or that through which it is ordered. And according to this threefold (measure) the good is found in us, that is, the good, which is able to be ordered; and this is (our) natural good; and the good, through which it is ordered, and this is virtue and/or grace; and the good, according to which (our) nature is able to be ordered by grace, and this is an intermediary ability [habilitas media]. |
|
Intelligendum est ergo, quod malum culpae ei bono, quod est ipsa natura vel substantia, non opponitur, quia ipsam substantiam non corrumpit, ut dicit Dionysius:4 « Nihil existentium corrumpitur in eo quod est essentia vel natura ». Ei autem bono, quod est virtus et gratia, simpliciter et directe opponitur. Unde mutuo se expellunt et simul esse non possunt. Ei autem bono, quod est habilitas media, quodam modo opponitur et quodam modo non. Nam illa habilitas media habet comparari ad naturam, cuius est, et ad gratiam, ad quam est. Secundum quod comparatur ad naturam, cuius est, sic non habet oppositionem ad malum, quoniam habilitas illa, ut erat5 talis naturae, indifferens erat ad bonum et ad malum; et sic est subiectum mali. Ut autem comparatur ad gratiam sive virtutem, vel etiam ad finem, ad quem est, sic habet oppositionem ad malum. Nam malum tollit ei rectam ordinationem ad illud ad quod est, et reddit minus et minus habilem. Quoniam igitur malum culpae primo et principaliter circa habilitatem consistit, et habilitas potentiae opponitur ipsi malo, cum malum reddat ipsam potentiam inhabilem; hinc est, quod Augustinus6 dicit, quod malum habet esse in bono sibi opposito; et quod in huiusmodi oppositis regula dialecticorum deficit, hoc est dicere, quod ad talia opposita non se extendit. Unde ex hoc non sequitur, quod regula dialecticorum falsificetur. Sed quoniam mos est Philosophi,7 positis considerationibus, instantias subinferre, non quae falsificent ipsas, sed quae intellectum considerationum rectificent et manifestent; sic beatus Augustinus, tanquam vir prudens ingenio, in hac instantia manifestat, illam maximam dialecticorum in his oppositis tenere, quae opponuntur oppositione formali, sicut opponitur virtus et vitium, gratia et culpa. In aliis autem oppositis, quae non opponuntur ratione eius quod sunt, sed ratione eius ad quod sunt, non est intelligenda illa regula; nam illa possunt simul stare, sicut stat gratia cum concupiscentia; et iterum, unum potest esse in altero, sicut culpa in habilitate. |
It must be understood, therefore, that the evil of fault is not opposed to that good, which is (our) very nature and/or substance, because it does not corrupt (our) substance itself, as (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite)4 says: « Nothing of existents is corrupted in that which is (its) essence and/or nature ». But to that good, which is a virtue and a grace, it is simply and directly opposed. Wherefore they mutually expel themselves and cannot be together. But to that good, which is an intermediary quality, it is opposed in a certain manner and in a certain manner (it is) not. For that intermediary ability has to be compared to the nature, to which it belongs, and to the grace, for which it is. According to which it is compared to the nature, to which it belongs, thus it does not have an opposition to the evil, since that ability, as it belonged5 to such a nature, was indifferent to good and to evil; and thus it is a subject for evil. But as compared to a grace or virtue, and/or even to the end, for which it is, thus it has an opposition to the evil (of fault). For the evil (of fault) takes away from it (its) right ordination to that for which it is, and renders (it) less and less able. Therefore, since the evil of fault consists first and principally about an ability, and the ability of a power is opposed to the evil itself, since the evil renders the very power unable; hence it is, that (St.) Augustine6 says, that evil has to be in the good opposed to it; and that in opposites of this kind the rule of dialectics fails, that is to say, that it does not extend itself to such opposites. Wherefore from this it does not follow, that the rule of dialectics is falsified. But since it is the custom [mos] of the Philosopher7, having posited (his) considerations, to infer subsequently [subinfer] the instances, not which falsify them, but which rectify the understanding of the considerations and manifest (them); and thus blessed Augustine, as a man prudent in genius, manifests in this instance, that that maxim of dialectics holds in those opposites, which are opposed by a formal opposition, just as there is opposed virtue and vice, grace and fault. But in other opposites, which are not opposed by reason of that which they are, but by reason of that for which they are, that rule is not to be understood; for those can stand together, just as grace stands with concupiscence; and again, the one can be in the other, just as a fault (is) in an ability. |
|
Ex his, quae dicta sunt, manifesta est responsio ad quaestionem propositam. Dico enim, quod malum substantificatur in bono, et non solum in bono, sed etiam in bono quodam modo sibi opposito, sicut ostendunt rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur. In bono autem, quod directe et formaliter opponitur sibi, substantificari non habet, sicut duae ultimae rationes, quae ad secundam partem inducuntur, ostendunt. |
