Commentary on the Book of Sentences

Tertio quaeritur, utrum aliqua creatura pura potuerit satisfacere pro toto genere humano. Et quod sic, videatur.

1. Una creatura pura potuit totum genus humanum inficere per culpam suam:⁴ ergo si gratia est principium satisfaciendi, sicut culpa principium inficiendi; videtur, quod aliqua pura creatura per suam gratiam potuerit satisfacerre pro toto genere humano.

2. Item, non plus exigitur in iusta poena, quam commissum fuit in culpa: si ergo genus humanum lapsum fuit per tansgressionem purae creaturae, videtur, quod pura creatura potuerit satisfacere pro genere humano.

3. Item, diabolus iuste perdidit genus humanum, quia extendit manum suam in innocentem:⁵ ergo si potuit esse aliqua pura creatura omnino innocens, quae se pro salute generis humani exponeret, et diabolus manum in eam extenderet; videtur, quod aliqua pura creatura redimere potuisset genus humanum de diabolica potestate, et ita satisfacere pro eodem.

4. Item, plus pensat Deus vitam et animam unius iusti quam vitam et animam innumberabilium peccatorum: ⁶ si ergo aliqua pura creatura innocens et sancta se Deo et Patri obtulisset pro peccatoribus hostiam, facta esset recompensatio iusta, ergo et satisfactio debita.

5. Item, esto quod Christus fuisset pura creatura et mortuus fuisset in cruce, sicut mortuus fuit; quaero tunc: aut fuisset detentus in limbo, aut non. Constat, quod in limbo detentus non fuisset, quia non habuit reatum peccati originalis: ergo apertum fuisset ei caelum: meruisset ergo Christus apertionem ianuae. Si ergo ianua non habuit aperiri nisi per sufficientem satisfactionem, videtur, quod pura creatura satisfacere potuisset pro toto genere humano.

Third it is asked, whether any pure creature could have made satisfaction for the whole human grace. And that it is so, it seen (from the following):

1. A pure creature could have tainted the whole human race through its own fault:⁴ therefore if grace is the principle of making satisfaction, as fault is the principal of tainting; it seems, that any pure creature by its own grace could have made satisfaction for the whole human race.

2. Likewise, not more is demanded in a just punishment, than what had been committed in a fault; if therefore the human race had fallen by means of the transgression of a pure creature, it seems, that a pure creature would have been able to make satisfaction for the human race.

3. Likewise, the devil justly lost the human race, since he extended his hand against the innocent:⁵ therefore if there could be some pure creature wholely innocent, which would lay itself down for the salvation of the human race, and the devil would extend his hand against it, it seems, that some pure creature could have redeemed the human race from the diabolic power, and so make satisfaction for latter.

4. Likewise, God thinks more of the life and soul of a single just one than the of the life and souls of innumberable sinners:⁶ if therefore any pure creature, innocent and holy, had offered itself as a host to (Our) God and Father for sinners, a just recompense would have been made, and therefore due satisfaction.

5. Likewise, granted that Christ was a pure creature and had died on the Cross, just as He did die; I ask then: either He would have been detained in limbo, or not. It is established, that He would not have been detained in limbo, since He did not have the guilt (reatus) of original sin: therefore Heaven had been opened to Him: therefore Christ would have merited the opening of the gate(s of Heaven). If therefore the gate(s of Heaven) had not been opened except by a sufficient satisfaction, it seems, that a pure creature could have made satsifaction for the whole human race.

SED CONTRA: 1. Si pura creatura esset, aut esset homo, aut non-homo. Si esset purus homo, ergo esset peccator et debitor: ergo non potuisset esse mediator et reconciliator, cum ipse indigeret reconciliatione. Si esset non-homo; sed pro homine non debet satisfacere nisi homo, quia ad eum pertinet satisfactio, in quo fuit transgressio: ergo si nec purus homo nec non-homo potuit satisfacere pro toto genere humano, videtur, quod nulla pura creatura potuerit:⁷

2. Item, satisfactio debet proportionari offensae et iniuriae; sed tanta est offensa et iniuria, quantus est ille cui infertur; cum igitur Deus sit infinitus, offensa et iniuria Dei est infinita. Sed nulla creatura nec eius operatio est infinita: ergo nulla pura creatura potest satisfacere pro offensa et iniuria Deo illata. Sed talis fuit iniuria Adae et posteritatis suae, quia Deum contempsit:⁸ ergo etc.

