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S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis |
St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio |
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum |
Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences |
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Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis |
of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris |
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SECUNDI LIBRI |
BOOK TWO |
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVI. |
COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXVI |
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ARTICULUS III.
Quaestio I. |
ARTICLE III
Question 1 |
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Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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Latin
text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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ARTICULUS III.
De comparatione poenae ad divinae iustitiae aequitatem. |
ARTICLE III
On the comparison of the punishment to the equity of the Divine Justice. |
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Consequenter quaeritur de comparatione poenae ad divinae iustitiae aequitatem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. |
Consequently there is asked concerning the comparison of the punishment to the equity of the Divine Justice. And about this two (questions) are asked: |
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Primo quaeritur, utrum aliqua poena sit a Deo. |
First there is asked, whether any punishment is from God. |
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Secundo dato quod sic, quaeritur, utrum omnis poena sit ab ipso. |
Second granted that there is, there is asked, whether every punishment is from Him. |
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QUAESTIO I.
Utrum aliqua poena sit a Deo. |
QUESTION 1
Whether any punishment is from God? |
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QUAERITUR IGITUR, utrum aliqua poena sit a Deo. Et quod non, videtur. |
THERE IS ASKED, THEREFORE, whether any punishment is from God. And that (it is) not (so), seems: |
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1. Sapientiae primo:2 Deus mortem non fecit: ergo si mors inter omnes poenas est maxime manifestativa divinae iustitiae, et haec non est a Deo; videtur igitur, quod nulla alia poena sit ab ipso. |
1. According to the first (chapter) of Wisdom:2 God did not make death: therefore, if death, among all the punishments, is the one most manifestive of the Divine Justice, and it is not from God; it seems, therefore, that no other punishment is from Him. |
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2. Item, Augustinus super illum locum Psalmi:3 Deduc me, Domine, in iustitia tua: « Cum punit malos Deus, non suum malum eis infert, sed suis malis eos relinquit »: ergo videtur, quod nulla poena secundum id quod est, a Deo sit. |
2. Likewise, (St.) Augustine (says) on that passage of the Psalm:3 Lead me forth, Lord, in Thy Justice: « When God punishes the wicked, He does not bring upon them His own evil, but abandons them to their own evils »: therefore it seems, that no punishment is from God, according to that which it is. |
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3. Item, poena est malum repugnans naturae; sed « Conditor naturae nihil facit contra naturam », sicut vult Augustinus:4 ergo videtur, quod nulla poena sit a Deo. |
3. Likewise, a punishment is an evil repugnant to nature; but « the Founder of nature does nothing contrary to nature », just as (St.) Augustine4 wants: therefore it seems, that no punishment is from God. |
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4. Item, omnis poena inducit privaitonem alicuius boni, et privatio boni dicit boni defectum; defectus autem non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem: si ergo Deus nullius est causa deficiens, nullus defectus potest esse ab eo:5 ergo nec poena aliqua. |
4. Likewise, every punishment induces a privation of some good, and a “privation of good” means a “defect of good”; but a defect does not have an efficient cause, but a deficient one: therefore, if God is the deficient cause of nothing, no defect can be from Him:5 therefore neither any punishment. |
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5. Item, sicut malum culpae privat bonam dispositionem voluntatis, sic malum poenae privat bonam dispositionem naturae;6 sed ita est a Deo natura, sicut voluntas, et ita conservatio naturae, sicut conservatio voluntatis: si igitur mala dispositio voluntatis a Deo non est, pari ratione nec mala dispositio naturae: ergo sicut non est a Deo culpa, ita non est a Deo poena. |
5. Likewise, just as the evil of fault deprives a good disposition of the will, so the evil of punishment deprives a good disposition of the nature;6 but the nature is as much from God, as the will, and the conservation of the nature as much, as the conservation of the will: if, therefore, an evil disposition of the will is not from God, for an equal reason neither an evil disposition of the nature: therefore just as a fault is not from God, so neither is a punishment from God. |
