Book Two, Distinction III, Part I, Article 2
Translated by Edward Buckner from the 1493 edition of Kilian Fischer
| Section | Quaracchi | |
| Art 2 Q1 41 | 2102 | Whether there is pure personal discreteness in angels. |
| Art 2 Q2 42 | 2105 | Whether this is accidental or substantial.. |
| Art 2 Q3 43, 44 | 2108 | Whether this is material or formal. |
Article II - summary
In the second article of Distinction III, Bonaventura argues that some angels differ in number only (Q1), that personal discreteness in the angels is a substantial, not an accidental difference (Q2), that personal discreteness is on the part of a material, rather than formal principle (Q3). He argues as follows:
Q1 Some angels differ solo numero. 1. The scriptures tell us that there are many angels (Daniel 7: 'thousands of thousands ministered to him'). But there cannot be as many species of angels as that, and there could not be so much diversity except according to number. 2. It is glorious for a ruler to have many uniform ministers, thus many of God's ministers will differ in number or person alone. 3. In God there are several persons differing in personhood alone, in men, in angels, therefore &c. 4. Every animal desires society similar in species, therefore so will angels.
Q2 That personal discreteness in the angels is a substantial, not an accidental difference. 1. Peter Lombard (The Master) says so. 2. A person is an individual substance, thus directly in the genus of substance, not accident. 3. There is no accident except in an individual substance, every accident follows from the individuatedness of essence, and so being an individual is (logically) prior to the accident, so also being a person. 4. Things that differ in personhood, differ in their substantial principles, (e.g. Peter and Paul), and things that differ substantially are discernible. But personal discreteness signifies substantial difference, therefore it is not accidental. 5. Opposites do not cause personal discreteness, because one man is a boy before, afterwards an old man, and yet he is the same individual and one person. 6. Diverse accidents in one underlying thing are one in number, but this would not be if diversity according to number or according to personal discreteness came about from accidents.
Q3. Personal discreteness is on the part of a material, rather than formal principle. 1. Species is the whole being of individuals, being is from form, therefore an individual does not add form upon the species, therefore neither a person upon nature. Whatever it adds is either matter, or accidents. But there cannot be personal or individual discreteness through accidents, therefore matter. 2. If a person were definable because it adds a differentia, the individual would be definable, which is false. 3. God could make another form similar in all respects to some individual, because there is no form of which we cannot think a similar one, but any such form is common to several, and therefore not an individual. 4. Personal discreteness is from the same thing from which there is distinction according to number. But that, according to Aristotle, is from matter. 5. Likewise, personal discreteness is from the same from which it is to be this, but this is matter, according to Aristotle. 6. Where there is personal discreteness through origin, it is not on account of another unless the one generating generates the other but, as Aristotle says, the one generating does not generate another except on account of matter.
Background
The problem of the 'principle of individuation' in corporeal or spiritual substances, is famous more on account of the endless scholastic argumentation it generated, than for any solution, and is regarded by some as typical of absurd scholastic quibbling. However, in different guises and under different names, the same problem continued to be discussed by philosophers well after the medieval period, and is still of relevance today [N1].
The problem is to explain what constitutes the individuality of Peter, Paul &c, given that the individual properties that characterise them are universal (i.e. they are common, or can be common to many things). As Bonaventure argues, there is no form of which we cannot imagine a similar one, but any such form would then be common to several things, and therefore not an individual at all. What constitutes being individual? Most medieval philosophers (with the exception of Scotus and his followers) therefore thought that matter is the principle of individuation in corporeal things such chairs, tables and persons. Individuals differ solo numero - only in number, because the matter, the material of which they are made can be numerically different, even when its properties are identical. (Imagine two objects, identical twins, for example, exactly alike in shape and colour, history &c).
But how, then, to explain individuation in angels, who are not corporeal, in whom there seems to be no matter? Scripture tells us there are a great number of angels ('thousands of thousands [of angels] ministered to him'). In what way are these angels distinguished among themselves? Either they are distinguished by species [distinctione specifica], and then there are as many species of angels, as there are individuals. Or the distinction is caused by some other principle of individuation. But this needs to be explained. There are at least six opinions held by the medieval schoolmen on this issue.
1. An individual is individual by its very own nature, and thus there is no 'principle of individuation'. This was held by Nominalists such as Ockham.
2. Individuation comes to be not through something positive, but through a 'twofold negation'. This was held by Henry of Ghent.
3. Individuation comes about through actual existence, e.g. Durandus (In Sent, II, d3 q. 2) says that the common nature and the individual nature differ only as one conceived and one existing.
4. Individuation comes to be through quantity in the matter: attributed to Giles of Rome.
5. Individuation comes about through matter, held by Aquinas and Bonaventura (although Aquinas holds that individuation is by difference of species in angels, for angels are not composed of matter).
6. Individuation comes about through something added over and above the essence of the species and distinguished formally from it, an 'individual difference' or haecceitas ('haecceity', 'thisness'). This was famously held by Scotus (q. 6) and his followers.
Bonaventura notes that there has been a debate over the issue (although without identifying the participants). Some philosophers have said 'that individuation comes from matter, since 'individual' does not add anything beyond the species but matter,' although 'others saw the issue otherwise, namely that individuation would be from the form, and said that beyond the form of the most specific species there is an individual form.'
He rejects each of these positions as involving something implausible.
In what way matter, which is common to all things be the main [principal] principle, will also be the cause of the distinction, is quite difficult to see.Again, in what way a form may be the entire and principal cause of natural discreteness is quite difficult to grasp, since every created form as far as it is of its own nature, is fitted to have another similar one, just as the Philosopher himself also says is the case with the sun and moon, or in the way we say two fires differ 'formally'. Or also others which are made several and distinguished in number and from division alone of the continuous [fire], where there is induction of no new form?