3. Item, nullus satisfacit, nisi restituat tantum et amplius, quantum abstulit; sed nulla pura creatura valet totum genus humanum, quod per peccatum Adae fuit Deo subtractum, restitutere: ergo nulla pura creatura potest satisfacere pro ipso.⁹

4. Item, nullus potest satisfacere pro omni homine, nisi posset influere in omnem hominem iustitiam, sicut primus parens transmisit culpam; sed nulla pura creatura potest aliis influere iustitiam vel dare gratiam, sicut ostensum fuit in primo libro:¹⁰ ergo nulla pura creatura potest satisfacere pro toto genere humano.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. If there was a pure creature, it was either a man, or a non-man. If there was a pure man, therefore he would have been a sinner and debtor: therefore he could not have been the mediator and reconciler, since he himelf would be in need of reconciliation. If there was a non-man; but none except man should make satisfaction for man, since satisfaction pertains to him, in whom there was transgression; therefore if neither a pure man nor a non-man could have made satisfaction for the whole human race, it seems, that no pure creature could have.⁷

2. Likewise, satisfaction should be proportionate to the offense and injury; but the offense and injury is as great, as the one to whom it is brought against; since therefore God is infinite, the offense and injury to God is infinite. But no creature nor its operation is infinite: therefore no pure creature can make satisfaction for the offense and injury offered to God. But such was the injury of Adam and his posterity, since it contemned God:⁸ therefore etc..

3. Likewise, none makes satisfaction, unless he restores so much and more, as much as he took away; but no pure creature avails to restore the whole human race, because by the sin of Adam it was removed from God: therefore no pure creature can make satisfaction for it.⁹

4. Likewise, none can make satisfaction for every man, unless it could infuse justice into every man, just as the first parent transmitted fault; but no pure creature can infuse justice into others or give grace, as had been been shown in the First Book:¹⁰ therefore no pure creature can make satisfaction for the whole human race.

5. Item, non minus obligamus Deo pro beneficio recreationis quam pro beneficio creationis: si ergo pura creatura genus humanum redemisset, tantum essemus sibi obligati, quantum nostro Creatori: ergo tantum teneremus diligere creaturam quantum Creatore. Si ergo impossibile est, nos ad hoc obligari;¹ impossibile fuit, puram creaturam satisfacere pro toto genere humano.

5. Likewise, we are not less oblidged to God for the benefice of re-creation than for the benefice of creation: if therefore a pure creature had redeemed the human race, we would be as much obligated to itself, as to Our Creator; therefore we would be bound to love a creature as much as the Creator. If therefore it is imposssible, that we are oblidged to it;¹ (then) it was impossible, that a pure creature make satisfaction for the whole human race.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod de duobus consuevit fieri satisfactio et requiri, videlicet de iniuriam et de damno. Si igitur Deus requirit satisfactionem ab humano genere; aut requirit pro utroque, aut pro altero horum. Si pro utroque, planum est, quod impossibile est, aliquam puram creaturam Deo satisfacere pro humano genere, pro eo quod tam gravis est iniuria, quae infertur Deo ob excellentissimam eius dignitatem, quod nulla pura creatura potest recompensare aliquid illi aequale. Si vero exigat satisfactionem de solo damno, condonando iniuriam; nec sic potest pro toto genere humano satisfacere aliqua pura creatura. Aut enim illa creatura esset homo, aut non esset homo. Si esset homo, cum unus purus homo non possit aequivalere toti generi humano, talis homo, offerendo se ipsum Deo, nunquam recompensaret damnum, quod Adam intulit, corrumpendo totum genus humanum. Si esset non-homo; nec sic adhuc posset damnum recompensare, si pura creatura esset; aut si posset, non tamen satisfaceret, quia ad illud genus spectat satisfactio, ad quod spectavit transgressio.² Aut si hoc posset, non tamen deceret, quia naturam humanam in statum pristinum non revocaret; esset enim ex hoc subiecta alii generi creaturae.

