S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVI.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXVI

ARTICULUS II.

 

Quaestio II.

ARTICLE II

 

Question 2

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 850-852.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 850-852.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO II.

 

Utrum poena possit esse in aliquo sine culpa praecedente.

QUESTION 2

 

Whether there can be a punishment in anyone without a preceding fault?

SECUNDA QUAERITUR, utrum poena possit esse in aliquo sine culpa praecedente.  Et quod non, videtur:

SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether there can be a punishment in anyone without a preceding fault?  And it seems, that there (can) not:

1. Primo auctoritate Hieronymi;1 ait enim sic:  « Quidquid patimur, peccata nostra meruerunt ».

1. First according to the authority of (St.) Jerome;1 for he speaks thus:  «  Whatever we suffer, our sins have merited ».

2. Item, Gregorius in quadam collecta:2  « Nulla eis nocebit adversitas, si nulla dominetur eis iniquitas »:  ergo si non praecessit dominium culpae, videtur, quod nullo modo sequi possit supplicium poenae.

2. Likewise, (Pope St.) Gregory (the Great says) in a certain collect:2  « No adversity will harm them, if no iniquity dominates them »:  therefore if the dominion of fault did not precede, it seems, that in no manner can the sentence of punishment [supplicium poenae] follow.

3. Item, Augustinus in primo Retractationum:3  « Mors et vita a Domino Deo est; sed vita ut a donante, et mors ut a vindicante »:  si igitur mors est a Deo ut a vindicante, pari ratione et omnis alia poena.  Sed omnis vindicta respicit meritum culpae praecedentis:  ergo videtur, quod in nullo sit aliqua poena, quin in ipso prius fuerit culpa illius poenae meritoria.

3. Likewise, (St.) Augustine (says) in the first (book) of (his) Retractations:3  « Death and life is from the Lord God; but life as from the One giving, and death as from the One avenging [vindicante] »:  if, therefore, death is from God as from One avenging, for an equal reason also every other punishment.  But every avenging punishment [vindicta] looks back to the merit of a preceding fault:  therefore it seems, that in no one is there any punishment, in whom [quin in ipso] there was no fault meritorious of that punishment beforehand.

4. Item, poena, quantum est de se, dicit aliquod malum; dividitur enim malum in malum culpae et malum poenae:4  ergo sicut malum culpae dicit privationem alicuius boni et alicuius ordinis, ita etiam et malum poenae:  ergo sicut malum culpae indiget ordinari, ita et malum poenae.  Sed sicut malum culpae ordinatur per sequens malum poenae, sic malum poenae per anterius malum culpae:  ergo sicut culpa non potest esse sine poena, sic nec poena sine culpa.

4. Likewise, a punishment, as much as it concerns itself, means some evil; for ‘evil’ is divided into the evil of fault and the evil of punishment:4  therefore, just as the “evil of fault” means the privation of some good and of some order, so too even the evil of fault:  therefore just as the evil of fault needs to be ordered, so too the evil of punishment.  But just as the evil of punishment is ordered through a following evil of punishment, so the evil of punishment through an anterior evil of fault:  therefore just as a fault cannot be without a punishment, so neither a punishment without a fault.

5. Item, omnis punitio, secundum quod huiusmodi, est effectus divinae iustititae; iustitia autem, secundum quod huiusmodi, considerat exigentiam meritorum; nullum autem est meritum poenae nisi peccatum:5  ergo impossibile est, aliquem puniri nisi in eo, quod praecesserit macula peccati.

5. Likewise, every act of punishment [omnis punitio], according to which (it is) of this king, is an effect of the Divine Justice; but justice, according to which (it is) of this king, considers the exigency of merits; moreover nothing [nullum] is worthy of punishment except sin:5  therefore it is impossible, that someone be punished except in that, which the stain of sin preceded.

