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S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis |
St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio |
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum |
Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences |
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Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis |
of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris |
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QUARTI LIBRI |
BOOK FOUR |
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I. |
COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I |
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PARS I. |
PART I |
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ARTICULUS UNICUS. |
ARTICLE SOLE |
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Quaestio IV. |
Question 4 |
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Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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Latin
text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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Quaestio IV.
De Sacramentorum efficacia. |
Question 4
On the efficacy of the Sacraments. |
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QUARTO QUAERITUR, utrum Sacramenta sint gratiae effectiva. Et quod sic, videtur: |
FOURTH THERE IS ASKED, whether the Sacraments are effective of grace. And it seems, that (it is) so: |
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1. Quia ista assignatur differentia Sacramentorum novae legis ad Sacramenta veteris legis, quod haec efficiunt, illa solum figurant;1 sed quod efficit est causa efficiens: ergo Sacramenta novae legis sunt gratiae effectiva. |
1. Because there is assigned that difference of the Sacraments of the New Law to the Sacraments of the Old Law, that these effect, those only figure;1 but what effects is an efficient cause: therefore the Sacraments of the New Law are effective of grace. |
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2. Item, Hugo2 dicit, « quod Sacramenta novae legis infusa sibi primum benedictione sanctificant »; et alibi dicit, quod sunt « ex sanctificatione sanctificantia »; sed non sanctificatur anima nisi per gratiam: ergo efficiunt ipsam gratiam in anima. |
2. Likewise, Hugo (of St. Victor)2 says, « that the Sacraments of the New Law sanctify by their own first, infused blessing »; and in another place he says, that they are « sanctifying out of sanctification »; but the soul is not sanctified except through grace: therefore they effect the grace itself in the soul. |
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3. Item, Magister in definitione Sacramenti in littera3 dicit, quod « Sacramentum est quod similitudinem gerit et causa existit »; sed non formalis neque finalis neque materialis, ut supra monstratum est: ergo a divisione est causa efficiens. |
3. Likewise, Master (Peter) in the definition of a Sacrament (given) in the text3 says, that « A Sacrament is that which bears a similitude and exists as a cause »; but not a formal one nor a final one nor a material one, as has been shown above: therefore by division it is the efficient cause. |
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4. Item, idem ratione videtur, quia signum insitutum humana institutione potest in nobis aggenerare spiritualem cognitionem et affectionem, sicut circulus ante domum aggenerat cognitionem in anima transeuntis, quod ibi sit vinum; et patibulum et signa belli aggenerant timorem: ergo si divina institutio multo potentior est quam humana, et Sacramenta sunt signa secundum divinam institutionem;4 possunt in nobis aggenerare multo nobiliorem effectum: ergo possunt efficere gratiam. |
4. Likewise, the same seems by reason, because a sign instituted by human institution can generate accordingly [aggenerare] in us a spiritual cognition and affection, just as a circle in front of [ante] a house generates accordingly a cognition in the soul of a traveler, that there is wine there; and a pillory [patibulum] and signs of war accordingly generate fear: therefore if a divine institution is much more potent than a human one, and the Sacraments are signs according to a divine institution;4 they can generate accordingly in us a much more noble effect: therefore they can effect grace. |
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5. Item, « opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem »;5 unde nihil est susceptibile culpae, nisi sit susceptibile gratiae, et e converso: cum ergo caro, quae est quid corporale, possit adeo vitiari, ut efficiat et generet culpam in anima, quae sibi unitur; ergo Sacramentum corporale poterit sanctificari adeo, quod transfundat gratiam: nihil ergo prohibet, quod efficiat in anima gratiam spiritualem. |
5. Likewise, « there are bound to be opposites about the same (thing) »;5 whence nothing is susceptible of fault, unless it be susceptible of grace, and conversely: therefore since the flesh, which is something corporal, can be vitiated to such an extend, that it effects and generates fault in the soul, to which it is united; therefore the corporal Sacrament can be sanctified to such an extend, that it transfuses grace: therefore nothing prohibits, that it effect spiritual grace in the soul. |
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6. Item, sicut in generatione carnis est generans et generatus et ulterius quo mediante fit generatio; ita in spirituali regeneratione est regenerans Christus, regeneratus homo, et illud quo mediante fit regeneratio, scilicet Sacramentum: ergo sicut semen, quod erat medium in generatione carnali, defert culpam, eadem ratione Sacramentum defert gratiam, quae facit filium;6 sed non defert essentialiter: ergo defert causaliter. Si dicas, quod non est simile, quia facilius est male facere sive vitiare quam bene facere; hoc nihil est: quia nunquam Adam fuit potentior ad malum vel eius culpa, quin Christus sit potentior ad bonum et eius passio;7 sed Adam sua culpa potuit vitiare omnem carnem: ergo Christus sua passione potuit adeo sanctificare Sacramenta, ut ipsa sanctificata animas sanctificarent et gratiam darent. |
6. Likewise, just as in the generation of the flesh there is the generating and the generated and lastly that by which means generation comes to be; so in spiritual regeneration there is the One regenerating, Christ, the regenerated, a man, and that by which means the regeneration comes to be, that is, a Sacrament: therefore just as the seed, which was the means in carnal generation, brings down [defert] fault, by the same reckoning a Sacrament brings down the grace, which makes (one) a son;6 but it does not bring (it) down essentially: therefore it brings (it) down causally. If you say, that it is not similar, because it is easier to do (something) badly or vitiate (it) than to do it well; this is nothing: because never was Adam and/or his fault more potent to (do) an evil (deed), that Christ, and His Passion, was not more potent to (do) good;7 but Adam by his fault could vitiate all flesh: therefore Christ by His Passion could sanctify the Sacraments to such an extend, that the sanctified themselves would sanctify souls and give (them) grace. |
