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S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis |
St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio |
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum |
Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences |
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Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis |
of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris |
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SECUNDI LIBRI |
BOOK TWO |
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVI. |
COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXVI |
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DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI. |
DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER |
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Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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Latin
text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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DUB. I. |
DOUBT I |
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In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur in primo capitulo, quod peccatum est causa peccati. Sed contra: aut peccatum est causa peccati voluntaria, aut necessaria. Non voluntaria, quia nihil voluntarie operatur, nisi quod cognoscit et appetit;11 talis autem est rationalis creatura, non culpa: ergo non est voluntaria causa. Item, non est causa necessaria, . . . |
In this part there are questions about the text, and first there is asked of this which is said in the first chapter, that sin is the cause of sin. But on the contrary: either sin is a voluntary cause of sin, or a necessary one. Not a voluntary one, because nothing operates voluntarily, except what cognizes and desires [appetit];11 but such is the rational creature, not the fault: therefore it is not a voluntary cause. Likewise, it is not a necessary cause, . . . |
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11 Vide supra pag. 592, nota 3. — Subinde post talis autem est cod. Y subiicit sola. |
11 See above d. 25, p. I, a. sole, q. 1, p. 592, footnote 3. — Then after the rational creature talis autem est[ codex Y subjoins alone [sola]. |
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quia qui peccavit uno peccato, non est necesse, quod peccet altero:1 ergo non videtur, quod aliquo modo sit causa. — Item, si peccatum est causa peccati, aut ratione alicuius boni substrati, aut ratione defectus. Non ratione boni substrati, quia tunc magis deberet dici bonum esse causa mali, quam peccatum causa peccati. Non ratione defectus, quia quod nihil est nullius est causa; intentio enim causalitatis in solis entibus reperitur. |
because he who sinned by one sin, it is not necessary [necesse], that he sin by the other:1 therefore it does not seem, that it is in any manner a cause. — Likewise, if a sin is a cause of a sin, either by reason of some substrate good, or by reason of a defect. Not by reason of a substrate good, because then the good would have to be said to be the “cause” of the evil, than the sin the cause of the sin. Not by reason of a defect, because what is nothing is the cause of nothing; for the intention* of “causality” is found in beings alone. |
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Propter quod est quaestio, quod peccatum sit causa peccati, et ratione cuius peccatum sit causa peccati. |
On which account there is the question, “On which account is a sin the cause of a sin?”, and “According to the reckoning of what is a sin a cause of a sin?” |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod cum in peccato duo sint, videlicet conversio et aversio, ratione utriusque peccatum habet ad aliud peccatum disponere, et per hoc peccatum aliud dicitur causare. Ratione quidem aversionis, quia in hoc, quod a Deo avertit, elongat a bono, et per hoc homo efficitur impotens ad resistendum malo. Ratione conversionis, sicut actus unius virtutis disponit ad actum alterius,2 utpote actus nutritivae ad generativam, sic una culpa habet disponere ad aliam, utpote gula ad luxuriam. Est igitur peccatum causa peccati, id est dispositio trahens sive inclinans ad aliud peccatum, tam ratione aversionis quam ratione conversionis. Sed ratione aversionis, in qua communicant omnia peccata, quodlibet est causa cuiuslibet; ratione vero conversionis, in qua distinguuntur, non quodlibet est causa cuiuslibet, sed peccatum unius generis disponit ad peccatum generis