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Magistri Petri Lombardi Arch. Episc. Parisiensis |
Master Peter Lombard |
Sententiarum Quatuor Libri |
The Four Books of Sentences |
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LIBER PRIMUS SENTENTIARUM.
DE DEI UNITATE ET TRINITATE |
THE FIRST BOOK OF THE SENTENCES
ON THE UNITY AND TRINITY OF GOD |
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DISTINCTIO VI. |
DISTINCTION 6 |
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Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, |
Latin
text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, |
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Cap. Unicum.
Utrum Pater voluntate genuerit Filium, an necessitate; et an volens vel nolens sit Deus. |
Chapter Sole
Whether the Father by will begot the Son, or whether by necessity; and whether God is willing and/or unwilling. |
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Praeterea quaeri solet, utrum Pater genuerit Filium voluntate, an necessitate. De hoc Orosius ad Augustinum1 ait: « Voluntate genuit Pater Filium vel necessitate? Nec voluntate, nec necessitate, quia necessitas in Deo non est, praeire voluntas sapientiam non potest ». « Quocirca, ut Augustinus ait in decimoquinto libro de Trinitate,2 ridenda est dialectica Eunonmii, a quo Eunomiani heretici orti sunt, qui cum non potuisset intelligere nec credere voluisset, unigenitum Dei Verbum Filium Dei esse natura, id est de substantia Patris genitum, non naturae vel substantia dixit esse Filium, sed Filium voluntatis Dei, volens asserere accedentem Deo voluntatem, qua gigneret Filium, sicut nos aliquid aliquando volumis, quod antea non volebamus; propter quod mutabilis intelligitur nostra natura, quod absit, ut in Deo esse creadamus ». Dicamus ergo, Verbum Dei esse Filium Dei natura, non voluntate, ut docet Augustinus in libro decimoquinto de Trinitate,3 ubi quendam catholicam haeretico respondentem commendat dicens: « Acute sane quidam respondit haeretico versutissime interroganti, utrum Deus Filium volens, an nolens genuerit, ut si diceret nolens, absurdissima Dei miseria sequeretur; si autem volens, continuo quod intendebat concluderet, scilicet non naturae esse Filium, sed voluntatis. At ille vigilantissime vicissim quaesivit ab eo, utrum Deus Pater volens, an nolens sit Deus, ut si responderet nolens, sequeretur grandis absurditas et miseria, quam de Deo credere magna est insania; si autem diceret volens, respondere- / -tur ei: |
Moreover there is accustomed to be asked, “Whether the Father begot the Son by will, or whether by necessity?” Concerning this (St. Paulus) Orosius says to (St.) Augustine:1 « Did the Father beget the Son by will and/or by necessity? Neither by will, nor by necessity, because necessity is not in God, (nor) can Will go before Wisdom ». « About which », as (St.) Augustine says in the fifteenth book On the Trinity,2 « the dialectic of Eunomius is to be laughed at, from whom the Eunomian heretics have originated, he who, since he could not understand nor did he will to believe, that the Only-Begotten of God, the Word, is the Son of God by nature, that is, begotten from the substance of the Father, said that the Son was not of the Nature and/or Substance, but the Son of the Will of God, willing to assert an accedent [accedentem] will to God, by which He begot the Son, just as we sometimes will something, which afterwards we not do not will; on account of which our nature is understood (to be) mutable, which (defect) far be it, that we believe it to be in God ». Therefore let us say, that the Word of God is the Son of God “by nature”, not “by will”, as (St.) Augustine teaches in the fifteenth book On the Trinity,3 where he commends a certain catholic responding to a heretic, saying: « Indeed he in an acutely sane manner responds to the heretic most cunningly interrogating (him), whether God willing or not willing begot the Son, so that if (the catholic) would say “not willing” [nolens], there would follow a most absurd misery for God; but if “willing”, there would conclude continually what He was intending, that is that the Son is not of the Nature, but of the Will. But that most vigilant (catholic) in turn asked him [ab eo], whether God the Father is a willing, or an unwilling God, so that if he would respond “unwilling”, there would follow a great absurdity and misery, which to believe of God is a great insanity [insania]; but if he would say “willing”, he would respond / to him: |