SED CONTRA:  1. Iob decimo septimo:6  Non peccavi, et in amaritudinibus moratur oculus meus.  Et similiter Iob sexto:  Utinam apprenderentur peccata mea, quibus iram merui, et calamitas, quam patior, in statera; quasi arena maris haec gravior appareret:  ergo videtur, quod poenae, quae fuerunt in Iob, non fuerunt merito praecedentium peccatorum.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:  1. According to the seventeenth (chapter of the Book) of Job:  I sinned not, and my eye lingers in bitternesses.  And similarly in the sixth (boo) of Job:  Would that they apprehend my sins, for which I have merited wrath, and the calamity, which I suffer, upon the balance [in statera]; as the sand of the sea, this would appear heavier:  therefore it seems, that the punishments, which were against Job, were not in merit of preceding sins.

2. Item, Ioannis nono:7  Quis peccavit, hic, aut parentes eius, ut caecus nasceretur? ibi dicitur:  Neque hic peccavit, neque parentes eius; et exponit Augustinus, quod hoc non dicitur, quia non peccaverunt, sed quia caecitas non erat poena peccati:  ergo idem quod prius.

2. Likewise, in the ninth (chapter of the Gospel of St.) John:7  Who has sinned, this one, or his parents, that he was born blind? there is said:  Neither has this one sinned, nor his parents; and (St.) Augustine expounds, that this is not said, because they did not sin, but because (his) blindness was not a punishment for a sin:  therefore the same (conclusion is had) as before.

3. Item, pro peccato originali non meretur quis nisi semel mori;8 et Lazarus non tantum fuit mortuus semel, sed bis:  ergo videtur, quod aut mors prima, aut secunda fuerit ei absque merito peccati inflicta.

3. Likewise, for original sin one does not merit but to die once;8 and Lazarus did not only die once, but twice:  therefore it seems, that either the first death, or the second was inflicted upon him apart from the merit of sin.

4. Item, tota die videmus, quod impius affligit iustum; et de hoc etiam propheta conqueritur Habacuc primo:9  Quare taces, conculcante impio iustiorem se?  Sed non esset iusta quaerela Prophetae, si iustus pro peccatis suis puniretur:  ergo videtur, quod multae poenae infligantur, quae non infliguntur merito peccatorum.

4. Likewise, all day we see, that the impious afflicts the just; and of this even a prophet complains loudly in the first (chapter) of Habakkuk:9  Why art Thou silent, when the impious tramples underfoot one more just than himself?  But the Prophet’s complaint [querela] would not have  been just, if the just were punished for his own sins:  therefore it seems, that many punishments are inflicted, which are not inflicted in merit of sins.

5. Item, Christus fuit a Iudaeis interfectus; et planum est, quod in ipso nullum fuit omnino peccatum; et mors illa poena fuit, hoc constat:  ergo videtur, quod poena possit esse absque culpa praeambula.

5. Likewise, Christ was killed [fuit interfectus] by the Jews; and it is plain, that in Him there was entirely no sin; and that death was a punishment, this is established:  therefore it seems, that there can be punishment apart from preambulary fault.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Poena potest esse in aliquo sine culpa propter ordinationem, quam habet ad bonum posterius, quod ex ea elici potest.

CONCLUSION

 

A punishment can be in anyone without fault on according of the ordination, which it has to a posterior good, which can be elicited out of it.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod malum poenae dupliciter potest ordinari:  uno modo ad malum culpae, quod puniendo ordinat; alio modo in comparatione ad bonum, quod Deus elicit ex illa poena. / Dico igitur, . . .

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that the evil of punishment can be ordered in a twofold manner:  in one manner to the evil of a fault, which it orders by punishing; in another manner in comparison to a good, which God elicits out of that punishment.  /  Therefore, . . .

1  In Ezech. c. 5, 16:  Famen et pestilentiam et bestias pessimas et quidquid aliud malorum sustinemus in saeculo, propter nostra venire peccata manifestum est.