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7. Item, dicit Anselmus de Conceptu virginali,7 quod « si Adam stetisset, transfunderet iustitiam originalem »; sed hoc non potest esse nisi mediante carne corporali: ergo multo magis Christus potest mediante corporali Sacramento transfundere iustitiam gratuitam. |
7. Likewise, (St.) Anselm says of the virginal Conception,7 that « if Adam had stood, he would have transfused original justice »; but this cannot be except by means of corporal flesh: therefore much more can Christ by means of a corporal Sacrament transfuse gratuitous justice. |
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CONTRA: 1. Omnis causa efficiens est nobilior suo effectu, et nullum corporale nobilius est aliquo spirituali: cum igitur gratia sit spiritualis, Sacramentum corporale, ut dicit Hugo;9 nullum Sacramentum est causa efficiens ipsius gratiae. |
ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Every efficient cause is more noble than its effect, and no corporal is more noble than any spiritual: therefore since grace is spiritual, a Sacrament corporal, as Hugo says;9 no Sacrament is an efficient cause of grace itself. |
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2. Item, Magister in littera10 dicit, quod « non est gratia ab illis, sed per illa »: ergo videtur, quod sint sicut canales, non sicut fons: ergo non sunt causa efficiens gratiae, sicut nec canales aquae. |
2. Likewise, Master (Peter) in the text10 says, that « grace is not from them, but (rather) through them »: therefore it seems, that they are just as canals, not just as a fountain: therefore they are not an efficient cause of grace, just as neither canales (are) of water. |
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3. Item, Hugo11 dicit, quod « gratia non est ex ipsis Sacramentis, sed in ipsis »; sed constat, quod ex dicit causam efficientem, sicut patet ibi: ergo etc. |
3. Likewise, Hugo11 says, that « grace is not out of the Sacraments themselves, but (rather) in them »; but it is established, that out of means an efficient cause, just as is clear there: ergo etc.. |
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1 Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 6. |
1 Cf. here the text of Master (Peter), ch. 6. |
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4. Item, super illud Psalmi:1 Benedicam Dominum, qui tribuit mihi intellectum; Glossa dicit: « Deus per semetipsum irradiat pias mentes »: ergo cum illa irradiatio fiat per lumen gratiae, constat, quod gratia est a Deo immediate: non ergo a Sacramentis. |
4. Likewise, on that (verse) of the Psalm:1 I will bless the Lord, who grants me understanding; the Gloss says: « God through His very Self irradiates pious minds »; therefore since that irradiation comes to be through the light of grace, it is established, that grace is immediately from God: therefore not from the Sacraments. |
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5. Item, « virtus est, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur »:2 si ergo non operatur in nobis virtutem per subiectam creaturam, per consequens nec gratiam. |
5. Likewise, « virtue is (that), which God works in us without us »:2 therefore if He does not work virtue in us through a subjected creature, consequently [per consequens] neither (does He work) grace. |
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6. Item, ordo debet servari in agentibus: ergo Deus per minus nobile non debet influere in magis nobile; sed anima nobilior est Sacramento: ergo Deus non influit per Sacramentum gratiam in animam: ergo gratia a solo Deo est effective. Si igitur Sacramentum est gratiae causa, hoc est solum dispositive. |
6. Likewise, an order ought to be observed [servari] in (things) acting: therefore God through a less noble ought not inflow into a more noble; but the soul is more noble than a Sacrament: therefore God does not inflow grace through a Sacrament into the soul: therefore grace is effectively from God alone. Therefore if a Sacrament is the cause of grace, this is only dispositively. |
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Quaeritur ergo, utrum Sacramentum sit causa disponens ad gratiam. Quod sic, videtur: |
Therefore there is asked, whether a Sacrament is a cause disposing to grace. It seem that (it is) so: |
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1. Quia si Sacramenta novae legis essent solum causa sine qua non, tunc ergo in ratione causandi non differrent a Sacramentis legis veteris et essent in onus;3 sed hoc est inconveniens: ergo etc. |
1. Because if the Sacraments of the New Law were only a cause sine qua non, then therefore in the reckoning of causing they would not differ from the Sacraments of the Old Law and they would be as a burden;3 but this is unbefitting [inconveniens]: ergo etc.. |
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2. Item, tam Hugo4 quam Magister in littera quam etiam alii dicunt, quod Deus per Sacramenta regenerat animam: ergo Sacramentum est medium actionis divinae in animam; sed omne medium agendi aut est deferens virtutem, aut disponens; sed Sacramentum non defert: ergo disponsit. |
2. Likewise, both Hugo4 and Master (Peter) in the text and even others say, that God regenerates the soul through the Sacraments: therefore the Sacrament is the medium of the divine action upon the soul; but every medium of acting either is bearing away from virtue, or disposing (to it); but a Sacrament does not bring down: therefore it disposes. |
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3. Item, « Sacramenta sunt medicinae spirituales »;5 sed medicina corporalis disponit ad sanitatem corporalem: ergo medicina spiritualis disponit ad sanitatem spiritualem. |
3. Likewise, « the Sacraments are spiritual medicines [medicinae] »;5 but corporal medicine disposes to corporal health: therefore spiritual medicine disposes to spiritual health. |
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4. Item, si nihil disponerent nec cooprarentur ad sanitatem animae, aeque bene sine his posset fieri salus, sicut cum eis: ergo imposita nobis in nova lege potius dicenda sunt onera quam medicamina, et lex nova lex oneris, non suavitatis.6 |
4. Likewise, if they would dispose and cooperate nothing toward the health of the soul, health could come to be equally well without them, just as with them: therefore the (things) imposed upon us in the New Law are rather to be said (to be) burdens than medicines [medicamina], and the New Law a law of burden, not of sweetness.6 |
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SED CONTRA: 1. Dispositio praecedit illud, ad quod disponit, non solum natura, sed etiam tempore;7 sed simul est Sacramenti perceptio et gratiae infusio tempore: ergo Sacramentum non disponit ad gratiam. |
BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. A disposition precedes that, to which it disposes, not only according to nature, but also according to time;7 but the perception of the Sacrament and the infusion of grace are simultaneous according to time: therefore a Sacrament does not dispose to grace. |
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2. Item, gratia ex nihilo et subito creatur,8 ergo nullo indiget disponente ad hoc, ut sit: ergo Sacramenta non disponunt ad gratiam. Si dicas, quod non disponunt ad hoc, quod gratia sit, sed ad hoc, quod insit ipsi animae, unde habilitant ipsam animam disponendo ad gratiae susceptionem; contra: esse gratiae est suum inesse, cum sit accidens:9 ergo si non habet dispositionem ad hoc, quod sit, nec ad hoc, quod insit. |
