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S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis |
St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio |
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum |
Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences |
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Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis |
of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris |
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SECUNDI LIBRI |
BOOK TWO |
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVI. |
COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXVI |
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ARTICULUS III.
Quaestio II. |
ARTICLE III
Question 2 |
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Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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Latin
text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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QUAESTIO II.
Utrum omnis poena sit a Deo. |
QUESTION 2
Whether every punishment is from God? |
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SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum omnis poena sit a Deo. Et quod sic, videtur. |
SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether every punishment [poena] is from God. And that (it is) so, seems: |
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1. Ad Romanos duodecimo:1 Mihi vindictam, et ego retribuam: ergo vindicta proprie competit ipsi Deo; sed omnis punitio vindicta quaedam est: ergo omnis poena et punitio est a Deo. |
1. According to the twelfth (chapter of St. Paul’s Letter) to the Romans: To Myself ( reserve) the vengeance [vindictam], and I shall repay [retribuam] (it): therefore vengeance properly suits God Himself; but every act of punishing [punitio] is a certain avenging punishment [vindicta]: therefore every punishment and act of punishing is from God. |
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2. Item, Augustinus dicit, et habetur in littera:2 « Omnis poena, si peccati poena est, iusta est et supplicium nominatur »; sed omne quod iustum est, a Deo est: ergo omnis poena a Deo est. |
2. Likewise, (St.) Augustine says, and it is had in the text:2 « Every punishment, if it is a punishment for sin, is just and is named a “sentence” [supplicum] »; but everything which is just, is from God: therefore every punishment is from God. |
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3. Item, ad Romanos primo:3 Tradidit illos Deus in passiones ignominiae; Glossa paulo ante: « Deserit Deus non apponendo gratiam, vel appositam subtrahendo ». Si igitur nulla poena magis caret ratione boni et pulcri, quam subtractio gratiae et passio ignominiae; et huiusmodi poenae sunt a Deo, sicut patet ex textu et ex Glossa: ergo et omnis poena. |
3. Likewise, according to the first (chapter of St. Paul’s Letter) to the Romans:3 God handed them over unto passions of ignominy; the Gloss a little before this (says): « God deserts by not apportioning grace, and/or by withdrawing (the grace) apportioned ». If, therefore, no punishment lacks the reckoning of the good and beautiful [pulcri] more, than the withdrawal of grace and the suffering of ignominy; and punishments of this kind are from God, just as is clear from the text and from the Gloss: therefore every punishment (is) also (from God). |
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4. Item, nulla poena est acerbior quam poena infernalis, nulla poena habet plus de ratione privationis et defectus quam poena mortis; sed utraque istarum est a Deo: ergo et omnis alia poena. |
4. Likewise, no punishment is sharper than the punishment of Hell [poena infernalis], no punishment has more of the reckoning of privation and defect than the punishment of death [poena mortis]; but each of these is from God: therefore also every other punishment. |
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5. Item, subtractio gratiae directe opponitur collationi gratiae; sed gratiam dare hoc maxime placet divinae bonitati: ergo inter omnes poenas minime est haec poena a Deo auctore. Sed haec est a Deo auctore: ergo et omnis alia. Probatio minoris: In subtractione gratiae est gratiae annihilatio et quaedam Dei de habitaculo cordis expulsio; sed operatio annihilationis soli Deo est possibilis, sicut dicit Hugo,4 cum sit infinita distantia inter extrema; et praeterea, nihil potest Deum eiicere: ergo videtur, quod talis subtractio gratiae non possit esse nisi a Deo tanquam ab auctore. |
