Magistri Petri Lombardi
Arch. Episc. Parisiensis

Master Peter Lombard
Archbishop of Paris

Sententiarum Quatuor Libri

The Four Books of Sentences

LIBER PRIMUS SENTENTIARUM.

 

DE DEI UNITATE ET TRINITATE

THE FIRST BOOK OF THE SENTENCES

 

ON THE UNITY AND TRINITY OF GOD

DISTINCTIO VII.

DISTINCTION 7

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 132-133.
Cum Notitiis Editorum Quaracchi

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 132-133.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Cap. I.

 

Utrum Pater potuerit vel voluerit gignere Filium.

Chapter I

 

Whether the Father could* and/or willed to beget the Son.

Hic solet quaeri a quibusdam, utrum Pater potuerit vel voluerit generare Filium.  Si enim, inquiunt, potuit et1 voluit generare Filium:  ergo potuit aliquid et voluit, quod nec potuit nec voluit Filius; nam Filius nec potuit nec voluit generare Filium.  Cui versutiae facile respondemus dicentes:  posse vel velle subiectum2 voluntati vel potentiae.  Est tamen aliqua potentia vel voluntas, scilicet posse vel velle gignere Filium; et ideo distinguenda est intelligentia propositi verbi:  posse vel velle gignere Filium est3 posse vel velle aliquid.  Neque enim generatio Filii aliquid eorum est, quae subiecta sunt divinae potentiae et voluntati, nec est aliquid inter omnia vel de omnibus, sed super omnia et ante omnia.  Non enim ante voluit vel potuit, quam genuit; sicut nec ante fuit, quam genuit, quia4 ab aeterno fuit et ab aeterno genuit.  Ex simili quoque hoc videre possumus.  Pater enim potest esse Pater et vult esse Pater; Filius autem nec5 potest nec vult esse Pater:  ergo Pater potest vel vult esse aliquid, quod non potest vel vult esse Filius.  Non sequitur, quia esse Patrem non est esse aliquid, sed est esse ad aliquid, ut in sequenti ostendetur.6

Here one is accustomed to be asked by certain (men), whether the Father could and/or willed to generate the Son.  For if, they say, He could [potuit] and1 did will to generate the Son:  therefore He could and willed (to do) something, which the Son neither could nor willed (to do); for the Son neither could nor willed to generate the Son.  To which craftiness [versutiae] we easily respond, saying:  that ‘to be able’ [posse] and/or ‘to will’ (is) subject to the (Divine)2 Will and/or Power [potentiae].  However, it is a different [aliqua] power and/or will, namely [scilicet], ‘to be able’ and/or ‘to will’ to beget the Son; and for that reason the understanding of the proposed word is to be distinguished:  “to be able and/or to will to beget the Son” is3 “to be able and/or to will (to do) something”.  For neither is the generation of the Son something belonging to those (things), which have been subjected to the Divine Power and Will, nor is it something among all and/or from all, but rather over all and before all.  For not before He willed and/or could, did He beget; just as neither before He was, did He beget, because4 from eternity He was and from eternity He begot.  From a similar (reason) we can also see this.  For the Father can be the Father and wills to be the Father; moreover the Son neither5 can nor wills to be the Father:  therefore the Father can and/or wills to be something, which the Son is cannot and/or does not will to be.  It does not follow, that ‘to be the Father’ is ‘not to be something’, but it is ‘to be toward something’, as will be shown in the following.6