He argues for 'a third position' which (he says) is much clearer. Both matter and form provide the necessary components of individuality. Matter allows the form to be located in space and time. Form makes actual what was only a potential, latent within matter. This happens in a way analogous to a seal made on individual pieces of wax by a ring. The seal is a composite being: the matter of the seal is the wax, the form is the shape engraved on the ring. Thus the matter exists prior to the seal, as a lump of wax; the form exists prior to the seal on the ring. The signet-ring is pressed on the wax, the form is impressed onto the wax. Thus the potential in the wax for receiving the form is actualized, resulting in an individual composite entity, the seal.
Individuation arises from actual conjunction of matter with form, from which conjunction the one appropriates the other to itself, just as it is clear that when an impression or expression of many seals on wax which previously was one takes place, neither the seals can be made several without the wax, nor is the wax numerated except because diverse seals are made in [the wax]
Legacy
Contempory discussions of individuation often locate its origin in Leibniz (1646-1716), and his principle of the identity of indiscernibles - the view that it is impossible for two individuals to be exactly alike, differing in number alone. However, the source of much of his philosophy lies in scholastic metaphysics. Germany was slower to pick up the new ideas of early modern philosophy than England. According to George McDonald Ross [N2], Leibniz had a somewhat conservative education, and his first and enduring experience of philosophy was through scholastic Aristotelianism, and, unlike virtually all the other modern philosophers, he never lost his respect for Aristotle, and later scholastics such as Suárez. Leibniz reportedly read the Disputationes Metaphysicae, the great work of the last scholastic philosopher, Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), 'as if it were a novel'. The Disputations contains extensive references to medieval sources, and comprehensive discussion of the diverse positions maintained by medieval philosophers. It was used as a standard textbook on metaphysics well into the eighteenth century
The principle of the identity of indiscernibles is similar to that held by Aquinas regarding angels, although Leibniz holds it to apply to all substances. However, Leibniz had certainly read Aquinas, and indeed mentions Aquinas as the source of the view in a letter to Arnauld, May 1686 [N3]. Other views of Leibniz were almost certainly influenced by Suarez, who discusses individuation in Book V of the Metaphysical Disputations (1597).
Many of those involved in the development of mathematical logic in the late nineteenth century showed an awareness of the historical background to the problem of individuation. Russell, one of whose first published works was on Leibniz (A Critical Examination of the Philosophy of Leibniz, 1900), recognises the scholastic origins of the issue in II. 14. of History of Western Philosophy (1946), where he says 'the principle of individuation was one of the important problems of the scholastic philosophy. In various forms, it has remained a problem to the present day'.
Frege alludes to the problem in ~24 of the his seminal work, The Foundations of Arithmetic, where he discusses whether number is a property of external things, saying that 'Leibniz rejects the view of the schoolmen that number is not applicable to immaterial things' (Baumann II, pp 2-3, 56) [Though it is not clear whether Frege had any extensive knowledge of scholastic philosophy, relying extensively on a single secondary source, Baumann's Die Lehren von Zeit, Raum und Mathematik, Berlin 1868].
The problem is also relevant to the development of the modern predicate calculus (by Peirce, Frege and Russell). According to Aristotelian logic, every judgment consists of two terms, a subject and a predicate. In the pure form of his logic, the two terms are both universals, i.e. signify what is common to more than one thing. This leads to the problem of how singular terms should be treated in logic. As Bonaventure notes, both Boethius and Porphry held that a singular term signifies a collection of accidental attributes, and thus can be regarded for logical purposes as a universal.
Boethius says that every characteristic [proprium] stems [manat] from the genus of accidents, not just what is characteristic of the individual, but also of the species (Q2).Porphyry says that the individual 'stands together' from properties of which a collection is impossible to find in another thing (ibid).
The position of modern logic, by contrast, is that there is an absolute difference between a singular (subject) term and a universal (predicate).
The same problem underlies a modern work, Strawson's Individuals (1958). There, he raises the question of whether we could even imagine an existence divorced from our body, i.e. having thoughts and memories, while at the same time having no perceptions relating to an experience of where our own body is. He notices that bodily existence and identity are tied together to such an extent, that a disembodied spirit would have no concept of itself except as a former person. It would have to think of itself as one of a class of beings with whom it is now prevented from entering into any of the transactions and events which were the basis of it having any idea of itself at all. It would have no personal life at all. Strawson concludes
Disembodied survival, on such terms as these, may well seem unattractive. No doubt it is for this reason that the orthodox have wisely insisted on the resurrection of the body (p. 116).
References to the problem in scholastic works
Albertus Magnus a. 5, d. 9, a. 7, Summa., p. II, tr. 2, q. 8.
Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II. q. 20.
Aquinas q. 1, a. 4; Summa., I, q. 50, a. 4; Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. II, c. 93.
Bonaventura, In Sent, I d. 24, a. 1, q. 1
Durandus, In Sent, II d3, q. 2
Giles of Rome, In Sent, II q. 2, a. 3.
Gabriel Biel, In Sent, II q. 1.
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibetals, 2, q. 8.
Peter of Tarentaise, In Sent, II q. 2, a. 1-2.
Richard of Middleton, In Sent, II a. 5, q. 1, a. 4, q. 1
Scotus In Sent, II qq. 1-5, q. 7, Reportatio, q. 1.
See also:
Peter King,
The Problem of Individuation in the Middle Ages,
Theoria 66 (2000), 159–184.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Medieval Theories of Haecceity
| Latin | English |
|---|---|
| Consequenter quaeritur de secundo attributo, scil. de discretione personali. Circa quam tria quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur utrum in angelis sit mera discretio personalis.Secundo utrum haec proprietas sit accidentalis aut substantialis. Tertio vero utrum sit materialis vel formalis.
