Book Two, Distinction III, Part I, Article 1
Translated by Edward Buckner from the 1493 edition of Kilian Fischer
| Section | Quaracchi | |
| Art 1 Q1 37 | 2088 | Whether an angel is composed from diverse natures, namely from matter and form |
| Art 1 Q2 38, 39 | 2094 | Given that an angel may have composition from matter and form whether [its matter] it is the same as the matter of corporeal bodies. |
| Art 1 Q3 40, 41 | 2099 | Whether the matter of spiritual and corporeal things is one according to number or according to another unity. |
The argument.
In the first article of Distinction III, Bonaventura argues that angels are composed of both matter and form (Q1), that the matter of angels is the same 'through essence' as the matter of corporeal bodies (Q2), and that the matter of spiritual and corporeal things is one through essence, and so is one in number (Q3). As follows:
Q1. An angel is composed, of matter and form, because: 1. The underlying principle of change is matter, citing Augustine: 'Everything changeable suggests a certain formlessness, according to which form is grasped, or is changed, or is transformed'. 2. Diversity comes about by difference in number, which does not come from form, but from matter. 3. Since the hypostasis or underlying substance of an angel is confined to a part of space amd time, it adds to itself some 'compacting substantial' that is beyond form. This has to be matter. 4. It is impossible for several natures to come together in the constitution of a third, unless one has the nature of the possible and the other has the nature of the actual, because from two beings in potentiality nothing can be created.
Q2. With the name 'matter' taken broadly as 'possible being' (esse possibile), matter in an angel is the 'same' as the matter of corporeal things, in the sense that all gold rings are made of the 'same' substance, i.e. it is the same 'through essence'. 1. Again quoting Augustine [N1] 'from the shapeless matter which he built before from nothing, almighty God has divided multiformed species, of all things together, i.e. of things sensible and insensible, of things which have understanding, and of things which lack it'. 2. In any kind of thing, we find we find one primary thing by all the things of that kind are measured. This must be matter. 3. Number is in spiritual and corporeal things uniformly (e.g. there are 10 angels, or 10 men). Thus there must be some common nature in them, according to which they are numbered. This is matter. 4. The matter of corporeal things is abstracted from every form, as is the matter of spiritual things: either the matter is distinguished or it is not. If not, it is the same in essence. If it is, it is not 'distinct', because distinctness (distinctio) cannot be incomplete, and can only come from form. 5. With the matter of spiritual and corporeal things considered under the form of a 'genus', it obviously does not differ in respect of form, therefore not in respect of matter itself. 6. The matter of corporeal things is said to be 'matter', the matter of spiritual things is said to be 'matter'. So (arguing that 'matter' signifies in the same sense) both are matter.
Q3. The matter of spiritual and corporeal things is is also one in number. 1. Matter 'by essence' is one thing which has altogether no distinctness (distinctio) according to essence, because all distinctness is from form (see above). 2. Everything which is one, is one either in genus or in species or in number, but unity of genus or species is only from form, therefore matter is one in number. 3. Likewise, there cannot be a perfect status except in one thing … 4. The 'matter' of a stone and the 'matter' of an angel are said to be 'matter' neither in the same sense nor different senses. Therefore the matter of a stone and the matter of an angel are not several matters but unique, it and so 'matter is one in number in spiritual and corporeal things'. 5. The different forms imposed upon or 'supervening' (supervenientes) on matter do not change its essence but only [its] being (esse). Therefore matter is 'unique in number' (unica numero) regarding its essence, whether or not it has forms. 6. If God made an angel from a single stone, the form and the being of the matter would be changed, but the essence would be preserved. But the matter from which the angel is made is one in number with the matter of the angel itself. But the angel made from the stone is no more distant from corporeal matter is any other angel. Therefore in angels and corporeal things, matter is one in number.
The idea that matter is 'entirely in possibility' is somewhat difficult to grasp, and Bonaventura spends some time explaining this, by means of many similes and examples. Matter in its essence has no actuality, no form, no distinctness. Yet is not nothing (non est nihil). It is one 'without multitude'. It has no genus, no species. Its unity is not by continuity (as a mountain is one), or by simplicity (as an angel is one), but rather, it has the unity of homogeneity, in the sense that many vessels are made of the same gold, even though the gold in one differs from, because discontinuous with, the gold in another. With all its possible forms abstracted, there is no distinctness in matter, on the contrary, it is understood as one absolutely. It is one in number, only in the sense that a sheep lacking a mark, is said to be marked out, in respect of sheep having a mark.
If anyone wishes to understand the unity of matter, he must abstract the soul from individual unity and rise beyond the act of the imagination and to think of a being altogether in potentiality through privation, and then he will in some way be able to grasp it. But so long as you think of matter as an extended mass, you will in no way will understand the unity of its essence.
Thus, matter is essentially passive potentiality, the capacity to take on various forms. However, these remarks pertain only to the essence of matter, as Bonaventure makes clear:
… the capacity following from the essence of matter, stands indifferently to form, whether spiritual or corporeal. But because matter is never stripped from all being, and what is alone under corporeal being is never cast off, and similarly what is under a spiritual being, hence it is that matter consequent to being in spiritual things is one thing, and in corporeal things another. (q2, ad 3).
The Context
Bonaventure endorses the standard mediæval account, that an individual is incapable of being divided into 'subjective' parts, each of which is of the same nature or kind as the whole of which they are parts. The individual contrasts with the universal, which is capable of being divided. The species man may be 'divided' into many men, but Socrates cannot be so divided. An individual is undivided in itself, it subsists [i.e. exists or possibly exists] in se i.e it is not ‘in’ another as accidents are in substance, and per se, i.e. it requires nothing else in order to exist, and it is distinct from all others. (The Latin word individuus is literally 'indivisible').
The purpose of Article 1 is to support the claim to be made later in Article 2, that individuation arises from form and matter. Matter and form are two 'principles', which are united to form a composite substance, distinct from the two constituent principles. In this composite the two constitutive principles remain as substantial entities, although incomplete as, just. Therefore a substantial union differs entirely from an accidental union.
The metaphysical principles of matter and form are thus together necessary for explaining the individuality of the individual, and, when the principles result in a substantial union, for accounting for the distinctness of the individual from everything else.
References in scholastic works
Albertus (Magnus),Summa., p. II, tr. 1, q. 3, m. 3, a. 2
-------In Sent, II, d3, a. 4
Durandus, In Sent, II d. 3 q. 1.
Dionysius the Carthusian, In Sent, II d. 3, q. 1.
Alexander of Hales,Summa., p. II, q. 20, d. 17, a. 1, q. 1
Augustine, On a Literal Exposition of GenesisBk. V, ch. 5; Bk. VII, ch. 5, ch. 6, ch. 17
Augustinus Hibernicus, de Mirabilibus s. Scripturaeq. 2.
AquinasIn Sent, Bk. II, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1;
-------Summa., I, q. 50, a. 2; q. 75, aa 5-6
------- I, q. 54, aa. 1,3; q. 3, a. 4).
-------Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. II, ch. 50, 52-54, Bk. III, ch. 68
-------de Spiritual. Creat., a. 1
-------de Anima, a. 6
-------de Substant. separatis, chs. 5-8
-------de Potentia, q. 1, a. 1, in the body of the Article),
Bartholomeo a Barberii,Cursus theol., p. II, disputation 2, qq. 6 and 7
Bonaventura, In Sent, d. 12, a. 1, q. 1, Bk. I, d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 3; d. 30, q. 3; d. 26, q. 1, Bk. III, d. 36, q. 6, a. 3; Bk. I, p. I, a. 2. q. 2, Breviloquium, p. II, ch. 6
Dionysius the Carthusian, In Sent, d3, q. 1.
Geronimo a Montefortino, Summa Scoti, tome II, q. 50, a. 2,
Giles of Rome, In Sent II d. 3, p. I, q. 1, a. 1.
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibetals, 4, q. 16.
John of BaconIn Sent, Bk. II, d. 14, q. 1, a. 3,
John of Rupella (John of la Rochelle)On the Soul, Bk. I, ch. 13
Peter of Aquila, In Sent, II, d3, q. 1
Peter of Tarentaise (In Sent., Bk. II, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2)
Richard of MiddletonIn Sent, II, d. 17, a. 1. q. 1
Scotus, de Anima, q. 15
-------de Rerum principiis, qq. 7 and 8, q. 7, a. 2; q. 7, a. 2, n. 28), q. 1, a. 1, n. 3, and q. 7, a. 2, n. 26; q. 8, a. 3
See also:
Peter King. Bonaventura on Individuation
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17va (37a)
Quaestio I. Utrum angelis sit compositus ex diversis naturis, scilicet, ex materia et forma.
