S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVI.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXVI

ARTICULUS II.

 

Quaestio I.

ARTICLE II

 

Question 1

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 847-850.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 847-850.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

ARTICULUS II.

 

De comparatione culpae ad poenam secundum inseparabilitatem.

ARTICLE II

 

On the comparison of the fault to the punishment according to inseparability.

Consequenter quaeritur de comparatione culpae ad poenam secundum inseparabilitatem.  Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Consequently there is asked concerning the comparison of the fault to the punishment according to (their) inseparability.  And about this two (questions) are asked:

Primo quaeritur, utrum contingat in aliquo ponere culpam sine poena subsequente.

First there is asked, whether one happens in any (act) to posit a fault without a subsequent punishment.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum contingat in aliquo reperire poenam sine merito praecedentis culpae.

Second there is asked, whether one happens to find a punishment in anyone without the (de)merit of a preceding fault.

QUAESTIO I.

 

Utrum in aliquo contingat ponere culpam sine poena subsequente.

QUESTION 1

 

Whether in any (act) one happens to posit a fault without a subsequent punishment?

CIRCA PRIMUM sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum contingat in aliquo ponere culpam sine poena subsequente.  Et quod sic, videtur.

ABOUT THE FIRST (the argument) is advanced thus and there is asked, whether in any (act) one happens to posit a fault without a subsequent punishment.  And it seems, that (it is) so:

1. Ecclesiastici quinto:6  Altissimus est patiens redditor; sed patiens non statim vindicat iram suam, sed usque in tempus exspectat:  ergo videtur, quod . . .

1. According to the fifth (chapter of the Book) of Ecclesiasticus:6  The Most High is patient in paying-back [patiens redditor]; but a patient (man) does not immediately vindicate his wrath, but waits until the (due) time:  therefore, it seems, that . . .

6  Vers. 4.

6  Verse 4.

 

p. 848

Deus peccatorem non statim puniat:  ergo contingit, in aliquo esse culpam sine poena.

God does not punish a sinner immediately:  therefore it happens, that in some (act) there is fault without a punishment.

2. Item, pronior est Deus ad miserendum quam ad condemnandum;1 sed meritum non habet statim coniunctum praemium: ergo videtur similiter, quod culpa non statim habeat iunctam poenam:  ergo etc.

2. Likewise, God is more prone to show mercy than to condemn;1 but merit does not have (its) reward immediately conjoined with (it); therefore it seems similarly, that a fault does not immediately have a joined punishment:  ergo etc..

3. Item, « poena est, ut dicit Augustinus,2 labor involuntarius »; sed impiis et peccatoribus in hac vita multa prospera proveniunt; et plures sunt, qui adeo in malo laetantur, quod dolorem non sentiunt:  ergo videtur, quod ponere sit peccatum absque poena, saltem ad tempus.

3. Likewise, as (St.) Augustine2 says, « a punishment is an involuntary labor »; but for the impious and sinners there come forth many prosperities [multa prospera] in this life; and there are several, who rejoice in evil to such an extent, that they do not feel (any) sorrow; therefore it seems there is a positing of sin apart from punishment, at least for a time.

4. Item, si statim peccator, cum peccat, punitur, aut punitur sufficienter, aut non sufficienter.  Si sufficienter:  ergo non deberet amplius in inferno puniri.  Si non sufficienter:  ergo aliquid de culpa ad tempus remanet impunitum.  Sed qua ratione aliquid remanet impunitur, eadem ratione et totum:  ergo videtur, quod peccatum possit saltem ad tempus separari a poena.

4. Likewise, if a sin, when he sins, is immediately punished, either he is punished in a sufficient manner [sufficienter], or in an insufficient manner [non sufficienter].  If in a sufficient manner:  therefore he ought not be punished further in Hell.  If in an insufficient manner:  therefore something of (his) fault remains unpunished for a time.  But by the reckoning by which something remains unpunished, by the same reckoning the whole (also):  therefore it seems, that a sin can at least for a time be separated from (its) punishment.

5. Item, multo misericordior et benignior est Deus, quam sit aliquis homo; sed ad laudem benignitatis humanae spectat, ut in nullo vindicet iniuriam sibi factam:  ergo multo fortius hoc decet facere Deum:  ergo videtur, quod saltem ad tempus debeat relinquere peccatum impunitum.