2. Likewise, grace is created out of nothing and suddenly,8 therefore it needs nothing disposing for this, that it be: therefore the Sacraments do not dispose to grace. If you say, that they do not dispose for this, that grace be, but for this, that it be in the soul itself, whence they habilitate the soul itself by disposing it to the susception of grace: on the contrary: the to be of grace is its own to be in, since it is an accident:9 therefore if it does not have a disposition for this, that it be, neither for this, that it be it. |
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3. Item, si Sacramenta disponunt animam et habilitant, ergo influunt in ipsam; sed nullum corporale influit in aliquod spirituale:10 ergo Sacramenta, cum sint corporalia, non influunt in animam: ergo non habilitant ipsam nec disponunt. |
3. Likewise, if the Sacraments dispose the soul and habilitate (it), therefore they inflow into it; but no corporal inflows into anything spiritual:10 therefore the Sacraments, since they are corporals, do not inflow into the soul: therefore they do not habilitate it nor do they dispose (it). |
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Si dicas forte, quod in ipsis Sacramentis est aliqua virtus spiritualis, per quam influunt in animam; quaeritur ergo ratione huius, utrum in Sacramentis sit aliqua virtus, per quam influant in ipsam animam. Et quod non, videtur: |
If you say perchance, that in the Sacraments themselves there is some spiritual virtue, through which they inflow into the soul; therefore by this reckoning there is asked, whether in the Sacraments there is any virtue, through which they inflow into the soul itself. And it seems, that (there is) not: |
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1. Quia illa virtus aut est substantia, aut accidens. Si substantia, aut Deus, aut Angelus, aut anima; nullum horum esse11 certum est, quia si illa virtus est de Sacramento, tunc Deus est de Sacramento. Si accidens; sed nullum accidens spirituale est in subiecto corporali: ergo aut illa virtus est corporalis, et sic non influet; aut si est spiritualis, non est in Sacramento. |
1, Because that virtue either is a substance, or an accident. If a substance, either God, or and Angel, or the soul; that it is none of these11, is certain, because if that virtue is from [de] the Sacrament, then God is from the Sacrament. If an accident; but no spiritual accident is in a corporal subject: therefore either that virtue is corporal, and thus does not flow in; or if it is spiritual, it is not in the Sacrament. |
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2. Item, illa virtus est bonum, constat; aut ergo est bonum magum, aut mediocre, aut parvum, sicut dividit Augustinus.12 Non de maioribus, quia tunc esset gratia, vel virtus gratuita, quae est in sola anima; non mediocre, quia talia sunt potentiae animae: ergo est bonum infimum. Sed hoc est bonum corporale: ergo illa virtus non est spiritualis et non influit in animam. |
2. Likewise, that virtue is a good, it is established; therefore either it is a great good, or a mediocre one, or a small one, just as (St.) Augustine divides (the genus).12 (It is) not of the greater ones, because then it would be grace, and/or a gratuitous virtue, which is in the soul alone; not a mediocre one, because such are the powers of the soul: therefore it is the least good. But this is the corporal good: therefore that virtue is not spiritual and does not flow into the soul. |
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3. Item, nullum corporale recipitur in spirituali corporaliter, sed solum spiritualiter:13 ergo / similiter . . . |
3. Likewise, no corporal is received in a spiritual corporally, but only spiritually:13 therefore / similarly . . . |
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1 Psalm. 15, 7; sed Glossa Augustini refertur
a Strabo et Lyrano in Ps. 118, 73: Da mihi intellectum. Verba August.
vide tom. III, pag. 895, nota 1. Cfr. etiam 83 Qq. q. 53, n. 2. |
1 Psalm 15:7; but the Gloss of (St.) Augustine is
referred by (Walafrid) Strabo and (Nicholas) of Lyra to Ps. 118:73: Give
me understanding. See the words of (St.) Augustine, tome III, page 895,
note 1. Cf. also 83 Questions, q. 53, n. 2. |
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ergo / similiter nullum spirituale recipitur in corpore spiritualiter, sed corporaliter: ergo illa virtus, cum sit in Sacramentis, est ibi corporaliter, et ita non est potens influere in animam: ergo frustra est ibi. |
therefore / similarly no spiritual is received in a body spiritually, but (rather) corporally: therefore that virtue, since it is in the Sacraments, is there corporally, and thus is not potent to inflow into the soul: therefore is it there in vain [frustra]. |
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4. Item, « omne quod recipitur in aliquo, est ibi per modum recipientis et non recepti », sicut dicit Boethius:1 ergo illa virtus recipitur in Sacramento corporali per modum corporis: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod verum est, loquendo naturaliter; sed illa virtus est ibi mirabiliter, et supra naturam; contra: quantumcumque sit ibi supra2 naturam et qualitercumque, tamen est ignobilior ipsa anima; non ergo influit in ipsam: ergo si non ponitur ob aliud, manifestum est etc. |
4. Likewise, « everything which is received in something, is there through the manner of the recipient and not of the received », just as Boethius says:1 therefore that virtue is received in the corporal Sacrament through the manner of a body: ergo etc.. If you say, that it is true, naturally speaking; but that virtue is there wonderfully, and above nature; on the contrary: howsoever much it be there above2 nature and in whatsoever manner, nevertheless [tamen], it is more ignoble than the soul itself; therefore it does not inflow into it: therefore if it is not posited because of another, it is manifest that etc.. |
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CONTRA: 1. Beda3 dicit, quod « Dominus contactu mundissimae carnis suae dedit vim regenerativam aquis »: ergo aliqua vis collata est ipsis aquis; sed haec non potuit esse nisi creata, quia collata est creaturae, et cum esset ad regenerandum, non potuit esse nisi spiritualis, quia operis spiritualis virtus est spiritualis: ergo etc. |
ON THE CONTRARY: 1. (St.) Bede (the Venerable)3 says, that « The Lord by contact with His most clean Flesh gave a regenerative force [vim] to the waters »: therefore some force has been conferred upon the waters themselves; and this could not be but a created (force), because it is conferred upon a creature, and since would be to regenerate, it could not be but a spiritual one, because of a spiritual work the virtue is a spiritual one: ergo etc.. |
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2. Item, Augustinus dicit, et habetur in tertia distinctione:4 « Quae est virtus aquae, ut corpus tangat et cor abluat »? Ergo aliqua virtus est in Sacramento, qua abluitur cor: ergo spiritualis. |
2. Likewise, (St.) Augustine says, and (this) is had in the third distinction:4 « What is the virtue of water, to touch the body and wash clean [abluat] the heart »? Therefore some virtue is in the Sacrament, by which the heart is washed clean: therefore (it is) a spiritual (one). |