proximi, utpote spirituale ad spirituale, ut superbia ad invidiam, et carnale ad carnale, sicut gula ad luxuriam. |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that since there are two (things) in sin, namely a conversion and an aversion, sin has (an ability) according to the reckoning of each to dispose (the sinner) to another sin, and through this it is said “to cause” the other sin. Indeed according to the reckoning of aversion, because in this, that it turns away from God, it distances from the good, and through this a man is made impotent to resist evil. According to the reckoning of conversion, just as the act of one virtue disposes to the act of the other,2 as for example the act of the nutritive (power) to the generative (power), thus one fault has (an ability) to dispose to another, as for example gluttony to lust. Therefore a sin is the cause of a sin, that is, (it is) a disposition drawing or inclining to another sin, both according to the reckoning of aversion and according to the reckoning of conversion. But according to the reckoning of aversion, in which all sins communicate, any is the cause of any; but according to the reckoning of conversion, in which they are distinguished, not every is the cause of any, but the sin of one genus disposes to the sin of the proximate genus, as for example a spiritual (sin) to a spiritual (sin), such as pride to envy, and a carnal (sin) to a carnal (sin), such as gluttony to lust. |
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Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod non est causa voluntaria nec necessaria; dicendum, quod peccatum non est sufficiens causa peccati; sed causa dicitur in hoc, quod trahit voluntatem, ut committat aliam3 culpam, et ita reducitur ad causam voluntariam. |
To that, therefore, which is objected, that it is not a voluntary nor a necessary cause; it must be said, that sin is not a sufficient cause sin; but it is said (to be) a “cause” in this, that it draws the will, to commit another3 fault, and thus it is reduced to a voluntary cause. |
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Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum sit causa ratione positionis, vel defectus; dico, quod ratione utriusque, sicut visum est.4 Conversio enim inordinata disponit ad aliam conversionem inordinatam. Ex conversione enim inordinata augetur in nobis concupiscentia et pronitas ad malum, et dum augetur pronitas et concupiscentia, quasi quoddam pondus ponitur in anima. « Quod enim est pondus in corporibus, hoc est amor in spiritibus ». Et ideo bene dicit Gregorius, quod « peccatum, quod per poenitentiam non diluitur, mox pondere suo ad aliud trahit ».5 Et ita nec defectus per se facit, nec bonum per se, sed unum cum alio. — Illud tamen argumentum non valet: quia defectus non potest esse causa alicuius, ergo non potest esse causa peccati. Causare enim peccatum non est causare aliquid, sed potius deficere. Unde est ibi sophisma secundum quid et simpliciter.6 |
To that which is asked, “Whether it be a cause according to the reckoning of a positing, and/or of a defect?”; I say, that (it is such) according to the reckoning of each, just as has been seen.4 For an inordinate conversion disposes to another inordinate conversion. For out of an inordinate conversion there is increased in us the concupiscence and proneness to evil, and when the proneness and concupiscence is increased, there is placed in the soul a certain weight. « For that which weight is in bodies, is love in spirits ». And for that reason (Pope St.) Gregory (the Great) says well, that « a sin, which is not washed away through penitence, by its own weight soon drags (one) to another (sin) ».5 And thus neither the defect works through itself, nor the good through itself, but one (works) with the other. — Yet that argument is not valid: ‘because a defect cannot be the cause of anything, therefore it cannot be the cause of a sin’. For ‘to cause a sin’ is not to cause anything, but rather to fail [deficere]. Wherefore in that (argument) there is a sophism secundum quid et simpliciter.6 |
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DUB. II. |
DOUBT II |
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Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Illico, ut peccat homo, fit in homine corruptio, quae tamen fit Deo auctore. Sed contra hoc est, quia illa boni corruptio, sive active dicatur sive passive, est imaginis Dei deformatio. Deformatio autem imaginis Deo displicet; et nihil quod Deo displicet, est a Deo — « idem enim est fieri Deo auctore et Deo volente »7 — ergo talis corruptio non est a Deo. — Item, eadem sunt principia actionis et passionis: ergo si corruptio-actio non est a Deo, videtur similiter, quod nec corruptio-passio. |