2  Libr. Sacram., sabbato infra Quinquages. in ultima collecta super populum, quae incipit Tuere (In Brev. Rom. feria 6. post Quinquages. ad 2. Vesp.).  In textu origin. pro Nulla eis habetur Nulla ei (populo), et dein post dominetur omittitur eis, quae vocula etiam abest a codd. K (a prima manu) T V W Y  bb ee et aliis.

3  Cap. 21. n. 2.  —  Textus s. Scripturae est Eccli. 11, 14.

4  Cfr. supra pag. 825, nota 3, et Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 6.  —  De minori subsumta cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. et quaest. praeced.

5  Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.

6  Vers. 2.  —   Seq. textus est loc. cit v. 2. seq.

7  Vers. 2. seq.  — Super hunc loc. August., tr. 44. n. 3. ait:  Habebant enim peccatum parentes eius, sed non ipso peccato factum est, ut caecus nasceretur.

8  Hebr. 9, 27:  Et quemadmodum statutum est hominibus semel mori etc.  —  Cfr. supra d. 33. dub. 4, ubi eadem infertur obiectio et solvitur.

9  Vers. 13.

1  On Ezekiel, Ezk.5:16:  It is manifest, that on account of our sins come famine and pestilence and the worst beasts and whatever else of the evils (which) we suffer in (this) world.

2  Libr. Sacram., Saturday in Quinquagesima, in the last collect super populum, which begins Tuere (In the Breviarium Romanum, Friday in Quinquagesima, 2nd Vespers).  In the original text for the first them [eis] there is had this (people) [ei], and then the second is omitted, which word is also absent from codices K (by the first hand) T V W Y bb ee and others.

3  Chapter 21. n. 2.  —  The text from Sacred Scripture is Ecclesiasticus 11:14.

4  Cf. above d. 35, a. 1, q. 2, p. 825, footnote 3, and Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 94, m. 6.  —  On the subsumed minor (of the argument) cf. above a. 1, q. 1, and the preceding Question.

5  See the text of Master (Peter) here in ch. 5.

6  Verse 4.  —  The following text is loc. cit., v. 2, f..

7  Verse 2, f..  —  On this passage (St.) Augustine, (On the Gospel of St. John), tractate 44, n. 3, says:  For his parents had sin, but it did not come to be, that he was born blind, on account of this sin.

8  Heb. 9:27:  And according to which manner it has been established for men to die once etc. [Et quemadmodum statutum est hominibus semel mori etc.].  —  Cf. above d. 33, doubt 4, where the same objection is inferred and solved.

9  Verse 13.

 

p. 851

poena. / Dico igitur, quodsi aliqua poena infligatur, cuius ordinatio principaliter consistat in comparatione ad malum; quod necessario requirit, malum culpae praecessisse,1 nec tantum praecessisse, sed etiam aliquo modo concomitari inseparabiliter.  Poena enim aut est directe ordinata ad puniendum, aut est ordinata principaliter ad malum excludendum.  Primo modo est poena infernalis, et secundo modo est poena purgatoria.2  Et primo modo requirit poena praesentiam culpae secundum deformitatem et maculam; secundo modo requirit culpae praesentiam secundum reatum et sequelam.

punishment.  /  Therefore, I say, that if any punishment is inflicted, the ordination of which consists principally in (its) comparison to an evil; that it necessarily requires that an evil of fault has preceded,1 and not only that it has preceded, but even is in some manner inseparable concomitant.  For a punishment is either one directly ordered to punishing, or is one ordered principally to exclude an evil.  In the first manner there is the punishment of Hell [poena infernalis], and in the second manner there is the punishment of Purgatory [poena purgatoria].2  And in the first manner the punishment requires the presence of fault according to a deformity and stain; in the second manner it requires the presence of fault according to liability and consequence [reatum et sequelam.]*

Si autem poena infligatur principaliter propter ordinem, quem habet ad bonum, quod inde elicitur; aut ergo propter bonum proprium, aut propter bonum alienum.  Si propter bonum proprium, sic requirit quod in subiecto illo aliquando fuerit culpa, et quod possit esse de futuro.  Si autem propter bonum alienum, sic sufficit poenae, ut fuerit culpa in alio, quam in eo qui punitur, in eo videlicet, pro quo poena illa sustinetur; per quem modum fuit in Christo, cuius mors et passio ordinata erat ad redimendum genus humanum et liberandum et reparandum a lapsu, in quem ceciderat ex peccato primo parentis.