Et quod sic ostenditur per rationem mutationis. Nullum mutabile [est] simplex, sed angelus de sua natura est mutabilis et mutatur, ergo habet compositionem. Sed ulterius quod ex materia, cuicumque inest mutatio, inest principium mutabilitatis. Sed principium mutabilitatis est materia, ergo &c. Prima manifesta est, secunda patet per Augustinum, xii confes, omne mutabile insinuat quandam informitatem, qua forma capitur, vel mutatur, vel vertitur. Et Boe, in iii li, [ii] de trinitate. Nihil quod est mere forma accidentis [/ibus] potest subiici, et ibidem expresse dicit quod forma non suscipit accidentia, quia haec[20] non suscipit nisi materia subiecta. Si tu dicas mihi, quod mutabilitas venit rebus, quia sunt ex nihilo, sicut in pluribus locis dicit [vult] Augustinus. Sed constat quod mutabilitas non est prima [pura] privatio, immo dicit aliquam positionem, ergo non habet causam ipsam puram privationem, necesse est ergo quod habeat causam {ipsam} dicentem positionem, sed non positionem omnimodam, cum etiam dicat privationem, ergo aliquid quod non est omnino aliquid, nec omnino nihil, sed medium interaliquid et nihil, hoc autem dicit Augustinus, materiam, ergo &c. Item hoc ipsum ostenditur per rationem actionis et passionis, quia nihil idem et secundum idem agit et patitur, sed angelus idem agit et patitur, ergo habet aliud et aliud principium secundum quod agit et patitur. Principium secundum quod agit est30 forma, principium vero secundum quod patitur non potest esse nisi materia ergo &c.
Item hoc videtur per rationem individuationis, in angelis enim est distinctio hypostasum, non per originem, fiat ergo talis ratio. Omnis distinctio secundum numerum venit a principio intrinseco et substantiali, quia omnibus accidentibus circumscriptis, differentia numero sunt diversa, sed non venit a forma, ergo venit a principio materiali, ergo &c. Maior per se manifesta est, {et} minor patet per Philosophum qui dicit de caelo et mundo. Cum dico caelum, dico formam, cum dico hoc caelum, dico materiam, et idem in pluribus locis dicit quod omnino materia numerabiliter se habet. Si dicas quod materia vocatur ipsa hypostasis, sive ipsum quod est, tunc [/ego] quaero a te de hypostasi aut addit aliquid super essentiam et formam, aut nihil. [50] Si nihil addit, ergo non contrahit, ergo sicut ipsum universale est natum supra esse et ubique, sic ipsa hypostasis sicut patet in divinis, quia persona non addit supra essentiam [sed] est ubique et immensa sicut essentia, ergo cum hypostasis angeli sit finita, et artata, et limitata, et itahic, et nunc, necessario oportet quod ultra formam addat aliquid artans substantiale sibi, hoc autem non potest esse nisi materia.
Si tu feras mihi instantiam in albe | 37a Whether an angel is composed from diverse natures, namely from matter and form.
1. And that it is so, is shown by reason of change. Nothing changeable is simple, but an angel by his nature is changeable and is changed, therefore he has composition. But furthermore, that [he is composed] out of matter: the principle of changeability exists in whatsoever change exists in, but the principle of changeability is matter, therefore &c. The first is manifest, the second is clear from Augustine, (Confessions xii) – 'Everything changeable suggests a certain formlessness, according to which form is grasped, or is changed, or is transformed'. And Boethius, in (On the Trinity, II): nothing that is pure form can be subjected to accidents [Q: accidentibus] and in the same place he expressly says that form does not receive accidents, because it does not receive these unless matter [is] the subject. If you say to me, that changeability comes into things, because they are from nothing, as Augustine says in many places. But it is plain [constat] that changeability is not first [prima] privation, indeed, it bespeaks some positive assertion. Therefore it does not have pure privation as the cause itself. It is necessary therefore that it has 'cause itself' in the sense of [dicentem] positive assertion. But not any kind of positive assertion, since it also bespeaks privation, therefore something that is not altogether something, but not altogether nothing, but halfway between something and nothing. And this Augustine calls matter, therefore &c. 2. Likewise also here it is shown by reason of action and action upon, that nothing the same acts and is acted upon according to the same thing. But the same angel acts and is acted upon, therefore there is one thing on which he acts, and another principle according to which he is acted upon. But the principle according to which he is acted upon cannot be [anything] except matter, therefore &c. The major premiss is manifest in itself, and the minor is similarly clear, for it belongs to an angel to receive and give illuminations, therefore &c. If perhaps you give the contrary instance [instantia] that a medium receives and gives light through the same matter, as is clear in the case of the air, there is no contrary instance, because a medium does not have the nature of acting, nor acting in concert. And again, this instance cannot come about in one acting and being acted-on, for an angel acts and is acted upon, for while it enacts what it ought not, it is acted upon for what it ought. When it enacts a fault, it suffers punishment, so that there no way exists shame without the dignity of justice. And this properly is 'being acted upon'. 3. Likewise, this seems to be so by reason of individuation, for in angels there is a distinction of hypostases [N2], not through [their] origin [N3]. And so let there be such a reason! Every distinction comes about according to number from an intrinsic and substantial principle, because (drawing a line round all accidents) things are diverse by difference in number, but [this] does not come from the form, therefore it comes from the principle of matter, therefore &c. The major premiss is manifest in itself, and the minor is clear from the Philosopher, who speaks about the heaven and the earth. 'When I say heaven, I say form, when I say this heaven, I say matter', and likewise in many places he says that matter subsists entirely in a numerable way. If you say that matter itself is called the hypostasis, or that which is, then I ask from you, about the hypostasis, whether it adds something over and above essence and form, or nothing. If it adds nothing, then it does not bring them together, therefore just as the universal itself is made to be above being and everywhere, so the hypostasis itself, as is clear in the divine [Persons], because the Person does not add anything over and above essence [but] is everywhere and immeasurable, just as essence [is]. Therefore since the hypostasis of the angel is finite, and confined, and limited, and so here and now, it must necessarily be that beyond form it adds to itself something that is a compacting substantial. But this cannot be [anything] except matter. 4. Likewise this very thing is shown by the nature of essential composition. For an angel is defined, and thus shares in the nature of genus and differentia, a nature in which he belongs with others, and a nature in which he differs. Therefore since it is necessary for the whole truth of the distinction [Q: definition] really to be found in any angel, it is necessary to suppose a diversity of natures in him. But it is impossible for several natures to run together in the constitution of a third, unless one has the nature of the possible and the other has the nature of the actual, because from two beings in potentiality nothing comes about, and similarly not from two entities in actuality, therefore it is necessary &c. If you bring to me the contrary instance of white |
| 17vb (37b) 1 dine et in aliis formis quae habent diffiniri et habent genera et differentias, nec tamen {habent} materiam partem sui, instantia omnino nulla est, quia secus est de [/in] naturis accidentium quae habent ortum a [/ex] substantia et eius principiis, et de naturis sive differentiis substantiae quae non habent ortum ex alio genere, unde necessario sequitur vel quod albedo habeat diversas naturas in se, vel {quod} natura speciei et generis primi et subalterni causantur a diversis naturis repertis in subiecto, quod si ita non potest poni in angelo, primum ponendum est.
Sed contra Boethius in fine li, de duabus naturis et una persona christi. Omnis natura in corporeae [/incorporeae] substantiae nullo materiae funda[11]mento innititur, nullum vero corpus est cuius materia non sit subiecta. Et iterum, cum alia res fundamento materiae innitatur, ut corpus, alia vero subiecto materiae non egeat ut incorporeum, nullo modo fieri potest ut [corpus] in [in]corporalem speciem [per]mutetur. Ex hac autoritate expresse habetur quod angelus non habet materiam. Item philosophus de anima dicit quod neque corpus est, neque forma in corpore est, neque mixtum cum materia omnino, et hoc dicit esse verum de intellectu,sed angelus est huiusmodi, ergo non habet materiam. Item ostenditur ratione universum est perfectissimum secundum ordinem naturarum, ita quod perfectius non potest cogitari, sed potest [rationabiliter] cogitari aliquae substantia spiritualis et[21] immaterialis, ergo illa est in universo, ergo &c. Maior patet per hoc quod deus fecit omnia valde bona, patet etiam per Damascenum, c, xii, omnia qui per dei providentiam fiunt, deductionem convenientem suscipiunt, et ut non est melius facta sunt.