19vb (41b) [20]
Dist. III Art. II Quaestio I [21] Quod in angelis sit mera discretio personalis, ita quod angeli aliqui differant solo numero videtur
Daniel, vii, milia milium ministrabant ei, et constat quod non [tot] habebant ministeria differentia specie quot daniel enumerat, ergo nec ministri omnes differebant specie, ergo aliqui vel omnes differabant numero solo. Quodsi dicas quod tot [quot] ministeria, obiicutur de secunda parte autoritatis, et decies [milies] centena milia assistebant, constat quod tanta diversitas non poterat cadere ibi nisi secundum numerum, cum haberent unum statum scilicet assistere.
Item gloria est regi habere multos ministros uniformes, ergo si gloriosum est regnum in quo cum christo [31] gaudent omnes sancti, videtur quod multi sint uniformes in illo superno palatio, et ita solo numero vel persona differentes.
Item personalis discretio est in deo, angelis, et hominibus et cum natura angelica sit divine propinquior quam humana, ergo et discretio personalis, sed in deo sunt plures personae differentes sola personalitate, similiter in hominibus, ergo videtur quod similiter in angelis, ergo sunt ibi aliqui solo numero differentes aut omnes.
Item omne animal per naturam desiderat societatem similis in specie. Nam omne animal ad sibi simile copulabitur et volatilia ad sibi similia conveniunt, ergo angelus per naturam [41] desiderat societatem similis in specie, sed desiderium eius non est frustra, maxime in angelo bono [/beato], ergo &c.
Si tu dicas quod illud est verum in animalibus non in substantiis spiritualibus, tunc quaero, utrum in angelis sit socialis et amicabilis affectus, constat quod sic, sed in quocumque est ponere affectum talem, est amare similem et appetere habere, ergo redit idem quod prius.
Contra, diversitas qua est numero solo causatur a diversitate [/ex divisione] materiae, inde est quod sol non multiplicatur, quia eius essentia est ex tota sua materia vel [/ita] quod materia eius non est divisibilis nec multiplicabilis sed talis ratio est in angelis, ergo &c.
Item ratio finalis multipli[51]cationis secundum numerum, venit ex parte corruptibilitatis, ideo enim multiplicatur secundum numerum, ut quod [/quia] non poterat salvari in uno, ipsa species salvaretur in pluribus, unde sol et luna quia perpetua sunt, non habent nisi unum [/unicum] solum individuum in eadem specie ergo &c.
Item reperire contingit extrema, et medium, [si illud est possibile esse] sed contingit reperire pluralitatem personarum in una natura in deo, et econverso, pluralitatem naturarum in una persona, ut in homine et in christo, ergo contingit pluralitatem naturarum reperire in pluribus personis, ut tot sint naturae differentes quot sunt supposita, et tot species quot individua.
Item distinctio personalis pura est [61] in deo quantum ad originem, et in homine similiter, ergo videtur quod origo sit tota et principalis ratio discretionis personalis, cum ergo in angelis non reperiatur origo, nec pura distinctio personalis per consequens.
Respondeo, dicendum quod hic fuit duplex positio. Quidam enim dixerunt quod in angelis est discretio personalis sed nunquam pure.
| Consequently we enquire about the second attribute, namely of personal discreteness. Concerning which three things are asked. First, it is asked whether in angels there is pure personal discreteness. Second, whether this property is accidental or substantial. Third, whether it is material or formal.
Question I. It seems that in angels there is purely personal discreteness, so that some angels differ in number alone:
2. Likewise, it is glorious [gloria est] to the king to have many uniform ministers, therefore if 'glorious is the kingdom in which all the saints rejoice with Christ', it seems that there are many who are uniform in that supernal palace, and so differing in number alone or person. 3. Likewise, there is personal discreteness in God, in angels, and in men and since the angelic nature is closer to the divine than the human, therefore also personal discreteness. But in God there are several persons differing in personhood alone, similarly in men, therefore, it seems, similarly in angels, therefore some there, or all, are differing in number alone. 4. Likewise, every animal through nature desires society similar in species. For 'every beast will be joined to its like' [N5], and 'birds resort unto their like' [N6], therefore the angel through nature desires society of one similar in species. But his desire is not in vain, particularly in the good angel, therefore &c.
2. Likewise, the ultimate reason of multiplication according to number comes on the part of corruptibility, for on that account it [species] is multiplied according to number, so that, because it could not be preserved in one, the species itself would be preserved in many. Wherefore the sun and moon, because they are eternal, have but one individual only in the same species therefore &c. 3. Likewise,if it is possible to find extremes, [then] also a medium. But it is possible to find a plurality of persons in one nature in God, and conversely, a plurality of natures in one person, as in man and in Christ. Therefore it is possible to find a plurality of natures in several persons, so that there are as many different natures as there are supposita, and as many species as inviduals. 4. Likewise, there is pure personal distinctness in God regarding origin, and similarly in man, therefore it seems that origin is the whole and principal reason of personal discreteness. Therefore, since an origin is not found in angels, neither, in consequence, pure personal distinctness. I reply, it is to be said that here there was a twofold position. For certain [people] have said that there is personal discreteness in angels, but never purely so. |
|
20ra (42a) 1 Immo sunt ibi tot species quot individua, similiter dicunt in luminaribus mundi, sed licet hoc aliquam probabilitatem habeat in corporibus, non tamen videtur rationabile in spiritibus ut nullus communicet cum alio in natura spirituali.