But if a punishment is inflicted principally for the sake of the order, which it has to a good, which is elicited therefrom; therefore either for the sake of one’s own good, or for the sake of another’s.  If for the sake of one’s own good, thus it requires that in that subject there was at some time a fault, and that there can be for the future [de futuro].  But if for the sake of another’s, thus it is sufficient for the punishment, that there was a fault in the other, than in the one who is punished — in him, namely, on whose behalf that punishment is sustained; through which manner it was in Christ, whose death and passion was ordered to remedy and free and repair the human race from the lapse, into which it had fallen on account of the sin of (our) first parents.

Et sic patet, quod omnis poena aliquo modo respicit culpam; sed quaedam ut praesentem in se, utpote poena infernalis; quaedam ut praeteritam in se, sed praesentem in reatu et sequela, sicut poena purgatoria; quaedam vero solum ut praeteritam, et hoc in eo, qui punitur; et sic est omnis poena iustorum, Christo excepto; quaedam vero respicit culpam non in se, sed in alio, sicut patet in Christo.  —  Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum omnis poena sit causata a culpa; dicendum, quod si intelligatur de causa meritoria de condigno, sic non habet veritatem; si autem intelligatur de causa sine qua non, sic aliquo modo veritatem habet.  Nulla enim esset poena in homine, nisi praecessisset culpa.  —  Et per hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam, qua scilicet quaeritur, utrum poena possit esse in aliquo sine culpa praecedente; sive qua quaeritur, utrum poena possit separari a culpa.  Concedendum est enim, quod sic, propter ordinationem, quam habet ad bonum posterius, quod ex ea elicitur.

And thus it is clear, that every punishment looks back in some manner to a fault; but a certain (punishment) as to a (fault) present in oneself, as for example the punishment of Hell; a certain one as to one past in oneself, but present in liability and consequence [in reatu et sequela], such as the punishment of Purgatory; but a certain one only as to one past, as this in him, who is punished; and in this manner is every punishment of the just, Christ excepted; but a certain one looks back to the fault not in one’s self but in another, just as is clear in Christ.  —  Therefore, when there is asked, “Whether every punishment has been caused by a fault?”; it must be said, that if (this) be understood of a cause meritorious from (something) completely worthy, thus it does not have truth; but if it be understood of a sine qua non cause, thus it in some manner has truth.  For there would be no punishment in man, if fault had not preceded.  —  And through this the response to the proposed Question is clear, by which, that is, there is asked, whether there can be a punishment in anyone without a preceding fault; or by which there is asked, whether punishment can be separated from fault.  For it must be conceded, that (this is) so, on account of the ordination, which (the punishment) has to a posterior good, which is elicited out of it.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de Hieronymo, dicendum, quod Hieronymus non accipit ibi mereri pro merito condigni, sed potius pro merito congrui, quod quidem est sicut dispositio praeambula.  Et verum est, sicut dictum est,3 quod nisi fuisset in nobis peccatum originale, in nobis non esset contracta poenalitas, unde esset aliqua afflictio poenae; et quod in Christo fuit, hoc fuit solummodo voluntarie.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected from (St.) Jerome, it must be said, that (St.) Jerome does not accept “to merit” there for the merit of the condign, but rather for the merit of the congruous, which indeed is as a preambulary disposition.  And it is true, just as has been said,3 that unless there were original sin in us, there would be no contracted penalty, from which there would be any affliction of punishment; and that (this) was in Christ, this was only voluntarily.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Gregorio, dicendum, quod facienda est vis in hoc quod dicit:  nulla nocebit adversitas; nam adversitas, quae non infligitur homini, exigente merito praecedentis peccati, non est ad eius nocumentum, sed potius ad eius profectum, iuxta illud Apostoli:4  Diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum.