Item videtur per deductionem ad inconveniens. Inconveniens enim est quod aliquae natura creata sit nobilior angelo, sed omnis causa nobilior est suo effectu, et angelus non habet aliam causam quam increatam, sed illa non potest esse causa materialis nec formalis, ergo angelus non habet materiam nec formam aliam, sed essentialiter est forma. Respondeo dicendum quod certum est angelum non habere essentiam simplicem per privationem omnis compositionis, certum enim est quod angelus compositus est compositione multiplici. Potest enim considerari in comparatione ad sui [/suum] principium, et sic intantum est compositus inquantum habet ad ipsum dependentiam, simplicissi[41]mum enim absolutum est, et omne dependens hoc ipso cadit in aliquam compositionem, {quia differt, quo est, et quid est}. Habet secundo considerari in comparatione ad suum effectum, et sic habet componi ex substantia et potentia. Habet nihilominus considerari ut ens in genere, et sic secundum methaphysicum, componitur ex actu et potentia, secundum logicum vero ex genere et differentia. Item habet considerari ut ens in se, et sic quantum ad esse actuale est in ipso compositio entis et esse, quantum ad esse essentiale, ex quo est et quod est, quantum ad esse indivisible [/individuale]sive personale, sic quod est et quis est.
Sed de compositione materiae et formae, sive materialiset formalis, de hac dubium est. Et voluerunt aliqui dicere quodtalis removetur ab angelo, et sunt in eo compositiones prius dictae. Sed sicut ostensum est supra, cum in angelo sit ratio mutabilitatis non tantum ad non esse, sed secundum diversas proprietates, sit iterum ratio possibilitatis [/passibilitatis], sit iterum ratio individualitatis [/tionis] et limitationis, postremo ratio essentialis compositionis secundum[61] propriam naturam, non video causam nec rationem quomodo defendi potest quin substantia angeli sit composita ex diversis naturis, et essentia omnis creaturae per se entis, et si composita est ex diversis naturis, illae duae naturae se habent per modum actualis et possibilis, et ita materiae et formae. Et | 37b ness and of other forms which have a definition, and have genera and differentia, yet still do not have matter as part of themselves, the instance is altogether nothing, because it is otherwise concerning the nature of accidents which have an origin from substance and from its principles, and concerning natures or differentia of a substance which do not have an origin in some other genus. Wherefore necessarily it follows either that whiteness has diverse natures in itself, or that the nature of species and first and subordinate genus are caused by different natures found in the subject. But if it cannot be supposed thus in an angel, the first is to be supposed.
But on the contrary, Boethius in the end of the book (Concerning the Two Natures, and One Person of Christ) [says that] every nature of an incorporeal substance is supported by no foundation of matter, but there is no body of which matter may not be the subject. And again, since one thing needs a foundation of matter, such as body, but another does not need a subject of matter, such as an incorporeal, in no way can it happen that a body be completely changed into an [in]corporeal species. And from this authority it is expressly held that an angel does not have matter. 2. Likewise the Philosopher (On the Soul) says that it is neither body, nor a form in a body, nor altogether mixed with matter, and this he says is true of the understanding. But an angel is of this kind, therefore it does not have matter.
Augustine (On Free Will) says that there can be something in the nature of reality that you do not think by your reason, but that there fails to be something that you think of by true reason, cannot be the case [N6]. The minor premiss is clear, because a substance, similar to God by spirituality and immateriality, is reasonably thought of, and this seems to be so, for since (i) there is some nature which according to substance and being is the actuality of matter, such as matter and corporeal forms, (ii) another which [is such] according to the actuality of being, not according to essence, such as the rational soul, accordingly (iii) there will be a third which will have been separated according to actuality and essence. 4. Likewise it seems so, through deduction to inconsistency. For it is inconsistent that some created nature be more noble than an angel, but every cause is more noble than its effect, and an angel does not have any cause other than an uncreated one, but that cannot be a material or formal cause, therefore an angel does not have matter, or another form, but is essentially form. I reply, it is to be said that it is certain that an angel does not have a essence [that is] simple through privation of all composition, for it is certain that an angel is composite by a manifold composition. For he can be considered in comparison to his principle, and thus, in as much as he is composite, by so much he has dependency on God himself [ad ipsum], for the most simple thing is absolute, and every dependent thing by this very fact falls into some composition, because it differs from what it is, and by what it is.
Likewise he has to be considered as a being-in-himself, and thus as far as actual being is concerned, there exists in him a composition of a being and being, as far as essential being is concerned, [a composition] from that by which he is and that which he is, as far as indivisible or personal being is concerned, thus [a composition of] that which he is and who he is. Since therefore the angelic essence is said to be simple, this is not by privation of these compositions, but this is certain: that some compositions are removed from the subject, regarding composition from quantitative parts, and composition from heterogeneous parts, and composition from corporeal and spiritual nature, as it is in man.
But just as was shown above, since there is in the angel the logical nature of changeability, not only regarding non being, but according to the diverse properties, and [since] again there is logical nature of possibility [Q: passibility], and again, the logical nature of individuality and of limitation, and finally, the logical nature of essential composition according to his own nature, I see no cause nor reason by which it can be defended, but that the substance of an angel, also the essence of every creature that has being-through-itself [per se entis], is composed of diverse natures, and if it is composed of different natures, those two natures subsist through a manner of possibility and actuality, and so [through the manner] of matter and form. And |
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18ra (38a) 1 ideo illa positio videtur verior esse, scilicet, quod in angelo sit compositio ex materia et forma.
Quod ergo obiicitur in contrarium de autoritatibus Boeth, et Aug, dicendum quod loquitur de materia appropriata [/ate], scilicet, ratione potentiae passivae quae est principium patiendi et transmutandi ab alio, et hoc patet, quia ipsi volunt [/ ipse vult] probare quod corporalia non convertuntur in spiritualia, nec econverso. Similiter philosophus vult dicere quod anima denudata sit a ratione materiae, secundum quod [/quam] est causa permixtionis et corruptionis, et ideo non loquuntur generaliter de materia sed appropriate. Alioquin ipse Boethius contradiceret sibi in, l de trinitate, ubi dicit quod nihil subiicitur accidentibus nisi per materiam, et ibi11 dem, quod solus deus est immaterialis.
Et si obiicias mihi, quod deus potest facere quod forma accidentalis sit sine materia, ut in sacramento altaris, dicendum quod nunquam fecit quin semper sit nata esse in materia, et ad illam quantum est de sui natura habeat [/habet] inclinationem, si ergo deus res condidit secundum quod[21] competit naturis ipsarum, patet quod nunquam debuit facere formam stare sine materia in conditione rerum, quamvis in miraculis faciat contra naturam et supra naturam. In conditione enim rerum non quaerimus quid deus possit, sed quid congruat naturae ipsius creaturae, sicut dicit Augustinus. Quod obiicitur quod causa nobilior est effectu, verum est de efficiente et finali quae propriae tenent rationem causae, sed de materiali et corporali [/formali] quae sunt principia ordinata ad compositionem non habent veritatem simpliciter sed solum secundum quid. | 38a for the same reason that supposition seems to be more true, namely, that in an angel there is composition from matter and form.
1. To the objection therefore that [it is] contrary to the authority of Boethius, and Augustine, it is to be said that he speaks of appropriated matter, namely, by reason of the passive potential which is the principle of being acted upon and being transmuted by another, and this is clear, because they themselves wish to prove that corporeal things are not converted into spiritual things, and conversely. 2. Similarly, the Philosopher wishes to say that the the soul may be stripped of the logical nature of matter, according to which it is the cause of of commingling and corruption, and indeed [immo] they do not speak generally of matter, but rather as appropriated [appropriate]. Otherwise Boethius himself would contradict himself (On the Trinity I), where he says that nothing is subjected to accidents except matter, and in the same place, where [he says] that God alone is immaterial. 3. To the objection that a simple creature can reasonably be thought [reading cogitari] &c, it is to be said that with the properties of the creature considered, by the very thing by which the creature is not pure actuality , it must have a possibility which is changeable. It must have a foundation because it is limited in genus. It must have composition, wherefore it cannot be reasonably thought, that it cannot be or be made.
