S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVI.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXVI

ARTICULUS I.

 

Quaestio II.

ARTICLE I

 

Question 2

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 845-847.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 845-847.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO II.

 

Utrum passiones animae poenae tantum sint, an poenae simul et peccata.

QUESTION 2

 

Whether the passions of the soul are only punishments, or whether (they are) at once punishments and sins?

SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum passiones animae sint poenae tantum, an poenae simul et peccata.  Et quod sint poenae et peccata, videtur.

SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether the passions of the soul are punishments only, or whether (they are) at once punishments and sins.  And it seems, that they are punishments and sins.

1. Omne illud, pro quo quis meretur mortem aeternam, est peccatum; sed pro passionibus animae meretur quis mortem aeternam, Matthaei quinto:1  Qui irascitur fratri suo reus erit gehennae ignis:  ergo ira, quae est passio animae, est culpa; pari ratione et aliae passiones animae.

1. Every that, for which one merits eternal death, is a sin; but for the passions of the soul one merits eternal death, according to the fifth (chapter of the Gospel of St.) Matthew:1  He who grows angry with his brother will be liable [reus] to eternal fire:  therefore anger [ira], which is a passion of the soul, is a fault; for an equal reason also the other passions of the soul.

2. Item, omne illud, quod directe repugnat virtuti, est culpa; sed ira et invidia et aliae passiones animae repugnant virtutibus:  ergo etc.

2. Likewise, every that, which is directly repugnant to virtue, is a fault; but anger and envy and the other passions of the soul are repugnant to the virtues:  ergo etc..

3. Item, omne illud, quod est contra rationem rectam, est culpa; sed passio animae, quae « est dolor de alieno bono »,2 est contra rationem rectam, quae de illo iudicat esse gaudendum:  ergo etc.

3. Likewise, every that, which is contrary to right reason, is a fault; but the passion of the soul, which « is the sorrow over another’s good »,2 is contrary to right reason, which judges that one must rejoice over it:  ergo etc..

4. Item, illud maxime tenet rationem culpae, quod maxime est impugnativum gratiae; sed invidentia gratiae fraternae maxime repugnat gratiae Spiritus sancti:3  ergo cum haec sit passio animae et poena, videtur, quod passiones animae sint peccata.

4. Likewise, that holds the reckoning of a fault most, which is most impugnative of grace; but the envying of a brother’s grace is most repugnant to the grace of the Holy Spirit:3  therefore since this is a passion of the soul and a punishment, it seems, that the passions of the soul are sins.

5. Item, ad hoc ipsum est ratio Augustini, in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum.4  Arguit enim sic:  « Omnis perturbatio est passio; omnis cupiditas est passio »; sed planum est, quod cupiditas est culpa:  ergo peccatum est passio, et e converso; redit igitur idem quod prius.

5. Likewise, regarding this very (thing) is the reckoning of (St.) Augustine in (his) book Of Eighty-Three Questions.  For he argues thus:  « Every perturbation is a passion; every cupidity is a passion »; but it is plain, that cupidity is a fault:  therefore a passion is a sin, and vice versa; (which inference) therefore, renders the same as before.

SED CONTRA:  1. « In omni peccato, sicut vult Augustinus in libro de Libero Arbitrio,5 regnat libido »; ubicumque autem regnat libido, ibi est improba delectatio.  Sed huiusmodi passiones animae eam puniunt et contristant:  ergo videtur, quod non sint peccata.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:  1. « In every sin », just as (St.) Augustine says in (his) book On Free Will,5 « violent desire reigns »; but wheresoever violent desire reigns, there is a depraved [improba] delectation. But the soul’s passions of this kind punish and completely sadden it:  therefore it seems, that they are not sins.

2. Item, omnis culpa actualis est voluntaria; . . .

2. Likewise, every actual fault is voluntary; . . .

1  Vers. 22:  Qui irascitur fratri suo reus erit iudicio.  Qui autem dixerit fratri suo:  raca reus erit concilio.  Qui autem dixerit:  fatue, reus erit gehennae ignis.

2  Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 14, ubi haec definitio invidiae ponitur.  —  Pro animae, quam vocem exhibent edd. cum multis codd., codd. I V W Z invidiae.

3  Vide infra d. 43. a. 3. q. 1.  —  Pro fraternae codd. T bb ee et alii cum ed. 2 supernae.  Subinde pro repugnat gratiae Spiritus sancti codd. K W X Z bb etc. impugnat Spiritus sancti gratiam, cod. F repugnat Spiritui sancto, alii codd. repugnat gratiam (!).