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3. Item, videmus, quod opera divinae iustitiae fiunt ministerio creaturae corporalis, quae habet a Deo vim aliquam, per quam possit agere in animam alioquin non posset sicut patet in igne purgatorio:5 ergo in operibus misericordiae, quae fiunt per Sacramenta, erit, quod Sacramenta habeant aliquam virtutem a Deo sibi collatam, per quam agant in animam. |
3. Likewise, we shall see, that the works of the Divine Justice are done by the ministry of a corporal creature, which has from God some force, through which it can act on the soul otherwise it could not just as is clear in the purgatorial fire:5 therefore in the works of Mercy, which are done through the Sacraments, it will be (seen), that the Sacraments have some virtue conferred upon them by God, through which they act on the soul. |
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4. Item, videmus, quod si aliquis contritus accedat ad baptismum, etsi non conferatur ei gratia, quia iam habet eam, tamen confertur ei remissio omnis poenae, quam non habebat prius:6 ergo baptismus supra collationem gratiae addit remissionem poenae: ergo aliqua virtus est in baptismo praeter virtutem gratiae; eadem ratione in aliis Sacramentis novae legis. |
4. Likewise, we shall see, that if someone contrite approaches to Baptism, even if grace is not conferred upon him, because he already has it, nevertheless [tamen], there is conferred upon him the remission of all punishment, which he did not have before:6 therefore Baptism adds a remission of punishment upon the conferral of grace: therefore there is some virtue in Baptism besides the virtue of grace; for the same reason (it is also) in the other Sacraments of the New Law. |
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5. Item, si nulla esset virtus ibi, tunc ergo rediret inconveniens saepe dictum, quod non different a Sacramentis veteris legis. |
5. Likewise, if there were no virtue there, then it would therefore render unfitting [inconveniens] what is often said [saepe dictum], because they would not differ from the Sacraments of the Old Law. |
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CONCLUSIO. Probabilis est opinio, cum suis rationibus primo posita, quod Sacramenta respectu gratiae gratum facientis sint causa sine qua non, respectu vero characteris et ornatus sint causa efficiens, respectu denique eficacia gratiae et sanationis potentiarum sint causa disponens. Probabilis etiam est alia opinio, quae negat, ipsis Sacramentis datam esse vitutem efficientem per modum qualitatis absolutae, non relativae. |
CONCLUSION Probable is the opinion, posited first with its own reasons, that the Sacraments in respect of the grace making one pleasing are the cause sine qua non, but in respect of the character and ornament they are a disposing cause. Probable also is the other opinion, which denies, that there has been given to the Sacraments themselves an efficient virtue through the manner of an absolute quality, not a relative one. |
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RESPONDEO: Aliqui volunt dicere, quod in Sacramentis7 est aliqua virtus creata, per quam influunt in animam et habent rationem causandi differenter. Dicunt enim, quod in Sacramentis datur gratia gratum faciens; datur etiam in eis gratia gratis data, sicut est character et ornatus animae; datur etiam debilitatio fomitis sive expeditio potentiarum, haec est efficacia gratiae. Dicunt ergo, quod respectu gratiae gratum facientis sunt sicut causa sine qua non; respectu characteristicationis8 et ornatus sunt sicut causa efficiens; respectu illius virtutis, respectu scilicet dibilitationis fomitis sive roboris potentiarum, sunt causa disponens. Et hoc sic manifestum est. Nam sicut videmus, quod in prugatione per ignem purgatorium est ipsa anima purgabilis, habens reatum vel maculam venialem; est9 gratia intra animam, quia sine ipsa non fieret purgatio; est rursus virtus ignis: sic in Sacramento est anima habens defectum et debilitatem potentiarum; est iterum gratia in anima intus operans; est iterum virtus Sacramenti exterior; et his concurrentibus roborantur et sanantur potentiae, et gratia fit efficacior in sua operatione mediante virtute Sacramenti. Sic ergo dicunt, quod Sacramentum est causa gratiae ut sine qua non, scilicet gratum facientis; est causa characteris et ornatus efficiens; est causa efficaciae10 gratiae et sanationis potentiarum ut disponens; et hoc per virtutem, quae est in ipso Sacramento, spiritualem et a Deo collatam sibi. His visi, manifesta est secundum ipsos responsio ad obiecta. |
I RESPOND: Some want to say, that in the Sacraments7 there is some created virtue, through which they inflow into the soul and (that) they have a reckoning of causing differently. For they say, that in the Sacraments there is given the grace making one pleasing [gratia gratum faciens]; there is also given in them the grace given gratis [gratia gratis data], just as is the character and ornament of the soul; there is also given the debilitation of the fomes or expedition of the powers, this is the efficacy of grace. Therefore they say, that in respect of the grace making one pleasing they are just as a cause sine qua non; in respect of the characterization8 and ornament they are just as an efficient cause; in respect of that of virtue, in respect, that is, of the debilitation of the fomes or of the strength [roboris] of the powers, they are a disposing cause. And this is thus manifest. For just as we shall see, that in the purgation through purgatorial fire there is a soul itself purgeable, having a venial stain or guilt [reatum]; there is9 a grace within the soul, because without this the purgation would not come to be; and again (there is) the virtue of the fire: just so in a Sacrament (being given) there is a soul having a defect or debility of powers; there is again a grace operating in the soul interiorly; there is again an exterior virtue of the Sacrament; and by the concurrence of these [his concurrentibus] the powers are strengthened [roborantur] and healed, and grace becomes more efficacious in its operation by means of the virtue of the Sacrament. Therefore in the same manner they say, that the Sacrament is a cause of grace as a sine qua non, that is (of a grace) making one pleasing; it is an efficient cause of the character and ornament; it is the cause of the efficacy10 of grace and of the healing of the powers as one disposing; and this through the virtue, which is in the Sacrament itself, one spiritual and conferred upon it by God. Having seen these, the response according to them to (what are) objected is manifest. |
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1. 2. Ad illud enim quod quaeritur primo, utrum sint causa efficiens gratiae gratum facientis; dicunt, |
1. 2. For to that which is first asked, whether (the Sacraments) are an efficient case of the grace making one pleasing; they say, |
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1 Libr. V. de Consol. prosa 4, ubi agens de cognitione
dicit: « Omne enim quod cognoscitur, non secundum sui vim, sed secundum
cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem ». Si verba istius
axiomatis attendantur, inveniuntur in Libro de Causis, proposit. 10; cfr.