Et ex hoc habetur, quod non solum pura creatura non posset Deo satisfacere, si esset alterius generis, sed etiam, nec si esset a Deo assumta, conveniret, ut pro humano genere satisfaceret. — Et ideo, cum pura creatura non posset pro toto genere humano satisfacere, nec alterius generis creaturam deceret ad hoc assumi; oportuit, ut persona satisfacientis esset Deus et homo.³ — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod nulla pura creatura posset satisfacere pro toto genere humano.

1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod pura creatura potuit totum genus humanum inficere; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia aliqua pura creatura potuit esse principium totius generis humani secudum propagationem carnalem, per quam genus humanum corrumpitur et inficitur; sed nulla pura creatura potuit esse principium totius generis humani secudum regenerationem spiritualem.⁴

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non plus exigitur in iusta poena, quam commissum est in culpa; dicendum, quod culpa non solum aggravatur ex parte conditionis peccantis,⁵ sed etiam ex parte eius, in quem peccatur; et licet peccans fuerit pura creatura, ille tamen, in quem peccavit, fuit Creator. Ideo, cum exigitur, quod satisfaciens non sit pura creatura, hoc non est supra id quod commissum est in culpa; oportet enim, quod persona satisfaciens pro peccatis gravitate satisfaciat secudum omnes conditiones, secundum quas habet aggravari.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod diabolus iuste amisit genus humanum, quia extendit manum in eum, in quem non habebat ius; dicendum, quod in hoc non exprimitur sufficiens ratio satisfactionis, sed modus vicendi diabolum. Et bene verum est, quod aliqua pura creatura innocens potuisset diabolum vincere; sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod posset⁶ Deo satisfacere. Longe enim plus est recompensare Deo illatam iniuriam quam vincere diabolicam fraudem.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod plus pensat Deus animam iusti⁷ quam animas innumberabilium peccatorum; dicendum, quod Deus in satisfactione non quaerit recompensationem de genere humano, secundum quod est in statu peccati, sed secundum quod fuisset, si non peccasset; et hoc modo nullius puri hominis vitam Deus tantum appretiatur, sicut totam generationem humanam.

5. Ad illud quod quaeritur, si Christus fuisset pura creatura, utrum moriens introisset in caelum; dicendum, quod sic; ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod⁸ meruisset ianuae apertionem, quia caelum nunquam fuerat sibi clausum, hoc posito, quod non habuisset peccati originalis reatum. Alii vero, qui reatum peccati originalis habebant, propter hoc non fuissent in caelum introducti; et ita adhuc remansisset ianua clausa, pro eo quod non fuisset sufficiens satisfactio persoluta.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that for two things satisfaction is accustomed to be made and required, namely for injury and for damage. If therefore God requires satisfaction from the human race, either He requires it for both, or for one of these. If for both, it is plane, that it is impossible, that any pure creature make satisfaction to God for the human race, for the reason that the injury is so grave, which is offered to God on account of His most excellent dignity, that no pure creature can recompense Him anything equivalent. If truly He would exact satisfaction for only the damage, by overlooking the injury, neither in this way could any pure creature make satisfaction for the whole human race. For either that creature would have been man, or would not have been man. If it would have been man, since a pure man cannot equal the whole human race, such a man, by offering his very self to God, would never recompense the damage, which Adam offered, by corrupting the whole human race. If it would have been non-man, not even in this way could it have recompensed the damage, if it would have been a pure creature, or if it it was able, it would not however have made satisfaction, since satisfaction pertains to that race, to which the transgression pertained.² Or if this was able, it would not however be fitting, since it would not recall the human race to its pristine state, for on account of this it would be subjected to a creature of another race.