Likewise is asked concerning this which (Master Peter) says: In this, that man sins, there comes to be in the man that corruption, which, however, is wrought by God as author. But against this is, that that corruption of the good, whether it be actively or passively said, is a deformation of the image of God. But the deformation of the image displeases God; and nothing which displeases God, is from God — « for that (something) is done ‘by God as author’ and ‘by God as willing’ is the same »7 — therefore such a corruption is not from God. — Likewise, the same are the principles of the action and the passion: therefore if the corruption-action is not from God, it seems similarly, that neither (is) the corruption-passion. |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod illud verbum non est dictum secundum opinionem Magistri, sed secundum opinionem aliorum, sicut patet ex ipsa serie litterae.8 Sed quia tamen illud idem videtur Magister dixisse in ultimo capitulo praecedentis distinctionis; aliter respondendum est, quod in illa corruptione et est considerare defectum et deordinationem; est nihilominus ibi considerare passionem et ordinem ad praecedentem actionem; et quantum ad haec duo ultima, corruptio ista tenet rationem poenae, et quantum ad hoc dicitur esse a Deo, videlicet in quantum poena. Simpliciter autem loquendo, ut dicatur corruptio modi, speciei et ordinis esse a Deo sive deformatio imaginis, non admittitur; sicut rationes ostendunt, propter hoc quod talis corruptio et defectum dicit et etiam deordinationem, quae est culpa, sicut supra9 est ostensum. Et est talis corruptio poena non inflicta nec contracta, sed acta; et ideo quodam modo tenet rationem culpae, sicut ostensum fuit in praecedenti distinctione.10 Et quantum ad hoc non intelligitur illud quod in littera dicitur. — Et per hoc patent ea quae in littera obiiciuntur. |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that that verse has not been said according to the opinion of Master (Peter), but according to the opinion of others, as is clear from the order [serie] itself of the text.8 But, yet, because Master (Peter) seems to have said the same in the last chapter of the preceding Distinction; it must be responded in another manner, that in that corruption there is both a considering of the defect and the disordering; and nevertheless there is in it a considering of the passion and the order [ordinem] to the preceding action; and as much as regards these last two, that corruption holds the reckoning of a punishment, and as much as regards this it is said to be “from God”, namely, inasmuch as (it is) a punishment. But simply speaking, as a corruption of measure, beauty and order or a deformation of the image is said to be “from God”, it is not admitted; just as the reasons show, on this account that such a corruption and defect mean also the disordering, which is a fault, just as has been shown above.9 And such a corruption is not a inflicted nor a contracted punishment, but an acted (one); and for that reason it holds in a certain manner the reckoning of a fault, just as has been shown in the preceding Distinction.10 And that which is said in the text is not understood as much as regards this. — And through this those (things) which are objected in the text are clear. |
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DUB. III. |
DOUBT III |
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Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Si quis dicat, ea quae peccata sunt, essentialiter poenas esse, in nullo praeiudicium fit veritati. Et postea subiungit, . . . |
Likewise is asked concerning this which (Master Peter) says: If anyone says, that those which are sins, are essentially punishments, in nothing is a prejudice done to the truth. And afterwards he subjoins, . . . |
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1 Edd., excepta 1, cum codd. O R ee etc. voci altero et paulo superius pariter voci uno praefigunt in. 2 Cod. T hic repetit virtutis. 3 Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 paulo superius post sed omissa voce causa, hic loco aliam exhibet aliquando. 4 Cfr. etiam supra d. 35. a. 1. q. 1, praesertim ad 2. 5 Secundum Augustinum. Vide supra pag. 76, nota 6. — Verbum Gregorii exhibetur XXV. Moral. c. 9. n. 22. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. et 3. — Pro spiritibus Vat. spiritualibus. 6 De quo vide Aristot., I. Elench. c. 4. (c. 5.). — De hoc dubio tractant Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 9; S. Thom., hic a. 1; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1; Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. 7 August., 83 Qq q. 3. Vide supra pag. 855, nota 4. 8 Hic c. 2. 9 Art. 3. q. 2. 10 Art. 1, q. 2, praecipue in solut. ad 4. — Cfr. Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a med., hic circa lit. |