ibid. proposit. 20. seqq. |
1 On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. V,
prose 4, where dealing with cognition he says: « For everything which
is cognized is comprehended, not according to its own force, but rather
according to the faculty of the ones cognizing ». If one directs one's
attention to the words of this axiom of his, they will be found in The
Book on Causes, prop. 10; cf. ibid., prop. 20 ff.. 2
The editions read contrary to [contra]. Below this in place of therefore
if it is not [ergo si non] codex N has therefore because it is not
[ergo quia non]. |
p. 22
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quod non. Quod ergo obiicitur de differentia horum Sacramentorum et illorum;1 dicunt, quod differentia attenditur ratione characteristicationis et ornatus et efficaciae gratiae. Et sic respondent ad illud Hugonis, quod de illa sanctificatione intelligitur. |
that (they are) not. Therefore that which is objected concerning the difference of these Sacraments and those;1 they say, that the difference is tended toward by a reckoning of the characterization and of the ornament and of the efficacy of grace. And in this manner they respond to that of Hugo's, which is understood concerning that sanctification. |
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3. Similiter dicunt de eo quod dicit Magister, quod sit2 causa; tamen si intelligatur quantum ad gratiam gratum facientem, dicunt, quod est causa sine qua non. Aliter etiam dicunt, quod potest dici, quod sit causa disponens vel ad hoc, quod insit, vel ad hoc, quod efficax sit, et hoc ratione operis operati; non sic autem erat in illis Sacramentis. |
3. Similarly they say of that which Master (Peter) says, that (a Sacrament)2 is a cause; however if it be understood as much as regards the grace making one pleasing, they say, that it is a cause sine qua non. Otherwise they also say, that it can be said, that it is a disposing cause and/or for this, that it be in, and/or for this, that it be efficacious, and by this reckoning (it belongs) to the work of the (thing) worked [operis operati]; but not thus was it in those Sacraments. |
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4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod signum ex humana institutione generat cognitionem et affectionem spiritualem; dicunt, quod hoc est solum dispositive3 sive occasionaliter, non effective; immo ipsa anima conferendo in semetipsa cognitionem generat et affectionem; sicut patet exemplo manifesto, quod alii vident patibulum et timent, alii non; tamen per hoc non potest ostendi, quod Sacramentum sit causa efficiens gratiae. |
4. To that which is objected, that a sign out of human institution generates a cognition and spiritual affection; they say, that this is only dispositively3 or occasionally, not effectively; nay (rather) the soul itself by conferring upon itself a cognition generates also an affection; just as is clear by the manifest example, that some see the pillory and fear, others (do) not; however through this it cannot be shown, that a Sacrament is the efficient cause of grace. |
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5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de transfusione culpae mediante carne, dicunt, quod sicut gratia non est in aliquo corporali, sic nec culpa. Sed tamen vitiositas in carne habere potest rationem efficiendi culpam in anima; non sic virtus Sacramenti gratiam. Et causa huius est, quia gratia est effectus nobilior omni virtute corporali et fit ex nihilo, et hoc4 est solius Dei; sed effectus culpae dicit ignobilitatem et imperfectionem et defectum. Ideo omnia argumenta illa non valent, quae fiunt per similitudinem gratiae ad culpam. |
5. To that which is objected concerning the transfusion of fault by means of the flesh, they say, that just as grace is not in any corporal, so neither fault. But, nevertheless [tamen], viciousness in the flesh can have a reckoning of one effecting fault in the soul; not so the virtue of the Sacrament (in regard to) grace. And the cause of this is, that grace is a more noble effect than all corporal virtue and comes to be out of nothing, and this4 belongs to God alone; but the effect of fault means ignobility and imperfection and defect. For that reason all those arguments are not valid, which are made through a similitude of grace to fault. |
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6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus potentior est in bonum; dicunt, quod verum est; nec tamen sequitur ex hoc, quodsi Adam transmittit culpam mediante carne, quod Christus transmittat gratiam mediante Sacramento. Nam istud esset inordinatio; praeterea, sicut creatura non potest recipere potestatem creandi, sic nec dandi gratiam.5 |
6. To that which is objected, that Christ is more potent unto the good; they say, that it is true; nor, however, does it follow from this, that even if Adam transmitted fault by means of the flesh, that Christ transmits grace by means of the Sacrament. For that would be inordinate arrangement [inordinatio]; besides, just as a creature cannot receive the power of creating, so neither (that) of giving grace.5 |
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7. Ad illud Anselmi dicunt, quod non intelligitur, quod transfunderet iustitiam carne mediante, sed quod omnes posteri haberent illam iustitiam a Deo, quia non esset impedimentum ex parte carnis. |
7. To that of (St.) Anselm they say, that it is not understood, that he would transfuse justice by means of the flesh, but that all after (him) would have that justice from God, because there would not be an impediment on the part of the flesh. |
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Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum Sacramentum sit causa disponens; dicunt, quod sic, sicut tactum fuit;6 quia disponit ad efficaciam gratiae, remittendo fomitem, qui impedit operationem gratiae; vel, sicut tactum fuit,7 disponit ad hoc, quod gratia insit animae, quamvis non disponat ad hoc, quod sit. Et hoc est dicere, quod gratia comparatur ad causam efficientem, comparatur ad substantiam suscipientem. Sacramentum autem non disponit a parte agentis, qui est Deus, sed a parte suscipientis, quod est anima. |
To that which is asked, whether a Sacrament is a disposing cause; they say, that (it is) so, just as has been touched upon;6 because it disposes to the efficacy of grace, by remitting the fomes, which impedes the operation of grace; and/or, just as had been touched upon,7 it disposes to this, that grace be in the soul, although it does not dispose to this, that it be. And this is to say, that grace is compared to an efficient cause, (and) is compared to the suscepting substance. But the Sacrament does not dispose on the part of the one acting, who is God, but (rather) on the part of the one suscepting, which is the soul. |
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2. Et sic patet responsio ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gratia est ex nihilo; dicunt enim, quod Sacramentum non disponit ad gratiam ratione eius ex quo, sed ratione eius in quod recipitur.8 |
2. And thus is clear the response to that which is objected, that grace is out of nothing; for they say, that a Sacrament does not dispose to grace by the reckoning of that out of which (it is), but by the reckoning of that into which it is received.8 |
