S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVI.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXVI

Utrum peccatum sit poena peccati.

Whether sin is a punishment for sin.

ARTICULUS I.

 

Quaestio I.

ARTICLE I

 

Question 1

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 842-845.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 842-845.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

Sciendum est tamen, quaedam sic esse peccata etc.

It must be understood, however, that certain (acts) are thus sins etc.

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

Supra determinavit Magister, quid sit peccatum secundum rem et definitionem.  In hac parte inquirit, utrum peccatum sit poena peccati.  Dividitur autem pars ista in partes duas.  In quarum prima Magister movet quaestionem illam et determinat secundum opinionem aliorum.  In secunda vero secundum opinionem propriam, ibi:  In nullo tamen praeiudicium fieri veritati etc.

Above Master (Peter) determined, what sins is according to the thing and (its) definition.  In this part he inquires, whether sin is the punishment for sin.  Moreover this part is divided into two parts.  In the first of which Master (Peter) moves that question and determines (it) according to the opinion of others.  But in the second, according to his own opinion, there (where he says):  Yet in nothing is there thought to be a prejudice done against the truth, etc..

Prima pars habet tres partes.  In prima adducit Magister auctoritates, in quibus ostendit, quod unum peccatum sit alterius peccati poena.  In secunda vero movet quaestionum1 et determinat iuxta aliorum opinionem, ibi:  Et ideo merito quaeri potest.  In tertia vero subiungit illius opinionis maiorem explanationem, ibi:  Et licet ex hoc sensu omne peccatum mortale possit dici etc.

The first part has three parts.  In the first Master (Peter) adduces the authorities, in which he shows, that one sin is the punishment for another sin.  But in the second he moves a question1 and determines (it), there (where he says):  And for that reason it can be deservedly asked.  However, in the third, he subjoins a greater explanation of that opinion, there (where he says):  And though in this sense every mortal sin can be said etc..

Similiter secunda pars principalis, in qua istam quaestionem determinat secundum propriam opinionem, dividitur in partes tres.  In quarum prima determinat propositam quaestionem secundum propriam opinionem, confirmans eam auctoritate Sanctorum.  In secunda vero determinat quoddam dubium, in praedictis auctoritatibus propositum, ibi:  Illud autem diligenter est notandum, quod supra positis etc.  In tertia vero breviter epilogat ea quae praedicta sunt, ibi:  Satis diligenter eorum posuimus etc.  —  Et sic in hac totali parte agitur principaliter de comparatione culpae ad poenam, utrum videlicet culpa sit poena causaliter.  Et quamvis secundum aliquorum opinionem peccatum sit poena tantum causaliter, secundum tamen opinionem Magistri, quam in littera innuit, non tantum causaliter, sed etiam essentialiter poena est.

Similarly the second principal part, in which he determines this question according to his own opinion, is divided into three parts.  In the first if which he determines the proposed question according to his own opinion, confirming it with the authority of the Saints.  But in the second he determines a certain doubt, proposed in the aforesaid authorities, there (where he says):  This, however, must be diligently noted in addition, that the above posited etc..  However, in the third he briefly summarizes those (things) which were said beforehand, there (where he says):  We have posited in a sufficiently diligent manner the sentence of those etc..  —  And thus in this entire part one deals principally with the comparison of the fault to the punishment, whether, namely, the fault is the punishment only causally.  And though according to the second opinion of some, sin is only the punishment causally, yet according to the opinion of Master (Peter), which he indicates in the text, it is not only the punishment causally, but also essentially.

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

Ad intelligentiam igitur huius partis circa tria incidit hic quaestio.

For an understanding, therefore, of this part there falls here a question about three (things):

Primo quaeritur de comparatione culpae ad poenam secundum identitatem.

First there is asked concerning the comparison of the fault to the punishment according to (their) identity.

Secundo vero quaeritur de comparatione culpae ad poenam secundum inseparabilitatem.

Second, however, there is asked concerning the comparison of the fault to the punishment according to (their) inseparability.

Tertio quaeritur de comparatione poenae ad divinae iustitiae aequitatem.

Third there is asked concerning the comparison of the punishment to the equity of the Divine Justice.

Circa primum quaeruntur duo.

About the first two (questions) are asked:

Primo quaeritur, utrum unum peccatum sit alterius peccati poena.

First there is asked, whether one sin is the punishment for another sin.

Secundo, utrum passiones animae sint poenae tantum, an poenae simul et peccata.

Second, whether the soul’s passions are only a punishment, or whether (they are) at once a punishment and sins.