4  Quaest. 77.  Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 6.  —  In non paucis codd. ut F H I L O R  S etc., et in edd. 1, 2 habetur tantum maior cum testimonio Augustini; minor et conclusio desunt.

5  Libr. I. c. 3. n. 8:  Clarum est enim, iam nihil aliud quam libidinem in toto male faciendi genere dominari.  Cfr. supra pag. 754, nota 9.

1  Verse 22:  He who grows angry with his brother shall be liable to judgment.  But he who will have said to his brother:  “raca!” will be liable to the Council.  However, he who will have said:  “fool!”, shall be liable for the fire of Gehenna [Qui irascitur frati suo reus erit iudicio.  Qui autem dixerit frati suo:  raca reus erit concilio.  Qui autem dixerit:  fatue, reus erit gehennae ignis].

2  (St. John) Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. II, ch. 14, where this definition of envy is posited.  —  For of the soul [animae], which the editions exhibit together with many codices, codices I V W and Z have of envy [invidiae].

3  See below in d. 43, a. 3, q. 1.  —  For a brother’s [fraternae]  codices T bb ee and others, together with edition 2, have supernal [supernae].  Then for is repugnant to the grace of the Holy Spirit [repugnat grataie Spiritus sancti] codices K W X Z bb etc. have impugns the grace of the Holy Spirit [impugnat Spiritus sancti gratiam], codex F has is repugnant to the Holy Spirit [repugnat Spiritui sancto], other codices have fights back grace [repugnat gratiam].

4  Question 77.  Cf. the text of Master (Peter), here in ch. 6.  —  In not a few codices, such as F K I L O R S etc., and in editions 1 and 2, there is only had the major (of the argument) together with the testimony of (St.) Augustine; the minor and conclusion are missing.

5  Book I, ch. 3, n. 8:  For it is clear, that nothing other than violent passion dominates in the whole genus of evil doing.  Cf. above d. 31, a. 2, q. 3, p. 754, footnote 9.

 

p. 846

sed istae passiones animae non sunt voluntariae:  ergo non sunt culpa, sed tantum poena.1

but these passions of the soul are not voluntary; therefore they are not a fault, but only a punishment.1

3. Item, omni culpa vituperamur; « passionibus autem animae non laudamur nec vituperamur », sicut vult Philosophus:2  ergo passiones animae non sunt peccata.

3. Likewise, for every fault we are blamed; « but for the passions of the soul we are neither praised nor blamed », just as the Philosopher2 wants; therefore the passions of the soul are not sins.

4. Item, « opposita sunt nata esse in eodem genere »,3 sed nulla virtus est passio, cum omnis virtus sit in genere habitus:  ergo nullum vitium sive peccatum est passio.

4. Likewise, « opposites are bound to be in the same genus »,3 but no virtue is a passion, since every virtue is in the genus of habit:  therefore no vice or sin is a passion.

5. Item, in omni peccato est conversio ad commutabile bonum;4 in huiusmodi autem passionibus animae, quae sunt invidia, ira, tristitia, potius est taedium boni et aversio quam conversio:  ergo tales passiones animae non sunt culpae.

5. Likewise, in every sin there is a conversion to a commutable good;4 but in the soul’s passions of this kind, which are envy, anger, (and) sadness, there is rather a weariness in a good [taedium boni] and an aversion than a conversion:  therefore such passions of the soul are not faults.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Passiones quaedam animae et poenae et peccata sunt, quatenus oriuntur vel ex corruptione concupiscentiae, vel ex inordinato amore voluntatis deliberativae.

CONCLUSION

 

Certain passions of the soul are punishments and sins, to the extent that they arise either out of the corruption of concupiscence, and/or out of the inordinate love of the deliberative will.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod sicut expresse dicit Magister in littera5 et probat per auctoritatem Augustini, multae sunt passiones animae, quae sunt non solum poenales, verum etiam culpabiles, sicut ira et invidia.  Licet autem huiusmodi passiones peccata sint, tamen peccata non sunt in quantum passiones, sicut idem Augustinus dicit, et habetur in littera:6  « Omnis autem passio, in quantum ipsa aliquis patitur, non est peccatum »; sed huiusmodi passiones peccata sunt ratione inordinationis voluntatis coniunctae vel antecedenter, vel consequenter.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that just as Master (Peter) says expressly in the text5 and proves through the authority of (St.) Augustine, there are many passions of the soul, which are not only penal, but also culpable, such as anger and envy.  But though passions of this kind are sins, yet they are not sins inasmuch as (they are) passions, just as the same (St.) Augustine says, and (as) is had in the text:6  « Moreover, every passion, inasmuch as anyone suffers by it, is not a sin »; but passions of this kind are sins by reason of the inordination of the conjoined will, either antecedently, and/or consequently.