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1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dispositio praecedit illud, ad quod disponit; dicunt, quod non semper praecedit tempore, sicut patet in dispositione, quae est necessitas sive in dispositione ultima;9 sic Sacramentum digne susceptum disponit dispositione ultima, quae simul est tempore cum gratia, sed natura prior, sicut ex parte illa. |
1. To that which is objected, that a disposition precedes that, to which it disposes; they say, that it does not always precede in time, just as is clear in the disposition, which is necessity or in the last disposition;9 in this manner a Sacrament suscepted worthily does dispose as a last disposition, which is simultaneous in time with grace, but prior in nature, just as just as on that part (of the one suscepting). |
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3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si disponit, influit; dicunt, quod influit. Quod ergo obiicitur,10 quod nullum corporale influit in spirituale; dicunt, quod in Sacramento est aliqua virtus spiritualis, per quam influit in animam. Tamen illa ratio non valet secundum eos, quia in anima mundanda est considerare ipsam substantiam et ipsam maculam, a qua mundatur; et licet secundum substantiam sit superior omni corpore, tamen ratione maculae vel defectus est inferior. |
3. To that which is objected, that if it disposes, it inflows; they say, that it does inflow. Therefore that which is objected,10 that no corporal inflows into a spiritual; they say, that in a Sacrament there is some spiritual virtue, through which it inflows into the soul. However that reckoning it not valid according to them, because in the soul to be cleansed it is that one considers the substance itself and the stain itself, from which it is cleansed; and though according to substance it is superior than every corporal, however by reason of the stain and/or defect it is inferior. |
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Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum sit in Sacramentis ponere virtutem creatam; dicunt, quod sic. |
To that which is asked, whether it is that one posits in the Sacraments a created virtue; they say, that (it is) so. |
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1. Quod ergo quaeritur, utrum11 substantia, aut accidens; dicunt, quod accidens. Quod iterum quaeritur, utrum accidens corporale, aut spirituale; dicunt, quod spirituale. Quod obiicitur postea, quod accidens spirituale non est in subiecto corporali; dicunt, quod verum est naturaliter, sed ipsum Sacramentum habet illam virtutem supra naturam secundum ordinem divinae misericordiae, sicut / virtus est . . . |
1. Therefore that which is objected, whether (it is)11 a substance, or an accident; they say, that (it is) an accident. Again that which is asked, whether (it is) a corporal accidens, or a spiritual one; they say, that (it is) a spiritual one. That which is objected afterwards, that a spiritual accident is not in a corporal subject; they say, that it is true naturally, but the Sacrament itself has that virtue above nature according to the order of Divine Mercy, just as / there is a virtue . . . |
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1 Codd. F H (bb a secunda manu) de differentia
novorum Sacramentorum et veterum. In fine solut. codd. A E F G I K L V,
posito sic pro Et sic, substituunt intelligit pro intelligitur. |
1 Codices F and H {bb by a second hand} read concerning
the difference of the New Sacraments and the Old [de differentia novorum
Sacramentorum et veterum]. At the end of the solution codices A E G G I K L
V, having put in this manner [sic] in place of And in this manner
[Et sic], they substitute he understands [intelligit] in place of is
understood [intelligitur]. |
p. 23
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sicut / virtus est in igne purgatorio secundum ordinem divinae iustititae supra naturam ignis. Et quod amplius est ex parte hac, quia Sacramentum non est subiectum naturale sive secundum naturam; et ideo non est mirum, si habeat virtutem supra naturam. |
just as / there is virtue in the purgatorial fire according to the order of Divine Justice above the nature of fire. And that it is more ample on this part, because a Sacrament is not a natural subject or one according to nature; and for that reason it is not (something) wonderful, if it has a virtue above nature. |
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2. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum sit bonum maximum etc.; dicunt, quod virtus illa ponenda est inter bona mediocria, quia est infra gratiam et supra corpus. Si obiicias, quod tale bonum est animae potentiae; dicunt, quod Augustinus non excludit propter hoc, quin alia sint; sed illud dicit exemplando vel arctando bonum ad subiectum humanum.1 Si vero obiicias, quod non aget vel influet in potentias animae, cum sit mediocre, et influxus sit a superior; dicunt, quod non influit in potentias ratione potentiarum, sed ratione ipsarum deficientium per culpam. |
2. To that which is asked, whether it is the greatest good etc.; they say, that that virtue is to be posited among mediocre goods, because it is below grace and above the body. If you object, that such a good belongs to a power of the soul; they say, that (St.) Augustine does not exclude (it) on this account; that there are not others; but he says this by giving an example [exemplando] and/or by constraining the "good" to the human subject.1 But if you object, that it does not act and/or inflow unto the powers of the soul, since it is mediocre, and an influx is from a superior; they say, that it does not inflow unto the powers by reason of the powers, but by reason of their deficiencies [ipsarum deficientium] through fault. |
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3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de receptione substantiae spiritualis; dicunt, quod non est simile: quia, si substantia spiritualis reciperet corporale corporaliter, tunc derogaretur ipsi substantiae nec perficieretur in ipsa receptione; sed si aliquod materiale2 recipiat spirituale spiritualiter, non derogaretur ei in aliquo. |
3. To that which is objected concerning the reception of a spiritual substance; they say, that it is not similar: because, if a spiritual substance would receive a corporal one corporally, then it would derogate from the substance itself nor would it be perfected in the reception itself; but if something material2 receives a spiritual spiritually, it would not derogate from it in anything. |
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4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne quod recipitur, est in recipiente per modum recipientis; dicunt, quod hoc verum est de receptione naturali; sed haec est supra naturam. Praeterea, ipsum Sacramentum, secundum quod huiusmodi, est medicina spiritualis; et ideo debet habere virtutem spiritualem. In naturalibus autem3 maxime consideratur materia, sed in divinis maxime et principaliter consideratur finis; ideo, quia in Sacramentis non consideratur ratio materiae, sed finis, conveniens fuit secundum ipsos virtutem spiritualem in eis ponere. |