1  Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 et nonnulli codd. addunt:  utrum peccatum secundum idem sit culpa et poena, an secundum diversa.

1  The Vatican edition, together with editions 3 and 4, and not a few codices, add:  whether a sin according to the same is fault and punishment, or whether according to diverse (things) [utrum peccatum secundum idem sit culpa et poena, an secundum diversa]

 

p. 843

ARTICULUS I.

 

De comparatione culpae ad poenam secundum identitatem.

ARTICLE I

 

On the comparison of the fault to the punishment according to identity.

QUAESTIO I.

 

Utrum peccatum sit poena peccati.

QUESTION 1

 

Whether a sin is the punishment for a sin?

CIRCA PRIMUM sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum peccatum sit poena peccati.  Et quod sic, videtur.

ABOUT THE FIRST (the argument) is advanced thus and there is asked, whether a sin is a punishment for a sin [poena peccati].  And it seems, that (it is) so:

1. Apocalypsis ultimo:1  Qui in cordibus est sordescat adhuc; Glossa:  « iustum est ».  Sed esse in sordibus non est aliud quam esse in peccatis, et sordescere non est aliud quam peccare:  ergo peccatum est meritum alterius peccati:  igitur a relativis, peccatum sequens est retributio praecedentis; sed retributio peccati non est nisi poena:  ergo etc.

1. According to the last (chapter of the Book) of the Apocalypse:1  He who is in sordid (things), let him grow sordid still; the Gloss (says):  « it is just ».  But ‘to be in sordid (things)’ is not other than ‘to be in sins’, and ‘to grow sordid’ is not other than ‘to sin’;  therefore a sin is the merit of another sin:  therefore a relativis, the following sin is a retribution for the preceding one; but the retribution for a sin is not but a punishment:  ergo etc..

2. Item, Gregorius expressius dicit, et habetur in littera:2  « Inter primum peccatum apostasiae et ultimam poenam ignis aeterni media quae sunt, et peccata sunt et poena peccati ».

2. Likewise, (Pope St.) Gregory (the Great) says more expressly, and it is had in the text:2  « The intermediaries which are between the first sin of apostasy and the last punishment of eternal fire, are both sins and the punishment for sin ».

3. Item, Isidorus:3  « Deus occultam superbiam clericorum vindicat per manifestam luxuriam »; sed vindicta peccati est poena:  ergo manifesta luxuria est poena superbiae.

3. Likewise, (St.) Isidore (of Seville): 3  « God takes vengeance upon [vindicat] the hidden pride of clerics through manifest lust »; but an avenging punishment [vindicta] for sin is a punishment [poena]; therefore manifest lust is the punishment for pride.

4. Item, ex hoc, quod homo peccat, meretur a Deo relinqui; sed ex hoc, quod relinquitur, cadit consequenter in aliud peccatum:  ergo si hoc iustum est, qui unum peccatum commisit meretur per consequens dimitti cadere in aliud:  ergo si dimissus cadit in aliud peccatum, illud quod secundo perpetratur, ordinem habet ad primum sicut ad meritum.  Sed omne tale est poena peccati:4  ergo etc.

4. Likewise, from this, that man sins, he merits to be abandoned by God; but from this, that he is abandoned, he falls consequently into another sin:  therefore if this is just, that one who commits one sin merits per consequens to be left [dimitti] to fall into another:  therefore if the one left falls into another sin, that which is perpetrated second, has an order to the first as to (its) merit.  But every such is a punishment for sin:4  ergo etc..

5. Item, omne illud est peccati poena, in quo homo damnificatur et laeditur, et in quod per illud peccatum inducitur; sed superbus hoc ipso, quod vult alium excellere, necessario cadit in invidiam, quando videt, alium superare.  Sicut enim dicit Augustinus in libro de Vera Religione:5  « Necesse habet alii invidere qui non vult ab alio superari ».  Ergo videtur, quod invidia sit poena superbiae; et invidia absque dubio est peccatum:  ergo peccatum est poena peccati.

5. Likewise, every that, in which man is damned and wounded, and unto which he is induced through that sin, is a punishment for sin; but the proud (man) by this very (thing), that he wants to excel another, necessarily falls into envy, when he sees, that the other is superior [alium superare].  For just as (St.) Augustine says in the book On the True Religion:5  « He who does not want to be surpassed [superari] by another, has necessarily to envy the other ».  Therefore it seems, that envy is the punishment for pride [superbiae]; and envy is without a doubt a sin:  therefore a sin is a punishment for a sin.