From these, which have been said, the response to the proposed Question has been manifested. For I say, that evil is substantiated in a good, and not only in a good, but even in a good in a certain manner opposed to it, just as the reasons, which are brought forward for the first side, show. But in the good, which is opposed to it directly and formally, it does not have (an ability) to be substantiated, just as the last two reasons, which are brought forward for the second side, show. |
|
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de verbo Dionysii, quod malum non est in existentibus etc.; dicendum, quod ipse loquitur per se, quod scilicet non est in existentibus, secundum quod existentia, sed potius secundum quod deficientia, cum sit privatio et defectus, ut iam8 patebit melius. |
1. To that which is objected from the verse of (St.) Dionysius, that evil is not in existents etc.; it must be said, that he himself speaks per se, that is (he says) that (evil) is not in existents, according to which (they are) existents, but rather according to which (they are) deficients, since (evil) is a privation and a defect, as soon will be more clear.8 |
|
2. 3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tantum unum uni opponitur; dicendum, quod illud intelligendum est de uno genere oppositionis, et intelligendo secundum idem, et per se loquendo. Habilitas autem potentiae non opponitur ipsi9 nisi ratione virtutis; virtus enim directe opponitur vitio; et quia naturalis habilitas quodam modo inclinat ad virtutem; hinc est, quod vitio opponitur quodam modo, licet non omnino ut virtus; et sic patet totum.10 |
2. 3. 4. To that which is objected, that only one is opposed to one; it must be said, that that (verse) must be understood of one genus of opposition, and by understanding (it) according to the same, and by speaking per se. But an ability of a power is not opposed to it9 except by reason of a virtue; for a virtue is directly opposed to a vice; and because a natural ability in a certain manner inclines (one) to virtue; hence it is, that it is opposed in a certain manner to vice, though not entirely as virtue (is); and thus the whole is clear.10 |
|
1 Verba Aristotelis vide supra pag. 100, nota 1. Paulo superius post repudianda esset multi codd., ut I K T ee, addunt et. 2 In plurimis codd. et ed. 1 desideratur et. 3 Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 finem. 4 De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 23. Pro corrumpitur (jqeiretai) multi codd., inter quos F H K T aa, cum primis edd. perperam corrumpit. Lectionem, corrumpitur rectam esse, evidenter apparet ex his verbis, quae loc. cit. verbis a S. Bonaventura allatis continuatur, nimirum: sed defectu iuxta naturam ordinis, harmoniae et commensurationis ratio infirmatur, manere similiter habens [Scot. Erig.]. Infra d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. arg. ult. ad opposit. omnes codd. habent corrumpitur. 5 Cod. aa hic et paulo post est. 6 Vide hic fundam 1. et 2. 7 Praesertim in Topic. ut videre et supra pag. 639, nota 2. 8 Quaest. seq. 9 Simul audi: malo, vel vitio, quam vocem Vat. addit. 10 Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest. |
1 See the words of Aristotle above in d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 3, p. 100, footnote 1. A little above this after would have to be repudiated [repudianda esset] many codices, such as I K T and ee, add also [et]. 2 In very many codices and edition 1 there is wanting the also [et]. 3 The Vatican edition, together with editions 3 and 4, has to the End [ad finem] for to the Most High (Good) [ad summum]. 4 On the Divine Names, ch. 4, § 23. For is corrupted [corrumpitur] (jqeiretai), many codices, among which are F H K T and aa, together with the first editions, faultily have corrupts [corrumpit]. That the reading is corrupted [corrumpitur] is the right one, appears evidently from those words, which follow cited from the same passage by St. Bonaventure: but by a defect according to the nature of order, harmony and measure [commensurationis], reason is infirmed, as one having (an ability) to remain similarly (from the Latin translation of Scotus Erigena). Below in d. 35, a. 1, q. 1, final argument for the opposed side, all the codices have is corrupted [corrumpitur]. 5 Codex aa here and a little after this has belongs [est] and is [est] for belonged [erat] and was [erat]. 6 See the 1st and 2nd arguments above for the fundament. 7 Especially in the Topics, as can be seen above d. 26, a. sole, q. 4, p. 639, foonote 2. 8 In the following Question. 9 Understand: evil [malo], and/or vice [vitio], which term the Vatican edition adds. 10 See the Scholium to the preceding Question. |
This English Translation and the digitization
of the Latin and English texts, the HTML markup, all emendations and
corrections of the Latin text, and all notes by the Translator, are © 2010 by
Br. Alexis Bugnolo. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which
follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The
translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English
text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than
that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ]
brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or
notes added by the English translator.
Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are
required for clarity in English.