5. Likewise, the withdrawal of grace is directly opposed to the conferral of grace; but ‘to give grace’ this pleases the Divine Goodness most of all: therefore among all punishments this punishment is least of all from God as author. But this one is from God as author: therefore also all the others. The proof of the minor: In the withdrawal of a grace there is the annihilation of the grace and a certain expulsion of God from the dwelling place of the heart; but the operation of annihilation is possible to God alone, just as Hugo (of St. Victor)4 says, since there is an infinite distance between the extremes; and moreover, nothing can eject God: therefore it seems, that such a withdrawal of grace cannot be but from God as from an author. |
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6. Item, omne illud, quod ordinat inordinatum et restituit honorem Deo sublatum, est a summo Ordinatore et honoris proprii Zelatore; sed omnis poena, secundum quod huiusmodi, est ordinativa culpae — in omni etiam punitione honor redditur Deo, cui subtractus est per culpam — ergo omnis poena, secundum id quod est, procedit a divina iustitia.5 |
6. Likewise, every that, which orders an inordinate and restores the honor withdrawn from God, is from the Most High Order-er [Ordinator] and the One Zealous [Zelator] for His own honor; but every punishment, according to which (it is) of this kind, is ordinative of fault — in every act of punishing, too, the honor is returned to God, from Whom it was withdrawn through the fault — therefore every punishment, according to that which it is, proceeds from the Divine Justice.5 |
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SED CONTRA: 1. Excaecatio est quaedam poena; sed excaecatio non est a Deo, sed ex propria malitia, sicut dicitur Sapientiae secundo:6 Excaecavit illos malitia eorum: ergo non omnis poena est a Deo. Quod autem excaecatio non sit a Deo, apparet tam ex textu quam ex verbis Augustini, qui dicit super illud Ioannis primo: Lux in tenebris lucet, ibi dicit, quod « quomodo caeco praesens est lux corporalis, et ipse non est praesens lumini »; sic intelligendum est in luce spirituali, et hoc ipse textus innuit. |
BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. The act of being completely blinded [Excaecatio] is a certain punishment; but the act of being completely blinded is not from God, but from one’s own wickedness, just as is said in the second (chapter of the Book) of Wisdom:6 There has completely blinded them, their malice: therefore not every punishment is from God. Moreover, that the act of being completely blinded is not from God, appears both from the text as from the words of (St.) Augustine, who says on that (verse) in the first (chapter of the Gospel of St.) John: The Light shines in the darkness, says there, that « in the manner in which corporal light [lux] is present to a blind (man), and he himself is not present to the light [lumini] »; so must it be understood in spiritual light, and this the text itself indicates. |
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2. Item, amissio sive exspoliatio gratuitorum est quaedam poena; sed haec non est a Deo, immo potius a diabolo, secundum quod dicitur, Lucae decimo,7 de homine descendente a Ierusalem in Iericho, qui a latronibus fuit vulneratur et spoliatus: ergo non omnis poena est a Deo. Quod autem exspoliatio gratuitorum non sit a Deo, apparet per hoc quod dicit Anselmus, quod « homo non habet gratiam, non quia Deus non dat, sed quia ipse non recipit ». |
2. Likewise, the act of loosing [amissio] or being despoiled of gratuitous (gifts) [expoliatio gratuitorum] is a certain punishment; but this is not from God, nay (it is) rather from the Devil, according to what is said, in the tenth (chapter of the Gospel of St.) Luke,7 of the man descending from Jerusalem unto Jerico, who was wounded by brigands and despoiled [spoliatus]: therefore not every punishment is from God. Moreover, that the act of being despoiled of gratuitous (gifts) [expoliatio gratuitorum] is not from God, appears through that which (St.) Anselm (of Canterbury) says, that « man does not have grace, not because God does not give (it), but because he himself does not receive (it) ». |
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3. Item, imaginis deformatio est quaedam poena; sed Deus imaginem suam nullo modo deformat, immo indignatur contra deformantem: ergo non omnis poena est a Deo. Quod autem imaginis deformatio non sit a Deo, apparet, quoniam imaginem Dei deformare est contumeliam Deo inferre; sed Deus nunquam facit sibi contumeliam: ergo nunquam deformat imaginem suam. |
3. Likewise, the deformation of the (Divine) image (in man) is a certain punishment; but God in no manner deforms His own image, nay He is indignant [indignatur] against the one deforming (it): therefore not every punishment is from God. Moreover, that the deformation of the image is not from God, appears, since to deform God’s image is to bring contumely upon God [contumeliam Deo inferre]; but God never works contumely against Himself [facit sibi contumeliam]: therefore He never deforms His own image. |