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1 Quaest. 65 Dialog. q. 7, in quo textu Vat. post primum necessitate addit sed, et in fine ponit potuit
loco potest, at contra omnes codd. et edd. 1, 6 et originale
Augustini. |
1 The Dialogue of 65 Questions, q. 7, in which text the Vatican text after the first by necessity [necessitate] adds but
[sed], and at the end puts could [could] in place of can
[potest], but contrary to the codices and editions 1 and 6 and the original
of (St.) Augustine. |
p.124
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respondere- /tur ei: ergo et ipse1 voluntate sua Deus est, non natura. Quid ergo restabat, nisi ut obmutesceret, sua interrogatione obligatum insolubili vinculo se videns »? Ex praedictis docetur, non esse concedendum, quod Deus voluntate vel necessitate, vel volens vel nolens sit Deus; item, quod voluntate vel necessitate, vel volens vel nolens genuerit Filium. |
to him: “And therefore He Himself1 is God by His own will, not by nature”. Therefore what remained, except for [ut] him to become dumb, seeing himself tied up [obligatum] with an insoluble chain by his own interrogation »? From the aforesaid there is taught, that it must not be conceded, that God by will and/or by necessity, willing and/or unwilling, is God; likewise, that He by will and/or by necessity, willing and/or not willing, begot the Son. |
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Sed contra hoc opponitur sic: voluntas Dei est natura sive essentia Dei, quia non est aliud Deo esse, aliud velle; et ideo, sicut una est essentia trium personarum, ita et una voluntas. Si ergo Deus natura Deus est, et voluntate Deus est; et si Verbum Dei natura Filius Dei est, et voluntate Filius Dei est. Hoc autem facile est refellere. Nam et praescientia Dei sive scientia, qua scit vel praescit bona et mala, divina natura sive essentia est; et praedestinatio sive voluntas eius eadem divina essentia est, nec est aliud Deo scire vel2 velle quam esse. Et cum sit unum et idem scientia Dei vel voluntas, non tamen dicitur de voluntate, quidquid dicitur de scientia, et e converso. Nec omnia illa sua voluntate Deus vult, quae sua scientia scit, cum scientia sua noverit tam bona quam mala, voluntate autem non velit nisi bona. Scientia quippe Dei et praescientia de bonis est et malis, voluntas vero et praedestinatio de bonis est tantum; et tamen unum et idem est in Deo scientia et voluntas, et praescientia et praedestinatio. Ita cum unum sit natura Dei et voluntas, dicitur tamen Pater genuisse Filium natura, non voluntate, et esse Deus natura, non voluntate. |
But against this there is thus opposed: ‘The Will of God is the Nature or the Essence of God, because for God the ‘to be’ is not one thing, ‘to will’ the other; and for that reason, just as there is one Essence of Three Persons, so also one Will. Therefore if God by nature is God, He is also by will God; and if the Word of God by nature is the Son of God, He is also by will the Son of God.’ But this is easy to refute [refellere]. For both the Foreknowledge [praescientia] or Knowledge [scientia] of God, by which He knows [scit] and/or foreknows [praescit] (things) good and evil, is the Divine Nature or Essence; and the His predestination or Will is the same Divine Essence, nor is ‘to know’ [scire] and/or2 ‘to will’ for God other than ‘to be’. And though one and the same (thing) be the Knowledge and/or Will of God, nevertheless [tamen] there is not said of the Will, whatever is said of the Knowledge, and conversely. Nor does God by His own Will will all those (things), which He knows by His own Knowledge, since by His own Knowledge He knows [noverit] good as much as evil (things), but by Will He does not will except the good (things). Indeed the Knowledge and Foreknowledge of God is of (things) good and evil, but the Will and predestination is only of (things) good; and nevertheless [tamen] in God one and the same (thing) is the Knowledge and the Will, and the Foreknowledge and the predestination. Thus, though one be the Nature and Will of God, the Father is nevertheless [tamen] said to have begotten the Son by nature, not by will, and that God is by nature, not by will. |