SED CONTRA:  1. Omnis poena peccati est laudabilis; nulla culpa est laudabilis:  ergo nulla culpa est poena peccati.  Maior probatur, quia omne quod iustum est, laudabile est; sed « omnis poena peccati iusta est », sicut dicit Augustinus, et habetur in littera.6  Minor vero per se patet.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:  1. Every punishment for sin is praiseworthy; no fault is praiseworthy:  therefore no fault is a punishment for a sin.  The major is proven, because everything which is just, is praiseworthy; but « every punishment for sin is just », just as (St.) Augustine says, and (as) is had in the text.6  But the minor is clear through itself.

2. Item, omnis poena est ordinativa culpae, et per hoc faciens ad universi decorem;7 sed culpa subsequens non ordinat culpam praecedentem nec decorat, immo magis deturpat:  ergo culpa non est peccati poena.

2. Likewise, every punishment is ordinative of the fault, and through this (is something) working for the ornament of the universe;7 but the subsequent fault does not order the preceding fault nor decorate (it), nay rather it befouls (it) further [deturpat]:  therefore the fault is not the punishment for the sin.

3. Item, si culpa subsequens est poena praecedentis:  ergo a relativis, culpa praecedens est meritum sequentis; pari ratione, illa culpa, quae est subsequens, est meritum alterius, et sic deinceps.  Si ergo nullum peccatum debet remanere impunitum,8 videtur, quod homo debeat peccare in aeternum.  Si ergo hoc est inconveniens et indignum, patet, quod peccatum non est peccati meritum:  ergo nec unum peccatum est alterius punitivum.

3. Likewise, if the subsequent fault is a punishment of the preceding one:  therefore a relativis, the preceding fault is (something) worthy of the following one; for an equal reason, the latter fault, which is the subsequent one, is (something) worthy of another, and thus one after another [deinceps].  Therefore, if no sin ought to remain unpunished,8 it seems, that man ought to sin unto eternity.  If, therefore, this is unfitting [inconveniens] and unworthy, it is clear, that sin is not (something) worthy of a sin:  therefore neither is one sin punitive of the other.

4. Item, si sequens peccatum punit praecedens:  ergo cum Deus non puniat bis in id ipsum,9 culpa sequenti perpetrata, culpa praecedens non debet puniri; aut si punitur non debet tantum puniri.  Quodsi hoc esset verum, reportaret quis commodum de malitia; quodsi hoc est inconveniens, patet etc.

4. Likewise, if the following sin punishes the preceding one:  therefore since God does not punish twice in regard to the very same,9 with the following fault perpetrated, the preceding fault ought not be punished; or if it is punished, it ought not be punished as much.  Which if this were true, one would obtain an advantage [reportaret commodum] from (his) wickedness; which if this is unfitting, it is clear that etc..

5. Item, si peccatum est poena peccati, et Deus non punit supra condignum, nunquam peccatum sequens esset maius peccatum praecedenti.  Quodsi hoc de plano est falsum, quia de minori peccato devenitur ad maius, planum est, quod peccatum non est poena peccati.

5. Likewise, if a sin is a punishment for a sin, and God does not punish above (what) is completely worthy [supra condignum], the following sin would never be a greater sin than the preceding one.  Which if this is plainly false, because one does arrive at a greater sin from a lesser one, it is plain, that a sin is not a punishment for a sin.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Peccatum sequens non tantum causaliter, sed etiam essentialiter est poena praecedens peccati.

CONCLUSION

 

The following sin is not only causally, but even essentially the punishment for the preceding sin.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod absque dubio, sicut auctoritates Sanctorum expresse dicunt, tenendum est, quod peccatum est poena peccati.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that without a doubt, just as the authorities of the Saints expressly say, it must be held, that sin is punishment for sin.

1  Vers. 11.  —  Glossas tum ordinaria quam interlinearis verba allata adiungit.  Cfr. Strabus et Lyranus.  —  Quoad modum argumentandi a relativis Boeth., III. de Differ. topic. dicit:  « In relativis, absque se relativa esse non posse ».  Et Petr. Hispan., Summul. tr. de Locis topicis:  Locus a relativis est habitudo unius relativorum ad aliud; et est constructivus et destructivus.  Constructive sic:  pater est, ergo filius est; item:  filius est, ergo pater est.  Locus a relativis:  Maxima:  posito uno relativorum, necessario ponitur et reliquum.  Destructive sic:  pater non est, ergo filius non est, et e converso.  Maxima:  remoto uno relativorum, removetur et reliquum.