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4. Item, nullus purus defectus est a Deo; aliqua poena est purus defectus: ergo aliqua poena non est a Deo. Maior per se manifesta est, quia defectus non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem; . . . |
4. Likewise, no pure defect is from God; some punishment is a pure defect: therefore some punishment is not from God. The major is per se manifest, because a defect does not have an efficient cause, but a deficient one; . . . |
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1 Vers. 19. Vulgata: Mihi vindicta, ego. 2 Hic c. 2. et 5. 3 Vers. 26. — Glossa allegata pertinet ad v. 24. et habetur apud Petr. Lombardum. Cfr. etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. 4 Libr. I. de Sacram. p. VI. c. 37. Vide supra pag. 729, nota 6. 5 Cfr. Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 13-15. 6 Vers. 21. — Seq. textus est loc. cit v. 5. Verba Augustini vide supra pag. 123, nota 6. — Aliquanto inferius post Lux in tenebris lucet Vat. omittit ibi dicit, quae verba revera superflua sunt, nisi forte verba qui dicit, quae immediate habentur post Augustini, aut expugnamur, quod in cod. W factum est, aut potius commutantur in quae dicit. 7 Vers. 30. Cfr. supra pag. 506, nota 3. et pag. 700, nota 1. — Dictum Anselmi habetur in Dialog. de Casu diaboli, c. 2. seq. Cfr. supra pag. 247, nota 1. et tom. I. pag. 720, nota 6. — Vat. hic textum valde mutilavit. Omissis enim ultima huius arg. parte inde a verbis Quod autem exspoliatio,* nec non prima parte arg. sequentis usque ad verba Quod autem imaginis, hae duo argg. in unum perperam confudit. |
1 Verse 19. The Vulgate reads: Vengeance (is) mine, I shall repay it [Mihi vindicta, ego retribuam]. 2 Here in chs. 2 and 5 (of Master Peter’s text). 3 Verse 26. — The cited Gloss pertains to v. 24, and is had in Peter Lombard. Cf. also the text of Master (Peter), in ch. 3. 4 On the Sacraments, Bk. I, p. VI, ch. 37. See above d. 30, a. 3, q. 1, p. 729, footnote 6. 5 Cf. (St.) Anselm, Cur Deus homo, Bk. I, chs. 13-15. 6 Verse 21. — The following text is loc. cit., v. 5. See the words of (St.) Augustine above in d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, p. 123, footnote 6. — Somewhat below this after The Light shines in the darkness [Lux in tenebris lucet] the Vatican edition omits says there [ibi dicit], which words are in truth superfluous, unless perhaps the words which says [qui dicit], which are had immediately after Augustine [Augustini], are expunged, which has been done in codex F, or are changed rather into which he says [quae dicit]. 7 Verse 30. Cf. above d. 21, a. 3, q. 2, p. 506, footnote 3, and p. 700, footnote 1. — The saying of (St.) Anselm is had in (his) Dialogue on the Downfall of the Devil, ch. 2, f.. Cf. above d. 9, a. sole, q. 4, p. 247, footnote 1, and Sent, Bk. I, d. 40, a. 4, q. 2, p. 720, footnote 6. — The Vatican edition greatly changes this text. For having omitted the final part of this argument from the words Moreover, that the act [Quod autem exspoliatio], and also the first part of the following argument up until the words Moreover, that the deformation [Quod autem imagnis], faultily fusing these two arguments together into one. |
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* [Trans. nota: His nota originalis perperam exspoliatus pro exspoliatio.] |
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p. 855
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sed Deus nullius est causa deficiens.1 Minor probatur, quia ignorantia nihil aliud est quam spiritualis tenebra: ergo est privatio pura; et ignorantia est poena: ergo etc. |
but God is the deficient cause of nothing.1 The minor is proven, because ignorance is nothing other than a spiritual shadow: therefore it is a pure privation; and ignorance is a punishment: ergo etc.. |
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5. Item, nullum vitium est a Deo; aliqua poena est vitium, utpote malitia et concupiscentia: ergo aliqua poena est, quae non est a Deo. Maior et minor per se manifestae sunt. |
5. Likewise, no vice is from God; some punishment is a vice, as for example malice and concupiscence: therefore there is some punishment, which is not from God. The major and minor are per se manifest. |
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6. Item, nullum peccatum est a Deo; sed aliquod peccatum est poena, sicut ostensum est supra,2 et manifeste apparet in illa deformitate, quae remanet in anima post culpam perpetratam: ergo aliqua poena est, quae non est a Deo. |
6. Likewise, no sin is from God; but some sin is a punishment, just as has been shown above,2 and it manifestly appears in that deformity, which remains in the soul after the perpetrated fault: therefore there is some punishment, which is not from God. |
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CONCLUSIO.