4. To that which is objected, that everything which is received, is in the recipient through the manner of the recipient; they say, that this is true concerning natural reception; but this is above nature. Besides, the Sacrament itself, according to which (it is) of this kind, is spiritual medicine [medicina]; and for that reason it ought to have spiritual virtue. Moreover3 in natural (things) matter is considered most of all [maxime], but in divine (things) the end is considered most of all and principally; for that reason, because in the Sacraments a reckoning of matter is not considered, but (rather that of the) end, it was fitting [conveniens] according to them to posit spiritual virtue in them. |
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Ad aliud4 secundum eos iam responsum est, quia nobilior est virtus ipsa, minus nobilis anima lapsa, non ratione substantiae, sed ratione lapsus. Et patent hoc modo cetera obiecta secundum hanc opinionem. Et haec opinio est magnorum.5 |
To the other one4 according to them there has already been responded, that virtue itself is more noble, the lapsed soul less noble, not by reason of (its) substance, but by reason of the lapse. And all the other (things) objected are clear in this manner according to this opinion. And this opinion belongs to the great (Masters of theology).5 |
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Est etiam aliorum magnorum circa hoc opinio dicentium, quod in Sacramentis non sit causalitas neque virtus aliqua, nec effectiva nec dispositiva ad gratiam, quae sit qualitas vel proprietas aliqua absoluta, sed per quandam assistentiam. |
About this there is also the opinion of other great (masters) saying, that in the Sacraments there is not a causality nor any virtue, neither effective, nor dispositive to grace, which is a quality and/or some absolute property, but (rather one that is) through a certain assistance. |
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Sacramento enim dicunt assistere divinam virtutem, quae est causa gratiae, et fidem et devotionem suscipientis,6 quae disponit ad gratiam. Et adducunt simile: quoniam ad verbum Elisaei, Naaman se lavante, astitit virtus divina effectiva sanitatis et devotio et obedientia Naaman dispositiva; nulla tamen causalitas fuit nec in verbo Elisaei nec in acqua Iordanis.7 Si ergo Dominus ita instituisset, ut ad verbum Elisaei non solum ipse Naaman, sed ceteri accedentes curarentur, et hoc ex quadam pactione, ita quod semper assiteret vis divina; aqua illa disceretur curare et sanare lepram et esse causa curationis et habere virtutem curandi. Sic in Sacramentis dicunt quod ad prolationes verbi assistit virtus divina aquis et infundit gratiam et regenerat, dum homo subiicit se per fidei professionem et obedientiam. Dicunt ergo, quod Sacramenta dicuntur habere virtutem et dicuntur causa et dicuntur efficere secundum communem modum loquendi propter assistentiam divinae virtutis. |
For they say that there are assisting the Sacrament a divine virtue, which is the cause of grace, and the faith and devotion of the one suscepting,6 (each of) which disposes to grace. And they adduce a similar (argument): since at the word of Eliseus, with Naaman having washed, there assisted a divine virtue effective of health and the devotion and obedience of Naaman dispositive (to it); however there was no causality neither in the word of Eliseus nor in the water of the Jordan.7 Therefore if the Lord had instituted (it) thus, that at the word of Eliseus not only Naaman alone, but all the others approaching would be cured, and this out of a certain making of a pact [ex quadam pactione], so that the divine force would always assist; the water would be discerned to cure and heal the leper and be the cause of the curing and have the virtue of curing. In the same manner in the Sacraments they say that at the pronunciation of the word a divine virtue assists the waters and infuses grace and regenerates, while the man subjects himself through the profession and obedience of faith. Therefore they say, that the Sacraments are said to have virtue and they are said (to be) a cause and they are said to effect according to a common manner of speaking on account of the assistance of a divine virtue. |
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Et si tu quaeras, utrum habeant virtutem aliquam creatam super8 increatum; respondent, quod praeter virtutem increatam est dicere aliquam virtutem habere Sacramentum, sed extenso nomine virtutis. Si enim virtus dicat aliquam qualitatem vel naturam sive essentiam adventientem Sacramento, sicut virtus proprie dicitur, sic secundum eos non est dicendum, quod habeat virtutem;9 sed extenditur nomen virtutis ad aliquam ordinationem, ut quando aliquid habet efficacem ordinationem ad aliquid, dicitur habere virtutem respectu illius. Et ponunt hoc exemplum: rex statuit, ut qui habent tale signum, habeant centum libras.10 Post istam instituitionem signum illud non habet aliquam proprietatem absolutam, quam non haberet prius; ad aliquid tamen est ordinatum, ad quod non erat prius. Et quia habet efficaciam ordinationem, dicitur habere virtutem, ut faciat aliquem habere centum marcas; et dicitur illud signum valere centum marcas, et tamen nihil plus habet de bonitate nunc quam prius. Si ergo quaeras, quid sit illa virtus in illo signo; dicetur, quod non est aliquid absolutum, sed ad aliquid.11 Sic dicunt, quod Sacramenta sunt talia signa a Deo instituta, ut qui ea suscepterit debito modo habeat tantum de gratia vel habeat gratiam ad hunc actum; illa, inquam, ordinatio efficax secundum istos virtus est Sacramenti, |
And if you ask, whether they have some created virtue upon8 the uncreated One; they respond, that besides uncreated Virtue there is the saying [dicere] that a Sacrament has some created virtue, but according to an extended name of virtue. For if virtue means some quality and/or nature or essence coming to the Sacrament, just as virtue is properly said, thus according to them it must not be said, that it has virtue;9 but the name of virtue is extended toward some ordination, as when something has an efficacious ordination to something, it is said to have virtue in respect of that. And they posit this example: a king has established, that they who have such a sign, have a hundred livres [libras].10 After that institution of his that sign does not have any absolute property, which it did not have before; however the ordered is for something, to which it was not before. And because it has an efficacious ordination, it is said to have a virtue, to make someone have a hundred marks [marcas]; and that sign is said to be worth a hundred marks, and, nevertheless [tamen], it has nothing more of goodness now than before. If therefore you ask, what is that virtue in that sign; it will be said, that it is not something absolute, but (rather) for something.11 Thus they say, that the Sacraments are such signs instituted by God, that he who has suscepted them in a worthy manner has so much of grace and/or has grace for this act; that efficacious ordination, I say, according to these (arguments) of theirs is the virtue of the Sacrament, |
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1 Vide II. Sent. d. 26. q. 3. ad 5. Vat. suppositum
humanum. Superius pro animae potentiae Vat. animae potentia.