2  Hic c. 1.  —  Verba hic Gregorio tributa sunt Augustini.

3  Libr. II. Sent. c. 39. n. 1:  Deus autem nonnunquam deiicit occultam mentis superbiam per carnis manifestam ruinam.

4  Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.

5  Cap. 45. n. 85.  Verba vide supra pag. 685, nota 7. in fine.  —  Paulo superius Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 verbo superare praefigit se.

6  Hic c. 2.

7  Cfr. loc. ex August., supra pag. 769, nota 5. et pag. 770, nota 1. citt.  —  In minori post decorat Vat. supplet universum.

8  August., Enarrat. in Ps. 44. n. 18:  Puniendum est peccatum; si puniendum non esset, nec peccatum esset.  Praeveni illum [Deum]; non vis, ut ipse puniat, tu puni.  Cfr. ibid. in Ps. 58. serm. 1. n. 13; Richard. a S. Vict., V. in Apocal. prolog.

9  Nahum 1, 9, ex versione secundum Septuag.:  Non vindicabit bis id ipsum in tribulatione.  Vulgata:  Non consurget duplex  tribulatio.  —  Immediate post Vat. culpa sequentis peccati pro culpa sequenti.

1  Verse 11.  —  Both the ordinary and interlinear Gloss adjoin the cited words.  Cf. Strabo’s and (Nicholas) of Lyra’s (Glosses).  —  In regard to the manner of arguing a relativis, (St. Severinus) Boethius, On the Differences of the Topics, Bk. III, says:  « In regard to relatives, apart from themselves relatives cannot be ».  And Peter of Spain, Summula., tract “On the Arguments of the Topics” (says):  An argument a relativis is the habitude of one of the relatives to the other; it is both constructive and destructive.  Constructively thus:  ‘there is a father, therefore there is a son’; likewise ‘there is a son, therefore there is a father’.  An argument from relatives [a relativis]:  The Maxim (is):  with one of the relatives posited, there is necessarily posited also the rest.  Destructively thus:  ‘there is no father, therefore there is no son’, and vice versa.  The Maxim (is):  with one of the relatives removed, there is also removed the rest.

2  Here in ch. 1.  —  The words attributed here to (St.) Gregory are (St.) Augustine’s.

3  Sent., Bk. II, ch. 39, n. 1:  Moreover God does not infrequently fell the occult pride of the mind through the manifest ruin of the flesh.

4  Cf. here the text of Master (Peter), ch. 3.

5  Chapter 45, n. 85.  See (his) words above in d. 28, a. 2, q. 2, p. 685, footnote 7, at the end.  —  A little above this the Vatican edition, together with editions 3 and 4, reads the other superior to himself [alium se superare].

6  Here in ch. 2.

7  Cf. the passage cited from (St.) Augustine, in the citations of d. 32, a. 3, q. 1, p. 769, footnote 5, and p. 770, footnote 1.  —  In the minor (of the argument) the Vatican edition has decorate the universe [universum] for decorate (it).

8  (St.) Augustine, Enarrations on the Psalms, Ps. 44, n. 18:  Sin must be punished; if it were not to be punished, neither would it be a sin.  I have gone before Him; Thou doest not want to punish; (but) Thou doest punish.  Cf. ibid., on Psalm 58, sermon 1, n. 13; Richard of St. Victor, On the Apocalypse, Bk. V, prologue.

9  Nahum 1:9, from the version according to the Septuagint:  He shall not avenge twice the very same in tribulation [Non vindicabit bis id ipsum in tribulatione].  The Vulgate:  A double tribulation shall not arise [Non consurget duplex tribulatio].  —  Immediately after the Vatican edition has with the fault of the following sin [culpa sequentis peccati] for with the following fault [culpa sequenti].

 

p. 844

Sed attendendum est, quod circa hoc est duplex modus intelligendi, secundum quod Magister in littera1 innuit.  Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod peccatum est poena peccati; non tamen essentialiter, sive secundum id quod est, sed ratione eius quod concomitatur, vel ratione eius quod consequitur; sicut patet, quod peccatum manifestum, ex quo consurgit infamia, dicitur esse vindicta peccati occulti, non ratione ipsius transgressionis, sed ratione infamiae consequentis; vel peccatum, in quo est manifesta ignominia, est poena peccati superbiae, sicut peccatum contra naturam et alia huiusmodi, quae vocat Apostolus2 passiones ignominiae, poenae est ratione ignominiae, non ratione culpae.  Et breviter quodlibet peccatum potest dici poena peccati praecedentis ratione laesionis, quam infert; et sic idem dicitur peccatum et poena peccati, ita tamen, quod peccatum dicitur essentialiter, et poena peccati causaliter.