Propter quod notandum est, quod quaedam est passio illata ab extrinseco, et circa hanc non consistit meritum nec demeritum, nisi in quantum a voluntate respuitur vel acceptatur.  Unde occidi pro Christo non est meritorium, nisi in quantum volitum est ab eo qui occiditur.  Unde proprie loquendo, in talibus passionibus passio non est meritoria,7 sed sufferentia passionis.

On account of which it must be noted, that there is a certain passion inferred from without [ab extrinseco], and about this there consists neither merit nor demerit, except inasmuch as it is rejected [respuitur] and/or accepted by the will.  Wherefore to be slain for Christ is not meritorious, except inasmuch as it has been willed by him who is slain.  Wherefore, properly speaking, in such sufferings [passionibus] the passion is not meritorious,7 but the suffering of the passion (is).

Est et alia passio, quae ortum habet ab intrinseco.  Et haec dupliciter potest oriri, quia quaedam oritur ex corruptione naturae, quaedam vero ex conversione voluntatis liberae.  —  Et illa quae oritur ex corruptione naturae, in duplici differentia est; quoniam natura corrupta est vitiosa corruptione per concupiscentiam, et corrupta est corruptione poenali per mortalitatem inflictam.  Illae igitur passiones, quae oriuntur ex corruptione naturae, ut est corrupta poenali corruptione, tenet rationem poenae tantum, ut fames et sitis; illae vero, quae oriuntur ab ipsa, ut est corrupta corruptione vitiosa, non tantum habent rationem poenae, sed etiam culpae; sicut sunt inordinatae affectiones animae, quae consurgunt ex morbo concupiscentiae, et tales sunt passiones irae et invidiae et consimiles.8

There is also another passion, which has (its) rise from within [ab intrinseco].  And this can arise in a twofold manner, because a certain one arises out of the corruption of the nature, but a certain one out of the conversion of a free will [voluntatis liberae].  —  And the former which arises out of the corruption of the nature, is in a twofold difference; since (our) nature has been corrupted by a vicious corruption through concupiscence, and it has been corrupted by a penal corruption through the mortality inflicted (upon it).  Therefore, those passions, which arise out of the corruption of the nature, as it is corrupted by a penal corruption, hold the reckoning of a punishment only, such as hunger and thirst; but those, which arises from that, as it has been corrupted by a vicious corruption, have not only the reckoning of a punishment, but also of a fault; just as are the inordinate affections of the soul, which rise completely out of the deadly disease of concupiscence, and such are the passions of anger and envy and (those) completely similar (to these).8

Secundum autem quod huiusmodi passiones oriuntur ex conversione voluntatis ad aliquod bonum amabile, sic, secundum quod voluntas habet converti dupliciter, passiones huiusmodi sunt in duplici genere.  Voluntas enim aliquando convertitur ad bonum simpliciter, et tunc detestatur et odit quod adversatur illi bono, utpote peccatum; et hoc modo passiones inde consurgentes sunt iustae et meritoriae.  —  Convertitur etiam voluntas aliquando ad bonum proprium et ad bonum ut nunc; et tunc passiones, quae inde consurgunt, culpabiles sunt et malae, sicut et voluntas, a qua oriuntur; sed non habent plenam rationem mali et culpae, nisi quando in voluntate consummantur, utpote cum aliquis vult irasci et invidere et etiam contristari.  —  Et sic patet, quod huiusmodi passiones animae peccata sunt, et in quantum oriuntur ex corruptione concupiscentiae, et in quantum ortum habent ex inordinato amore voluntatis deliberativae.9  —  Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, aliquas passiones animae esse peccata.