From this it is had, that not only could a pure creature not have made satisfaction to God, if it would have been of another race, but also, neither if it would have been assumed by God, would it have been suitable, to make satisfaction for the human race. — And on that account, since a pure creature could not have made satisfaction for the whole human race, neither would it have been fitting that a creature of any other race be assumed for this; it was proper, that the person to make satisfaction be God and man.³ — Therefore these manifest reasons must be conceded, that no pure creature could have made satisfaction for the whole human race.

1. To that which is at first objected to the contrary, that a pure creature could have tainted the whole human race; it must be said, that it is not the same thing: since some pure creature could be the principle of the whole human race according to carnal propagation, through whom the human race is corrupted and tainted; but no pure creature could be the principle of the whole human race according to spiritual regeneration.⁴

2. To that which is objected, that there is not exacted more in a just punishment, than what has been commited in a fault; it must be said, that fault not only is aggravated on the part of the condition of the one sinning,⁵ but even on the part of the one, who is sinned against; and though the one sinning had been a pure creature, however He, whom he sinned against, was the Creator. On that account, since it is determined, that the one making satisfaction would not be a pure creature, this is not more than that which was commited in the fault; for it is proper, that the person making satisfaction satisfy for the gravity of the sins according to all the conditions, by which it was aggravated.

3. To that which is objected, that the devil justly lost the human race, since he extented his hand against him, over whom he had no right; it must be said, that in this there is not expressed a sufficent reason for making satisfaction, but rather for conquering the devil. And well it is true, that some pure innocent creature could have conquered the devil; but it does not however follow, that it could⁶ havve made satisfaction to God. For by far it is more to recompense the injury offered to God than to conquer the diabolic deceit.

4. To that which is objected, that God thinks more of the soul of a just one⁷ than the souls of innumberable sinners; it must be said, that God as regards satisfaction does not seek recompense for the human race, on account of it being in the state of sin, but on account of that it would have been, if he had not sinned; and in this manner God does not appraise the life of any pure man as much as the whole human race.

5. To that which is asked, if Christ were a pure creature, whether as he died he would have entered into Heaven; it must be said, that it would be so; from this however it does not follow, that⁸ he would have merited the opening of the gate(s of Heaven), since Heaven had never been closed to Him, this posited, because he would not have had the guilt (reatum) of the original sin. Truly others, who had the guilt (reatum) of the original sin, on account of this were not inducted into Heaven; and so the gate(s) of Heaven would still have remained closed, for the reason that a sufficient satisfaction would not have been payed back.

I. In hac et seq. (4) quaestione S. Bonav. cum Alexandro Hal. et Richardo sequitur modum dicendi S. Anselmi, cuius argumenta Scot. (hic q. unica n. 3. seqq.) restringere vel evertere nititur; qui insuper contendit, quod purus homo i.e. non unitus hypostatice Deo, at plenitudine gratiae repletus, satisfacere potuerit pro genere humano, et quidem de condigno. Tamen Scot. explicite loquitur non de potentia ordinaria, quae respicit leges et decreta in praesenti providentia stabilita, sed de potentia absoluta, qua Deus secundum ipsum potest facere quidquid in se non implicat contradictionem. Concorditer igitur doctores tenent, quod secundum praesentem divinam dispositionem incarnatio fuit necessario, supposit quod Deus voluerit habere satisfactionem perfectam (de condigno), sive quae est ad aequalitatem iustitiae. De potentia absoluta loquendo, vulgo distinguiter inter satisfactionem imperfectam, quae, licet non sit condigna, acceptatur tamen ab eo cui illa debetur (cfr. hic q. 4.), et satisfactionem perfectam sive condignam. Respectu satisfactionis imperfectae facile conceditur, creaturam, Deo adiuvante, eam praestare, Deumque, si vellet, eam acceptare posse ut sibi sufficientem. Quod eadem autem posset acceptari etiam ut perfecta et condigna, docent Scot. Durad. et Nominales, refragantibus schola S. Thomae aliisque multis.