But one must attend to (this), that about this there is a twofold manner of understanding, according to what Master (Peter) indicates in the text.1  For certain ones wanted to say, that a sin is a punishment for a sin; yet not essentially, or according to that which it is, but by reason of that which accompanies (it), and/or by reason of that which is consequent (to it); just as is clear, that a manifest sin, out of which there rises infamy, is said to be the avenging punishment [vindicta] of an occult sin, not by reason of the transgression itself, but by reason of the consequent infamy; and/or the sin, in which there is manifest ignominy, is a punishment of the sin of pride, just as the sin against nature and others of this kind, which the Apostle2 calls the sufferings of ignominy [passiones ignominae], is a punishment by reason of the ignominy, not by reason of the fault.  And, briefly, every sin can be said (to be) a “punishment for a preceding sin” by reason of the wounding [laesionis], which it infers; and thus the same is said (to be) a “sin” and a “punishment for sin”, yet thus, that “sin” is said essentially, and “punishment for sin” causally.

Sed quoniam secundum istum modum non tantum unum peccatum posset dici poena alterius, sed etiam unum peccatum posset dici poena sui, causaliter loquendo, quia peccans se ipsum laedit; et iterum, sicut ostensum fuit in precedentibus,3 non tantum actio inordinata est culpa, verum etiam ipsa deformitas, quae remanet in anima, et ipsa animae deformatio non modica est ei poena; et rursus, sicut rationes primae ostendunt, quaedam ordinatio meriti et retributionis est inter culpam praecedentem et sequentem, etiam quantum ad id quod culpae sunt:  ideo est alia opinio, cui magis videtur consentire Magister, quod peccatum sequens non tantum causaliter, sed etiam essentialiter, ut sic loquamur, est poena peccati praecedentis.  Et hoc dicendo, sicut Magister4 dicit, in nullo fit praeiudicium veritati, immo hoc est satis planum.  Nam poena duo dicit:  et dicit malum sive damnum, et dicit ordinem ad praecedens meritum; et haec duo contingit reperire circa sequens peccatum.  Damnificatio enim et nocumentum est in ipso, secundum quod peccatum; eo enim est peccatum, quo nocet;5 et magnum malum incurrit, quis, cum incidit in peccatum, etiam si nihil aliud deberet habere posterius.  Ordinationem vero habet in eo, quod sequens; hoc ipso enim, quod homo est in peccato, dignus est dimitti cadere in aliud, iuxta illud Apocalypsis ultimo,6 sicut dicitur in Glossa:  « Iustum est », ut qui in sordibus est sordescat adhuc.  —  Concedendum est igitur simpliciter, quod peccatum potest esse poena peccati, ut expresse dicunt auctoritates Sanctorum.

But since according to this manner (of understanding) one sin could not only be said (to be) the “punishment” of another, but one sin could also be said (to be) the “punishment” of itself, speaking causally, because the one sinning wounds his very self; and again, just as has been shown in the preceding,3 not only is the inordinate action the fault, but also the deformity itself, which remains in the soul, and the very deformation of the soul is not a slight punishment for it; and again, just as the first reasons show, there is a certain ordering of merit and retribution between the preceding fault and the following one, even as much as regards this that they are faults:  for that reason there is another opinion, to which Master (Peter) seems to consent more, that the following sin is not only causally, but even essentially, as we thus say, the punishment of the preceding sin.  And in saying this, just as Master (Peter)4 says, in nothing is prejudice done to the truth, nay this is sufficiently plain.  For “punishment” means two (things):  it both means an evil or damage [damnum], and it means an order to (something) preceding (it which was) worthy (of it); and one happens to find these two about the following sin.  For the damaging [damnificatio] and harm is in the latter one, according to which (it is) a sin; for according to that, by which it harms, it is a sin;5 and one incurs a great evil, when he falls into a sin, even if he should have no other posterior (sin).  On the other hand, it has an ordering [ordinationem] in this, that (it is) the following (sin); for by this very (thing), that a man is in sin, he is worthy to be left to fall into another, according to that (verse) in the last (chapter) of the Apocalypse,6 just as is said in the Gloss:  « It is just », that he who is in sordid (things), grow sordid still.  —  It must be conceded, therefore, simply, that a sin can be the punishment for a sin, just as the authorities of the Saints expressly say.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur, quod omnis poena est laudabilis; dicendum, quod illa propositio dupliciter potest intelligi:  aut quod laus attribuatur poenae, secundum id quod est; aut in quantum poena.  Si attribuatur poenae secundum id quod est, sic est falsa; multae enim sunt poenae, quae sunt passiones ignominiae et non sunt laudabiles, sed vituperabiles.  Si autem attribuatur poenae sub ratione poenae, hoc est, in quantum est praecedentis peccati punitiva; sic omnis poena est laudabilis, propter hoc quod est ordinata.  Et per eundem modum intelligenda est haec propositio:  omnis poena est iusta.  Cum ergo infertur, quod peccatum sit iustum vel quod sit laudabile, est ibi sophisma secundum accidens,7 quia proceditur a laudabilitate ordinis ad laudem rei ordinabilis.  Hoc autem non sequitur, quia frequenter laus ordinis extranea est ordinabili, maxime cum illud quod est vituperabile, ordinatur convenienter et laudabiliter.