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6. Item, sicut in Deo est summa bonitas quantum ad rectitudinem voluntatis, quae est iustitia, sic in Deo est summa bonitas quantum ad completionem et perfectionem naturae; sed Deus, quia summe bonus est et summe iustus, non potest facere aliquod malum sive aliquam iniustitiam sive peccatum: ergo pari ratione, cum sit summe bonus per naturam, non poterit ab eo egredi malum, quod sit in nocumentum naturae: ergo sicut ab ipso non exit malum cupae, sic nec malum poenae. |
6. Likewise, just as in God there is a Most High Goodness as much as regards the rectitude of the (Divine) Will, which is Justice, so in God there is a Most High Goodness as much as regards the completion and perfection of the (Divine) Nature; but God, because He is most highly good and most highly just, cannot work anything evil or any injustice or sin: therefore for an equal reason, since He is most highly good through nature, there cannot step forth from Him an evil, which is unto the harm of a nature: therefore just as from Him there comes forth no evil of fault, so neither an evil of punishment. |
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SED CONTRA: 1. Isaiae quadragesimo quinto:7 Ego Dominus formans lucem et creans tenebras, faciens pacem et creans malum; sed hoc non intelligitur de malo culpae: ergo necesse est, quod habent veritatem de aliquo malo poenae. |
BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. According to the forty-fifth (chapter of the Book) of Isaiah:7 I, the Lord, forming light and creating shadows, making peace and creating evil; but this is not understood of the evil of fault: therefore it is necessary, that it have truth concerning some evil of punishment. |
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2. Item, expressius in cantico, Deuteronomiii trigesimo secundo:8 Ego occidam et ego vivere faciam, percutiam et ego sanabo; sed occisio et percussio est poena: ergo etc. |
2. Likewise, more expressly in the canticle, in the thirty-second (chapter of the Book) of Deuteronomy:8 I shall slay and I shall make live, I shall strike and I shall heal; but (the act of) slaying and (the act of) striking is a punishment: ergo etc.. |
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3. Item, adhuc magis expresse Ecclesiastici undecimo:9 Bona et mala, vita et mors, paupertas et honestas a Deo sunt; sed huiusmodi sunt poenae: ergo etc. |
3. Likewise, still more expressly in the eleventh (chapter) of Ecclesiasticus:9 Goods and evils, life and death, poverty and honesty are from God; but (things) of this kind are punishments: ergo etc.. |
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4. Item, adhuc expressius de novo Testamento, Matthaei vigesimo quinto:10 Ite maledicti in ignem aeternum; sed ab illo principaliter est poena, qui dictat sententiam, sed hic est Deus: ergo etc. |
4. Likewise, still more expressly from the New Testament, in the twenty-fifth (chapter of the Gospel of St.) Matthew:10 Go you accursed into the eternal fire; but from him is the punishment principally, who dictates the sentence, but this is God: ergo etc.. |
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5. Item, Augustinus in libro de Libero Arbitrio:11 « Deus est auctor mali, quod patimur »; sed hoc est malum poenae, ut ibidem dicit: ergo aliqua poena est a Deo. |
5. Likewise, (St.) Augustine (says) in (his) book On Free Will:11 « God is the Author of the evil, which we suffer »; but this is the evil of punishment, as he says in the same place: therefore some punishment is from God. |
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6. Item, sicut actus divinae misericordiae est parcere, ita actus divinae iustitiae est punire: ergo sicut peccati remissio et indulgentia est a divina misericordia, ita peccati punitio est a divina iustitia: ergo aliqua poena est a Deo tanquam a causa. |
6. Likewise, just as ‘to spare’ is an act of the Divine Mercy, so ‘to punish’ is an act of the Divine Justice: therefore just as the remission of sin and indulgence is from the Divine Mercy, so the act of punishing [punitio] is from the Divine Justice: therefore some punishment is from God as from a cause. |
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2 Vers. 13. 3 Psalm. 5, 9. — August., super hunc locum n. 10. proprie dicit: Cum punit Deus peccatores, non malum suum eis infert, sed malis eorum eos dimittit. 4 Libr. XXVI. contra Faustum, c. 3. Vide supra pag. 435, nota 1. 5 Cfr. August., XXI. de Civ. Dei, c. 8. 6 Vide supra d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1. 7 Vers. 6. seq.: Ego Dominus et non est alter formans etc. 8 Vers. 39. 9 Vers. 14. 10 Vers. 41. 11 Libr. I. c. 1. n. 1. |
2 Verse 13. 3 Ps. 5:9. — (St.) Augustine, on this passage, says in n. 8, properly: When God punishes sinners, He does not bring His own evil upon them, but leaves [dimittit] them to their own evils. 4 Against Faustus, Bk. XXVI, ch. 3. See above d. 18, a. 1, q. 2, p. 435, footnote 1. 5 Cf. (St.) Augustine, On the City of God, Bk. XXI, ch. 8. 6 See above d. 35, a. 1, q. 1, and a. 2, q. 1. 7 Verse 6, f.: I the Lord and there is no other, forming etc. [Ego Dominus et non est alter formans etc.]. 8 Verse 39. 9 Verse 14. 10 Verse 41. 11 Book I, ch. 1, n. 1. |
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CONCLUSIO.