5. Likewise, God is much more merciful and more kind that any man; but it pertains to the praise of human kindness, that in one vindicate in nothing the injury done to one’s self:  therefore much more strongly is it fitting [decet] that God do this:  therefore it seems, that He ought at least for a time leave a sin unpunished.

SED CONTRA:  1. Augustinus primo Confessionum:3  « Iussisti, Domine, et sic est, ut poena sua sit sibi omnis inordinatus animus »:  si ergo ad culpam necessario sequitur animi inordinatio, necessario igitur ad culpam sequitur aliqua punitio.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:  1. (St.) Augustine (says) in the first (book) of (his) Confessions:3  «  Thou hast commanded, Lord, and thus it is, that every inordinate spirit is its own punishment for it »:  if, therefore, an inordinacy of spirit necessarily follows after a fault, therefore some act of punishment [aliqua punitio] necessarily follows after the fault.

2. Item, ubicumque est peccatum, ibi est privatio modi, speciei et ordinis;3 ubicumque autem hoc est, ibi est damnificatio; ubicumque autem damnificatio est merito culpae, ibi est iusta punitio:  ergo impossibile est, culpam esse in aliquo absque poena.

2. Likewise, wheresoever there is sin, there is a privation of measure, beauty and order;3 but wheresoever this is, there is the inferring of damage [damificatio] but wheresoever there is the inferring of damage in merit of a fault, there is a just act of punishment:  therefore it is impossible, that there be a fault in some (act) apart from a punishment.

3. Item, quicumque inordinate convertitur ad bonum ut nunc, avertitur a bono simpliciter; et quicumque acquirit carnalem delectationem, perdit spiritualem consolationem;5 sed perdere spiritualem consolationem, ad quam anima nata est, et amittere Deum, qui est omne bonum animae, hoc est maximum damnum et poenam incurrere:  ergo videtur, quod nunquam peccatum committitur absque poena.

3. Likewise, whosoever is inordinately converted to a good as now, is turned away from the good simply; and whosoever acquires a carnal delectation, loses the consolation of the spirit [spiritualem consolationem];5 but to lose the consolation of the spirit, for which the soul has been born, and to let go of God, who is the Every Good of the soul, this is to incur the greatest damage and punishment:  therefore it seems, that a sin is never committed apart from a punishment.

4. Item, universum ideo dicitur esse valde bonum, quia optime ordinatum;6 sed in eo quod est optime ordinatum, non potest esse ordinis corruptio, nec simpliciter nec ad tempus; sed peccatum absque poena est inordinatum:  ergo impossibile est, ad momentum peccatum esse impunitum.

4. Likewise, the universe is said to be “very good” for this reason, that (it has) been optimally ordered;6 but in this that it is optimally ordered, there cannot be a corruption of order, neither simply nor for a time; but a sin part from a punishment is (something) inordinate:  therefore it is impossible, that a sin be unpunished for (even) a moment.

5. Item, ad iustitiae perfectionem spectat superare iniustitiam, sicut ad sapientiae perfectionem spectat vincere malitiam, ut dicitur Sapientiae septimo:7  Sapientia vincit malitiam; sed quia sapientia vincit malitiam, impossibile est, aliquod malum esse, quod divina sapientia non statim ordinet et exinde bonum aliquod eliciat:  ergo cum iustitia Dei similiter omnem superet iniustitiam, impossibile est, aliquam culpam committi, quin statim ad eam non sequatur aliqua poena.

5. Likewise, it pertains to the perfection of justice to overcome injustice, just as it pertains to the perfection of wisdom to conquer wickedness [malitiam], as is said in the seventh (chapter) of Wisdom:  Wisdom conquers wickedness; but because wisdom conquers wickedness, it is impossible, that there be some evil, which the Divine Wisdom does not immediately order and out of which It elicits no good:  therefore since God’s Justice similarly overcomes all injustice, it is impossible, that any fault be committed, to which there does not [quin ad eam] immediately follow some punishment.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Impossibile est, culpam in aliquo esse, quin ad ipsam sequatur poena inseparabiliter.