1. To that, however, which is objected first, that “every punishment is praiseworthy”; it must be said, that that proposition can be understood in a twofold manner:  either that praise is attributed to the punishment, according to that which it is; or inasmuch as (its is) a punishment.  If it be attributed to the punishment according to that which it is, thus it is false; for there are many punishments, which are sufferings of ignominy and are not praiseworthy, but worthy of blame [vituperabiles].  If, however, it be attributed to the punishment under the reckoning of a punishment, that is, inasmuch as it is punitive of the preceding sin; in this manner every punishment is praiseworthy, on account of this that it has be ordered.  And through the same manner must this proposition be understood:  “every punishment is just”.  Therefore, when it is inferred (from this proposition), that “a sin be just” and/or that it “be praiseworthy”, in this there is the sophism according to accident,7 because it proceeds from the praiseworthiness of the order to the praise of the thing able to be ordered.  But this does not follow, because frequently the praise of the order is extraneous to the (thing) able to be ordered, most of all when that which is worthy of blame, is ordered fittingly in a fitting and praiseworthy manner [convenienter et laudabiliter].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis poena est ordinativa culpae; dicendum, quod verum est, quod eo modo ordinat, quo modo punit; et illa quae simpliciter est poena et simpliciter punit, est simpliciter ordinativa; et illa, quae sufficienter punit, sufficienter ordinat.  Quae vero est poena secundum quid et non punit sufficienter, ordinat solum secundum quid.  Et verum est illud, quod sicut quidam ordo laudabilis est — licet magis manifestus — poenae infernalis ad culpam; ita quidam ordo est laudabilis — licet minus manifestus — peccati subsequentis ad peccatum praecedens; et in hoc ordine laudatur divina iustitia, quae committentem unam peccatum iusto iudicio permisit labi in aliud.

2. To that which is objected, that every punishment is ordinative of a fault; it must be said, that it is true, that in the manner in which it punishes, in that manner it orders; and that which is simply a punishment and punishes simply, is simply ordinative; and that, which punishes sufficiently, sufficiently orders.  But that which is a punishment secundum quid and does not punish sufficiently, orders only secundum quid.  And this is true, that just as a certain order is praiseworthy — though more manifest — (such as the order) of the punishment of Hell to a fault; so a certain order is praiseworthy — though less manifest — (such as the order) of the subsequent sin to the preceding sin; and in this order the Divine Justice, which has permitted by a just judgment that the one committing one sin to slip [labi] into another, is praised.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod culpa praecedens non8 est meritum sequentis; dicendum, quod est meritum congrui, et est meritum condigni.  Et cum dicitur culpa praecedens esse meritum sequentis, hoc non est quantum ad meritum condigni, sed congrui, quae quidem congruitas in alia congruitate de facili potest recompensari.  Sicut enim est congruum, quod Deus peccatorem permittat labit in aliud peccatum, sic etiam congruum est, ut, quia male usus est vita, eam sibi auferat et in infernum demergat.  Sicut etiam congruum est, ut dimittat eum cadere in aliud peccatum, sic etiam congruum est, ut si velit abstinere, det ei auxilium, ut in aliam culpam non corruat.

3. To that which is objected, that the preceding fault is not8 (something) worthy of the following one; it must be said, that (a sin) is worthy of (something) congruous [meritum congrui], and is worthy of (something) completely worthy [meritum condigni].  And when a preceding fault is said to be (something) worthy of the following one, this is not as much as regards the merit of the condign, but of the congruous, which congruity, indeed, can be recompensed easily in another congruity.  For just as it is congruous, that God permit a sinner to slip into another sin, so too is it congruous, that, because he has used life evilly, that He take it away from him and plunge (him) into Hell.  Just as it is also congruous, that He let him fall [cadere] into another sin, so too it is congruous, if he wants to abstain, that He give him help, so that he does not fall down [corruat] into another fault.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non punit bis in id ipsum; dicendum, quod peccatum sequens non erat poena, in qua fieret retributio de condigno, sed solum de congruo.  Et sicut9 retri- / -butio eius . . .