Omnis poena, quatenus tenet rationem poenae, est a Deo, non tamen id quod dicitur poena, a Deo est, si importat defectum simpliciter, vel aliquam positionem cum deordinatione. |
CONCLUSION
Every punishment, to the extent that it holds the reckoning of a punishment, is from God, yet that which is said (to be) a “punishment”, is not from God, if it conveys a defect simply, and/or the positing of some (thing) with a disorder. |
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RESPONDEO: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod poena de sui generali acceptione dicit nocumentum ordinatum.3 Nocumentum autem comparationem habet et ad ipsum nocivum, et ad illud quod patitur nocumentum, et ad illud, secundum cuius privationem nocumentum illud attenditur. Et secundum istam triplicem comparationem nomen poenae habet triplicem acceptionem. Unde dicitur poena aliquando actio rei laedentis, secundum quod adustio ignis infernalis dicitur esse poena reproborum. Dicitur etiam poena passio rei laesae sive punitae, secundum quod dicitur: afflictio reproborum est eorum poena aeterna. Dicitur etiam defectus alicuius boni, in quem incurritur ex illa passione, sicut defectus quietus, salutis et pacis est poena reproborum. |
I RESPOND: For an understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that “punishment” [poena] from its general acceptation means a certain ordained harm [nocumentum ordinatum].3 But a harm has a comparison both to that very (thing which is) harmful, and to that which suffers the harm, and to that, according to the privation of which that harm is attained. And according to this threefold comparison the name of “punishment” has a threefold acceptation. Whence a “punishment” is sometimes said (to be) the action of the wounding thing, according to which the singeing [adustio] of the infernal fire is said to be “the punishment” of the reprobate. A “punishment” is also said (to be) the suffering [passio] of the wounded or punished thing, according to which there is said: “the affliction of the reprobate is their eternal punishment”. It is also said (to be) the defect of some good, against whom it is incurred out of that suffering, just as the defect of rest, of salvation and of peace is the punishment of the reprobate. |
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Quocumque autem istorum modorum dicatur poena, sive actio, sive passio, sive defectus, semper nomen poenae, ut sic est, impositum est ab ordine; et quod dicit nominat ut ordinatum. Et quoniam omne ordinatum, ut tale est, procedit a Deo, a quo est omnis ordo; quocumque modo dicatur poena, et quidquid dicitur poena, in quantum poena, a Deo est, quoniam omne ordinatum a Deo est. A Deo enim habet, quod sit ordinatum, et Deo placet omnis ordo, et idem est fieri Deo auctore et Deo volente.4 |
But in whatsoever of the manners “punishment” be said, whether the action, or the suffering, or the defect, the name of “punishment”, as it is in this manner, has been imposed from an order; and it names what it says as (something) ordinate. And since every ordinate (thing), as it is such, proceeds from God, from Whom is every order; in whatsoever manner “punishment” be said, and whatever is said (to be) a “punishment”, inasmuch as (it is) a punishment, is from God, since every ordinate (thing) is from God. For form God it has (it), that it is ordinate, and every order pleases God, and that (something) is done ‘by God as author’ and ‘by God as willing’ is the same.4 |
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Si autem loquamur de poena secundum illud quod subest huic ordini, a quo imponitur nomen poenae; tunc dicendum est, quod si poena dicatur defectus sive carentia alicuius boni, sic dicendum est, quod talis defectus a Deo non est; non enim habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem, nec poena, quae talem defectum nominat, est a Deo. — Si autem poena dicatur ipsa passio rei punitae, quae est via ad defectum alicuius boni, tunc distinguendum est: quia quaedam est passio, quae est ordinata simpliciter;5 quaedam vero, quae, quamvis sit ordinata secundum quid, est tamen deordinata simpliciter; quaedam vero medio modo se habens. Passio illa, quae est ordinata simpliciter, illa est passio, quae est pure poenalis¸ sicut passio famis et sitis, et talis passio a Deo est; unde fames et siti a Deo dicitur esse. — Passio vero, quae est deordinata simpliciter, sed ordinata secundum quid, est illa quae est culpabilis, sicut est deformatio imagnis et corruptio habilitatis ad bonum; et talis non est concedenda esse a Deo. — Passio vero media est illa, quae est passio vitiosa, utpote illa quae est ex rebellione carnis ad spiritum, quae quodam modo ordinata est ad culpam praecedentem, quodam modo deordinata est, quia est inclinativa ad culpam sequentem; et haec non conceditur esse a Deo. Et Magister dixit supra distinctione trigesima secunda,6 quod « fomes et concupiscentia non habent Deum auctorem, sed diabolum aut hominem ». — Et sicut distinctum est de poena, prout dicitur passio rei punitae, sic distinguendum est de poena, prout dicitur actio rei punitivae. |