CONCLUSION

 

It is impossible, there be a fault in any (act), to which there does not inseparably follow a punishment.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod impossible est, culpam in aliquo esse, quin ad ipsam sequatur poena inseparabiliter.  —  Et ratio huius potest sumi ex perfectione divinae aequitatis, et ex pulcritudine universitatis, et ex inordinatione culpae, et ex conditione peccantis naturae.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that it is impossible, that there be a fault in some (act), to which there does [quin ad ipsam] not inseparably follow a punishment.  —  And the reason for this can be taken from the perfection of the Divine Equity, and from the beauty of the university (of things) [pulcritudine universitatis], and from the inordinacy of fault, and from the condition of the nature of the one sinning.

Ex perfectione divinae aequitatis ratio sumitur.  Tantae enim aequitatis est Deus, qui est iudex omnium,8 ut non patiatur dedecus peccati ad modicum esse sine decore iustitiae; omni enim modo debet iustitia iniustitiam superare.  —  Ex pulcritudine universitatis ratio sumitur.  Universum enim ex ordine pulcritudinem habet, et talis est ita pulcritudo, qualem decuit fieri ad ostensionem summae sapientiae; et ideo nullo modo foedari potest, ac per hoc nec ad momentum esse in ea aliquid inordinatum, et ita nec peccatum a poena separatum.  —  Ex corruptione culpae ratio sumitur.  Nunquam enim culpa committitur, quin modus, species et ordo circa actionem voluntatis privetur; et dum voluntas se voluntarie in actu suo deordinat, semetipsam incurvat; et dum incurvatur, modo, specie et ordine privatur quantum ad habilitatem ad bonum.  Talis autem privatio magna est in ipsa anima damnificatio et laesio.  Et ideo dicit Augustinus in quodam sermone de Innocentibus:9  « Nemo habet iniustum lucrum sine iusto damno; ubi lucrum, ibi damnum; lucrum in arca, et damnum in conscientia; tulit vestem, et perdidit fidem; acquirit pecuniam, et perdit iustitiam ».  —  Ex conditione peccantis naturae ratio sumitur.  Quia voluntas rationalis, quae est causa peccati, quasi media est inter sensualitatem et synderesim, media est etiam inter Deum et alias creaturas; et cum se convertit ad haec inferiora, ab eo . . .

A reason is taken from the perfection of the Divine Equity.  For God, who is the Judge of All, is of such great equity, that He does not suffer the dis-ornament [dedecus peccati] for (even) a little while without the ornament of justice [decore iustitiae]; for Justice ought to overcome injustice in every measure [omni modo].  —  A reason is take from the beauty of the university (of things).  For the universe has a beauty [pulcritudinem] out of (its) order, and such is as great a beauty, as was fitting [decuit] to be wrought for the display [ostensionem] of the highest wisdom; and for that rason it can be befouled in no manner, and through this neither (can) there be (even) for a moment anything inordinate in it, and thus neither a sin separated from (its) punishment.  —  A reason is taken from the corruption of fault.  For a fault it never committed, in which [quin] the measure, beauty [species] and order of the will is not deprived about the action; and when the will voluntarily disorders [deordinat] itself in its own act, it bends itself over [invurcat]; and when it is bent over, it is deprived in measure, beauty and order as much as regards (it) ability for the good.  But such a privation is great act of damaging and wounding [damnificatio et laesio] in the soul itself.  And for that reason (St.) Augustine says in a certain sermon (of his) On Innocents:9  « No one has unjust lucre without a just damage; where (there is) lucre, there (is) damage; lucre in the money-chest [arca], and damage in the conscience; he took the garment, and lost the Faith; he acquired the money, and lost justice ».  —  A reason is taken from the condition of the nature of the one sinning.  Because the rational will, which is the cause of the sin, is a quasi intermediary between the sensuality and the synderesis, it is also an intermediary between God and other creatures; and when it converts itself to these inferiors, it recedes / from Him, . . .

1  Verba huius sententiae August. vide supra pag. 784, nota 6.

2  De Vera Relig. c. 40. n. 76.

3  Cap. 12. n. 19.

4  Cfr. supra d. 35. a. 2.

5  Cfr. Gregor., XVIII. Moral. c. 9. n. 16.

6  Gen. 1, 31:  Viditque Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona.  Cfr. August., Enchirid. c. 10. n. 3; et I. Sent. d. 44. a. 1. q. 3. nec non d. 46. q. 6.