4. To that which is objected, that God does not punish twice in regard to the very same (thing); it must be said, that the following sin was not a punishment, in which there was wrought a retribution de condigno, but only de congruo.  And just as9 the retri- / -bution of that . . .

1  Hic c. 2. seqq.

2  Rom. 1, 26.  —  Paulo ante pro peccatum contra naturam Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 peccatum haeresis.

3  Dist. 35. a. 1. q. 2.

4  Hic c. 4.

5  Vide supra d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. fundam . 2.

6  Vers. 11.

7  Cfr. tom. 1. pag. 58, nota 5.  —  Mox pro laudabilitate cod. F laude.

8  Edd., excepta 2, omittunt non; utraque lectio explicari potest.  Paulo inferius pro esse meritum codd. F K T cc et alii cum ed. 1 est meritum.

9  Vat. sic; nostra lectio defenditur a cod. cc et ed. 1; cod. Y pro sic habet si, et subinde pro eius codd. F K T et aliis est.  Plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 in fine solut, ante habere omittunt se.

1  Here in ch. 2, ff..

2  Romans 1:26.  —  A little before this for the sin against nature [peccatum contra naturam] the Vatican edition, together with editions 3 and 4, has a sin of heresy [peccatum haeresis].

3  Distinction 35, a. 1, q. 2.

4  Here in ch. 4.

5  See above d. 35, a. 1, q. 1, in the 2nd argument of the fundament.

6  Verse 11.

7  Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 2, a. sole, q. 4, p. 58, footnote 5.  —  Next for praiseworthiness [laudabilitate] codex F has praise [laude].

8  The editions, except edition 2, omit not [non]; each reading can be explained.  A little below this for a preceding fault is said to be etc. [dicitur culpa praecedens esse] codices F K T cc and others, together with edition 1, have there is said, “the preceding fault is” etc. [dicitur culpa praecedens est].

9  The Vatican edition has in this manner [sic] for just as [sicut]; our reading is defended by codex cc and edition 1; codex Y has if [si] for in this manner [sic], and then for of that [eius] codices F K T and others have is [est].  A very many codices and editions 1 and 2, at the end of the solution, omit itself [se] before in the proposed [habere].

 

p. 845

retri- / -butio eius quod meretur quis quantum ad meritum congrui, non praeiudicat ei quod meretur quantum ad meritum condigni — dat enim Deus iustis bona in praesenti, non propter hoc dat minor in futuro — sic intelligendum est se habere in proposito.

the retri- / -bution of that which one merits as much as regards the merit of the congruous, does not prejudice that which one merits as much as regards the merit of the condign — for God gives goods to the just in the present, He does not, on this account, give a lesser (good) in the future — thus must it be understood to hold itself in the proposed.

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod Deus non punit supra condignum etc.; iam patet responsio.  Hoc enim intelligitur de poena, quae a Deo infligitur proprie, et de ea, quae circa peccatum praecedens respicit meritum condigni; utrumque autem horum deficit in proposito.  Nam culpa sequens, secundum id quod est, non est a Deo; culpa etiam sequens non ordinatur ad praecedens peccatum secundum rationem condigni, sed secundum rationem congrui.  Congruit enim hoc ordini divinae iustitiae, sicut ostensum.