1 The editions, except edition 1, together with codices O R ee etc., have a little above in the one [in uno] for by the one [uno], and here in the other [in altero] for by the other [altero]. 2 Codex T repeats here virtue [virtutis]. 3 The Vatican edition, and editions 2, 3 and 4, having omitted (to be) a “cause” [causa] after but [sed], here exhibits sometimes a [aliquando] for another [aliam]. 4 Cf. also above d. 35, a. 1, q. 1, chiefly in reply to n. 2. 5 According to (St.) Augustine. See above d. 2, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, p. 76, footnote 6. — The words of (Pope St.) Gregory (the Great) are exhibited in (his) Morals on the Book of Job, Bk. XXV, ch. 9, n. 22. Cf. the text of Master (Peter) here in chs. 1 and 3. — For spirits [spiritibus] the Vatican edition has spiritual (things) [spiritualibus]. 6 Concerning which, see Aristotle, Lists of Sophistic Errors, Bk. I, ch. 4 (ch. 5). — Treating of this doubt are Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 94, m. 9; St. Thomas, here in a. 1; (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 1; Richard of Middleton, here on the text; Giles the Roman, here in q. 2, a. 1. 7 (St.) Augustine, Of Eighty-Three Questions, q. 3. See above here in a. 3, q. 2, p. 855, footnote 4. 8 Here in ch. 2. 9 Article 3, q. 2. 10 Article 1, q. 2, chiefly in the solution of n. 4. — Cf. (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Middleton, here on the text. |
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* [Trans. note: Intention, in the sense it is used here, is the technical Scholastic term for the meaning of a word; thus the Seraphic Doctor is saying here that, that which the word “causality” signifies, is found only in those which are positive beings; defects are negations or negative beings, by definition.] |
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quod huiusmodi punitiones iustae sunt et a Deo sunt, nec tamen1 peccata a Deo sunt. Videtur enim esse implicatio contradictionis. Primo enim dicit, unum et idem, essentialiter loquendo, est poena et culpa; et post dicit, quod idem ipsum et est a Deo et non est a Deo. |
that acts of punishing of this kind are just and are from God, and yet the1 sins are not from God. For (this) seems to be a implication of a contradiction. For first he says, that one and the same, essentially speaking, is the punishment and the fault; and afterwards he says, that the very same is from God and is not from God. |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum est ad hoc, quod illud et consimilia intelligenda sunt cum reduplicatione, ut quando dicitur, quod aliquod peccatum est poena peccati, et quod poena illa est a Deo; hoc intelligitur, secundum quod poena, hoc est secundum rationem ordinationis. Et hoc innuit Magister in littera,2 cum dicit, quod non in quantum peccata sunt, poenae sunt, nec in quantum peccata sunt, a Deo sunt, quasi dicat: cum in idem concurrant ratio deordinationis et ordinationis per relationem ad diversa, ordinatio est a Deo, deordinatio vero minime. |
I RESPOND: It must be said to this, that that (verse) and (those) completely similar (to it) are to be understood with a reduplication, such as when there is said, that something “is a sin and a punishment for sin, and that that punishment if from God”; this is understood, according to which (it is) a punishment, that is according to the reckoning of (its) being ordered [rationem ordinationis]. And Master (Peter) indicates this in the text,2 when he says, that they are punishments, not inasmuch as they are sins, and (that) they are from God, not inasmuch as they are sins, as if to say: “since the reckoning of (their) being disordered [deordinationis] and (their) being ordered [ordinationis] concur in the same through a relation3 to diverse (things), (their) being ordered is from God, but (their) being disordered (is) least of all (from God). |
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DUB. IV. |
DOUBT IV |