7  Vers. 30:  Sapientiam autem non vincit malitiam.

8  Hebr. 12, 23:  Sed . . . et iudicem omnium Deum.  —  Quoad ea quae sequuntur, vide supra pag. 770, nota 1.

9  Nunc 220.  In Appendice (alias 10. de Sanctis) n. 2, ubi textus originalis pro tulit vestem, et perdidit fidem exhibet tollit vestem et perdit fidem.  Cfr. Serm. 8. de Decem Plagis et decem praeceptis, c. 7. n. 8.  —  De hac ratione vide supra d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1.

1  See the words of this sentence of (St.) Augustine, above d. 33, a. 1, q. 2, p. 784, footnote 6.

2 On the True Religion, ch. 40, n. 76.

3  Chapter 12, n. 19.

4  Cf. above d. 35, a. 2.

5  Cf. (Pope St.) Gregory (the Great), Morals on the Book of Job, Bk. XVIII, ch. 9, n. 16.

6  Genesis 1:31:  And God saw that all which He had wrought, was also very good [Viditque Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona].  Cf. (St.) Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 10, n. 3; and Sent., Bk. I, d. 44, a. 1, q. 3, and also d. 46, q. 6.

7  Verse 30:  But wickedness does not conquer wisdom [Sapientiam autem non vincit malitiam].

8  Hebrews 12:23:  But . . . and God the Judge of all [Sed . . . et iudicem omnium Deum].  —  In regard to those which follow, see above d. 32, a. 3, q. 1, p. 770, footnote 1.

9  Now 22.  In the Appendix (alias sermon 10, “On the Saints”), n. 2, where the original text has he takes the garment, he loses the Faith [tollit vestum et perdit fidem] for he took the garment, he lost the Faith [tulit vestem, et perdidit fidem].  Cf. On the 10 Plagues and 10 Precepts, Sermon 8, ch. 7, n. 8.  —  On this reckoning, see above d. 35, a. 1, q. 1, and a. 2, q. 1.

 

p. 849

recedit, qui sursum est; et dum acquirit parvum bonum, amittit magnum bonum, quia, dum acquirit bonum ut nunc, amittit bonum simpliciter; et quae erat media facit se ipsam infimam.  Similiter, cum peccando concordat cum sensualitate, discordat cum synderesi; et dum cum synderesi discordat, incurrit ex illa repugnantia remorsum quendam et afflictionem internam.  Et ita, dum peccat, perdit magnum bonum, perdit honorem proprium, perdit solatium et incurrit remorsum.1  —  Et sic patet, quod ad culpam inseparabiliter sequitur poena, sive dicatur poena quaedam damnificatio, sive dicatur poena afflictio sive involuntaria passio.  Sed poena, quae est damnificatio, semper sequitur et actu et habitu, quia nunquam est homo in culpa, quin semper sit in damno.  Afflictio vero sive remorsio sequitur saltem in habitu, quamvis propter delectationem intensam, vel inconsiderationem sive distractionem animi non sentiatur.

it recedes / from Him, who is on high; and when it acquires a small good, it lets go of the Great Good, because when it acquires a good as now, it lets go of the Good simply; and that which was an intermediary makes its very self the lowest (of all).  Similarly, when in sinning it concords with the sensuality, it discords with the synderesis; and when it discords with the synderesis, it incurs from that repugnance a certain remorse and internal affliction.  And thus, when it sins, it loses a great Good, it loses its own honor, it loses solace and it incurs a remorse.1  —  And thus it is clear, that to fault there inseparably follows punishment, whether the punishment be said (to be) a certain inferring of damage [damnificatio], or whether the punishment be said (to  be) a involuntary affliction or passion.  But the punishment, which is the act of damaging [damnificatio], always follows both according to act and according to habit, because a man is never in a fault, who is not also at a loss [in damno].  But the (act of) affliction or of remorse follows at least in habit, even though on account of an intense delectation, and/or the inconsideration or distraction of spirit it is not sensed.