2. To that which is objected from (Pope St.) Gregory (the Great), it must be said, that one put the force of the meaning [facienda est vis] in that which he says:  “no adversity will harm”; for the adversity, which is not inflicted upon man, with the merit of a preceding sin requiring (it), is not for his harm, but rather for his progress [profectum], in according with that (word) of the Apostle:4  For those loving God all (things) cooperate unto the good.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mors est a Deo vindicante, et ita aliae poenae; dicendum, quod in opere iustitiae se multum immiscet opus misericordiae.  Et ideo, quamvis prima dispositio ad poenam fuerit vindicta, multae tamen poenae consequuntur ad illam dispositionem, quae potius sunt beneficia divinae misericordiae et divinae visitationis, quam sint instrumentum irae.  Cum ergo dicitur, quod mors est a Deo vindicante, hoc intelligitur de ipsa necessitate moriendi; sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod omnis alia poena sit a Dei vindicta, immo, sicut tactum est, potest esse a Dei misericordia, quae erudit et flagellat omnem filium, quem recipit.5  Sic enim competit praesenti statui.

3. To that which is objected, that death is from God as One avenging, and thus the other punishments; it must be said, that in a work of (Divine) Justice the work of (Divine) Mercy mingles itself much.  And for that reason, though the first disposition to punishment was avenged, yet many punishments are consequent to that disposition, which are rather benefices of the Divine Mercy and of the Divine Visitation, than an instrument of wrath.  Therefore, when it is said, that death is from God as One avenging, this is understood of that necessity of dying; but from this it does not follow, that every other punishment is an avenging punishment from God, nay, just as has been touched upon, it can be from God’s mercy, which instructs [erudit] and scourges every son, whom He receives.5  For thus it is suited to the present state.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod poena ordinatur ad culpam, sicut et converso; dicendum, quod non est simile.  Poena6 enim habet ordinari, sicut dictum est, dupliciter:  non solum ad prius, sed etiam ad posterius.  Peccatum autem, secundum quod huiusmodi, ordinari habet solum ad posterius, videlicet ad poenam; et ideo culpa semper dicit inordinationem, nisi praesentialiter adsit poena; poena vero propter ordinationem ad posterius bonum, ordinata et utilis esse potest, etiam si nulla sit culpa in eo qui punitur, illius poenae meritoria.  Illud enim malum recompensatur per maius bonum, quod inde elicitur, sicut patet in caeco nato et in Iob et in Lazaro et in quolibet viro iusto.  Quot autem bona inde eliciantur, invenietur determinatum in quarto, distinctione decima quinta.7

4. To that which is objected, that punishment is ordered to fault, just as (fault is) too vice versa; it must be said, that it is not similar.  For a punishment6 has (an ability) to be ordered, just as has been said, in a twofold manner:  not only to a prior, but also to a posterior.  But a sin, according to which (it is) of this kind, has (an ability) to be ordered only to a posterior, namely to a punishment; and for that reason a fault always means an inordinacy, unless a punishment is at hand by means of (its) presence [praesentialiter adsit]; but a punishment can be ordinate and useful on account of (its) ordination to a posterior good, even if there is no fault in him who is punished, meritorious of that punishment.  For that evil is recompensed through the greater good, which is elicited from it, just as is clear in the one born blind and in Job and in Lazarus and in any just man.  But how many goods are elicited from it, will be found (to be) determined in the Fourth (Book), in the Seventeenth Distinction.7

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, iam patet responsio; quia, etsi punitio sit a divina iustitia, nihilominus tamen plerumque est a divina misericordia.  Sicut enim vult Augustinus in quodam sermone,8 . . .

5. To that which is objected last, the response is already clear; because, even if the act of punishment is from the Divine Justice, yet, nevertheless, very frequently it is from the Divine Mercy.  For just as (St.) Augustine wants in a certain sermon,8 . . .