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Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod sunt quaedam necessitate facta improbanda. Contrarium huius videtur dicere Augustinus in libro de Duabus Animabus.4 Dicit enim, quod illud solum est peccatum, a quo « liberum est abstinere ». |
Likewise is asked concerning that which (St. Augustine) says, that certain (acts) done by necessity are not to be approved [improbanda]. (St.) Augustine seems to say the contrary of this in (his) book On the Two Souls.4 For he says that that alone is a sin, from which « one is free to abstain ». |
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Et dicendum est ad hoc, quod, sicut Magister determinat infra,5 quaedam necessitas est ad venialia peccata, saltem in universali. Illa autem ratio et verbum, quod ibidem sequitur, intelligitur de peccato actuali mortali. Qualiter autem necessitas sit ad venialia, hoc habebit quaestionem infra suo loco, ubi Magister inquirit, distinctione quadragesima prima.6 |
And there must be said to this, that, just as Master (Peter) determines below,5 there is a certain necessity regarding venial sins, at least in the universal. But that reckoning and verse, which follows in the same place, is understood of actual mortal sin. Moreover in what kind of manner (this) necessity regards venial (sins), this will have a Question below in its own place, where Master (Peter) inquires [inquirit], in the Forty-First Distinction.6 |
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DUB. V. |
DOUBT V |
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Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Addunt quoque, quosdam actus non tantum essentia, sed etiam genere esse bonos, ut reficere esurientem. Quaeritur enim: pro quanto dicitur7 bonum in genere. Si quia dicit bonum absque circumstantia aliqua superaddita, tunc videtur, quod reficere indigentem non sit bonum in genere, quia est ibi circumstantia debita in eo qui reficitur. Si tu dicas, quod bonum in genere dicitur, quia commune est et universale; tunc videtur, quod similiter deberet dici bonum in species, cum generale dicitur respectu speciei. |
Likewise is asked concerning this which (Master Peter) says: They also add, that certain acts are good not only according to essence, but also according to genus, such as to refresh the hungry. For there is asked: “To what extent is it said (to be)7 “good in genus”? Because, if he says (that this act is) good apart from any superadded circumstance, then it seems, that to refresh the indigent is not good in genus, because there is a circumstance due there in him who is refected. If you say, that it is said (to be) “good in genus”, because it is common and universal; then it seems, that similarly it ought to be said (to be) “good in species”, since the general is said in respect of the species. |
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Est igitur quaestio, pro quanto dicatur aliquid esse bonum in genere. Quaestio est etiam de sufficientia ipsius divisionis per tria membra; videtur enim esse insufficiens, quia non tantum est bonum in genere et bonum ex intentione et causa, sed etiam bonum gratiae et bonum gloriae. |
Therefore, there is the question, “To what extent [pro quanto] is something said to be ‘good in genus’?” There is also a question concerning the sufficiency of the division of the same through three members; for it seems to be insufficient, that there is not only a good in genus and a good out of intention and cause, but also a good of grace and a good of glory. |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod Magister dividit hic bonum non quocumque modo, sed bonum, prout est in actu. Bonum autem huiusmodi habet considerari in se sive secundum se; et sic est bonum naturae. Habet iterum considerari secundum comparationem ad materiam debitam; et sic dicitur bonum in genere. Habet iterum considerari secundum alia tria genera causarum, videlicet in comparatione ad efficiens et formam et finem; et sic est bonum perfectum. |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that Master (Peter) here divides not the ‘good in whatsoever manner’, but the ‘good, insofar as it is in act’. Moreover the good of this kind has (an ability) to be considered in itself or according to itself; and thus it is the good of nature. Again, it has (an ability) to be considered according to the comparison to (its) due matter; and in this manner there is said the “good in genus”. Again it has (an ability) to be considered according to the other three genera of causes, namely in comparison to (its) efficient (cause) and form and end; and thus there is the ‘perfect good’. |