Et ex hoc patet, qualiter peccatum claudit in se poenam, et qualiter peccatum potest dici poena peccati, et etiam poena sui ipsius.  Secundum enim diversam comparationem voluntatis peccantis ad synderesim et sensualitatem, idem ipsum et habet rationem peccati et habet rationem poenae, sicut ostensum est.  —  Concedendae sunt igitur rationes probantes, quod poena consequitur culpam inseparabiliter.

And from this it is clear, in what kind of manner a sin encloses in itself a punishment, and in what kind of manner a sin can be said (to be) the “punishment for sin”, and (in what kind of manner) a sin (can) even (be said to be the punishment) of its very self.  For according to the diverse comparison of the will of the one sinning to the synderesis and sensuality, the very same (sin) has both the reckoning of a sin and has the reckoning of a punishment, just as has been shown.  —  There are to be conceded, therefore, the reasons proving, that the punishment is inseparably consequent to the fault.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod Altissimus est patiens redditor; dicendum, quod dupliciter est loqui de poenae, scilicet quantum ad statum inchoationis, et quantum ad statum consummationis.  Et primo modo punitur homo remediabiliter, secundo irremediabiliter.  Poenam igitur secundum statum inchoationis et remediabilitatis statim infert Deus, quia hoc decet suam iustitiam.  Secundum statum vero consummationis et irremediabilitatis differt; hoc enim decet suam benignitatem et patientiam, secundum cuius divitias nos exspectat ad poenitentiam.2

1. To that, therefore, which is objected unto the contrary, that the Most High is a patient in paying-back [pattiens redditur]; it must be said, that there is a speaking of “punishment” [poena] in a twofold manner, that is as much as regards the state of initiation [statum inchoationis], and as much as regards the state of consummation [statum consummationis].  And in the first manner a man is punished remedially, in the second irremediably.  Therefore, God infers immediately the punishment according to the state of initiation and remediability, because this befits [decet]  His Justice.  But He is defers (it) according to the state of consummation and irremediability; for this begits His Kindness and Patience, according to Whose Riches await us for penitence.2

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non statim remunerat; dicendum, quod sicut in poena magnitudo afflictionis differtur, et interior afflictio et remorsio peccatum concomitatur, sic et in bene factis multitudo dulcedinis absconditur bene facientibus; nihilominus tamen aliquae primitiae spiritus degustantur, et in omni bono opere quaedam iucunditas conscientiae et tranquillitas bene operanti conceditur, quae est sicut fructus et remuneratio operis illius.  Et hoc est quod dicit Apostolus:4  Laborantem agricolam oportet primo de fructibus edere.

2. To that which is objected, that God does not remunerate immediately; it must be said, that just as the magnitude of affliction is different in punishment, and the interior act of affliction and remorse is concomitant with the sin, so also in (deeds) done well the multitude of sweetness is hidden from (those) doing good; yet nevertheless some first fruits of the spirit are tasted, and in every good work there is a certain jocundity of conscience and tranquility conceded to the one working well, which is as the fruit and remuneration of the work itself.  And this is what the Apostle4 says:  It is necessary that farmer laboring eat of the fruits first.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod poena est passio involuntaria et afflictiva; iam patet responsio ex his quae dicta sunt.  Nam ibi est et damnificatio et afflictio, quamvis non semper sentiatur.

3. To that which is objected, that a punishment is an involuntary and afflictive passion; the response is already clear from those (words) which have been said.  For in it there is both a inferring of damage and an affliction, even though (this) is not always sensed.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus punit sufficienter, aut non; dicendum, quod punire sufficienter hoc est dupliciter:  aut simpliciter, aut secundum quod competit statui.5  In praesenti igitur punitur culpa sufficienter; sed hoc non simpliciter, sed prout competit statui praesenti.  Et ideo in tali punitione salvatur debitus ordo; et nihilominus post egressum animae a corpore debet fieri poenae accumulatio; nec remanet in praesenti nec in futuro aliquid impunitum, sed totum punitur, licet etiam plus et minus, secundum quod exigit tempus et locus.