Aliquae poenae sunt a Deo vindicante. |
CONCLUSION
Some punishments are from God as the One avenging. |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod poena plus dicit quam malum. Malum enim importat1 absentiam sive defectum boni, ubi debet esse; poena vero importat ordinem ad ipsum meritum poenae, et simul cum hoc dispositionem aliquam significat circa ipsum punibile. — Quoniam igitur tam ordo quam dispositio rei dicitur esse a Deo sicut a principio; hinc est, quod rationabiliter conceditur, quod poena sit a Deo,2 de illa potissime, quae importat ordinem fundamentum super realem dispositionem. Et quoniam dicit aliquo modo ordinem ad culpam praecedentem, et culpa praecedens non est ex constitutione naturae, sed potius ex voluntatis inordinatione; hinc est, quod etsi poena dicatur a Deo, non tamen dicitur a Deo faciente, sed a Deo vindicante. — Concedendum est igitur, aliquas poenas a Deo esse, sicut ostendunt rationes ad hoc inductae, pro eo quod aliquae poena sunt dispositiones ipsius punibilis, et dispositiones non qualescumque, sed ordinatae secundum rigorem divinae iustititae. |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that “punishment” [poena] means more than a evil. For “evil” conveys [importat]1 an absence or defect of a good, where it ought to be; but “punishment” conveys an order to the very (act) worthy of the punishment, and together with this it signifies some arrangement [dispositionem] about the one able to be punished. — Since, therefore, both the order and the disposition of the thing is said to be from God as from a principle; hence it is, that there is reasonably conceded, that a punishment is from God,2 concerning that (punishment) most of all, which conveys an order founded upon the arrangement of a thing [realem dispositionem]. And since it means in some manner an order to a preceding fault, and a preceding fault is out of the constitution of the nature, bur rather out of the inordination of the will, hence it is, that even if a punishment is said (to be) “from God”, yet it is not said (to be) from God as the One causing (it), but from God as One avenging. — There must be conceded, therefore, that some punishments are from God, just as the reasons brought forward for this show, in virtue of this that some punishments are dispositions of the very one able to be punished, and not dispositions of whatsoever kind, but ordered according to the rigor of the Divine Justice. |
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1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod Deus mortem non fecit; iam patet responsio, quia non negatur, quod mors non sit a Deo vindicante, sed quia non fuit a Deo naturam instituente. Ideo enim3 Deus eam inflixit, quia homo eam meruit merito culpae. |
1. To that, therefore, which is objected unto the contrary, that God did not make death; the response is already clear, because it is not denied, that death is not from God as One avenging, but because it was not from God as the One instituting nature. For3 God inflicted it for this reason, because man merited it by the merit of the (original) fault. |
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2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod Deus, cum punit malos, non infert eis malum; dicendum, quod Augustinus non vult ibi negare, poenam inferri a Deo, sed hoc vult negare, quod defectus ille, qui clauditur in intellectu poenae, non causatur a Deo. Unde non dicit: non infert poenam, sed: non infert malum; malum enim dicit ipsum defectum, sicut dictum est; poena autem non tantum dicit boni defectionem, sed etiam dicit punibilis dispositionem. |
2. To that, however, which is objected, that God, when He punishes the wicked, does not bring evil upon them; it must be said, that (St.) Augustine does not want to deny there, that punishment is brought on by God, but he wants to deny, that that defect, which is enclosed in the understanding of “punishment”, is not caused by God. Whence he does not say: “He does not bring on punishment”, but: “He does not bring evil upon (them)”; for an “evil” means the defect itself, just as has been said; but “punishment” does not only be (an act of) defecting from a good [boni defectionem], but also (the act of) disposing [dispositionem] the one able to be punished. |
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3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Conditor naturae nihil facit contra naturam; dicendum, quod si natura dicatur naturalis creaturae obedientia, vel naturale iudicatorium, secundum quod homo est habilis ad iustitiam — quia utrumque horum dicit immediatam ordinationem ad Deum — sic Deus non facit contra naturam, sicut nec facit contra se ipsum.4 Alio modo natura dicitur vis operans secundum solitum cursum et quodcumque bonum, quod inest creaturae ex sua origine; et hoc modo Deus facit contra naturam, sive per miracula potentiae, sive per supplicia vindicantis iustitiae. Et sic non facit simpliciter contra naturam, immo potius secundum naturam, cuius operatio subiacet divinae iustitiae. Et cum Deus utitur creatura, sive ad manifestationem divinae potentiae, sive ad manifestationem iustitiae, utitur ea, prout debet. |