1  In Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 legitur:  in comparatione ad malum culpae puniendum, necesse est, aliquam culpam praecessisse; et post pauca in Vat. sola:  Poena enim ordinata ad puniendum culpam, aut est directe ordinata ad solum puniendum, aut est ordinata etc.

2  Vide August., XXI. de Civ. Dei, c. 13, ubi Platonici refelluntur, qui omnes poenas et in hac vita et post mortem non nisi purgatorias esse contendebant.

3  Supra d. 30. a. 1. q. 1.

4  Rom. 8, 28.  —  Paulo superius Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 et pluribus codd. ante infligitur omittit non.

5  Hebr. 12, 6.

6  Permulti codd. cum primis edd. Culpa; perperam.

7  Part. I. dub. 2.  —  Pro Quot autem bona codd. T  W ee et alii cum ed. 2 Quod autem bona.

8  Nunc. 22. in Appendice (quia sermo Caesarii est — alias 88. de Tempore) n. 2-6, super Exod. 9, 12:  Induravit Dominus cor Pharaonis.

1  In the Vatican edition and in editions 2, 3 and 4, there is read:  in comparison to the evil of fault to be punished, it is necessary, that some fault has preceded [in comparatione ad malum culpae puniendum, necesse est, aliquam culpam praecessisse]; and after a few (words) the Vatican edition alone reads:  For a punishment is one ordered to punish a fault, or directly ordered solely to punish, or is ordered etc. [Poena enim ordinata ad puniendum culpam, aut est direte ordinata ad solum puniendum, aut est ordinata etc.].

2  See (St.) Augustine, On the City of God, Bk. XXI, ch. 13, where the Platonists are refuted, who contended that all punishments in this live and after death were not but purgatorial.

3  Above in d. 30, a. 1, q. 1.

4  Rom. 8:28.  —  A little above this the Vatican edition, together with editions 3, and 4, and a few codices, omits not [non] before inflicted [infligitur].

5  Heb. 12:6.

6  Very many codices, together with the first editions, have fault [Cupam], faultily.

7  Part I, Doubt 2.  —  For But how many goods [Quot autem bona] codices T W ee and others, together with edition 2, have But on which account goods [Quod autem bona].

8  Now Sermon 22 in the Appendix of his Opera (because the sermon belongs to Caesarius — alias 88, “On the Season” ), nn. 2-6, on Exodus 9:12:  The Lord hardened the heart of the Pharaoh [Induravit Dominus cor Pharaonis].

 

* [Trans. note:  It is not clear whether the Seraphic Doctor intends this phrase liability and consequence  [reatum et sequelam] in reference to the moral order, or if he is alluding to the legal order, for according to Du Cange, Glossaria mediae et infimiae latinitatis, sequela is also the right in Roman Law of seeking the chattel of delinquents and obtaining them.  In the civil law of Italy, this right is still called il diritto di sequela.  In the former sense, Bonaventure is referring to the liability and results or effects consequent to the fault, in the latter to the legal order, whereby on account of this liability and deformity, God has the right has to inflict punishments upon person and possessions.]

 

p. 852

quem facit de flagellatione Pharaonis:  cum Deus immittebat Pharaoni flagella, impendebat misericordiae beneficia, quia cor eius ad conversionem excitabat; cum vero subtrahebat, hoc erat ex rigore iustitiae, quae propter ipsius Pharaonis peccata, dum illa flagella subtrahebat, ipsum obdurari sinebat; et pro tanto Scriptura dicit, quod cor eius indurabat.1

which he makes on the scourging of the Pharaoh:  when God sent scourges upon the Pharaoh, He dispensed the benefices of (the Divine) Mercy, because He excited his heart to conversion; but when He subtracted (them), this was out of the rigor of (the Divine) Justice, which on account of the sins of the Pharaoh himself, allowed him to become obdurate [obdurari], when It subtracted those scourges; and to this extent Scripture says, that He hardened his heart.1

1  Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

1  See the Scholium at the preceding Question.

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