Moreover, passions of this kind arise out of a conversion of the will to some lovable good; thus, according to which the will has (an ability) to be converted in a twofold manner, passions of this kind are in twofold genus.  For the will is sometimes converted to a good simply, and then it detests and hates what is turned against that good, as for example sin; and in this manner the passions rising completely from there are just and meritorious.  —  The will is also converted sometimes to its own good and to a good as now; and then the passions, which rise completely from there, are culpable and evil, just as the will too, from which they arise; but they do not have the full reckoning of evil and fault, except when they are consummated in the will, as for example when someone wants to grow angry and envy and even be completely saddened.  —  And thus it is clear, that the soul’s passions of this kind are sins, both inasmuch as they arise out of the corruption of concupiscence, and inasmuch as they have (their) rise out of the inordinate live of the deliberative will.9  —  There are to be conceded, therefore, the reasons showing, that some passions of the soul are sins.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur primo in contrarium, quod libido regnat in omni peccato; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod libido dicitur improba voluntas; sed non oportet, secundum quod libido dicitur immoderata delectatio.10  —  Nihilominus tamen potest dici, quod et in istis peccatis reperitur libido respectu proprii motivi.  Nam invidus delectatur in boni singularitate, et iracundus delectatur in adeptione vindictae.  Immo quod plus est, sicut vir iustus ex rectitudine voluntatis delectatur dolendo de malo culpae, sic etiam invidus quandam refectionem invenit in dolendo de aliena prosperitate, ita quod delectatio est de uno, et tristitia est de altero.  Quemadmodum enim aliquis, dum amisit illud quod multum dilexit, vehementer tristatur, et magna est illi consolatio posse tristari, et ibi solum invenit quietem in fletu et dolore, sicut Augustinus in quarto Confessionum11 dicit de se; sic invidus in dolendo de bono alieno in illa passione . . .

1. To that, however, which is objected first, that violent desire reigns in every sin; it must be said, that (this) is true, according to which the violent desire [libido] is said (to be) a perverse will [improba voluntas]; but it is not necessary [non oportet], according to which the violent desire is said (to be) an immoderate delectation.10  —  Yet, nevertheless, it can be said, that there is also found in these sins a violent desire in respect of their motive.  For the envious delights in a singularity of the good, and one inclined to anger [iracundus] delights in the attainment of vengeance.  Nay what is more, just as the just man out of the rectitude of (his) will delights by grieving over the evil of a fault, so too the envious (man) finds a certain refection in grieving over another’s prosperity, such that the delectation is over one (thing), and the sadness is over the other.  For according to the manner which one, when he has lost that which delighted him much, is vehemently saddened, great too is his consolation to be able to be saddened, and in this he finds rest alone in weeping and in sorrow, just as (St.) Augustine says in the fourth (book) of (his) Confessions11 concerning himself; thus the envious (man) in grieving over the good of another finds / in that passion . . .

1  Vide supra pag. 719, nota 1.

2  Verba Philosophi vide supra pag. 113, nota 8.

3  Secundum Aristot., de quo vide supra pag. 814, nota 8.  —  De minori cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quali, et II. Ethic. c. 5.

4  Cfr. supra pag. 839, nota 4.

5  Hic c. 6.

6  Hic c. 6.  —  Mox pro ipsa cod. cc et ed. 1 ipsam.

7  In codd. F K P (Q a prima manu) Z et aliis nec non in Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 deest passio et pro meritoria legitur meritorium, cui verbo Vat. et edd. 3, 4 insuper praefigunt quid.  —  Cfr. August., XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 4-8.

8  Cfr. supra d. 30. a. 1. q. 1. seq.  —  Mox voci passiones edd., excepta 1, addunt animae.

9  Cfr. August., IX. de Civ. Dei, c. 4. seq. et XIV. c. 3-11. et 15. n. 2.

10  De hac duplici significatione vocis libidinis vide supra d. 31. a. 2. q. 3. in corp.

11  Cap. 6. n. 11.

1  See above d. 30, a. 1, q. 2, p. 719, footnote 1.

2  See the words of the Philosopher, above in d. 2, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, p. 113, footnote 8.

3  According to Aristotle, concerning which see above d. 34, a. 2, q. 3, p. 839, footnote 8.  —  On the minor (of the argument), cf. Aristotle, On the Predicaments, ch. “On What Kind”, and Ethics, Bk. II, ch. 5.

4  Cf. above d. 35, Doubt VI, p. 839, footnote 4.

5  Here in ch. 6.

6  Here in ch. 6.  —  Next for by it [ipsa] codex cc and edition 1 have it [ipsam].

7  In codices F K P (Q by a first hand) Z and others, and also in the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3 and 4, there is had it for the passion [passio] and for the feminine form meritorious [meritoria] there is had the neuter meritorious [meritorium], to which the Vatican edition and editions 2 and 4, moreover, prefix something [quid].