3. To that which is objected, that the Founder of nature does nothing against nature; it must be said, that if “nature” be said the natural obedience of the creature, and/or the natural judgment [naturale iudicatorium], according to which a man is able for justice — because each of these means a immediate ordination to God — thus God does not work against nature, just as He neither works against His very self.4 In another manner “nature” is said (to be) an operative force according to the customary course and whatsoever good, which is in the creature from its own origin; and in this manner God does work against nature, whether through miracles of power, or through capital punishments of avenging justice. And thus He does not works simply “against nature”, nay rather according to nature, the operation of which is subject to the Divine Justice. And when God uses a creature, whether for the manifestation of the Divine Power, or for the manifestation of (the Divine) Justice, He uses it, insofar as He ought. |
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4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod poena dicit privationem et defectum; dicendum, quod generaliter loquendo, poena non dicit solum defectum, immo quaedam poena est, quae dicit veram passionem circa ipsum punibile. Unde sicut actio ignis aeterni, qua agit in animam, aliquid est; sic et passio, quam patitur anima a igne, aliquid est.5 Et iterum, aliquid ordinatum est, et ita a Deo est, a quo est omnis essentia et omnis ordo. Et propter hoc deficit illa ratio, quia non omnis poena dicit defectum purum. |
4. To that which is objected, that that a “punishment” means a privation and a defect; it must be said, that generally speaking, “punishment” does not mean the defect alone, nay there is a certain punishment, which means a true suffering [veram passionem] about the one able to be punished. Wherefore just as the action of the eternal fire, by which it acts upon the soul, is something; so too the suffering [passio], which the soul suffers from the fire, is something.5 And again, it is something ordered, and thus it is from God, from Whom is every essence and every order. And on this account that reckoning fails, because not every “punishment” means a pure defect. |
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5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod malum poenae privat bonam dispositionem naturae, sicut malum culpae dispositionem voluntatis; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia malum culpae privat inordinate et vituperabiliter; malum vero poenae, secundum quod huiusmodi, privat ordinate et laudabiliter. Et quia quod laudabile est, est attribuendum Deo; quod vero vituperabile, non; hinc est, quod recte aliquod malum poenae Deo attribuitur, malum vero culpae non, sicut infra6 melius videbitur. |
5. To that which is objected, that the evil of a punishment deprives a good disposition of the nature, just as the evil of a fault the disposition of the will; it must be said, that it is not similar, because the evil of a fault deprives in an inordinate and blameworthy manner; but the evil of a punishment, according to which (its is) of this king, deprives in an ordinate and praiseworthy manner. And because what is praiseworthy, is to be attributed to God; but what (is) blameworthy, (is) not; hence it is, that rightly some evil of punishment is attributed to God, but the evil of fault (is) not, just as will be better seen below.6 |
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6.* Et per hoc patet responsio ad ultimum, quod obiicitur de perfectione bonitatis quantum ad voluntatem et naturam Dei. Concedo enim bene, quod utriusque est summa perfectio, quia una et eadem; idem enim est in eo natura et voluntas. Comparatio tamen divinae voluntatis ad culpam et poenam, sive e converso poenae et culpae ad divinam voluntatem, differens est, quia culpa propter sui deordinationem deordinationem ponit circa peccantem; poena vero non deordinationem connotat circa punientem et ordinantem. |
6. And through this the response to the last (objection) is clear, because it is objected concerning the perfection of goodness as much as regards God’s Will and Nature. For I well conceded, that the highest perfection belongs to Each, because (they are) one and the same (thing). Yet the comparison of the Divine Will to fault and punishment, or conversely of punishment and fault to the Divine Will, is different, because fault on account of its own disorder posits a disorder about the one sinning; but punishment does connote a disorder about the one punishing and the one ordering. |
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SCHOLION. |
SCHOLIUM |
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I. Poenas non esse a Deo, asserere non dubitabant multi et antiqui et recentiores, praesertim illi qui providentiam Dei circa res humanas negabant, inter quos fuit etiam Cicero, III. de Officiis, c. 29. — In utraque huius articuli quaestione adhibentur plures distinctiones magni momenti; notanda est in primis in q. 2. distinctio triplicis poenae, et alia, quae est de poena, secundum quod ordinata est, et secundum id quod subest huic ordini. Sub primo respectu constat poenam omnem ratione ordinis esse a Deo; item sub secundo respectu patet, non esse a Deo id quod dicit defectum, privationem vel malum. |