But if we speak of “punishment” according to that which underlies this order, by which the name of “punishment” is imposed; then it must be said, that if the “punishment” be said (to be) a defect or lack of some good, thus it must be said, that such a defect is not from God; for it does not have an efficient cause, but a deficient one, nor is the “punishment”, which names such a defect, from God. — But if the “punishment” is said (to be) the very suffering [passio] of the thing punished, which is the way to the defect of some good, then one must distinguish: because there is a certain suffering, which is simply ordinate;5 but a certain one, which, though it is ordinate according to something [secundum quid], yet is simply disordered; on the other hand (there is) a certain one holding itself in an intermediary manner. That suffering, which is simply ordinate, is that passion [passio], which is purely penal, just as (is) the passion of hunger and thirst, and such a suffering [passio] is from God; wherefore hunger and thirst is said to be “from God”. — But the suffering, which is simply disordered, but ordered according to something, is that which is culpable, just as is the deformation of the image and the corruption of the ability for the good; and such is not to be conceded to be from God. — However, the intermediary suffering is that, which is the vicious passion, as for example that which is out of a rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, which is in a certain manner ordered to a preceding fault, (and) is in a certain manner disordered, because it is inclinative of a following fault; and this is not conceded to be from God. And Master (Peter) said above in the Thirty-Second Distinction,6 that « the fomes (of sin) and concupiscence do not have God as author, but (rather) the Devil and man ». — And just as has been distinguished concerning the “punishment”, insofar as it is said to be the suffering of the thing punished, so must it be distinguished concerning the “punishment”, insofar as it is said (to be) the action of the punitive thing. |
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Ex praedictis igitur patet, quod etsi omnis poena sit a Deo, in quantum tenet rationem poenae, non omne tamen, quod dicitur poena, a Deo est; immo quaedam est a Deo, quaedam non. Illa est a Deo, quae dicit positionem aliquam, ita quod non nominat deordinationem; et haec est simpliciter poena. Illa vero non est concedenda esse a Deo, quae nominat simpliciter defectum, vel quae nominat positionem aliquam cum deordinatione. Unde nec conceditur a Deo esse excaecatio nec obduratio nec imaginis deformatio nec gratiae subtractio sive exspoliatio nec error nec ignorantia nec concupiscentia nec his consimilia; omnia enim haec vel dicunt defectum, vel deordinationem aliquam. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod non omnis poena est a Deo. |
From the aforesaid, therefore, it is clear, that even if every punishment is from God, inasmuch as it holds the reckoning of a punishment, yet not everything, which is said (to be) a “punishment”, is from God; nay a certain one is from God, a certain one (is) not. That (“punishment”) is from God, which means the positing of something, such that it does not name an act of disordering [deordinationem]; and this is simply a punishment. But that is not to be conceded to be from God, which names a defect simply, and/or which names the positing of something together with a act of disordering. Whence there is not conceded to be from God the act of being completely blinded [excaecatio] nor of being made obdurate [obduratio] nor of deforming the image [imaginis deformatio] (of God in man) nor of the withdrawing or of despoiling of grace nor error nor ignorance nor concupiscence nor (those) completely similar to these; for these either mean an defect, and/or some act of disordering. — There are to be conceded, therefore, the reasons showing, that not every punishment is from God. |
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1. 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis vindicta est a Deo, et similiter ad sequens, quo dicitur, quod omnis poena iusta est; dicendum, quod illae . . . |
1. 2. To that which is objected, that every avenging punishment [vindicta] is from God, and similarly regarding the one following, according to which there is said, that every punishment is just; it must be said, that those . . . |