S. Bonav. in hac quaestione solvenda non loquitur de potentia Dei absoluta, sed arguit ex principiis, quae in praesenti providentia rata sunt. Hoc iam observavit Brulifer (ad hanc quaest.), unde concludit. S. Bonaventuram non contradicere Scoto. Haec interpretatio confirmatur infra quaestione 6, ubi in fine auctor dicit, se quoad redemptionem alio modo possibilem nihil velle determinare, sicilet « quia temerarium est, cum de divina potentia agitur, termimum praefigere ». — Nihilominus auctor hic plura dicit, quae a Scoto non probantur (cfr. etiam IV Sent. d. 15. p. I. q. I. seqq.).

II. In 2. fundam. arguitur ex quadam infinita gravitate et malitia peccati, de qua infinitate scholae non eodem loquendi modo utuntur. Plurimi enim discipuli S. Thomae defendunt, peccatum in ratione moralis offensae esse simpliciter et intrisecus infinitum, dum Scotus cum suis multisque aliis non admittit nisi infinitatem obiectivam et extrinsecam. Sed in ipsa schola S. Thomae non desunt, qui S. Thomam pro secunda sententia stare asserant, ut P. Nicolae O. Pr., qui in sua editione Commentarii S. Thomae in Sententias (hic a. 2; nota marginal.) annotat: « Ubi ergo praetexta simplex et intrinseca infinitas, quam praeter perpetuam et uniformem S. Thomae doctrinam gratis aliqui fingunt et affingere illi non dubitant, pro extrinseca tantum et respectiva, ex objecto sumta et vocabulo diminuto [scil. quandam] significata, quam agnoscit »? In hoc altero sensu etiam S. Bonav. debet intelligi, cum ipse duplex distinguat infinitum, scilicet absolute in se et in comparatione ad aliud (I. Sent. d. 43. q. 1, III. Sent d. 13. a. 1. q. 2.), et pluries, ut in scholio ad II. Sent. d. 35. a. 1. q. 3. iam notatam est, peccato infinitatem tribuat in comparatione, scilicet ad bonum divinum in se infinitum. — Aliud principium, quod Scot. pro sua opinione hic urget, respicit ipsum valorem meriti Christi quatenus dependeat ab acceptatione divina, de quo cfr. infra q. 5, scholio.

III. De hac 3. quaestione: Alex. Hal. S. p. III. q. 1. m. 6. a. 1. 2. — Scot., loc, cit. et Report. q. unica. — S. Thom., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 2. et d. 1. q. 1. a. 2. ad 9.; S. III. q. 1. a. 2 ad 2. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 6. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3. — Durand. hic. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., III Sent. d. 1. q. 1.

IV. Etiam quoad seq. (4.) quaetionem Scot. cum suis et Nominalibus a S. Bonav. et ceteris antiquis doctoribus discedit, ita tamen, ut loquatur non de potentia Dei ordinaria, sed absoluta. Quidam autem Nominales, ulterius progressi, dicunt, satisfactionem purae creaturae et viribus pura naturalibus factam ex acceptatione Dei extrinseca, si Deus velit, posse esse sufficientem. Scotus autem (IV. Sent. d. 15. q. 1. n. 7. ) explicite requirit ad talem satisfactionem auxilum et statum gratiae.
De hac 4. questione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 5. a. 1. 2. — Scot., loct. cit. — Richard., hic q. 5.