4. To the objection that a cause is more noble than an effect, it is true of the efficient and the final [cause], which properly belong to the logical nature of cause. But concerning material and bodily [causes], which are the principles ordered towards composition, they do not have truth absolutely but only in a qualified sense [secundum quid]. Quaestio II. Given that an angel has composition from matter and form (with the name 'matter' broadly taken as possible being), which comes with another to the constitution of a thing as if a foundation of the thing.
1. And that it is the same through essence seems to be so by the authority of Augustine (On the Wonders of Sacred Scripture, chapter one): 'from the shapeless matter which he built before from nothing, almighty God has divided multiformed species, of all things together, i.e. of things sensible and insensible, of things which have understanding, and of things which lack it'. What [is] clearer than this? 2. Likewise it seems so by reason. In any genus whatever, we find one primary thing by which are measured all the things which are in that genus, as the Philosopher would have it (Metaphysics xi). But substance is one genus not only according to the logician, who examines the 'intentions' [N] of things, but also according to the metaphysician who considers the essences of things, therefore in the genus of substance there is one 'something' by which are measured all things in that genus. But that cannot be an extrinsic principle, since according to a greater or lesser intrinsic participation in this, things of that genus may be [reading sint] greater or less. Therefore, since there is not an extrinsic principle except form or matter, it will be either matter or form. If matter, I have proposed [that]. If form - but the unity of form necessarily presupposes the unity of matter, therefore &c.
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| 18rb (38b) 1 forma, est ita simplex ut punctus, ergo nullam partibilitatem habet, ergo si in hoc non differunt, non videtur quod in alio.
Si dicas quod per capacitatem. Contra, materia non est sua capacitas per essentiam ergo contingit eam abstrahi a capacitate, abstrahatur ergo materia spiritualium et corporalium a capacitate, quaero per quid differant, nullam omnino est dare, nullam assignare differentiam, ergo essentia est eadem per naturam. Item forma generis est abstrahibilis a forma specierum sive a differentiis, sed differentia [substantia] dicit formam generis, corporeum et incorporeum sunt differentiae, ergo ab his potest abstrahi, sed forma generis, naturaliter est prior quam forma differentiarum, sicut dicit philosophus quod [11] prius est animal quam homo, considerata [consideretur] igitur materia spiritualium et corporalium sub forma generis, non [/nec] differunt quantum ad formam quae consequitur ipsam essentiam materiae, ergo multo fortius non differunt quo ad ipsam materiam ut videtur. Item cum dicitur materia rerum corporalium est materia spiritualium {,} materia est materia, aut est convenientia in solo nomine, aut in habitudine, aut in essentia. Si in solo nomine, ergo cum sit aequivocatio in primo principio, ergo nulla est univocatio. Si in comparatione, abstrahatur ab illa comparatione, tunc aut erit dictum per convenientiam in essentia, aut aequivocatio pura. Contra, Aug, xi, confess, duo fecisti Domine, unum prope te, aliud[21] prope nihil. Et iterum in, xii, duo sunt carentia temporibus, unum quod sine ullo defectu contemplationis, et sine ullo intervallo mutationis tua eternitate perfruatur, alterum quod ita uniforme [/informe] erat ut ex alia forma in quam formam mutaretur non haberet, si ergo quae recte dividuntur unum non intrat in constitutionem alterius, si angelica natura dividit contra corporalem naturam sive corporalium, ergo &c. Si tu dicas quod loquitur de ea secundum esse, hoc nihil est, quia loquitur de ea sicut patet in antecedentibus et consequentibus secundum quod omni forma erat privata, sive ut intelligitur sub omnimoda informitate, et sic consideratur ut mutabilis [/immutabilis], ergo &c. Beda etiam et alii sancti sic dividunt. Item quaecumque[31] communicant in materia sunt ad invicem transmutabilia, sicut dicit Boethius, de duabus naturis et una persona xri, sed spiritualia et corporalia non sunt huiusmodi, ergo &c. Item ratione videtur, sicut agendi potentia essentialiter consequitur formam, ita potentia suscipiendi essentialiter [immo essentialius] consequitur materiam, sed necessario sequitur quod si sunt diversae potentiae [primae] et essentiales aliquarum formarum, ita quod ad aliquem effectum vel actum ordinatur una [forma] ad quem non alia quod differunt per essentiam. Cum ergo materia subiecta corporalibus formis nullo modo possit capere formas spirituales per individuam perfectionem nec econverso, quia nunquam de angelo potest fieri corpus, nec econver[41]so, ergo differunt per essentiam. Item partibilitas inest rebus corporalibus, aut ergo a parte formae, aut a parte materiae radicaliter. Non a parte formae, quia omnis forma est in simplici essentia consistens, ergo principaliter a parte materiae et originaliter. Aut igitur consequitur materiam secundum se, aut non. Si non, ut si materia sit simplex quantum est de se, ut punctus, ergo sicut punctus non potest esse materia vel pars superficiei, ita nec materia pars corporis, quod si hoc absurdum est, quia dimensiones secundum rationem infinitam consequuntur materiam secundum se, cum ergo sit in corporalibus et spiritualibus, patet &c. Item obiicitur quod [ /ostenditur hoc] a parte finis, quia angeli facti sunt[51] ad videndam claritatem summae lucis, sed materia corporalium de se tenebrosa est, et quod magis permiscetur et magis unitur ei tanto minus cognoscit, et magis est tenebrosum. Si ergo forma angeli unitur suae materiae maxime in divisione [/maxima indivisione], substantia eius esset ineptissima ad contemplandam lucem, si ergo propter hoc solum factus est, nunquam habet materiam conformem per unitatem naturae materiae corporali. Item videtur quod non sit ponere materiam tanquam mensuram generis substantiae rerum, quia quae magis participant de ratione materiae minus sunt entia, et ipsa est quid ignobilissimum in genere entium, quia prope nihil. Si ergo illud unum quod est [61] mensura generis debet esse perfectissimum in genere illo, ut albedo in genere coloris, patet &c. Respondeo, dicendum, quod circa hanc quaestionem sapientes videntur contrariari sapientibus. Nam magni et profundi clerici, et in theologia et in philosophia qui magis fuerunt veritatis inquisitores, diversificati sunt. | form is in this way simple, like a point, therefore it has no partibility [i.e. divisibility]; therefore if they do not differ in this, it does not seem that they differ in the other.
If you say [they differ] by capacity - on the contrary, matter is not its own capacity through essence, therefore it is possible for it to be abstracted from [its] capacity, therefore the matter of spiritual and corporeal things is abstracted from capacity. I ask by what they differ? There is nothing altogether to grant, no difference to assign, therefore [their] essence is the same through nature. 5. Likewise, the form of a genus can be abstracted from the form of the species or differentiae, but substance bespeaks the form of the genus, 'corporeal' and 'incorporeal' are differentiae, therefore it is possible to abstract from them. But the form of a genus is naturally prior to the form of the differentiae, just as the Philosopher says, that 'animal' is prior to 'man'. Accordingly, with the matter of spiritual and corporeal things considered under the form of genus, they do not differ in respect of form, which follows from the very essence of matter, therefore much more strongly do they not differ in respect of matter itself, as it seems. 6. Likewise, when it is said that the matter of corporeal things is matter, [and] the matter of spiritual things is matter, either it is agreement in name alone, or in condition, or in essence. If in name alone, therefore since it is equivocation in first principle, therefore there is no univocation. If in comparison, it is abstracted from that comparison, then either it will be said through agreement in essence, or pure equivocation. 1. On the contrary, Augustine (Confessions xi) [says] 'You have made two things, Lord, one close to you, and one close to nothing'. And again in xii: 'Two things are lacking in the compass of time: one, which without any loss of contemplation, and without any interval of change may enjoy your eternity, the other, which was so formless [Q: informe] that it did not have that into which the form was changed from another form'. Which, therefore, if they are strictly divided, one does not enter into the constitution of the other, if the angelic nature divides against the corporeal nature of corporeal things, therefore &c. If you say that he speaks of it according to being, this is nothing, because he speaks of it in a way that is clear in the antecedents and consequents, according to which every form was stripped [from it], or it is understood as formless in every way, and thus considered as immutable [Q: immutabilis], therefore &c. Also St Bede (the Venerable) and other saints thus divide [it]. 2. Likewise, whatever things share matter are transmutable among themselves, just as Boethius says (Concerning the Two Natures, and One Person of Christ), but spiritual and corporeal things are not of this kind, therefore &c.