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1 Cfr. August. XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 8. Idem in Enarrat. in Ps. 34. serm. 1. n. 9 ignorantiam vocat tenebram. — In initio arg. post Item Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 interserit si, et deinde sola post defectus est a Deo interiicit et. 2 Art. 1. q. 1. et d. 35. a. 1. q. 2. 3 Isidor., V. Etymolog. c. 27. n. 2: Poena dicta, quod puniat. — Mox pro nocivum codd. K M T V bb ee etc. nocumentum. 4 August., 83 Qq. q. 3: Illo autem auctore cum dicitur, illo volente dicitur. — Paulo superius post poena, a Deo est Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 incongrue addit et; at mox sola et ante Deo placet et ante idem est hanc particulam omittit; deinde post idem est subiicit enim. 5 In multis codd., ut B C E F H K O R S T W Y etc., et in edd. 3, 4 deest simpliciter. 6 Cap. 3. — In Vat., edd. 3, 4 et in aliquibus codd. desiderantur verba, quae mox sequuntur: sicut distinctum est . . . usque ad rei punitae inclusivae. |
1 Cf. (St.) Augustine, On the City of God, Bk. XII, ch. 8. The same in (his) Enarrations on the Psalms, on Ps. 334, sermon 1, n. 9, calls ignorance a “shadow”. — At the beginning of the argument after Likewise [Item] the Vatican edition, together with editions 3 and 4, inserts if [si], and then it alone after defect is from God [defectus est a Deo] interjects and [et]. 2 Article 1, q. 1, and d. 35, a. 1, q. 2. 3 (St.) Isidore (of Seville), Etymologies¸ Bk. V, ch. 27, n. 2: A “punishment” said (is) what punishes. — Next for the very (thing which is) harmful [ipsum nocivum] codices K M T V bb ee etc. have the harm itself [ipsum nocumentum]. 4 (St.) Augustine, Of Eighty-Three Questions, q. 3: Moreover when there is said “by that one as author”, there is meant “by that one as willing”. — A little above this after punishment, is from God [poena, a Deo est] the Vatican edition, together with editions 3 and 4 incongruously adds and [et]; but it alone next omits this particle both before every order [Deo placet] and before the working [idem est]; then it reads for the working [idem est enim]. 5 In many codices, such as B C E F H K O R S T W Y etc., and in editions 3 and 4, there is missing the simply [simpliciter]. 6 Chapter 3. — In the Vatican edition, editions 3 and 4 and in some codices, there are wanting the words, which follow next: just as has been distinguished [sicut distinctum est] up until of the punished thing [rei punitae] inclusively |
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856
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due rationes non concludunt, nisi quod poena sit a Deo sub ratione poenae; sic enim aliquid dicit, quod respicit ordinem, qui attenditur secundum ultionem divinae iustitiae. De eo autem, quod subest, non oportet illud intelligi, quod sit a Dei; nam « crimina criminibus vindicantur », secundum quod Sancti dicunt, et supra1 ostensum fuit. |
two reckonings do not conclude, except that a punishment is from God under the reckoning of a punishment; for thus it means something, which respects the order, which is attained according to the vengeance [ultionem] of the Divine Justice. But concerning that, which underlies (this order), it is not necessary [non oportet] that there be understood, that it be from God; for « crimes are avenged by crimes », according to what the Saints say, and (as) has been shown above.1 |
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3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod passio ignominiae et subtractio gratiae est a Deo; dicendum, quod proprie loquendo, neutrum a Deo esse conceditur nisi permissive, secundum quod Deus dicitur obdurare, quia, ipso gratiam non apponente, homo obduratur; sicut etiam Deus dicitur tradere in desideria cordis. Unde Glossa dicit ibidem:2 « Tradere est permittere, et non incitare, sed dimittere; praecedentibus quippe culparum causis, iure et merito deseruntur a Deo »; et per hoc, quod deseruntur, desideriis traduntur. Similiter, quod dicitur Deus gratiam subtrahere, hoc non est, quod auferat datam, sed quia, homine se avertente, Deus eam non continuat. |
3. To that which is objected, that a passion of ignominy and a withdrawal of grace is from God; it must be said, that properly speaking, neither is to be conceded to be from God except permissively, according to which God is said to make (a sinner) obdurate, because by not apportioning grace to him, man becomes obdurate; just as God is also said “to hand (sinners) over unto the desires of (their) hearts”. Whence the Gloss says on the same place:2 « “To hand over” is “to permit”, and not to incite, but to send away [dimittere]; indeed for the preceding causes of faults, they are rightly and deservedly deserted by God »; and through this, that they are deserted, they are handed over to (their) desires. Similarly, that God is said “to withdraw grace”, this is not, because He takes away a (grace which has been) given, but because, with man turning himself away from (Him), God does not continue it. |