Sicut enim innotescit per scripturam multi angeli ad idem officium ordinantur, et [communem] videntur habere operationem eandem, nobis autem nec per scripturam, nec per dicta sanctorum, nec per officia innotescit tanta diversitas, ideo non videtur nisi praesumptio hoc dicere, maxime cum non appareat inpromptu aliqua ratio[ne] cogens. Alia est positio sobria et catholica, quod in angelis est ponere distinctionem quantum ad persona[11]litatem tantummodo, aut in omnibus aut in aliquibus, et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae, tum ex parte ministerii, tum ex parte assimilationis ad deum, tum ex parte assimilationis mutuae. Quod [ergo] obiicitur quod diversitas secundum numerum venit ex divisione materiae, dicendum quod falsum est, sed multitudo per generationem venit ex divisione materiae, quia generans dat generato partem suae substantiae. Diversitas autem angelorum non est per multiplicationem unius ab altero, sed omnium angelorum a deo. Et per hoc patet sequens obiectum de fine, quia ille non est finis multiplicationis, sed multiplicationis successivae, sed ratio potissima multiplicationis in [21] hominibus et in angelis est divinae potentiae, et sapientiae, et bonitatis declaratio et collaudatio, quae manifestantur in multiplicatione [/multitudine] et gloriae beatorum amplificatione, quia amor charitatis exultat in multiplicatione bonae societatis, unde credo quod erunt in magno numero et perfectissimo, secundum quod decet illam supernam civitatem omni decore fulgentem. Quod obiicitur de medio, dicendum quod angelus non potest esse medium, quia sicut in praecedentibus probatum est, quamvis in angelo non sit tanta naturarum diversitas quanta in homine, nihilominus aliqua est. [Et] praeterea, quamvis non diversificetur in hominibus pluribus humana natura [31] tamen multiplicatur in illis, et ideo non est quaerere aliud medium. Quod ultimo obiicitur de origine quae [/quod] est principalis ratio discretionis, dicendum quod quamvis Richardus dicat quod personae in hominibus distinguantur origine, tamen hoc non habent ratione principii, nam pauci homines sic distinguuntur per illam habitudinem. Ad solum enim unum hominem habet homo [/habeo ego] illam habitudinem, et tamen ab omnibus differt personaliter, sed ratio distinctionis personalis quantum ad veritatem venit ex principiis constituentibus et particularibus [/particulantibus], quantum ad noticiam venit ex qualitatibus, quorum utrumque est in angelis reperire secundum diversitatem, diversa enim habent principia in[41]dividuantia, et diversas proprietates innatas, sicut enim homines diversas habent facies, sic diversas habent mentes et proprietates mentales, ita intelligendum est in angelis suo modo. | Rather, there are as many species there as individuals, similarly they say in the [celestial] luminaries of the world, but although this may have some probability in bodies, yet it does not seem reasonable in spirits, that none may share with another in the nature of a spiritual thing.
For just as it is made known through scripture, many angels were ordered to the same office, and they seem to have the same operation, moreover neither through scripture, nor through the sayings not through functions [officia] of the saints, does so much diversity became known to us. For that reason it does not seem anything but a presumption to say this, particularly when there does not appear some compelling reason to hand [inpromtu]. The other is the sober and catholic position, that distinctness is to be supposed in angels as far as personhood only, either in all or in some, and the reasons leading to this are conceded, both on the part of ministers, on the part of assimilation to God, and on the part of mutual assimilation.
Now the diversity of the angels is not through multiplication of one from another, but at once of the angels from God. And from this the following objection about the end [of multiplication] is clear, because that is not the end of multiplication, but of successive multiplication. But the most potent reason for multiplication in men and in angels is the declaration and communal praise of divine power, and wisdom, and goodness, which are made manifest in the multiplication [Q: the multitude], and in the amplification of the glory of the blesssed, because the love of charity rejoices in the multiplication of good society. Wherefore, I believe that they will be in great and most perfect number, according to which it becomes that supernal City, glittering with every ornament. 3. To the objection of the 'medium', it is to be said that angel cannot be a medium, because just as it was proved in the preceding, although in an angel there is not so much a diversity of natures as in man, nonetheless there is some.
4. To what is objected last concerning an origin, which is the principal reason for a personal discreteness, it is to be said that though Richard says, that persons in men are distinguished by origin, still they do not have this by reason of a principle, for few men are thus distinguished through that condition.
2. Likewise, Hugo de St Victor [says] that in the divine [persons] there is personal discreteness through origin, in angels through quality, in men in both ways. Therefore if quality bespeaks accidental property in creatures as much as origin, it is clear &c. 3. Likewise, Porphyry says that the individual 'stands together' from properties of which a collection is impossible to find in another thing, but such are accidental properties. Therefore individuation is through accidents, but through the same is personal discreteness, through which is individuation, therefore &c.
5. Likewise, drawing a line round [i.e. ruling out] all accidents, a thing does not fall under sense, but only in the understanding, but while a universal is understood, a singular is sensed. Therefore, in ruling out accidents, individuation is ruled out, therefore also |
| 20rb 42b 1 personalis discretio, et sic idem quod prius.
Item discretio personalis est discretio secundum numerum, sed circumscripta quantitate non est intellegere numerum, ergo nec discretionem personalem, sed substantiale intelligitur circumscripto accidentali, ergo si discretio personalis non potest intelligi accidentibus circumscriptis, ergo non est substantialis angelo sed potius accidentalis. Contra, arguitur primo per textum. Magister enim dicit quod prima consideratio est de substantia et sub prima consideratione comprehendit personalem discretionem, ergo videtur quod personalis discretio est angelo substantialis. Item persona non est aliud quam individua substantia rationalis [11] naturae, sed individua substantia inquantum huiusmodi est in genere substantiae, non per reductionem, sed directe secundum lineam rectam, ergo inquantum huiusmodi est in genere substantiae, ergo personalitas non est in genere accidentis, quia in eodem genere est album inquantum album, et albedo, ergo in eodem genere personalitas et persona. Item nullum accidens est nisi in substantia individua, ergo omne accidens consequitur individuitatem essentiae, et tam in rationali quam in irrationali hoc habet veritatem, ergo prius per naturam est aliquid individuum substantiae rationalis quam habeat accidens, ergo per prius persona ergo discretio in personalitate.