I. In this and the following (4) question St. Bonaventure, with Alexander Hales and Richard of St. Victor, follows the manner of speaking of St. Anselm, whose arguments Scotus (this very question, n. 3. ff.) strives to restrict and overturn; who above contends, that a pure man, i.e. not united hypostatically to God, but replete with the plenitude of grace, could have made satisfaction for the whole human race, and indeed de condigno. However Scotus, explicitly speaks not of potentia ordinaria, which respects the laws and decrees established in the present providence, but of potentia absoluta, by which God on account of himself [secundum ipsum] can make anything in itself not imply a contradiction. As of one mind therefore the doctors hold, that according to the present divine disposition the incarnation was necessary, it is supposed that God wanted to have a perfect satisfaction (de condigno), or that which is equal in justice. In speaking of potentia absoluta, there is commonly distinguished imperfect satisfaction, which, though it is not condign, is accepted however by him to whom it is owed (cf. here q. 4.), and perfect or condign satisfaction. In respect to imperfect satisfaction it is easily conceded, that the creature, with God helping, can fulfil it, and that God, if He wants, can accept it as sufficient for Himself. Moreover that the same could be accepted even as perfect and condign, Scotus, Durandus and the Nominalists do teach, in opposition to the school of St. Thomas and many others.

St. Bonaventure in answering this question does not speak of the potentia absoluta of God, but argues from the principals, which have been ratified in the present providence. This Brulifer (on this question) already has observed, whence he concludes. that St. Bonaventure does not contradict Scotus. This interpretation is confirmed below in question 6, where at the end the author says, that as regards the redemption he does not want to determine anything possible in any manner, that is "since it is temarious, when dealing with divina potentia, to prefex a terminus." — Nonetheless the author says many things here, which are not proven by Scotus (cf. also IV Sent. d. 15. p. I. q. I. seqq.).

II. At the bottom of 2 it is argued from a certain infinite gravity and wickedness of sin, of which infinity the schools are not used to speak in the same manner. For very many disciples of St. Thomas defend, that sin reckoned as a moral offense is simply and intrinsicly infinite, while Scotus with his disciples and many others does not admit anything except an objective and extrinsic infinite. But in the same school of St. Thomas there is not lacking, those who assert that St. Thomas stood for the second view, thus P. Nicholae O. Pr., who in the edition of his Commentarium S. Thomae in Sententias (here a. 2; in the marginal note) notes: "Where therefore as a pretext a simple and intrinsec infinity, which some foist upon the perpetual and uniform doctrine of St. Thomas and others do not doubt to affix, only for an extrinsic and respective infinity, taken from its object and signified with a diminutive word (namely "certain"), which he does not admit"? In this other sense even St. Bonaventure should be understood, when he himself distinguishes a two fold infinite, that is absolutely in itself and and in comparison with another (I. Sent. d. 43. q. 1, III. Sent d. 13. a. 1. q. 2.), and many, so that in the scholium on II. Sent. d. 35. a. 1. q. 3. it has already been noted, that he attributes an infinity in sin in comparison, that is, with the Divine Good in Itself infinite. — The other principle, that Scotus urges here as his own opinion, respects the value itself of the merit of Christ in as much as it would depend upon divine acceptance, concerning which cf. below q. 5, in the scholium.

III. On this third question: Alexander Hales, S. p. III. q. 1. m. 6. a. 1. 2. — Scotus, loc. cit., and in his Reportatio q. 1 — St. Thomas, concerning this and the following question a. 2. and d. 1. q. 1. a. 2. upto 9.; S. III. q. 1. a. 2 upto 2. — Bl. Albert [trans. now "St." and Doctor of the Church], concerning this and the following questsion a. 6. 7. — Peter of Tar., here in a. 3. — Durandus here in q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, III. Sent. d. 1. q. 1.

IV. Even as regards the following question (#4) Scotus, with his disciples and the Nominalists, departs from St. Bonaventure and other ancient doctors, but however, to speak not of the potentia ordinaria of God, but the potentia absoluta. Indeed, the Nominalists moreover, departing in another way, say, that the satisfaction of a pure creature can be sufficiently made even by purely natural powers as regards God's extrinsic acceptance, if God should will it. Scotus however (IV. Sent. d. 15. q. 1. n. 7. ) requires explicitly for such satisfaction the help and state of grace.
On this fourth question: Alexander Hales, loc. cit. m. 5. a. 1. 2. — Scotus, loc. cit. — Richard of St. Victor, here in q. 5.