4. To that which is objected, that God punishes in a sufficient manner, or not; it must be said, that ‘to punish in a sufficient manner’ this is in a twofold manner:  either simply, or according to what is suited to the5 state [competit statui].  In the present, therefore, fault is punished sufficiently; but this not simply, but insofar as it is suited to the present state (of man).   And for this reason in such an act of punishment a due order is kept; and nevertheless after the stepping forth of the soul from the body the punishment accumulated ought to be executed [debet fieri poenae accumulatio]; (and thus) nothing remains un punished in the present nor in the future, but the whole is punished, even though (this is done) more and less, according to which time and place require.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homo benignus totum condonat; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod, cum Deus sit ipsa iustitia, si propriam offensam dimitteret impunitam, iniuriam faceret ipsi iustitiae; non sic autem est de homine.6  Praeterea, cum ipse sit ultimus iudex, ei reservantur omnia punienda; unde quod ipse dimittit impunitum, alius punire non potest.  Non sic autem est de homine, qui habet alium superiorem iudicem, et quod ipse non punit quasi ad Deum remittit.

5. To that which is objected, that a kind man condones the whole (of the offense); it must be said, that it is not similar, in virtue of this that, since God is Justice Itself, it He would dismiss [dimitteret] unpunished an offense done Him [propriam offensam], He would do injury to Justice Itself; but not so is it concerning man.6  Moreover, since He Himself is the Last Judge, all are reserved to Him to be punished; wherefore what He dismisses unpunished, another cannot punish.  But not so is it concerning man, who has another superior as Judge, and what he himself does not punish, he leaves [remittit] for God.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Utraque huius articuli quaestio abundat salutari doctrina.  Quoad 1. quaest. recole quod supra d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. 2. dictum est, praesertim (q. 2. ad 4.) de poena acta, inflicta et contracta.

I. Each Article of this Question abounds with salutary doctrine.  In regard to the 1st Question review what has been said above in d. 35, a. 1, qq. 1 and 2, especially (in q. 2, reply to n. 4) concerning acted, inflicted and contracted punishment.

Quaestio 1. tangitur ab Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 7. 8, et a S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 35. a. 1; S. I. II. q. 87. a. 1.  De eadem:  B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 121. m. 1. 2.  —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1.  —  Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1.  —  Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 2. dub. lat.  —  Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3.

The 1st question is touched upon by Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 94, mm. 7 and 8, and by St. Thomas, Sent., Bk. II, d. 35, a. 1; Summa., I, II, q. 87, a . 1.  On the same:  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here a. 2; Summa., p. II, tr. 22, q. 121, mm. 1 and 2.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 1.  —  Richard of Middleton, here in a. 2, q. 1.  —  Giles the Roman, here in q. 2, a. 2, lateral doubt.  —  (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following q. here in q. 3.

II. Quoad seq. (2. quaest.) consentiunt antiqui doctores in hoc, quod poena, licet ordinari possit non tantum ad praecedens . . .

II. In regard to the following (2nd question), the ancient doctors agree in this, that a punishment, though it can be ordered not only to a preceding . . .

1  Cfr. August., II. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 9. n. 12. et Epist. 140. (alias 120.) seu de Gratia novi Testam. lib. ad Honorat. c. 2. n. 3. seq.  Cfr. etiam Gregor., XI. Moral. c. 9. n. 12. et XXVII. c. 25. n. 48.  —  De synderesi agitur infra d. 39. a. 2.

2  Respicitur illud Rom. 2, 4:  An divitias bonitatis eius et patientiae et longanimitatis contemnis? ignoras, quoniam benignitas Dei ad poenitentiam te adducit?  —  Cod.  Z misericordiam pro patientiam.

3  Psalm., 30, 20:  Quam magna multitudo dulcedinis tuae, Domine, quam abscondisti timentibus te.  —  Rom. 8, 23:  Non solum autem illa, sed et nos ipsi primitias spiritus habentes etc.

4  Epist. II. ad Tim. 2, 6, ubi Vulgata:  laborantem agricolam oportet primum de fructibus percipere.  —  Cod. K operantibus pro operanti.

5  Vat. et edd. 3, 4 adiungunt praesenti, sed prorsus inconvenienter, cum in subnexis duplex status distinguatur, praesens et futurus.  —  Paulo superius post Deus codd. M Q addunt aut.

6  Cfr. Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 12, ubi ostenditur, quodsi peccatum a Deo dimitteretur impunitum, tunc peccantem et non-peccantem aequales essent* ante Deum, peccatum nulli legi subiaceret, et iniustitia liberior esset quam iustitia sicque Deo similis.