Item non est maior discretio in accidentibus quam inter opposita, sed opposita non faciunt discretionem personalem, quia unus homo prius est albus, postea niger prius puer, postea senex, et tamen idem individuum est et una persona, ergo &c. Item accidentia diversa cum sunt in uno supposito, sunt unum numero, ut grammaticum et musicum, sed hoc non esset si diversitas secundum numerum vel secundum discretionem [31] personalem veniret ab accidentibus, ergo &c. Respondeo, ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum quod circa hoc est triplex modus dicendi. Quidam enim [/namque] dicere voluerunt quod personalis discretio est accidentalis proprietas, quia dicit [dicunt] quod est in genere accidentis, et quod [etiam] causatur ab accidentibus, sicut discretio numeralis, [sed] in hoc {autem} differentia est, quia discretio numeralis causatur a diversitate proprietatum, in quibus communicant [/at] creatura rationalis et irrationalis, sed discretio personalis a proprietatibus quae insunt proprie rationali creaturae. Sed illud improbatur in opponendo per multas rationes, nec potest habere veritatem [41] quod distinctio individualitatis [/individualis] sit ab accidentibus, cum individua differant secundum substantiam, non solum secundum accidens, et similiter de discretione personali intelligendum est. Et ideo alius modus est dicendi, quod discretio personalis dicit proprietatem accidentalem, quae tamen non causatur ab accidentibus, sed a substantia sive principiis substantialibus, sicut unitas quae est principium numeri est in genere accidentis, tamen immediate habet ortum a substantia. Sed cum persona dicat idem quod suppositum rationalis naturae ut est in genere substantiae, non videtur probabile quod personalis discretio dicat proprietatem accidentalem solum. Et ideo est ter[51]tius modus dicendi quod discretio personalis etsi videatur dicere accidens, quia dicit per modum accidentis, tamen principaliter dicit quid substantiale, et si aliquo modo importat accidens hoc est consequenter, illud tamen immediate habet ortum a principiis substantialibus, et hoc patet sic. Discretio personalis addit super discretionem individualem, discretio autem individualis duo dicit, [scilicet] individuationem et consequenter distinctionem . Individuatio autem est ex principiorum indivisione et appropriatione, ipsa enim rei principia dum coniunguntur invicem se appropriant et faciunt individuum, sed ad hoc consequitur esse discretum sive esse distin[61]ctum ab alio, et surgit ex hoc numerus, et ita accidentalis proprietas consequens ad substantiam, et sic individualis discretio dicit aliquid accidentale, et aliquid substantiale, personalis autem addit super hanc dignitatem personalitatis. Dignitas autem illa duo dicit, scilicet, nobilitatem rationalis naturae, quae est quod | personal discreteness, and thus [it is] the same as before.
6. Likewise, personal discreteness is discreteness according to number. But ruling out quantity [means] not understanding number, therefore [not understanding] personal discreteness. But what is substantial is understood by ruling out what is accidental, therefore if personal discreteness cannot be understood with accidents ruled out, therefore there is no substantial difference in an angel, but rather [it is] accidental. On the contrary, is argued first through the text. 1. For the master says that the first consideration is of substance and under the first consideration he comprehends personal discreteness, therefore it seems that personal discreteness in the angel is substantial. 2. Likewise, a person is no other than an individual substance of a rational nature, but individual substance insofar as of this sort, is in the genus of substance, not through reduction, but directly according to a straight line, therefore inasmuch as [it is] of this sort, it is in the genus of substance, therefore personhood is not in the genus of accident, because in the same genus there is white inasmuch as it is white, and whiteness, therefore in the same genus there is personhood and person. 3. Likewise, there is no accident except in an individual substance, therefore every accident follows the individuatedness of essence, and this is true as much in a rational thing as in an irrational one, therefore something that is individual, belonging to a rational substance, is by nature before [what] may have an accident, therefore, through [consideration of] what is prior, so is a person, therefore so is discreteness in personhood. 4. Likewise, what differ in personhood, differ in their substantial principles, just as is clear in Peter and Paul, and what thus differ are substantially discernible [discernuntur], therefore personal discreteness bespeaks substantial difference, therefore it is not an accidental property. 5. Likewise, there is not a greater discreteness in accidents than among opposites, but opposites do not cause personal discreteness, because one man is white before, afterwards black, a boy before, afterwards an old man, and yet he is the same individual and one person, therefore &c. 6. Likewise, diverse accidents, when they are in one suppositum, are one in number, such as one who is grammatical or musical, but this would not be if diversity according to number or according to personal discreteness came about from accidents, therefore &c. I reply, it is to be noted for the understanding of the previous matters that concerning this there is a threefold manner of speaking. For certain [people] wished to say that personal discreteness is an accidental property, because they say that it is in the genus of accident, and that it is caused by accidents, just as numerical discreteness. But in this there is a difference, because numerical discreteness is caused by the diversity of properties, in which the rational and the irrational creature share, but personal discreteness [is caused] by the properties which are properly in a rational creature.
And for the same reason there is another mode of speaking, that personal discreteness bespeaks accidental property, which yet is not caused by accidents, but from substance or substantial principles, just as unity, which is the principle of number, is in the genus of accident, yet immediately has a beginning from substance. But since 'person' bespeaks the same thing which is the suppositum of the rational nature, as it is in the genus of substance, it does not seem probable that personal discreteness bespeaks accidental property alone.