Therefore since matter subjected to corporeal forms in no way could possess spiritual forms through individual perfection nor conversely (because a body can never can be made from an angel, nor conversely) therefore they differ through essence. 4. Likewise, partibility is in corporeal things; therefore this is either on the part of the form, or entirely on the part of the matter. Not on the side of the form, because every form consists in a simple essence, therefore principally on the part of matter and originally [so]. Accordingly, either it follows from matter according to itself, or not. If not, such as if matter is simple so far as it is of itself, like a point, then just as a point cannot be matter, or part of a surface, so neither can matter be part of a body; which, if this is absurd, because dimensions follow according to an infinite nature from matter according to itself, since therefore it is in corporeal and spiritual things, it is clear &c. 5. Likewise, it is objected that, on the part of [their] end, because angels are made for the seeing the clarity of the highest light, but the matter of corporeal things is dark of itself, that also the more commingled and more united to it, the less it knows, and the darker it is. Therefore if the form of an angel is united to its matter especially in division [or: by the greatest indivision], its substance would be most unsuited to contemplating the light. Therefore if he was created on account of this alone, he [would] never have matter similar through unity of nature to corporeal matter.
I reply, it is to be said that concerning this question, wise men seem opposed to wise men. For great and profound clerics, both in theology and philosophy, who were greater investigators of the truth, are diversified [in opinion]. |
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18va (39a) 1 Quidam enim posuerunt quod materia in spiritualibus et corporalibus differt, nec habet unitatem nisi analogie. Alii posuerunt quod est una per essentiam. Si quis autem diligenter velit considerare quae istarum positionum sit probabilior et verior, et attendere ad rationes moventes, videbit quod utraque opinio secundum diversas vias verum dicat, ita quod neutri sunt decepti.
Ratio autem huius diversae positionis fuit diversus modus cognoscendi materiam. Materia enim dupliciter est scibilis, scilicet, per privationem, et per analogiam. Cognitio per privationem est prius, removendo formam, deinde dispositiones [disponens] ad for[11]mam, et considerare ipsam essentiam nudam in se quasi tenebram [/um] intelligibilem. Cognitio autem per analogiam est per consimilem habitudinem, habitudo autem materie est per positionem [potentiam], et ita haec cognitio est per comparationem materiae ad formam mediante potentia. Potentia autem materiae dupliciter potest comparari ad formam. Aut inquantum praebet ei fulcimentum in ratione entis, et sic considerat methaphysicus. Aut sub ratione mobilis, et sic considerat naturalis philosophus. Considerantes igitur materiam secundum privationem omnis formae, tam substantialis quam accidentalis, dixerunt quod eadem est in spiritualibus et corporalibus [21] per essentiam, si enim ab omnibus formis et ab omnibus accidentibus separetur utraque materia, nulla omnino diversitas apparebit. Considerantes autem materiam secundum analogiam, scilicet, sub ratione potentiae inquantum praebet fulcimentum formae in ratione entis, dixerunt esse eandem secundum analogiam, quia est ibi consimilis habitudo. Sicut enim materia corporalium sustinet et dat suis formis existere et subsistere, ita etiam materia spiritualium. Est etiam ibi ratio participationis secundum plus et minus. Nam in spiritualibus substat formae spirituali [/substantiali] tantum, in corporibus superioribus formae substantiali et quantitati, et in inferioribus formae sub[31]stantiali et quantitati et contrarietati. Et quoniam quod pure est in genere substantiae plus participat de ratione per se stantis et independentis, quod autem plus accedit ad naturam accidentium magis elongatur, hinc est quod substantiae spirituales per prius et verius sunt substantiae, deinde corpora superiora, postremo corpora inferiora, et hi [/hic] non dixerunt quod esset eadem proprie, quia nec materia corporalium est nata sustinere formas spirituales nec econverso. Considerantes autem secundum analogiam sub ratione potentiae inquantum praebet fulcimentum formae in rationem mobilis, dixerunt esse eandem per analogiam. Quoniam sicut in cor[41]poribus [/alibus] est aliquid quod sustinet variationes quo ad proprietates corporales, ita in spiritualibus quo ad spirituales, et est ibi ratio prioris et posterioris in participando. Nam materia potest esse fulcimentum variationis secundum situm et formam, ut in corporibus corruptibilibus, aut ad situm tam ut in superioribus, aut ad receptionem influentiae et habituum et perditionem, ut in substantiis spiritualibus, et secundum hanc considerationem proprie est materia corporalibus et corruptibilibus, minus proprie in corporibus incorruptibilibus, minime in spiritibus. Et inde etiam est quod dicuntur aliquando immateriales, quia minimum habent de hac pos[51]sibilitate, et secundum hoc materia est infimum. Et hi non posuerunt materiam unam, quoniam materia in angelis non habet potestatem [/possibilitatem] ad transmutationem formarum substantialium, nec est possibilis ad recipiendum formas corporales, et inde est quod dici est [/dicit] philosophus, quod spiritualium et corporalium non est materia una, considerans potentiam materiae in relationem ad formam ut mobilem. Ex his patet ratio diversitatis et via harum positionum, et quod verum dicunt secundum diversas vias et secundum diversos modos intelligendi, et sic currunt diversae rationes, et autoritates invenientur ad partes oppositas. Et patet responsio obiectorum, nec[61] est contradictio si quis recte intelligat utra[m]que.
Nam ad materiam resolvit naturalis, | For certain [of them] supposed that matter in spiritual things and corporeal things differs, and does not have unity except by analogy. Others supposed that it is one through essence. Now if anyone may wish carefully to consider which of these positions may be more probable and more true, and to pay attention to the reasons motivating them, he will see that both opinions in different ways speak what is true, so that neither are deceived.
Now the reason of this difference of position was the diverse way of thinking about matter. For matter can be known in two ways, namely by privation and by analogy. Thinking about [something] through privation is prior, by removing the form [Q: prior to &c] , next, [by removing] the dispositions to form, and considering the very essence, bare in itself as if an intelligible shadow.
Accordingly, considering matter according to the privation of every form, as much substantial as accidental, they have said that it is the same in spiritual and material things through essence, for if from every form and from every accident each matter is separated, altogether no diversity will appear. But considering matter according to analogy, i.e. under the logical nature of potentiality inasmuch as it bestows a support of the form in the logical nature of a being, they have said it to be the same according to analogy, because the condition is there is similar. For just as the matter of corporeal things sustains and gives to its forms existence and subsistence, so also [does] the matter of spiritual things. There is also there the logical nature of participation according to more and less. For in spiritual things it stands under the spiritual [Q: substantiali] form only, in superior bodies under the substantial form and quantity, and inferior ones under the substantial form, and quantity and contrariety. And since what is purely in the genus of substance participates more of the logical nature of standing-through-itself and being independent, but what agrees more to the nature of accidents is more distant [magis elongatur], hence it is that spiritual substances through [consideration of] what is prior and truer are substances, next the superior bodies, finally the inferior bodies. And these persons [reading: hi] did not say that it was the same properly, because the matter of corporeal things is not fitted to sustain spiritual forms nor conversely. But considering [matter] according to analogy under the logical nature of potentiality, inasmuch as it bestows a support of a form in the logical nature of a moveable thing, they have said it to be the same through analogy. Since, just as in bodies there is something which sustains variations in respect of corporeal properties, thus [it is] in spiritual things in respect of spiritual [properties], and in that case it is the logical nature of what is prior and posterior in participating. For matter can be the basis [fulcimentum] of variation according to place or to form, as in corruptible bodies, either by place, as with superior bodies, or by the reception or loss of influence and conditions, as in spiritual substances. And according to this consideration, matter is properly in corporeal and corruptible things, less properly in incorruptible bodies, least of all in spiritual ones.
Or otherwise it can be said that when we speak of the unity of matter, we speak of that according as of things which depend upon a principle stand to it. For that reason we can speak in three ways according as there are three [authorities] who teach the solution to give [facere] to the material principle. For the natural [philosopher], |
| 18vb 39b 1 qui considerat generationem et corruptionem. Ad eam resolvit philosophus [/physicus] universalis, qui considerat omne corpus mobile, sive ad situm, sive ad formam. At eam resolvit methaphysicus, qui considerat omne ens, et unusquisque resolvit secundum amplitudinem suae considerationis.