I. That punishments are not from God, many (authors), both ancient and more recent, have not doubted to assert, especially those who denied God’s providence about human affairs, among whom was even Cicero, de Officiis, Bk. III, ch. 29. — In each Question of this Article there are employed several distinctions of great moment; there is to be noted first of all in q. 2 the distinction of the threefold punishment, and the other one which concerns punishment, according to which it has been ordered (i. e. placed in an order), and according to that which underlies this order (into which it is placed). Under the first respect it is established that every punishment according to the reckoning of the order (which it has to a preceding fault or a consequent good) is from God; likewise under the second respect it is clear, that that which means a defect, privation and/or evil is not from God.* |
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1 Vat. cum paucis codd. verbo importat praemittit plus et mox pro meritum poenae (i. e. culpam) substituit meritum culpae. 2 Vat. et edd. 3, 4 omittunt de, quod pertinet ad conceditur. Paulo inferius post ordinem in multis codd., ut C F K O R S T V etc., et in primis edd. desideratur ad culpam. 3 In Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 nec non in aliquibus codd., inter quos est cod. ee, deest enim. 4 Cfr. verba Augustini, ex. VI. de Gen. ad lit. supra pag. 435, nota 1. et pag. 437, nota 5. allata. — Mox pro et quodcumque non pauci codd., inter quos F H V W Y bb, cum primis edd. etiam quodcumque. 5 Vide August., de Natura boni, c. 38. 6 Quaest. seq. et d. 37. a. 2. q. 1. |
1 The Vatican edition, together with a few codices, reads conveys more [plus importat] and next for the very (act) worthy of the punishment [meritum poenae], that is the fault, it substitutes the very merit of the fault [meritum culpae]. 2 The Vatican edition, and editions 3 and 4, omits concerning [de], which pertains to it is conceded [conceditur]. A little below this after order [ordinem] in many codices, such as C F K O R S T V etc., and in the first editions there is wanting to a . . . fault [ad culpam]. 3 In the Vatican edition, and editions 2, 3, and 4, and also in some codices, among which is codex ee, there is absent the For [enim]. 4 Cf. the words of (St.) Augustine, cited from On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. VI, above in d. 18, a. 1, q. 2, p. 435, footnote 1, and p. 437, footnote 5. — Next for and whatsoever [et quodcumque] not a few codices, among which are F H V W Y and bb, together with the first editions, have even whatsoever [etiam quodcumque]. 5 See (St.) Augustine, On the Nature of the Good, ch. 38. 6 In the following Question, and in d. 37, a. 2, q. 1. |
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* [Trans. nota: Hic perperam 5 pro 6 in editionis Quaracchiensis.] |
* [Trans. note: In this paragraph the explanations within parentheses are those of the translator, not the Quaracchi editors.] |
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Primum principium ita intelligitur, ut ordinatio illa sit a Deo secundum voluntatem consequentem, non antecedentem (cfr. infra d. 37. dub. 5, et I. Sent. d. 46. q. 1.). In applicatione secundi principii est quaedam differentia opinionum, sed exigui momenti, ut notat Richard. a Med. — Plura ad hanc questionem spectantia vide hic dub. 3. Utramque quaestionem alii magistri plerumque una sola absolvunt. |
The first principle is thus understood, that that ordination is from God according to (His) consequent, not antecedent Will (cf. below d. 37, Doubt 5, and Sent., Bk. I, d. 46, q. 1). In the application of the second principle there is a certain difference of opinion (among theologians), but of very little moment, as Richard of Middleton notes. — For more pertaining to this question see here Doubt 3. Each question here is very frequently solved by the other masters (of theology) with one (question) only. |
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II. De utraque quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 6. 7 (quoad principia solutionis). — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 37. q. 3. a. 1;* S. I. II. q. 87. a. 7. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 37. a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3, q. 1. 2. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 37. q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 37. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. |
II. On each question: Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 94, m. 6 and 7 (in regard to the principles of their solution). — St. Thomas, Sent., Bk. II, d. 37, q. 3, a. 1; Summa., I, II, q. 87, a. 7. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Sent., Bk. II, d. 37, a. 3. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, aa. 2 and 3. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 3, qq. 1 and 2. — Giles the Roman, Sent., Bk. II, d. 37, q. 2, aa. 1 and 2. — Durandus, Sent., Bk. II, d. 37, q. 2. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 1. |
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* [Trans. nota: Hic in scholione originali perperam legitur q. 3. a. 1. post q. 87. a. 7.] |
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