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Et sic patet sufficientia, quia omnis actus aut comparatur ad suum principium efficiens solum; aut comparatur ad suum principium efficiens, prout respicit debitum obiectum; aut comparatur ad suum principum efficiens, prout respicit debitum obiectum et finem congruum. Bonum autem, secundum quod respicit materiam debitam, dicitur esse bonum in genere, pro eo quod, sicut genus dicit esse in potentia ad esse completum, quae completur per adventum differentiarum,8 sic in actu transeunte super materiam debitam quodam modo inchoatur bonum moris; illud autem bonum moris specificatur et completur per adventum circumstantiarum, unde potest fieri et bene et male. Similiter intelligendum est de malo in genus. — Quamvis autem bonum et malum possint differenter fieri et bene et male; nihilominus tamen bonum, quantum est de se, dicit inchoationem boni, et malum similiter mali; et ideo nomen boni tenet, quia in ipso salvatur ratio generis. Unde bonum naturae respectu boni moris est quasi in potentia materiali, quae est potentia passiva; bonum autem in genere aliquo modo est bonum moris ex hoc, quod transit supra materiam debitam; et ideo assimilatur potentiae generis, quae est aliquo modo activa. Genus enim est forma, ut dicit Philosophus,9 licet per comparationem ad differentias in definitione sit sicut materia. |
And thus the sufficiency (of the division) is clear, because every act is either compared to its efficient principle alone; or it is compared to its efficient principle, insofar as it looks back to (its) due object; or it is compared to its efficient principle, insofar as it looks back to its due object and congruous end. But the good (act), according to which it looks back to (its) due matter, is said to be “the good in genus”, in virtue of this, that just as “genus” means the “being” in potency [esse in potentia] regarding a complete “being” [esse completum], which is completed through the advent of the differences,8 so in a transient act upon a due matter there is in a certain manner undertaken [inchoatur] a good of morals; but that good of morals is specified and completed through the advent of the circumstances, wherefore it can be done both well and badly. Similarly must it be understood concerning the (act) “evil in genus”. — But though the a good and evil (act) can be done differently both well and badly; yet, nevertheless, the good (act), as much as it concerns itself, means a undertaking of a good [inchoationem boni], and evil similarly (the undertaking) of an evil; and for that reason it holds the name of “good”, because in it there is saved the reckoning of the genus (of the good). Wherefore the good of nature in respect of a good of morals is quasi in material potency, which is a passive potency; but the (act) good in genus in some manner is a good (act) of morals out of this, that it passes over a due matter; and for that reason it is likened [assimilatur] to the potency of a genus, which is in a certain manner active. For a genus is a form, as the Philosopher9 says, though through (its) comparison to (its) differences in the definition it is just as a matter. |
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Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam bo- /-num . . . |
And through this the response to the objections is clear. For the (act) / good . . . |
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1 In littera Magistri additur in quantum. 2 Hic c. 4. 3 Codd. C F H I O R S T V W Z ee et edd. 2, 3, 4 assertionem, codd. X Y bb comparationem, ed. 1 assumptionem; in cod. T legitur per assertionem, per assertionem ad diversa. — Huius dubii solutio habetur etiam apud S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 5. 4 Cap. 11. n. 15. 5 Dist. XLI in fine. Vide ibid. Comment. a. 2. q. 1. De eadem re Magister iam locutus est in praecedente d. c. 6. — Mox edd. praeter 1 cum codd. O R ee et aliis: ad peccata venialia, peccata saltem in universali. 6 Loc. citt. in nota praeced. — De hoc dubio cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 4; Peter. a Tar., et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 6. 7. 7 Edd., excepta 1, adiiciunt esse. Subinde pro Si quia dicit Vat. Si dicitur quia. 8 Cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 43. (VI. c. 12.). — Paulo ante pro genus dicit Vat. genus dicitur. Subinde pro in potentia plures codd. in potentiam, alii impotentiam. 9 Libr. II. Phys. text. ult.; VII. Metaph. text. 43. et VIII. text. 6 (VI. c. 12. et VII. c. 2.). Averroes hos locos exponens docet, definitiones continere genera et differentias; genera esse formas universales, differentias autem formas proprias, genera determinantes. |