Nam philosophus [/physicus] inferior qui negociatur circa generationem et corruptionem, considerat materiam ut est principium generationis et corruptionis, et sic est solum in his inferioribus, et quoniam omnia talia sunt ad invicem transmutabilia ideo solum dicit eandem materiam corporalium [/generabilium] et corruptibilium. Philosophus [/physicus] superior considerat ipsam naturam [/materiam] mutabilem sive ad si[11]tum sive ad formam, et videt eandem passionem in inferioribus et superioribus, per quam mutabilia sunt ad situm, ut partibilitatem mobilis, cuius principium est materia, et ideo resolvit ad materiam omnis rei corporalis, et secundum hunc philosophus [/physicus] est eadem materia in omnibus corporalibus. Metaphysicus, considerat naturam omnis creaturae, et maxime substantiae per se entis, in qua est considerare et actum essendi, et hunc dat forma, et stabilitatem per se existendi, et hanc dat et praestat illud cui innititur forma, haec [/hic] est materia, et quoniam per se esse in spiritualibus et corporalibus dicit communitatem non aequivocam [/ationem], et communitatem generis et rei, non analo[21] giae solum, ideo debet [/oportet] recurrere ad principii unitatem, ideo secundum methaphysicum, in omnibus per se entibus est ponere unitatem materiae. Omnium istorum philosophorum consideratio vera est, sed differenter iudicant. Philosophus [/physicus] enim non dicit eandem [esse] materiam nisi in corporalibus, quia nunquam venit ad considerandum materiam secundum essentiam, sed solum secundum esse, et absque dubio aliquod habet esse in corporalibus quod non in spiritualibus, et aliquod in corruptibilibus quod non in incorruptibilibus. Metaphysicus, vero non tantum secundum esse,sed secundum essentiam considerat, et quia abstracto omni esse non est reperire nec etiam fingere diversitatem in materia, ideo dicit [31] esse {materiam} unam per essentiam, et ideo cum hanc quaestionem tractat theologus, aut pertractat eam sicut naturalis aut sicut metaphysicus, quia ipse potest accipere modos omnium scientiarum cum ei famulantur. Si ut naturalis, sic dicet non esse eandem. Si ut metaphysicus, dicet eandem esse per essentiam, differentem secundum esse. Et quoniam nobiliori modo iudicat metaphysicus, quam scientiae inferiores, ideo hi qui posuerunt materiam [eandem] in spiritualibus et corporalibus, altius elevati melius iudicaverunt, quamvis secundum diversas considerationes utrique posuerunt [/potuerint] dicere verum, ut prius est ostensum. Concedendae ergo [/igitur] sunt rationes probantes esse ma[41]teriam per essentiam in spiritualibus et corporalibus, sicut manifeste innuit Augustinus, in libro de mirabilibus sacrae scripturae, qui fuit altissimus metaphysicus. Quod obiicitur ergo, quod distinguitur materia contra angelicam naturam, dicendum quod loquitur de materia secundum esse, non secundum essentiam. Vel aliter distinguit ratione actualitatis quae est in angelo, ratione cuius summe inter creaturas appropinquat deo, et ratione passibilitatis [/possibilitatis] quae est in materia de se, ratione cuius est prope nihil. Quod obiicitur quorum materia est una &c, dicendum quod loquitur de materia secundum esse, hoc est de materia transmutabili ratione cuius dicuntur res ad invicem [51] transmutabiles, et ideo sermo ille secundum physicum et in genere physici est intelligendus, et alii sermones consimiles qui dicunt materiam esse diversam, omnes enim loquuntur de materia secundum esse. Quod obiicitur de potentia suscipiendi, dicendum quod potentia materiae secundum se considerata [/consideratae], non est magis ad hanc formam quam ad aliam, immo indifferenter se habet ad omnem. Nam materia in se considerata nec est spiritualis nec corporalis, et ideo capacitas consequens essentiam materiae, indifferenter se habet ad formam, sive spiritualem sive corporalem, sed quia materia nunquam expoliatur ab omni esse, et quod solum [/quae simul] est sub esse corporali nunquam ex[61]uitur, et similiter quod [/illa quae est] sub esse spirituali, hinc est quod materia consequens esse in spiritualibus et corporalibus est alia et alia. Quod obiicitur de partibilitate, dicendum quod hoc non est ratione ipsius materiae, quia materia abstracta omni forma simplex est, non tamen habet actualem simplicitatem, ut punctus, sed simplex [est] quia caret | who considers generation and corruption, explains according to matter. The general philosopher, who considers every moveable body, whether in respect of place, or of form, explains according to matter. The metaphysician, who considers every being, and each one explains according to the amplitude of his consideration, explains according to matter.
For the superior philosopher [N7], who deals with generation and corruption, considers matter as it is the principle of generation and corruption, and it is so, only in these inferior things, and since all such things are transmutable among themselves, he only speaks of 'the same matter' of corporeal and corruptible things.
The consideration of all these philosophers is true, but they adjudge differently. For the philosopher does not say [there is] the same matter except in corporeal things, because he never arrives at the consideration of matter according to essence, but only according to being, and without doubt has some being in corporeal things that is not in spiritual things, and some [being] in corruptible things that is not in incorruptible things.
If as the natural philosopher, he will say thus that it is not the same. If as the metaphysician, he will say it is the same through essence, different according to being. And since the metaphysician judges in a more noble way than inferior sciences, for that reason they who suppose matter to be [the same] in spiritual and corporeal things, have judged better, being from a much higher position, although according to diverse considerations both have been able [reading potuerint] to speak the truth, as was shown before. Therefore the reasons demonstrating that matter is through essence in spiritual and corporeal things are to be conceded, just as Augustine, who was the most profound metaphysician, manifestly suggests (in the book On the Wonders of Sacred Scripture). 1. Therefore, to the objection that matter is distinguished against the angelic nature, it is to be said it speaks of matter according to being, not according to essence. Or otherwise it distinguishes by reason of the actuality which is in the angel, by reason of which the most high among creatures approaches close to God, and by reason of the possibility [reading: possibilitatis] which is in matter of itself, by reason of which it is close to nothing. 2. To the objection about things whose matter is one &c, it is to be said that it speaks of matter according to being, i.e. of transmutable matter by reason of which things are said to be transmutable among one another, and for that reason that expression is to be understood according to the physicist, and in the genus of the physicist, and [also] other similar expressions which say matter is diverse, for [they] all speak of matter according to being.
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| 19ra (40a) 1 actuali extensione, habet tamen possibilitatem ad illam, et cum natura formae corporalis illi materiae datur, tunc reducitur ad actum.
Unde cum dicitur quod extensio est a materia non est intelligendum quod a materia secundum essentiam suam, sed secundum esse prout suscipit formam corporalem quae non est nata esse in materia nisi cum extensione, quamvis ipsa in se sit simplici essentia consistens. Quod obiicitur quod materia est tenebra, dicendum quod tenebra dicitur ratione privationis formae, quia forma lumen est, et ideo materia cum privatione repugnaret contemplationi. Et quia in angelis facta est sub [11] actu perfecto [/perfectio] sublata privatione, hinc est quod remota est ab ea ratio tenebrositatis, et sic patet illud. Non enim est tenebra per essentiam, nisi quis forte dicat tenebram comparative, sicut creatura omnis tenebra est respectu summae lucis sic et materia tenebra potest dici respectu dei et respectu formae qua perficitur. Quod obiicitur quod materia non est illud quo omnia numerantur [/mensurantur], dicendum quod licet aliqui voluerunt [/voluerint] dicere quod materia ratione qua est fundamentum dat esse fixum, et in ea ratione est ratio mensurandi, quia plus sapit et participat de natura generis substantiae quod magis in seipso [21] fulcitum est, tamen illud non est conveniens dicere quod ipsa materia sit illud unum, cum hoc debeat esse completissimum, sicut dicitur in x primae philosophiae, quod albedo est mensura omnium colorum, et ideo dicendum quod non ponimus materiam unam, quia ipsa sit mensura, sed quia si non est materia una, impossibile est ponere ad unum [/aliquod unum] mensurans, cum illud praesupponat illam, quid autem sit illud unum quod est mensura omnium quae sunt in genere substantiae hoc est alterius inquisitionis. | actual extension, yet has possibility to that [extension], and when the nature of the corporeal form is given to that matter, then it is brought back to actuality.