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Praedicta tamen verba, quibus prudenter dictum est, quod Deus Pater nec volens nec nolens est Deus, nec volens nec noles genuit Filium, sive voluntate sive3 necessitate, ex talis sensu mihi videntur accipienda, ut voluntatem praecedentem vel accedentem intelligamus, qualiter Eunomius intelligebat. Non enim ipse est Deus4 voluntate praecedenti vel efficienti, vel volens, priusquam Deus; nec voluntate praecedenti vel accedenti genuit Filium, nec prius volens quam generans genuit Filium,5 nec prius generans quam volens genuit Filium. Volens tamen genuit, sicut potens genuit et bonus genuit et sapiens genuit et huiusmodi. Si enim Pater sapiens et bonus dicitur genuisse Filium, cur non et volens? cum ita sit Deo idem esse volentem, quod est esse Deum; sicut idem est esse sapientem, quod esse Deum. Dicamus ergo, quia Pater sicut sapiens, ita volens genuit Filium, sed non voluntate praecedenti vel accedenti. Quem sensum aperit Hieronymus et confirmat, ita dicens super Epistolam ad Ephesios:6 « De Filio Dei, id est Domino Nostro Iesu Christo scriptum est, quia cum Patre semper fuit, et nunquam eum, ut esset, voluntas paterna praecessit; et ille quidem natura Filius est ». |
The aforesaid words, however, by which it has been prudently said, that God the Father is neither a “willing” nor an “not willing God”, neither willing nor not willing begot the Son, whether by will or3 by necessity, in [ex] such a sense seems to me (are) to be accepted, lest that we understand a precedent and/or accedent Will, in the manner that [qualiter] Eunomius understood it. For He Himself is not God4 by a precedent and/or efficient Will, and/or as one willing, before (He was) God; nor by a precedent and/or accedent will did He beget the Son, nor first willing then generating did He beget the Son,5 nor first generating then willing did He beget the Son. However, willing He did beget, just as able He begot and good He begot and wise He begot and (as one) of this kind. For if the Father, wise and good, is said “to have begotten the Son”, why not willing? since thus it is that for God it is the same (to be) willing, as it is to be God; just as it is the same to be wise, as to be God. Therefore let us say, that the Father as one wise, thus willing begot the Son, but not by a precedent and/or accedent will. Which sense (St.) Jerome manifests [aperit] and confirms, thus saying On the Epistle to the Ephesians:6 « Concerning the Son of God, that is, Our Lord Jesus Christ it was written, that “He was always” with the Father, and that never did the paternal Will precede Him, so that He would be; and He indeed is (His) Son by nature ». |
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Notula. Hilarius in libro de Synodis:7 « Eos qui dicunt, de non exstantibus esse Filium Dei, similiter qui dicunt, quod neque consilio neque voluntate Pater genuit Filium, anathematizat sancta Ecclesia. Item si quis nolente Patre dicat natum Filium, anathema sit. Non enim, nolente Patre, coactus Pater vel naturali necessitate ductus, cum nollet, genuit Filium, sed mox ut voluit, sine tempore et impassibiliter ex se Unigenitum demonstravit ». |
Brief Note. (St.) Hilary in the book On Synods, (says):7 « Those, who say, that the Son of God is from non-extant things [non exstantibus], similarly, (those) who say, that the Father neither by counsel nor by will begot the Son, the Holy Church anathematizes. Likewise if anyone says that the Son (has) been born by a not willing Father, anathema sit. For not with the Father not willing, did the Father, driven and/or lead by natural necessity, since he was not willing, beget the Son, but as soon as He willed, He, without time and in an impassible manner, showed from out of [demonstravit ex] the Only-Begotten ». |
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1 Codd. A B C D omittunt et ipse, quod
tamen in ed. operum Augustini habetur. Paulo infra Vat. contra omnes codd. et
edd. 1, 8 et originale indissolubili pro insolubili. |
1 Codices A B C and D omit and . . . Himself
[et ipse], which however is had in the edition of (St.) Augustine's works. A
little below this the Vatican text, contrary to all the codices and editions 1,
8 and the original has indissoluble [indissolubili] in place of insoluble
[insolubili]. |
The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation that that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.