8  Cf. above d. 30, a. 1, q. 1, f..  —  Next the editions, except edition 1, add the soul’s [animae] to passions [passiones].

9  Cf. (St.) Augustine, On the City of God, Bk. IX, ch. 4, f., Bk. XIV, chs. 3-11, and ch. 15, n. 2.

10  On this twofold signification of the term libido, see above d. 31, a. 2, q. 3, in the body (of the Question).

11  Chapter 6, n. 11.

 

p. 847

invenit quandam delectationem in eo, quod placet sibi de bono alieno contabescere; illa tamen delectatio multum est respersa amaritudine.

finds / in that passion a certain delectation in this, that pining over [contabescere] the good of the other pleases him; yet that delectation is one sprinkled with much bitterness.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod passiones sunt involuntariae; dicendum, quod involuntarium dicitur dupliciter, sicut et voluntarium:  uno modo dicitur voluntarium, cuius principium est voluntas; alio modo dicitur voluntarium, quod concomitatur voluntas.1  Et secundum hunc duplicem modum dupliciter dicitur involuntarium:  uno modo, ut dicatur involuntarium, quod non est a voluntate efficiente; alio modo, ut dicatur involuntarium, quod non fit cum voluntate concomitante.  Primo igitur modo accipiendo involuntarium, sic veritatem habet de passionibus, quae fiunt ab extrinseco, quia earum2 principum est extra; voluntarium autem est, cuius principum est in ipso.  Non autem habet veritatem in passionibus, quae sunt ab intrinseco, sicut prius ostensum est, immo possunt esse voluntariae, non solum sicut a voluntate concomitante, immo sicut a voluntate causante, dum diligit aliquid inordinate.

2. To that which is objected, that passions are involuntary; it must be said, that the “involuntary” is said in a twofold manner, just as (is) the “voluntary” also:  in one manner the “voluntary” is said (to be that), the principle of which is the will; in another manner the “voluntary” is said (to be that), which the will accompanies.1  And according to this twofold manner (of speaking) the “involuntary” is said in a twofold manner:  in one manner, so that the “involuntary” is said (to be that), which is not from the efficient will; in another manner, so that the “involuntary” is said (to be that), which is not done with the accompanying will.  Therefore, accepting the “involuntary” in the first manner, thus it has truth concerning the passions, which are wrought by (something) extrinsic, because their2 principle is outside; but the voluntary is (that), the principle of which is in itself.  But it does not have truth in the passions, which are by (something) intrinsic, just as has been shown before, nay they can be voluntary, not only just as from an accompanying will, nay just as from a causing will, when one loves something inordinately.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod passionibus non laudamur nec vituperamur; dicendum, quod hoc verum est, per se loquendo; prout tamen radicem habent ex voluntate, et voluntas concomitatur eis, et laudari possumus et vituperari, sicut prius ostensum est.  Ideo ratio illa non concludit, quod huiusmodi passiones non sint peccata, sed quod peccata non sint, in quantum eis patimur.

3. To that which is objected, that were are not praised nor blamed for passions; it must be said, that this is true, speaking per se; yet insofar as they have (their) root out of the will, and the will accompanies them, we can both be praised and blamed, just as has been shown before.  For that reason, that reckoning does not conclude, that passions of this king are not sins, but that they are not sins, inasmuch as we suffer by them.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nulla virtus est passio; iam patet responsio.  Nam aliqua virtus potest circa passiones consistere, sicut patientia et fortitudo, prout illae passiones efficiuntur voluntariae.  Sic et in proposito intelligendum est esse.  —  Nihilominus tamen potest dici, quod quamvis passio non sit virtus nisi ex actu voluntatis simul coexistentis, potest tamen aliqua passio, in quantum egreditur a natura vitiata et corrupta, esse peccatum.  Nec valet illa ratio, cum plura exigantur ad complendum bonum quam ad committendum malum.3

4. To that which is objected, that no virtue is a passion; the response is already clear.  For any virtue can consist about the passions, just as patience and fortitude (do), insofar as those passions are become voluntary.  Thus too must it be understood to be in the proposed.  —  Yet, nevertheless, it can be said, that though a passion is not a virtue except on account of an act of the will co-existing together (with it), yet any passion can, inasmuch as it steps forth from a vitiated and corrupted nature, be a sin.  Nor is that reason valid, since more (things) are required [exigantur] to complete a good than to commit an evil.3

5. Ad ultimum iam patet responsio.  Nam istae passiones oriuntur ex conversione voluntatis ad commutabile bonum, et ideo peccata sunt; nunquam enim quis invideret alicui, nisi nimis amaret proprium bonum; et ut vult Damascenus,4 « ira vindex est laesae concupiscentiae »; immo generaliter, sicut ostendit Augustinus in decimo quarto de Civitate Dei, omnes huiusmodi passiones ortum habent ex amore.