5. To the objection that matter is a shadow, it is to be said that a shadow is so-called by reason of the privation of form, because the form is light, and for that reason matter with privation would be repugnant to contemplation. And because in angels it [matter] is made under a perfected actuality with privation removed, hence it is that the logical nature of the shadow is removed from it, and so it is clear. For it is not a shadow through essence, unless someone perhaps say 'a shadow' comparatively. Just as every creature is a shadow in respect of the highest light, thus also matter can be called a shadow in respect of God and in respect of the form by which it is perfected. 6. To the objection that matter is not that by which all things are numbered, it is to be said that, although some have wanted to say that matter, by the reason by which it is a foundation allows fixed being (and in that logical nature there is the logical nature of measuring, because it smacks of and participates of more the nature of the genus of substance which is more in itself a foundation), still, it is not appropriate to say that matter itself is that one thing, since this ought to be the most complete, just as is said in Metaphysics x ('that whiteness is the measure of all colours'). And for that reason it is to be said that we do not suppose there is one matter, because that very thing is a measure, but rather because if matter is not one, it is impossible to suppose [there is] measuring to one thing, since the one presupposes the other. But what may be that one thing that is the measure of all things which are in the genus of substance - this belongs to another investigation. Art. I, Question III Whether the matter of spiritual and corporeal things is one according to number or according to another unity. And that it is one in number it seems as follows. 1. Everything that is one in this way, which does not take in distinctness, is one in number. Matter through its essence is one thing which altogether has no distinctness according to its essence, because all distinctness is from form. Therefore it is necessary that matter in all things is one in number.
3. Likewise, there cannot be a perfect status except in one thing, therefore just as there is a status in the genus of an efficient and final cause, so in the genus of matter. But in the genus of First Efficient [principle] and of Last Final, there is a status such that one thing alone is the first efficient [N8] through essence, to which all things are brought back. Therefore, similarly it seems to be the case that, since on the part of explanation there is a status in the essence of matter, that it is one in number [N9]. 4. Likewise, when one says 'the matter of a stone is matter', and 'the matter of an angel is matter', either it is said univocally or equivocally, or the same thing is predicated of itself. But not equivocally, because then the angel and the stone would be called substances equivocally. Not univocally, because univocation is only in forms, and in the things which bespeak forms, therefore it must be that the same thing is predicated of itself. Therefore if the matter of a stone and the matter of an angel are not several matters but unique, it remains that matter is one in number in spiritual and corporeal things. 5. Likewise we may understand matter, whether of spiritual or corporeal things, through abstraction from all forms. Matter is understood as simple, matter is understood as unique, in no way multiplied or distinct, but the supervenient forms do not change the essence of matter, but only [its] being. Therefore if before there was matter unique in number regarding essence, therefore also now when it has forms. 6. Likewise, we may understand by an impossible supposition that God could make an angel from one stone. Then the form and the being of the matter would be changed, but the essence would be preserved, therefore the matter, since it is one through essence, is also the subject of that change in this transmutation. But that change is one in number, therefore matter through essence remains one in number. Therefore it is argued thus: if in that angel so produced and with the stone |
| 19ra (40b) 1 stente est materia una numero, et tantum distat ille angelus a materia [/natura] corporali quantum alius angelus, ergo videtur quod in aliis [angelis et in aliis] rebus corporalibus sit materia una numero
Contra, unum numero respicit esse individuum sive individuatum, sed materia in corporalibus et spiritualibus non est una unitate individuali, ergo non [/nec] est una secundum numerum. Maior patet, minor probatur per hoc quod quaecumque sunt eadem numero alicui individuo, inter se sunt una numero, sed angelus a sua materia non differt numero, nec lapis [a sua], ergo si materia lapidis et angeli est una numero, ergo lapis [11] et angelus sunt unum numero, quod falsum est. Item unum et multum sunt differentiae entis [et entis]in actu, sed materia est omnino ens in potentia, ergo si dividentia non conveniunt nisi eis quibus convenit divisum, ergo nullo modo potest esse [/dici] materia per essentiam una numero. Item si de auro uno fiant diversa vasa, postquam facta sunt, iam illud aurum definit esse unum propter distinctionem superinductam, cum ergo de materia fiant creaturae genere et specie differentes, videtur igitur [/ergo] quod materia numeretur in illis, ergo &c. Item opposita non sunt compossibilia circa idem numero, hoc planum [21] est, quia mutuo se expellunt, sed oppositae formae sunt circa materiam ut [est] in diversis, ergo impossibile est materiam esse unam numero. Item impossibile est idem numero esse ens et non ens, quia inter ens et non ens summa est distantia, sed angelus secundum suam formam et distantiam est in actu, anima antichristi nec est secundum materiam nec secundum formam, immo creanda est secundum suum totum ergo impossibile est quod angeli et animae sint eadem materia, vel alterius creaturae diversae. Item creatio non solum terminatur ad esse, sed etiam ad essentiam, ergo ubi sunt diversae creationes, oportet diversos esse terminos per essentiam, [31] sed creatio animae petri et animae antichristi est alia et alia, et utrobique producitur essentia materiae, ergo necesse est materiam hic et ibi aliam esse per essentiam, ergo impossibile est esse numero unam.
Respondeo, dicendum quod positio philosophorum et philosophicorum [/physicorum] virorum haec fuit et est, quod materia in quibuscumque est per essen[41]tiam, est una, et una numero. Et rationem huius assignant quia materia hoc ipsum quod est, omnino est ens in potentia, et ideo oportet quod in quibuscumque est [quod] sit per essentiam numero una, haec autem ratio bona est, quod melius patet si pertractetur. Quia enim materia omnino est ens in potentia, ideo per sui essentiam nullum habet actum, nullam formam, ergo nullam distinctionem, si nullam distinctionem habet, et non est nihil, oportet ergo quod sit una sine multitudine, et ita numero una. Amplius. Quia ens omnino in potentia, ideo nec genus nec species esse potest. Quia dicit [/quae dicunt] aliquo mo[51]do actum, [et] ideo non potest esse communis eis quibus est communis unitate universalitatis vel univocationis, ergo nec genere nec specie est una, et tamen nihilominus est una, et ita est una numero. Rursus quia est ens omnino in potentia, ideo de se est infinita, et ad formas infinitas, sed deus quia infinitus est, ubique est sua infinitate, quae venit ex actualitatis summae perfectione, sic et materia quia infinita, in omnibus materiatis est una propter infinitatem eius quae venit ex summae potentialitatis [/possibilitatis] imperfectione. Postremo, quia materia est ens in potentia, unitas eius [61] non potest esse unitas individuationis, sive per continuitatem sicut mons est unus, sive per actualem simplicitatem sicut angelus est unus, sed si habet unitatem, unitatem habet homogeneitatis, haec autem unitas solum [/simul] manet in diversis, sicut patet si de eodem auro fiant multa vasa, illa | pre-existing the matter is one in number, and that angel is as distant from corporeal matter as the other angel, then it seems that in other [angels and in other] corporeal things matter is one in number.
2. Likewise one and many are differentiae of a being, and of a being in actuality, but matter is altogether a being in potentiality. Therefore if the things being divided are not appropriate except to those which the divided thing belongs, therefore in no way can matter be one in number through essence. 3. Likewise, if from one gold diverse goblets are made, after they are made, already that gold ceases to be one on account of a distinctness induced upon it [superinductam], therefore, since out of matter there are made creatures differing in genus and species, it seems accordingly that matter is numbered in those, therefore &c. 4. Likewise, opposed things are not co-possibles concerning the same in number, this is plain, because they mutually drive each other away, but, concerning matter, opposed forms are as [it is] in diverse things, therefore it is impossible that matter is one in number. 5. Likewise, it is impossible for the same in number to be a being and a non-being, because between a being and a non-being is the highest distance, but the angel according to his form and distance is in actuality, the soul of the antichrist is neither according to matter nor to form, indeed is to be created according to its whole. Therefore it is impossible that the same matter belong to angels and souls, or to another diverse creature. 6. Likewise, creation is terminated not only in respect of being, but also in respect of essence. Therefore where there are diverse acts of creation, there must be diverse terms through essence, but the creation of the soul of Peter is one thing and of the soul of the Antichrist another, and in both cases the essence of the matter is produced. Therefore it is necessary for the matter in the one case to be different from the matter in the other, through essence. Therefore it is impossible to be one in number. 7. Likewise, this - to be absolutely one in several things, or to be one in all things - is the property of God. Therefore it does not belong to another. Or if it belongs to another, it belongs least to that which is most distant from God. But matter is the most distant from God, since it is close to nothing, therefore in no way does it seem that itt belongs to that very thing that is one in number in all things, or also in several things. I reply, it is to be said that the position of philosophers and of philosophical men was and is this: that in any things whatsoever, matter is one through essence, and is one in number. And they assign a reason of this, because that very thing that matter is, is altogether a being in potential, and for that reason it must be that in whatever things it is, it is one in number through essence. Now this is a good reason, that will become clearer if it is dealt with thoroughly.