Personal discreteness adds [something] over individual individual discreteness, but 'individual discreteness' bespeaks two things, namely individuation and, consequently, distinction. Individuation is from the indivision and appropriation of principles [i.e. matter and form]. The principles of a thing, when they are conjoined, appropriate each other and produce the individual. But being discrete or being distinct from another is consequent upon this, and from this there arises number, and so accidental property following upon substance. Thus 'individual discreteness' bespeaks something accidental and something substantial, but personal [discreteness] adds upon this the dignity of personhood.
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| 20va (43a) 1 natura rationalis tenet principatum inter naturas creatas.Unde non est ordinabilis ad perfectiorem formam, et haec nobilitas etsi per modum qualitatis habeat intelligi, tamen essentialis est naturae rationali.
Dicit enim illa nobilitas actualem eminentiam, ita quod in supposito nulla sit alia natura ita principalis, ut natura rationalis, ut sit quasi per se sonans, et ideo quia hoc deficit ei in christo, natura rationalis creata non facit personalitatem, et hoc est accidentale.
Ex his patet veritas problematis et dissolutio obiectionum pro parte. Si enim quaeratur utrum personalis discretio sit proprietas substantialis vel accidentalis. Si substantialis proprietas dicatur, quia immediate sequitur substantiam, sic dicendum est esse substantiale. Si substantiale dicatur, quia non exit genus substantiae, dicendum quod quodammodo sic, et quodammodo non. [21] Similiter si dicatur accidentalis proprietas quae [/quia] causatur ab accidentibus sic dicendum simpliciter quod non. Si vero accidentalis quia est in genere accidentis, sic potest dici quod quodammodo sic, et quodammodo non secundum distinctionem primo factam. Quod ergo obiicitur quod personalis discretio pertinet ad substantiam et non causatur ab accidentibus, hoc totum concedendum est. Quod obiicitur in oppositum quod omne proprium manat de genere accidentium, dicendum quod Boetius loquitur de propria passione, et hanc dicit manare de genere accidentium, non quia non causetur ex principiis subiecti, sed quia etsi ex ipsis formatur, causaliter [/formaliter] tamen est in genere accidentium. Dupli[31]citer ergo deficit illa ratio, primo quia peccat in intellectu huius generis [/nominis] proprium. Est enim proprietas quantum ad rem, et est proprietas quantum ad modum. Et Boetius intelligit de eo quod realiter est propriae passio, [non de eo] quod est proprietas quantum ad modum.
Peccat et [/etiam] praedicta ratio in malo intellectu praedicati, quia proprium dicitur et manare de genere accidentium non quia manat ab accidentibus, sed quia manat a substantia existens de genere accidentium, sic in proposito, unde sicut unitas quae est principium numeri ortum habet a principiis substantiae accidentaliter ad ipsam relatis, non [autem] a principio aliquo [/altero] quod sit in genere accidentis. Sic intelligi potest de discretione personali secundum id quod in ea accidentale, utpote comparatio ad alteram personam, respectu cuius habet distingui et numerari et eminentia dignitatis in supposito respectu alterius na[51]turae quam non habuit humana natura in christo.
Quod obiicitur quod discretio personalis est per qualitatem, dicendum quod intelligit [ur] de qualitate quae est in genere qualitatis quantum ad modum non autem quantum ad rem. His enim duobus distinguuntur praedicamenta vel quantum ad essentiam, vel quantum ad modum, et aliquid est in genere substantiae quod nihilominus habet modum accidentis, unde etiam consuevit distingui qualitas duplex, scilicet, substantialis et accidentalis. Vel dicendum quod hic [/Richardus] loquitur de distinctione personali quantum ad nostram cognitionem, et quia cognitio nostra est per qualitates accidentales, dixit personas crea[61]tas distingui qualitate, et per hunc modum intelligit verbum porphirii, qui dicit individuum constare ex collectione proprietatum, loquitur enim secundum rationem et cognitionem, non secundum rem, et sic patet tertium. Quod obiicitur in christo human natura non habet personalitatem, dicendum quod hoc est ratione illius eminentiae quae con | rational nature holds first place among created natures. Wherefore it cannot be ordered to a more perfect form, and also this nobility, and if has to be understood through a mode of quality, still it is essential to a rational nature.
It is to be said accordingly that in the way which indivisible discreteness comes from the existence of a natural form in matter, so personal discreteness [comes] from the existence of a noble and supereminent nature in the suppositum, and for that reason although in both ways there is conveyed what is substantial, and similarly a consequent accidental, (this I say in a creature), yet the accidental, that is caused or has a beginning from an accident, is not conveyed. Rather it follows from the form in matter, or the nature in the suppositum.
For (if it is asked whether personal discreteness is a substantial or an accidental property): If it is called a substantial property, because it immediately follows substance, thus it is to be said it is substantial. If it is called substantial, because the genus of the substance does not come into being, it is to be said that in a certain way yes, and in a certain way no.
Therefore that reasoning is lacking in two ways, first because it errs in understanding the genus [Q: name] 'proper'. For there is property as far as it regards the thing, and there is property as far as it regards the manner. And Boethius understands of that which really is a proper affection [a proper affection is any logical subset of a category: e.g. 'car' is a proper affection of 'vehicle'], which is a property as far as it regards the manner. But an individual property or a personal property, even if it seems to say that the consequent property is just as an accident, still in reality means nothing but the appropriation of principles through indivision: this I say as much as regards individual property, similarly personal property does not bespeak [anything] beyond this except dignity or nobility of rational nature, which is not accidental to it, indeed is absolutely and altogether essential.