5. To the last (objection) the response is already clear.  For those passions arise out of the conversion of the will to a commutable good, and for that reason they are sins; for one would never envy anyone, unless one loved his own good exceedingly; and as (St. John) Damascene4 wants, « anger is the avenger of a wounded concupiscence »; nay generally, just as (St.) Augustine shows in the fourteenth (book) On the City of God, all passions of this kind have (their) rise out of a love.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Quaestio est de passionibus poenalibus generaliter sumtis, quatenus omnes poenales affectiones animae comprehendunt, ut explicatur in textu.  Passio, qua passio, non est nec peccatum nec meritum, sed tantum quatenus multipliciter relationem habet ad voluntatem.  —  Quomodo autem anima pati possit, explicatur IV. Sent. d. 44. p. II. a. 3. q. 2; quomodo per passionem quis meretur, III. Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 3.  De passionibus, ut sunt animae affectiones, cfr. III. Sent. d. 26. a. 1. q. 1. et praecipue S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 22. et seqq.

I. The Question concerns penal passions taken generally, to the extent that they comprehend all penal affections of the soul, as is explained in the text.  A passion, according to which (it is) passion, is neither a sin nor a merit, but only to the extent that it has a relation to the will in multiple manner.  —  Moreover, in what manner the soul can suffer, is explained in Sent., Bk. IV, d. 44, p. II, a. 3, q. 2; in what manner one merits through suffering, Sent., Bk. III, d. 18, a. 1, q. 3.  On passions, as they are affections of the soul, cf. Sent., Bk. III, d. 26, a. 1. q. 1, and chiefly St. Thomas, Summa., I, II, q. 22 and ff..

II. S. Thom., hic a. 2; S. I. II. q. 24. a. 1-4.  —  B. Albert., hic a. 5; S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 132. m. 1. a. 3. et m. 2.  —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3.  —  Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2.  —  Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3.  —  Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

II. St. Thomas, here in a. 2; Summa., I, II, q. 24, aa. 1-4.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 5; Summa., p. II, tr. 22, q. 132, m. 1, a. 2 and m. 2.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 3.  —  Richard of Middleton, here in a. 1, q. 2.  —  Giles the Roman, here in q. 1, a. 3.  —  Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 3.

1  De hac duplici distinctione voluntarii vide supra d. 25. p. II. q. 4. arg. 1. ad opposit., et de definitione voluntarii, quae in seqq. occurrit, cfr. supra pag. 592, nota 3.  Damascenus, II. de Fide orthod. c. 24. ait:  Quaecumque propter iram agimus, non praeconsiliantes, voluntarie facimus, non tamen secundum electionem.

2  Primae edd. cum multis codd. eorum; perperam.

3  Bonum enim ex integra causa, malum ex quovis defectu.  Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6, et Donys. de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 30.  —  Paulo superius codd. F bb existentis pro coexistentis.

4  Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 16.  Cfr. supra pag. 560, nota 12.  —  Testimonium Augustini, quod mox signatur, habetur loc. cit c. 7. n. 2.

1  On this twofold distinction of the voluntary, see above d. 25, p. II, q. 4, 1st opposed argument, and concerning the definition of the voluntary, which occurs in the following, cf. above d. 25, p. I, a. sole, q. 1, p. 592, footnote 3.  (St. John) Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. II, ch. 24 says:  Whatsoever we do for the sake of anger, not taking counsel beforehand, we do voluntarily, yet not according to choice.

2  The first editions, together with many codices, have the masculine form their [eorum] faultily (the feminine refers to passions).

3  For a good (is) out of the whole cause, an evil out of any defect.  Cf. Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. II, ch. 6, and (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Divine Names, ch. 4, § 30.  —  A little above this codices F and bb have existing [existentis] for co-existing [coexistentis].

4  On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. II, ch. 16.  Cf. above d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, p. 560, footnote 12.  —  The testimony of (St.) Augustine, which is indicated next, is had loc. cit., ch. 7, n. 2.

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