Again, because it is altogether a being in potential, for that reason it is of itself unlimited, and [exists] in respect of unlimited forms. But God, because He is unbounded, exists everywhere according to his unlimitedness, which comes from the perfection of the highest actuality. Thus also matter, because [it is] unbounded, is one in all materialised things, on account of its unboundedness which comes from the imperfection of the highest potentiality [or: possibility]. Finally, because matter is a being in potential, its unity cannot be the unity of individuation, either by continuity (just as a mountain is one), or by actual simplicity (just as an angel is one,) but rather if it has unity, it has the unity of homogeneity. Now this unity alone remains in diverse things, just as is clear if many vessels are made of the same gold, they |
| 19va(41a) 1 sunt de eodem auro per homogeneitatem, sed aurum quod est in uno differt ab auro quod est in alio, adeo ut non sit [/sint] unum per continuitatem.
Si igitur materia non est una actuali simplicitate ut angelus, nec continuitate ut mons vel auri frustum, sed solum homogeneitate, et haec non tollitur per adventum formarum, ita est materia una sub omnibus formis, sicut omnibus formis abstractis, sed abstractis omnibus formis nulla est distinctio in materia, immo intelligitur ut simpliciter una, nunc igitur materia est in omnibus materiatis numero una, quia est ens omnino in potentia, et haec est recta ratio [11] et causa. Ex his pro magna parte patent obiecta, quoniam ex praedictis colligi potest qualis est illa unitas, qua materia dicitur una. Non enim est unitas actualis cuiusmodi est unitas corisci in foro et theatro, et cuiusmodi est unitas dei, sed illa unitas magis est possibilitatis, et potest dici homogeneitatis, quae adeo ampla est ut sustineat receptionem maioris multitudinis diversitatis formarum super adiectarum, quam unitas formae alicuius universalis et [/etiam] generis generalissimi, et hoc [est] propter summam possibilitatem, unde dicitur una numero, quemadmodum ovis carens signo, respectu ovium [21] habentium signum dicitur esse signata, per hunc modum intelligi potest materia numero una. Quod obiicitur ergo, unum numero respicit individuum, dicendum quod verum est prout unum numero dicit accidens vel prout consequitur esse actuale, non autem est verum prout respicit essentiam, quoniam hoc modo se extendit ad unitatem maioris capacitatis quam sit unitas individualis et de illa non sequitur quod quae sunt eadem uni &c, sicut non sequitur quod homo et asinus uniuntur in animali, ergo sunt unum inter se. Quod obiicitur quod unum numero est differentia entis in actu dicendum quod verum est de uno quod dicit unitatem completam. Uni[31]tas enim et veritas et bonitas proprie et complete sunt in creatura completa, nihilominus tamen sicut dicit Augustinus de vera religione, incomplete reperiuntur in materia. Sicut enim [/ergo] materia incompleta est de se, ita unitatem secundum se habet incompletam, possibilem tamen quantum ad esse compleri per formam cuius adventu constituitur individuum numero unum, unitate actuali et completa, ex cuius etiam adventu fit distinctio et surgit in rebus multitudo. Quod obiicitur de auro non est simile, quia aurum habet unitatem continuitatis, et individualitatis [/individuationis] quae opponitur numerationi et discontinuitati, et [41] hoc est quia aurum, etsi sit materia cyphi, est ens in actu non sic materia prima respectu materiatorum ut ostensum est prius. Quod obiicitur quod opposita non possunt se compati circa unum, et quod idem non potest esse simile ens et non ens, et diversis mutationibus introduci in esse. Ad haec tria unica est reponsio, scilicet, quod illud est verum de eo quod est ita unum quod eius unitas repugnat multitudini, sicut est unum individuum, sed de eo quod est ita unum quod multitudini non repugnat, immo propter suam possibilitatem admittit omnem diversitatem non habet veritatem, immo simul et semel habent [/habet] opposita, simul etiam [51] et semel potest esse in re et potest esse in potentia agentis et diversis productionibus produci, sicut diversum formis informari. Et hoc patet, quia forma humanitatis est una unitate universalitatis, {vel} ideo simpliciter [/ideo simul] verum est quod est homo qui generatur, et est homo qui generandus est, et est homo albus et est homo niger, [et] in omnibus his est forma una universalis.
| are of the same gold by homogeneity, but the gold that is in one differs from the gold that is in another, to the extent that they may not be one by continuity.
From these, for the most part, the objections are clear, since from the preceding it can be gathered of what kind is that unity by which matter is called 'one'. For it is not an actual unity (of which sort is the unity of Coriscus in the forum and the theatre, and of which sort is the unity of God), but that unity is more a possibility, and can be called 'homogeneity', which is ample to the extent that it sustains receiving a greater multitude of diversity of superadjoined forms, than the unity of form of some universal and [even] of the most general genus, and this [is] on account of the highest possibility, wherefore it is called one in number, in the way that a sheep lacking a mark, is said to be marked out, in respect of sheep having a mark. In this manner matter can be said to be one.
2. To the objection that one in number is the differentia of a being in actuality, it is to be said that it is true of one thing that it bespeaks a complete unity. For unity, truth and the good properly and completely are in a creature that is complete, yet notwithstanding, just as Augustine says (On True Religion), they are found incompletely in matter. For just as matter is incomplete of itself, so according to itself it has incomplete unity, yet possible in respect of being that is completed through the form by whose arrival the individual is constituted one in number, by a unity that is actual and complete, from the arrival of which distinctness comes about, and there arise a multitude of things.
4-6. To the objection (4) that opposed things cannot suffer being together about one thing, and that (5) the same thing cannot be similar [to] a being and a non-being, and (6) be introduced into being by diverse changes. To these three there is a unique reply, namely, that this is true of what is one in such a way that its unity is repugnant to a multitude, just as one individual thing is, but of that which is one in a way that is not repugnant to multitude, by contrast, on account of its possibility it allows all diversity, it does not have truth, but rather at the same time and together it [reading habet] has opposites, also at once and together it can be in a thing and can be in the power of an agent and be produced according to diverse productions, just as as (it can) be informed by diverse forms. And this is clear, because the form of humanity is one by the unity of universality, for that reason I see it is true at the same time that there is a man who is generated, and there is a man who is to be generated, and there is a white man and there is a black man, [and] in all these there is one universal form. Which if you that is not similar, because humanity is not one in number as matter [is], I say that although it is not one in number but in species, yet the unity of matter which is the unity of homogeneity is of greater strength than humanity itself, and allows a greater diversity, and for that reason there is no opposition, altogether no contradiction from the comparison of opposites to the unity of matter through essence, but only by the comparison of opposites to unity according to being. Wherefore, just as if two goblets are fashioned of gold, one can be destroyed with the other remaining, or one be produced with the other |
| 41b 1 esse producto, sic intelligendum est in proposito.
Si quis enim vult unitatem materiae intelligere, oportet ab unitate individuali animum abstrahere, et super actum imaginationis condescendere [/conscendere], et omnino ens in potentia per privationem cogitare et sic poterit aliqualiter capere. Quamdiu enim materia ut moles ex[tensa]cogitatur, ad unitatem essentiae [consideratam] nullo modo pertingitur. Quod ultimo obiicitur satis planum est, sicut enim deus est infinitus et materia infinita, alio tamen modo infinitatis qui [quae] potius est per recessum quam per accessum, unde non competit formae sed materiae, sic intelligendum est de illa unita[11]te, Deus enim est unus in pluribus, ita quod perfectissimus et omnino actus, et hoc est eius solius, sed materia est una in omnibus et hoc quia per suam essentiam non potest esse distincta, non sic est de forma, et sic patent omnia.
| having been produced into being, thus it is to be understood in what was proposed.
If anyone wishes to understand the unity of matter, he must abstract the soul from individual unity and rise beyond the act of the imagination and to think of a being altogether in potentiality through privation, and so one will in some way be able to grasp it. So long as matter is thought of as an extended mass, in no way will one reach the unity of [its] essence. 7. To the final objection [the reply] is clear enough, for just as God is unbounded, and matter unbounded, yet in another manner of unboundedness which exists rather through recess than through access, wherefore it does not suit form but matter, so it is to be understood of that unity. For God is one in several, so the most perfect and altogether actuality, and this is of him alone, but matter is one in all things, and this [is] because through its essence it cannot be distinct. It is not so concerning form, and thus all [objections] are clear.
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