Subinde pro exemplando cod. H exemplificando. Post pauca pro obiiciat
substituimus ex codd. E P Q obiicias. |
1 See Sent., Bk. II, d. 26, q. 3, at n. 5.
The Vatican text reads human supposit [suppositum humanum]. Above this
in place of belongs to a power of the soul [est animae potentiae] the Vatican text has according to a power of the soul [est animae potentia]. Below this
in place of by giving an example [exemplando] codex H has by
offering an example [exemplificando]. After a few words in place of one
objects [obiiciat] we have substituted from codices E P and Q you
object [obiicias]. |
p. 24
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et ratione illius disponit hominem, ut habeat gratiam, quia efficaciter ordinat ad habendam et suscipiendam gratiam. |
and by reason of that it disposes a man, to have grace, because it efficaciously orders (him) to have and suscept grace. |
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Rursus dicunt, quod ex tali pactione Dominus astrinxit se quodam modo ad dandum gratiam suscipienti Sacramentum; astringit enim quodam modo Deum ad efficiendum, et ideo1 dicitur habere virtutem ad efficiendum et etiam disponendum. Et sicut extenditur nomen virtutis, ita verbum efficiendi, vel disponendi, quia nec efficit nec disponit influendo, sed efficaciter ordinando. Et sicut haec extenduntur, ita et nomen causae, quia non dicitur causa, secundum quod est principium operandi, sed secundum quod est ratio ordinandi. |
Again they say, that out of such a making of a pact the Lord has bound Himself in a certain manner to give grace to the one suscepting the Sacrament; for it binds God in a certain manner to effect, and for that reason1 it is said to have a virtue to effect and even to disposed. And just as the name of virtue is extended, so the verb of effecting, and/or of disposing, because it neither effects nor disposes by inflowing, but (rather) by ordaining efficaciously. And just as these are extended, so also the name of cause, because a cause is not said, according to that which is a principle of operating, but (rather) according to that which is the reckoning of ordaining. |
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Huic positioni pietas fidei non repugnat, et ratio consentit.2 Consentit namque ratio, quia valde difficile est intelligere, qualiter illa virtus detur sicut qualitas absoluta; difficilius, quando detur; difficile etiam est intelligere, cui detur, verbo scilicet, an elemento, quae sunt duo nihil unum facientia; difficile etiam est scire, quamdiu duret; difficile est similiter valde intelligere, quomodo influat; difficile etiam, cuius naturae sit in se ipsa; et multa talia. Alii vero3 positioni satis faciliter ratio concordat. |
To this position the piety of the Faith is not repugnant, and the reckoning (thereof) consents.2 For the reckoning consents, because it is very [valde] difficult to understand, in what kind of manner that virtue is given as an absolute quality; more difficult, when it is given; it is also difficult to understand, to what it is given, that is to the word or the element, which are two nothings making one (thing); it is also difficult to know [scire], how long it lasts; it is difficult similarly to understand well [valde], how it inflows; difficult also, to which nature it belongs in its very self; and many (other) such (questions). However, with3 the position of the other the reckoning (of the Faith) concords in a sufficiently easy manner. |
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Pietas etiam fidei non repugnat. Cavendum est enim, ne, dum nimis damus corporalibus signis ad laudem, subtrahamus honorem gratiae curanti et animae suscipienti. Haec autem opinio non nimis dat neque subtrahit aliquid honoris debiti. Sicut igitur litterae regiae anulo regis sigillatae magnae sunt dignitatis et virtutis et valoris et magna dicuntur et4 posse et facere, tamen in eis nulla virtus est absoluta, sed sola ordinatio per assistentiam virtutis regiae quod patet, quia, mortuo rege, non plus curatur de litteris suis quam de aliis, tamen nihil absolutum amiserunt sic intelligendum in Sacramentis, et sic loquitur Sanctorum auctoritates secundum communem usum. |
The piety, too, of the Faith is not repugnant. For one must beware, lest, while we give too much [nimis] to corporal signs for (their) praise, we subtract honor from curing grace and from the suscepting soul. But this opinion does not give too much nor does it subtract anything of due honor. Therefore just as the royal letters sealed with ring of the king are of a great dignity and virtue and value and are said (to be documents) great both4 to be able and to do, nevertheless [tamen] in them there is no absolute virtue, but only an ordination through the assistance of the royal virtue which is clear, because, with the king dead, there is no more care [non plus curatur] of his letters than of others, however, they have lost nothing absolute thus must it be understood in the Sacraments, and thus do the authorities speak of the Holy Things [Sanctorum] according to the common usage [usum]. |
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Et rationes ad oppositum patent. Et si tu quaeras; super quid fundatur relatio, et quomodo advenit sine donatione proprietatis? dicendum, quod in institutionibus signorum; ut quando nummus fit arrha, nihil datur de novo ipsi nummo.5 |
And the reasons for the opposite are clear. And if you ask; upon what is the relation founded, and how does it come to be present [advenit] without a donation of property? it must be said, that (it is founded) in the institutions of signs; so that when a piece of money [nummus] becomes a pledge [arrha], nothing is given anew [de novo] to the piece of money itself. |
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Utraque harum positionum satis videtur probabilis, haec tamen mihi videtur ad sustinendum facilior; nescio tamen, quae sit verior, quia cum loquimur de his quae sunt miraculi, non multum adhaerendum est rationi. Concedimus igitur, quod Sacramenta novae legis sunt causa et efficiunt et disponunt, extenso nomine, ut dictum est, et hoc securum est dicere; utrum autem plus habeant, nec volo affirmare nec negare. Et secundum hanc ultimam viam omnia quasita patent.6 |
Both of these positions seems sufficiently probable, however the latter [haec] seems to me more easily sustained; however, I do not know, which is more true, because when we speak of those things which are miracles, one must not adhere much to reason. Therefore we concede, that the Sacraments of the New Law are a cause and do effect and do dispose, by an extended name, as has been said, and this is safe to say; but whether they have (something) more, I neither want to affirm nor to deny. And according to this last way all (those things) asked are clear. |
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1 Ex codd. F G H V (I bb a secunda manu) supplevimus ideo,
pro quo cod. Z iam. Paulo superius pro suscipienti cod. G suscipientibus.
Aliquanto inferius pro Et sicut extenditur codd. I R cc (K a secunda
manu) Et ideo sicut extenditur, cod. Z Et sicut hic extenditur,
qui etiam subinde por extenduntur substituit extenditur virtus. |
1 From codices F G H V {I bb by a second hand} we
have supplied for that reason [ideo], in place of which codex Z has already
[iam]. A little above this in place of to the one suscepting
[suscipienti] codex G has to the ones suscepting [suscipientibus]. A
little below this in place of And just as . . . is extended [Et sicut
extenditur] codices I R cc {K by a second hand} read And for that reason
just as . . . is extended [Et ideo sicut extenditur], codex Z And just
as here . . . is extended [Et sicut hic extenditur], which codex also
below this substitutes this virtue is extended [haec extenditur
virtus] in place of these are extended [haec extenduntur]. |
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square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English
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