[F: new sentence] Thus it can be understood of personal discreteness according to that which is accidental in it, for example, comparison to another person, in respect of which it has to be distinguished and numbered and the eminence of dignity in the suppositum in respect of the other nature which human nature did not have in Christ. 2,3. To the objection that personal discreteness is through quality, it is to be said that he understands by quality, what is in the genus of quality, as far as manner is concerned, but not as far as the thing is concerned. For categories are distinguished by these two, either as far as essence is concerned, as far as manner is concerned, and something is in the genus of substance that nevertheless has the manner of an accident, wherefore also quality is customarily distinguished in two ways, namely, as substantial and as accidental.
4. To the objection that in Christ human nature does not have personhood, it is to be said that this is by reason of that eminence which is a consequence |
| 20vb (43b) 1 sequitur ad nobilitatem, et illa supereminentia dicit quandam dignitatem accidentalem sicut prius ostensum est, quae amitti potest non solum per deperditionem, sed [etiam] per dignioris superinductionem, sicut alibi melius dicetur.
Quod obiicitur de sensu et intellectu, dicendum quod etsi sensus solummodo sit singularium, intellectus tamen potest esse non solum universalium, sed etiam singularium, unde non est intelligenda illa differentia cum praecisione, et hac patet, quia solus intellectus comprehendit intrinseca principia petris et platonis, et circumscriptis omnibus accidentibus dicit eos esse discretos et distinctos. Quod obiicitur [11] de numero, dicendum quod sicut unitatem substantialem consequitur unitas accidentalis inseparabiliter, quia [/quae] non est principium indivisionis sed consequens ad illam, sic diversitatem substantialem consequitur numerus inseparabiliter, tamen secundum rem et naturam distinctio illa est a substantiali principio non accidentali, et sic patet totum. | of [divine] nobility, and that supereminence bespeaks a certain accidental dignity just as was shown before, which can be lost not through destruction alone, but through the superinduction of something more worthy, as elsewhere will better be stated [dicetur]
5. To the objection about sense and understanding, it is to be said that even if sense is only of singulars, still the understanding can be not of universals alone, but also of singulars, wherefore that difference is not to be understood with precision, and by this it is clear, because the understanding alone comprehends the intrinsic principles of Peter and Paul, and, by ruling out all accidents, it is saying they are discrete and distinct.
1. And that it is on the part of a formal principle, Richard [of St Victor] says that in angels as much as in men, personal discreteness is through quality. But quality is either a form, or it holds itself on the part of form, therefore &c. 2. Likewise, if something is in some things, and is in them commonly through analogy, it is necesssary that it is in them through something found by analogy in them. But personal discreteness is in divine things and in angels by analogy, but in divine things it is in no way from matter, because God is pure form, therefore &c. 3. Likewise, personal discreteness in a creature bespeaks the greatest nobility, but what is more noble, is more removed from matter, and most approaches form, therefore &c. 4. Likewise, personal discreteness bespeaks the greatest authority [Q: actuality] in a creature, because where there is such a thing, in no way is it possible as regards another, but every such thing follows from form, not matter, therefore &c. 5. Likewise, nothing that is one in all things is the principle of discreteness, matter as much as it is of itself, is unique, therefore in no way is a principle of discreteness, therefore neither of personal discreteness. 6. Likewise, a definition, as the Philosopher would have it, is of an aggregate, therefore when a man is defined, not only form but the composite of matter and form is defined. Therefore if man in common (and similarly rational nature) encloses matter in himself, but if 'person' adds something over nature, since it is not possible to add matter, it is bound to add something formal.
2. Likewise, if a person were to add some form upon nature, therefore just as a species is definable because it adds a differentia, and form upon the genus, so also the individual would be definable, which is false. 3. Likewise, if an individual without a person adds an individuating form over the most specific species, I ask whether the Founder could make another form through all things similar to that individual. It is plain that it is so, because there is no accidental form of which we cannot think a similar, therefore similarly in a substantial form, but if he makes it similar, that one is common with several, but no such thing is an individual. Therefore it is impossible for personal discreteness to be from some formal principle added upon a species.
5. Likewise, personal discreteness is from the same from which it is to be this, but this is matter, because in the book De Caelo et Mundo he says that it differs to say 'heaven' and 'the heaven', because when I say 'heaven' I say 'form', when I say 'the heaven' I say 'matter', therefore &c. 6. Likewise, in creatures in which there is personal discreteness through origin, it is not on account of another unless the one generating generates the other but, as the Philosopher says, the one generating does not generate another except on account of matter, therefore in created things there is personal discreteness on account of matter. I reply, it is to be said that this same thing is a question of individuation which is now raised about personal |
| 21ra (44ª) 1 discretione, et de ipsa fuit contentio inter philosophicos viros.Quidam enim imitantes verbum philosophi dixerunt quod individuatio venit a materia, quia individuum supra speciem non addit nisi materia, et hoc ponebant, quia dixerunt universalia solum dicere formas, et tunc primo tangitur materia quando provenit ad hoc aliquid.