Sed vehementer nos movet quod ait Augustinus in secundo libro contra Maximinum,7 qui asserebat Patrem potentiorem Filio, eo quod Filium genuit Deum creatorem, Filius autem non; dicebatque Patrem potuisse gignere non Filium; et ideo potentiorem esse Filio.  Ad quod respondens Augustinus dicere videtur, quod Filius etiam potuit gignere, volens ostendere, Patrem non esse potentiorem Filio, his verbis:  « Absit, ut ideo potentior sit Pater Filio, sicut putas, quia Creatorem genuit Pater, Filius autem non genuit Creatorem; neque enim non potuit, sed non oportuit ».  Vide et diligenter attende haec verba:  non enim non potuit, sed non oportuit.  Videtur enim dicere, quod Filius potuit gignere, sed non oportuit; et ita potuit quod non oportuit.  Quare autem non oportuit, subdit dicens:  « Immoderata enim esset divina generatio, si genitus Filius nepotem gigneret Patri, quia et ipse nepos, nisi avo suo pronepotem gigneret, secundum vestram mirabilem sapientiam impotens diceretur.  Similiter etiam ille, si nepotem non gigneret avo suo et pronepotem proavo suo, non a vobis appelaretur omnipotens; nec impleretur generationis series, si semper alter ex altero nasceretur; nec eam perficeret ullus, si non sufficeret unus omnipotens.  Itaque omnipotentem genuit Filium Patris natura, non fecit ».

But we are vehemently moved by [nos movet] what (St.) Augustine says in the second book Against Maximinus,7 who used to assert that the Father (is) more powerful [potentiorem] than the Son, for the reason that He begot the Son (to be) God the Creator, but the Son (did) not; and he used to say that the Father could beget not-the-Son; and for that reason He is more powerful than the Son.  To which (St.) Augustine, responding, seems to say, that the Son also could beget, wanting to show, that the Father is not more powerful than the Son, with these words:  « Far be it, that for that reason the Father be more powerful than the Son, as you think, because the Father begot the Creator, but the Son did not beget the Creator; for neither could He not, but rather it was not proper (that He do so) ».  See and diligently attend to these words:  “for not could He not, but rather it was not proper”.  For he seems to say, that the Son could beget, but it was not proper (that He beget); and thus He could (do) what was not proper (to do).  Moreover why it was not proper, He says below [subdit] saying:  « For the divine generation would be immoderate, if the Begotten Son would not beget a descendent [nepotem] for the Father, because even a descendent himself, unless he begets a great-grandson for his own grandfather, would be called impotent according to your wonderful wisdom.  Similarly also that one, if he did not beget a descendent for his own grandfather and a great-grandson for his own great-grandfather, would not by you be named “omnipotent”; nor is the series of generation fulfilled, if one of the two is always born out of the other; nor would any thoroughly accomplish [perficeret] this, if one omnipotent was is not sufficient.  And thus the Nature of the Father begot, not made, the Son Omnipotent ».

Hoc autem non videtur quibusdam posse stare, scilicet quod Filius potuerit gignere.  Si enim Filius potuit8 gignere, potuit esse pater; si potuit esse pater, ergo potuit esse pater vel sui, vel Patris, vel Spiritus san- / -cti, vel alicuius alius.

Moreover this does not seem to certain (men) to be able to stand, that is, that the Son could beget.  For if the Son could8 beget, He could be a father; if He could be a father, therefore He could be a father either of Himself, and/or of the Father, and/or of the Holy Spirit /, and/or of anyone else [alicuius alius].

1 Vat. vel, sed contra codd. et edd. 1, 6, 8.
2 Supple cum cod. A divinae.
3 Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 8 et. Paulo ante codd. A B C E cum edd. 1, 3, 7 praepositi loco propositi.
4 Edd. 1, 2, 8 addunt et.
5 Vat. cum edd. 4, 6 non.
6 Dist. XXVIII. c. 5. — Paulo ante codd. A B C E et ed. 1 omittunt propositionem sed est esse ad aliquid, quam edd. 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10 sic exhibent: sed potest esse ad aliquid.
7 Cap. 12. n. 2. — Mox Vat., repugnantibus codd. et edd. 1, 8 post potentiorem addit esse.  Dein cod. C bene genuerit loco genuit.
8 Edd. 2, 3, 7, 9, 10 poterit.