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4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de poena mortis et aeternae damnationis, dicendum, quod utraque a Deo est; utraque enim positionem aliquam vel dispositionem3 nominat sine deordinatione aliqua. — Et si obiiciat, quod poena infernalis est acerbissima; dicendum, quod acerbitas non impedit, quin poena sit a Deo, sed potius deordinatio et defectus. — Et si obiiciat, quod mors dicit defectum; dico, quod mors non tantum dicit defectum, immo dicit passionem et progressum ab esse in non-esse, qui quidem est per animae et corporis separationem, ubi est ergo4 dolor et afflictio. Et licet defectus consequatur ad illam passionem, mors tamen non nominat purum defectum, sed potius passionem et transitum illum; et ideo conceditur mors esse a Deo, quamvis non concedatur de aliis poenis, quarum nomina imponuntur ab ipso defectu. |
4. To that which is objected concerning the “punishment of death” and (the “punishment) of eternal damnation”, it must b e said, that each is from God; for each names the positing and/or arrangement3 of something without a disordering of anything. — And if one objects, that the punishment of Hell is the sharpest one; it must be said, that sharpness does not impede, that a punishment be from God, but rather disorder and defect (do). — And if one objects, that “death” means a defect; it say, that “death” not only means a defect, nay it means a suffering and progress from “being” into “not-being”, which indeed is through the separation of the soul and body, where there is, therefore,4 pain and affliction. And though a defect is consequent to that suffering, yet “death” does not name a pure defect, but rather a suffering and that transitus; and for that reason death is conceded to be from God, though it is not conceded concerning the other punishments, the names for which are imposed from the defect itself. |
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5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod subtractio gratiae est a Deo; dicendum, quod falsum est, proprie loquendo, nisi dicatur permissive, ut dictum est. — Quod vero obiicitur,5 quod ibi est annihilatio et Dei expulsio; dicendum, quod Deum expelli non est aliud quam gratiam Dei repelli. Gratiam autem Dei repelli non est aliud quam gratiam corrumpi, pro eo quod ipsa, cum sit accidens, non habet salvari nisi in substantia rationali. Gratia autem corrumpitur et annihilatur non per actionem contrarii agentis, sed propter defectum in se ipsa. Deficit autem in se ipsa propter hoc, quod subiectum deficit sibi. Anima enim non est nata esse subiectum gratiae nisi per conversionem sui ad Deum; et ideo, cum se a Deo avertit, iam gratia gratum faciens in ea non potest salvari, et ideo in se ipsa deficit. — Quod ergo obiicitur, quod nihil potest gratiam annihilare et Deum de habitaculo suo eiicere; dicendum, quod illa ratio procedit, ac si talis annihilatio vel eiectio fieret per virtutem alicuius agentis. Hoc autem non fit, immo fit propter ineptitudinem suscipientis, sicut visum est.6 |
5. To that which is objected, that the withdrawal of grace “is from God”; it must be said, that (this) is false, properly speaking, unless it be said permissively, as has been said. — But what is objected,5 that in this there is an annihilation (of grace) or an expulsion of God; it must be said, that ‘to expel God (from the soul)’ is not other than to repel the grace of God. But ‘to repel the grace of God’ is not other than to corrupt grace, in virtue of this that it itself, since it is an accident, does not have (an ability) to be conserved [salvari] except in a rational substance. Moreover, grace is corrupted and annihilated not through the action of a contrary agent, but on account of a defect in its very self. But it is deficient in its very self on this account, that (its) subject defects from it. For the soul is not bound to be the subject of grace except through the conversion of itself to God; and for that reason, when it turns itself away from God, the grace already making it pleasing cannot be conserved in it, and for that reason it is deficient in it. — What, therefore, is objected, that nothing can annihilate grace or eject God from His dwelling place; it must be said, that, that reckoning proceeds, as if such an annihilation and/or ejection came to be through the virtue of some agent. But it does not come to be in this (manner), nay it comes to be on account of the ineptitude of the suscipient, just as has been seen.6 |