5. To that which is objected last, that God does not punish above (what is) completely worthy [supra condignum] etc.; the response is already clear.  For this is understood of the punishment, which is inflicted by God properly, and of that, which respects the merit of (something) completely worthy about the preceding sin; but each of these fails in the proposed.  For the following fault, according to that which it is, is not from God; the following fault is also not ordered to the preceding sin according to the reckoning of (something) completely worthy, but according to the reckoning of (something) congruous.  For this was congruent to the order of the Divine Justice, just as has been shown.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Difficultas, quae hic solvitur, praesupponit solutionem generalioris quaestionis, utrum scilicet peccatum possit esse causa alterius peccati; de qua breviter agit Seraphicus hic dub. 1, et fusius Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 94. m. 9.); alii autem commentatores Magistri cum S. Thoma (hic a. 1; S. I. II. q. 75. a. 4.) in speciali quaestione docent, quod peccatum possit esse causa alterius peccati in genere causae efficientis, per accidens tamen, non per se (ut removendo prohibens), finalis, materialis et etiam aliquo modo (scilicet per reductionem) formalis.  —  Quaestio autem hic tractata est, utrum peccatum ab alio peccato causatum habeat rationem poenae respectu praecedentis peccati, et qua ratione.  Prima opinio vult, quod peccatum habeat rationem poenae, non quatenus est essentialiter peccatum, sed causaliter, id est, quatenus habet plura annexa, ab ipso causata, quae rationem poenae manifeste habent.  Secunda opinio communis sequitur Magistrum et tenet, quod peccatum, etiam essentialiter sumtum, induat rationem poenae.  Res satis difficilis et subtilis est, cum peccatum, ut peccatum est, sit voluntarium, sit iniustum, sit non a Deo; poena autem, ut poena, sit voluntati contraria, sit iusta, sit a Deo.  Solutio difficultatis eruitur ex eo, quod idem possit esse culpa et poena, non tamen secundum eandem rationem (cfr. infra a. 2. q. 2.); sicut in eodem actu voluntatis est actio et passio, ut actio ab agente, ut passio a patiente; tamen ut actio non est passio, et e converso (Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2.).  Hinc illa deformitas, quae causatur in anima per ipsum actum peccati, habet rationem tum culpae tum poenae (supra d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. 2.).  Similiter deformitas peccati, ex praecedenti peccato orti, essentialiter, et non tantum causaliter, est laesio animae per se involuntaria et ad aliquid praecedens demeritum ordinata; et sub hac ratione est poena, ut explicatur in textu.  Contraria sententia late proponitur a Magistro hic c. 2. 3.

I. The difficulty, which is solved here, presupposes the solution of a more general question, that is, whether a sin can be the cause of another sin; which the Seraphic (Doctor) deals with briefly here in Doubt 1, and (which) Alexander of Hales deals with more at length (Summa., p. II, q. 94, m. 9); but the other commentators on Master (Peter), together with St. Thomas (here in a. 1; Summa., I, II, q. 75, a. 4) teach in a special question, that a sin can be the cause of another sin in the genus of an efficient cause, yet per accidens, not per se (as one prohibiting by removing), (and in the genus) of a final (cause), a material (cause) and even in some manner (that is through reduction) a formal (cause).  —  But the Question treated of here is, whether a sin caused by another sin has the reckoning of a punishment in respect of the preceding sin, and according to which reckoning (it has this).  The first opinion wants, that a sin has the reckoning of a punishment, not to the extent that it is essentially a sin, but causally, that is, to the extent that it has several (sins) annexed (to it), caused by it, which have manifestly the reckoning of a punishment.  The second common opinion follows Master (Peter) and holds, that a sin, even taken essentially, clothes itself in [induat] the reckoning of a punishment.  The matter is sufficiently difficult and subtle, since a sin, as it is a sin, is voluntary, is unjust, (and) is not from God; but a punishment, as a punishment, is contrary to the will, is just, (and) is from God.  The solution of the difficulty is construed from this, that the same can be fault and punishment, yet not according to the same reckoning (cf. below a. 2, q. 2); just as in the same act of the will there is an action and a passion, as an action from an agent, as a passion from a patient; yet as an action it is not a passion, and vice versa (Giles the Roman, here in q. 1, a. 2).  Hence this deformity, which is caused in the soul through the act itself of the sin, has the reckoning both of a fault and of a punishment (above in d. 35, a. 1, qq. 1 and 2).  Similarly the deformity of the sin (which has) arisen form the preceding sin is essentially, and not only causally, a per se involuntary, wounding of the soul [laesio animae] and (is) ordered to something preceding the demerit; and under this reckoning it is a punishment, as is explained in the text.  The contrary sentence is proposed by Master (Peter)  at length in chs. 2 and 3 (of this Distinction).

II. Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. unica.  —  S. Thom., hic a. 3; S. I. II. q. 87. a. 2.  —  B. Albert., hic a. 1. 3; S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 131. m. 3.  —  Petr.. a Tar., hic q. 1. a . 2.  —  Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1.  —  Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2.  —  Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.  —  Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

II. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, in each version (of his Commentary), here in the q. sole.  —  St. Thomas, here in a. 3; Summa., I, II, q. 87, a. 2.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus); here in aa. 1 and 3; Summa., p. II, tr. 22, q. 131, m. 3.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 2.  —  Richard of Middleton, here in a. 1, q. 1.  —  Giles the Roman, here in a. 1, a. 2.  —  (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 1.  —  (Gabriel) Biel, on this and the following qq., here in the q. sole.

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