Aliis vero aliter visum est scilicet quod individuatio esset a forma, et dixerunt quod ultra formam speciei specialissimae est forma individualis, et quod movit hos ponere illud fuit, quia [/quod] intellexerunt ordinem in formis secundum generationem et naturam esse per eundem modum, [11] per quae ordinatur in genere, ita quod forma generis generalissimi primo advenit materiae, et sic descendendo usque ad speciem, et adhuc illa forma non constituit individuum quia non est omnino in actu, sed ultra hanc formam individualis substantia sequitur, quae est omnino in acto, sicut materia fuit omnino in potentiam. Quaelibet istarum positionum aliquid habet quod homini non multum intelligenti rationabiliter videri poterit improbabile, quomodo materia quae omnibus est communis erit principale principium, et causam distinctionis valde difficile est videre. Rursus, quomodo forma sit tota et praecipua causa natu[21]ralis distinctionis valde difficile est capere, cum omnis forma creata quantum est de sui natura, nata sit habere aliam similem, sicut et ipse philosophus dicit etiam in sole et luna esse vel quomodo dicimus duos ignes differre formaliter, vel etiam alia quae plurificantur et numero distinguuntur ex solo divisione continui, ubi nullius est novae formae inductio. Ideo est tertia positio satis plana [/planior], quod individuatio consurgit ex actuali coniunctione materiae cum forma, ex qua coniunctione unum sibi appropriat alterum, sicut patet cum impressio vel expressio fit multorum sigillorum in cera quae prius erat una, [31] nec sigilla plurificari possunt sine cera, nec cera numeratur nisi quia fiunt in ea diversa sigilla. Si tamen quaeras a quo veniat principaliter, dicendum quod individuum est hoc aliquid.Quod sit hoc principalius habet a materia ratione cuius forma habet positionem in loco et tempore. Quod sit aliquid, habet a forma. Individuum enim habet esse, habet etiam existere. Existere dat materia formae, sed essendi actum dat forma materiae. Individuatio igitur in creaturis consurgit ex duplici principio, personalis autem discretio dicit singularitatem et dignitatem. Inquantum dicit singularitatem, hoc dicit ex ipsa [41] coniunctione principiorum, ex quibus resultat ipsum quod est. Secundum [/sed], dignitatem dicit principaliter rationem formae, et sic patet unde sit personalis discretio originaliter in cre | discreteness, and of that very [subject] there was contention among philosophical men. For certain [of them], imitating the words of the Philosopher, have said that individuation comes from matter, because the individual does not add anything above the species except matter, and they supposed this, because they said that universals alone bespeak forms, and then matter is touched upon first when this something is arrived at.
But to others it seemed otherwise, i.e. that individuation would be from form, and they have said that beyond the form of the most specific species, there is individual form, and what moved them to suppose this was, because they understood the order in forms according to generation and nature to be through the same manner, through which it is ordered in genus, so that the form of the most general genus first comes to matter, and thus by descending unto the species, and still that form does not constitute the individual because it is not altogether in actuality, but beyond this form the individual substance follows, which is altogether in actuality, just as the matter was altogether in potentiality.
Again, in what way a form may be the entire and principal cause of natural discreteness is quite difficult to grasp, since every created form as far as it is of its own nature, is fitted to have another similar one, just as the Philosopher himself also says is the case with the sun and moon, or in the way we say two fires differ 'formally'. Or also others which are made several and distinguished in number and from division alone of the continuous [fire], where there is induction of no new form? For that reason there is a third position which is clear enough, that individuation arises from actual conjunction of matter with form, from which conjunction the one appropriates the other to itself, just as it is clear that when an impression or expression of many seals on wax which previously was one takes place, neither the seals can be made several without the wax, nor is the wax numerated except because diverse seals are made in [the wax]. Yet if you ask from what [individuation] principally comes, it is to be said that an individual is a this something [hoc aliquid]. That it is a this, it has more principally from the matter, by reason of which the form has location in space and time. That it is a something, it has from the form. An individual has being [esse] and also has existence [exsistere]. Matter gives existence to the form, but form gives the actuality of being to the matter. Accordingly, in the case of creatures, individuation arises from a twofold principle, but personal discreteness bespeaks singularity and dignity. Inasmuch as it bespeaks singularity, it bespeaks this from that very conjunction of principles, out of which there results the very thing which it is. According to dignity it bespeaks principally the logical nature of the form, and thus it is clear wherefore personal discreteness is originally in |
| 21rb (44b) 1 aturis, loquendo sive in hominibus, sive in angelis.
Quae ergo obiiciuntur ad primam partem procedunt ratione nobilitatis et dignitatis, prout tamen est in ipso supposito sive quae [/quod] est, cuius distinctio venit in divinis ex origine, in creaturis ex principiis originalibus, sicut in primo libro fuit ostensum. Si autem quaeratur quid est illud commune secundum quod inest, dicendum quod proprietas dignitatis incommunicabiliter existens in hypostasi, aliter tamen reperitur hoc, aliter ibi. Omnes rationes sequentes procedunt via praedicta. Quod obiicitur ad oppositum quod non possit esse a forma sed a materia, dicen[11]dum quod rationes illae probant ut patet quod non totaliter est a forma, quia forma nulla est individua nisi propter coniunctionem sui cum materia, et universalia similiter, quia dicunt formas, non concernunt materiam nisi rationem suorum individuorum pro quibus supponunt quando diffiniuntur vel subiiciuntur, unde illae rationes concedendae sunt quod individuum non addit aliam formam quae sit individualis de se. Quod obiicitur quod individuatio est a materia, dicendum quod per illas autoritates non datur intellegi quod materia sit principium individuationis nisi sicut causa sine qua non, non autem sicut [21] tota causa, nec tamen ita potest attribui materiae personalis discretio sicut individuatio, propter hoc quod dicit dignitatem quae principalius respicit formam, sicut ostendunt rationes ad partem primam. | creatures, whether speaking with regard to men, or to angels.
The objections to the first part proceed by reason of nobility and dignity, according as, nonetheless it is in the suppositum itself or 'what is', of which the distinctness comes into divine [persons] from their origin, and in creatures from [their] original principles, just as was shown in the first book. Now if it be asked what is that common thing according to which it is in, it is to be said that the property of dignity incommunicably existing in the hypostasis, in one way is found here, in another way there. All following reasons proceed in the way already mentioned. 1-3. To the opposed objection that it cannot be from form but from matter, it is to be said that those reasons prove, as is clear, that it is not wholly from form, because no form is individual except on account of its conjunction with matter, and universals similarly, because they bespeak forms, do not concern matter unless by reason of their individual [instances], which they stand for when they are defined or are subjected. Wherefore those reasons are to be conceded that an individual does not add another form which is individual of itself.
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