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6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne ordinatum, et quod reddit honorem Deo, est a Deo; dicendum, quod verum est in quantum tale. Sed cum assumit,7 quod omnis poena est huiusmodi; verum est in quantum poena; et tunc conclusio vera est, videlicet, quod omnis poena, in quantum poena, a Deo est. Sed si ex hoc arguatur ulterius, quod omne illud, quod dicitur poena, est a Deo, utpote culpa vel vitium vel defectus, fiet sophisma secundum accidens,8 quia quaedam sunt, quae Deo attribuere potius sonat in contumeliam quam in gloriam. — Et propterea si alicubi unquam inveniatur, quod concupiscentia vel ignorantia vel cetera similia a Deo sint, exponenda sunt verba, vel quod9 dicta sunt esse a Deo, in quantum sunt poenae, vel dicuntur esse a Deo, secundum quod concernunt aliquod ens, non secundum illud, a quo primo et principaliter imponuntur.10 |
6. To that which is objected, that everything ordinate, and what returns honor to God, is from God; it must be said, that (this) is true inasmuch as (it is) such. But when it assumes,7 that every punishment is of this kind; it is true inasmuch (it is) a punishment, and then the conclusion is true, namely, that every punishment, inasmuch (as it is) a punishment, is from God. But if from this there be argued further, that every that, which is said (to be) a “punishment”, is from God, as for example a fault and/or vice and/or defect, a sophism according to accident will be made,8 because there are certain (acts), to attribute which to God resounds [sonat] rather to (His) contumely than to (His) glory. — And moreover if ever it be found anywhere, that concupiscence and/or ignorance and/or all the other similars are “from God”, the words are to be expounded, either because9 they have been said “to be from God”, according to which they concern some being [ens], not according to that, by which they are first and principally imposed.10 |
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1 Art. 1. q. 1. Verbum August. vide hic lit. Magist. c. 3. 2 Super Rom. 1, 24; vide Petr. Lombard. in hunc locum. — Versus finem solutionis ante datam Vat. repetit gratiam. 3 Codd. K (a secunda manu) T ee et alii cum ed. 1 indispositionem. Particula vel, quae voci dispositionem praecedit, deest in codd. K (a secunda manu) T ee; codd. H Y bb pro ea substituerunt et. 4 Edd. cum aliquot codd., ut F bb, omittunt ergo. 5 Cod. V et ed. 1 Ad illud vero quod obiicitur. 6 Cfr. supra d. 26. q. 5. praesertim ad 5. — Paulo superius pro eiectio edd. praeter 1 cum pluribus codd. abiectio. 7 Sive aliis verbis: cum in minori dicit. — Paulo ante post dicendum, quod Vat. et edd. 3, 4 addunt hoc. 8 Vide tom. I, pag. 58, nota 5, et infra d. 37. a. 2. q. 1. in fine. — Mox pro attribuere Vat. attributa, edd. 3, 4 attribuere possunt, cod. ee attribui possunt. Subinde pro sonat Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 et plures codd. sonant. 9 Cod. F quia. 10 Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest. |
1 Article 1, q. 1. See the verse of (St.) Augustine here in the text of Master (Peter), ch. 3. 2 On Romans 1:24; see Peter Lombard on this passage. — Near the end of the solution before given [datam] , the Vatican edition repeats grace [gratiam]. 3 Codices K (by a second hand) T ee and others, together with editions 1, have non-arrangement [indispositionem]. The particle and/or [vel], which precedes arrangement [dispositionem], is missing in codices K (by a second hand) T and ee; codices H Y and bb have substituted and [et] for it. 4 The editions, together with some codices, such as F and bb, omit the , therefore, [ergo]. 5 Codex V and edition 1 have To that, however, which is objected [Ad illud vero quod obiicitur]. 6 Cf. above d. 26, q. 5, especially in the reply to n. 5. — A little above this for ejection [eiectio] the editions, except edition 1, together with several codices, have casting-away [abiectio]. 7 Or in other words: when it says in the minor (of the argument). — A little before this after it must be said, that [dicendum, quod] the Vatican edition, and editions 3 and 4, add this [hoc]. 8 See Sent, Bk. I, d. 2, a. sole, q. 4, p. 58, footnote 5, and below in d. 37, a. 2, q. 1, at the end. — Next for to attribute [attribuere] the Vatican edition has attributed [attributa], editions 3 and 4 have can attribute [attribuere possunt], codex cc has can be attributed [attribueri possunt]. Then for resounds [sonat] the Vatican edition, together with editions 3 and 4 and several codices, has resound [sonant]. 9 Code F has because [quia]. 10 See the Scholium at the preceding Question. |
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