1 In the text of Master (Peter) there is read yet inasmuch as (they are) sins they [tamen in quantum] for yet the sins [tamen]. 2 Here in ch. 4. 3 Codices C F H I O R S T V W Z ee and editions 2, 3 and 4 have an assertion [assertionem], codices X Y and bb a comparison [comparationem], edition 1 an assumption [assumptionem]; in codex T there is read through assertion, through assertion to diverse (things) [per assertionem, per assertionem ad diversa]. — The solution of this doubt is also had in St. Thomas and (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text; Giles the Roman, here in the 5th doubt on the text. 4 Chapter 11, n. 15. 5 Distinction XLI at the end. See ibid., Commentary (of St. Bonaventure), a. 2, q. 1. — On the same matter Master (Peter) has already spoke in the preceding distinction, ch. 6. — Next the editions, except edition 1, together with codices O R ee and others, have: regarding venial sins, sins at least in the universal [ad peccata venialia, peccata saltem in universali]. 6 Loc. citt., in the preceding footnote. — On this doubt cf. Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 4; (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Middleton, here on the text; Giles the Roman, here in the 6th & 7th doubt on the text. 7 The editions, except edition 1, adjoin to be [esse]. Then for Because if he says (that this act is) [Si quia dicit] the Vatican edition has If it is said that (this act is) [Si dicitur quia] 8 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 43 (Bk. VI, ch. 12). — A little before this for “genus” means the “being” [genus dicit esse] the Vatican edition has a genus is said to be [genus dicitur]. Then for in potency [in potentia] several codices have in regard to a potency [in potentiam], others an impotence [impotentiam]. 9 Physics, Bk. II, last text; Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 32, and Bk. VIII, text 6 (Bks. VI, ch. 12, and VII, ch. 2). Averroës, expounding these passages, teaches, that definitions contain genera and differences; that genera are universal forms, but differences are proper forms, determining the genera. |
p.
859
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bo- /-num ex circumstantia contineri potest sub bono perfecto, vel sub bono in genere. Si enim est indutum omnibus bonis circumstantiis, continetur sub bono perfecto. Si autem deficit in aliqua circumstantia, reducitur ad bonum in genere. Sub bono autem perfecto comprehenditur actus gratuitus et gloriosus. |
the (act) /good out of (its) circumstances can be contained under the perfect good, and/or under the (act) good in genus. For if it has clothed itself in all good circumstances, it is contained under the perfect good. But if it is deficient in any circumstance, it is reduced to the good in genus. But under the perfect good there is comprehended the gratuitous and glorious act.* |
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Possent autem plura quaeri de hac materia, sed alibi magis habent locum quam hic.1 |
Moreover more could be asked concerning this matter, but they have (their) place rather elsewhere than there.1 |
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1 Cfr. infra d. 41. a. 1. q. 1. — Pro habent locum cod. cc et ed. 1 habet locum. In praecedentibus multi codd., ut F K T V Y bb ee etc., ter sub bono perfecte pro sub bono perfecto, sed contra contextum. — De hoc dubio scripserunt Alex. Hal., S. p. II, q. 96. per totam; B. Albert., hic a. 6. seq.; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3. |
1 Cf. below d. 41, a. 1, q. 1. — For they have (their) place [habent locum] codex cc and edition 1 has (this) has (its) place [habet locum]. In the preceding many codices, such as F K T V Y bb ee etc., have three times under the perfectly good [sub bono perfecte] for under the perfect good [sub bono perfecto], but contrary to the context. — Writing of this doubt are Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 96 throughout; Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 6, f.; (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Middleton, here on the text; Giles the Roman, here in q. 2, a. 3. |
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* [Trans. note: The gratuitous and glorious act are those moral acts accomplished either in this life with graces or in the next, with the light of glory.] |
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