* [Trans. Note: This question turns about the Latin terms posse, potens, potentia, impotentia, omnipotens, all of which cannot be translated into English with the same cognate. For the sake of utility the following English words will be used, respectively: to be able or forms of the helping verb can, able, power, impotency, omnipotent.]
1 The Vatican text reads and/or [vel], but contrary to the codices and editions 1, 6, and 8.
2 Supply with codex A Divine.
3 The Vatican text, contrary to the codices and editions 1 and 8, reads and [et]. A little before this codices A B C E together with editions 1, 3, and 7 read preposed [praepositi] in place of proposed [propositi].
4 Editions 1, 2, and 8 add even [et].
5 The Vatican text together with editions 4 and 6 reads cannot nor [non potest nec].
6 Distinction XXVIII, ch. 5. — A little before this codices A B C E and edition 1 omit the proposition but it is ‘to be toward something’, which editions 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10 exhibit in this manner: but it can be ‘toward something’.
7 Chapter 12, n. 2. — Then the Vatican text, disagreeing with the codices and editions 1 and 8, at more powerful [potentiorem] adds is [esse].  Then codex C well has (the subjunctive) He begot [genuerit] in place of (the indicative) He begot [genuit].
8 Editions 2, 3, 7, 9, 10 have (the subjunctive) could [potuerit].

 

p.  133

 

vel Spiritus san- / -cti, vel alicuius alius.  Sed1 alius non, quia nullus alius semper fuit; nec Patris, quia Pater est ingenitus et innascibilis; sec sui, « quia nulla res se ipsam gignere potest »; nec Spiritus sancti, quia nasci non potuit.  Si enim nasci potuit, potuit esse filius, et ita mutabilis esse potuit.

and/or of anyone else [alicuius aliua].  But not (of anyone)1 else, because no other always was; neither of the Father, because the Father is unbegotten and innascible; neither of Himself, « because no thing can beget its very self »; nor of the Holy Spirit, because He could not be born.  For if He could be born, He could (also) be a son, and thus He could be mutable.

Quomodo ergo accipietur2 quod supra dictum est:  non enim non potuit gignere, sed non oportuit, quasi potuit, sed non oportuit?  Non est nobis perspicuum aperire, quomodo sit hoc verum, et ideo sub silentio potius esse praetereundum, nisi me super hoc aliquid loqui cogeret instantia quaerentium.

Therefore in what manner shall2 what has been said above be accepted:  “for not (that) He could beget, but it was not proper (that He do so)”, as if He could, but it was not proper (that He do it)?  To uncover, in what manner this may be true, is not clear [perspicuum] to us, and for that reason (it is clear to us) that in silence it must rather be passed by, unless the insistence [instantia] of questioners would drive me to say something on it.

Potest ergo sic intelligi:  non enim non3 potuit, sed non oportuit, id est, non ex impotentia sui fuit, quod Filius non genuit, sed ei non conveniebat, sicut Deus Filius non est Deus Pater; nec tamen hoc ex impotentia sui est.  Nam et Pater similiter non est Filius, nec hoc est ex impotentia Patris.  Sed quaerit Maximinus, Arianorum Episcopus:  unde ergo est, quod Pater non potest esse Filius, vel Filius Pater? Non utique ex impotentia, sed Pater4 proprietate generationis Pater est, qua oportet eum non esse Filium, et Filius proprietate nativitatis Filius est, qua oportet eum non esse Patrem.  De quibus proprietatibus postea plenius tractabitur.5

Therefore it can be thus understood:  “for not (that) He could not,3, but it was not proper”, that is, it was not out of His impotence [impotentia], that the Son did not beget, but it was not fitting for Him, in the same manner [sic] God the Son is not God the Father; nor, however, is this out of His impotence.  For even the Father similarly is not the Son, nor is this out of the Father's impotence.  But Maximinus, the Bishop of the Arians, asks:  “Whence, therefore, is it, that the Father cannot be the Son, and/or the Son the Father?”  Certainly not out of an impotence, but rather the Father by4 the property of generation is the Father, by which it is proper that He not be the Son, and the Son by the property of nativity is the Son, by which it is proper that He not be the Father.  Concerning which properties there will be a fuller treatment [plenius tractabitur] afterwards.5

Cap. II.

 

An posse gignere Filium sit aliqua potentia in Patre, quae non sit in Filio.

Chapter II

 

Or whether there is some power in the Father that can beget the Son, which is not in the Son.