1  Cf. (St.) Augustine, On Genesis against Mani, Bk, II, ch. 9, n. 12, and Epistle 140 (alias 120) or On the Grace of the New Testament (Book to Honoratio), ch. 2, n. 3, f..  Cf. also (Pope St.) Gregory (the Great), Morals on the Book of Job, Bk. XI, ch. 9, n. 12, and Bk. XXVII, ch. 25, n. 48.  —   Synderesis is dealt with below in d. 39, a. 2.

2  A reference to that of Rom. 2:4:  Or do you contemn the riches of His Goodness and Patience and Longsuffering? are you ignorant, that God’s Kindness leads you to penitence?  —  Codex Z has Mercy [misericordiam] for Patience [patientiam].

3  Psalm 30:20.  How great the multitude of Thy sweetness, Lord, which Thou has hid from those fearing Thee [Quam magna multitudo dulcedinis tuae, Domine, quam abscondisti timentibus te].  Rom. 8:23:  Not only that, but we ourselves too having the first fruits of the spirit etc. [Non solum autem illa, sed et nos ipsi primitias spiritus habentes etc.].

4  2 Tim. 2:6, where the Vulgate reads:  It is necessary that the farmer laboring harvest the first of the fruits [laborantem agricolam oportet primum de fructibus percipere].  —  (A little above this) codex K has to the ones working [operantibus] for to the one working [operanti].

5  The Vatican edition, and editions 3 and 4, adjoing present [praesenti], but in an entirely unfitting manner, since in the following a twofold state is distingushed, the present one and the future one.  —  A little above this after God [Deus] codices M and Q add either [aut].

6  Cf. (St.) Anselm (of Canterbury), Cur Deus homo, Bk. I, ch. 12, where it is shown, that if sin were allowed to go unpunished by God, then the sinner and non-sinner would be* equal before God, sin would be subject to no law, and injustice would be freer than iustice and (would) in this manner (be) similar to God.

* [Trans. nota:  Hic in modo extraneo mori editorum, syntaxis originalis notae perperam scripta est in locutione indirecta magis quam subiunctiva perfecta, quis error correctus est essent pro esse, subiaceret pro subiacere, iniustitia liberior esset quam iustitia . . . similis pro iniustitiam liberiorem esse quam iustitiam . . . similem.]

* [Trans. note:  In the original note, completely foreign to the custom of the Quaracchi editors, an erroneous syntax was employed, which used indirect discourse instead of the perfect subjunctive in the main part subordinate clause which beings with that if [quodsi].]

 

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malum, sed etiam ad posterius bonum (hic ad 4.), in praesenti tamen providentia semper aliquo modo respiciat aliquod peccatum.  Hinc dicit S. Thom. (de Malo, q. 1. a. 4. in corp.):  « Habet autem hoc traditio fidei, quod nullum nocumentum creatura rationalis potuisset incurrere, neque quantum ad animam neque quantum ad corpus neque quantum ad aliqua exteriora, nisi peccato praecedente, vel in persona, vel saltem in natura ».

evil, but even to a posterior good (here in reply to n. 4), yet in the present providence it always looks back in some manner to some sin.  Hence St. Thomas says (de Malo, q. 1, a. 4, in the body of the Question):  « Moreover the tradition of the Faith holds this, that a rational creature would not have been able to incur harm, neither as much as regards soul nor as much as regards body nor as much as regards any exteriors, except by a preceding sin, either in person, or at least in nature ».

Scot., apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. III. q. 87. a. 7.  —  S. Thom., hic a. 4; S. I. II. q. 87. a. 7.  —  Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2.  —  Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1.

(Bl. John Duns) Scotus, in Jerome of Montefortino’s, (Summa Scoti.), tome III, q. 87, a. 7.  —  St. Thomas, here in a. 4; Summa., I, II, q. 87, a. 7.  —  Richard of Middleton, here in a. 2, q. 2.  —  Giles the Roman, here in q. 2, a. 1.

This English Translation and the digitization of the Latin and English texts, the HTML markup,  all emendations and corrections of the Latin text, and all notes by the Translator, are © 2010 by Br. Alexis Bugnolo.  The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator.
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