Item quaeritur a quibusdam, si Pater potens sit natura gignere Filium, et an haec6 sit aliqua potentia, quae sit in Filio.  Ad quod dicimus, quod Pater non est potens nisi natura; eius enim potentia natura est vel essentia.  At inquiunt illi, si potens est gignere, habet ergo potentiam gignendi; Filius autem non habet potentiam gignendi, si non potest gignere:  habet ergo Pater aliquam potentiam, quam non habet Filius.  Non sequitur.  Eandem enim potentiam penitus habet Filius quam et Pater, qua Pater potuit gignere, et Filius potuit gigni.  Eadem enim potentia est in Filio, qua potuit gigni, quae est in Patre, qua potuit gignere.  Sed contra hoc opponitur:  aliud est posse gignere, aliud est posse gigni; quia aliud est gignere,7 aliud gigni.  Hic distinguendum est.  Si enim, cum dicitur:  aliud est posse gignere, aliud posse gigni, aliam significes8 potentiam, qua Pater potens est gignere, et aliam, qua Filius potens est gigni, falsus est intellectus.  Si autem dicas, Patrem posse habere aliam proprietatem sive notionem, qua genitor est; et Filium aliam, qua genitus est, verus est intellectus.  Aliam enim habet Pater proprietatem, qua Pater est, aliam Filius, qua Filius est.

Likewise it is asked by certain (men), “If the Father is by nature able [potens] to beget the Son?”, and “Whether this6 is some power, which is in the Son?”  To which we say, that the Father is not able except by nature; for His power is by nature and/or essence.  But they say, “if He is able to beget, therefore He has a power to beget; moreover the Son does not have a power to beget, if He cannot beget:  therefore the Father has some power, which the Son does not have.”  (But this is a) non sequitur.  For the Son thoroughly has the same power which the Father also (has), by which the Father could beget, and the Son could be begotten.  For the same power is in the Son, by which He could be begotten, which is in the Father, by which He could beget.  But against this there is objected:  “It is one (thing) to be able to beget, it is another to be able to be begotten; because it is one (thing) to beget,7 an other to be begotten.”  Here there must be a distinction [distinguendum est].  For if, when there is said:  “it is one (thing) to be able to beget, another to be able to be begotten,” you signify8 the one Power, by which the Father is able to beget, and the other, by which the Son is able to be begotten, (then) there is a false understanding.  But if you say, “that the Father can have one property or notion, by which He is the Begetter; and the Son another, by which He is the Begotten,” there is a true understanding.  For the Father has one property, by which He is the Father, the Son another, by which He is the Son.

Ita etiam, cum dicitur:  Filius non habet potentiam generandi, quam habet Pater, dupliciter intelligi potest.  Si enim dicatur:  Filius non habet potentiam generandi quam et Pater, id est,9 qua potens sit ad generandum, id est, ut genuerit, vel ut generet sicut Pater, verum est.  Si vero intelligatur sic:  non habet potentiam, qua possit gigni vel genitus esse, qua eadem Pater potens est, ut genuerit vel ut generet, falsum est; sicut dicitur:  Pater habet potentiam, qua potest esse Pater; Filius vero non habet potentiam, qua possit esse Pater; et e converso, Filius habet potentiam, qua possit esse Filius, Pater vero non habet potentiam, qua possit esse Filius:10  habet ergo aliquam Pater, quam non habet Filius, et e converso.  Absit; quia eadem est potentia Patris, qua potest esse Pater, et Filii, qua potest esse Filius.  Ita etiam eadem est voluntas, qua Pater vult esse Pater, non Filius, et Filius vult esse Filius, non Pater:  et eadem est voluntas Filii, qua vult esse genitus, et Patrem genuisse; et Patris, qua vult esse genitor, et Filium genitum esse.11

Thus also, when there is said:  “the Son does not have the power to generate, which the Father has,” it can be understood in a twofold manner.  For if there be said:  “the Son does not have the power to generate which the Father also (has)”, that is,9 “by which He is able regarding the thing to be generated, that is, to generate, and/or to have generated as the Father (does)”, it is true.  However if it be understood thus:  “He does not have the power, by which He can be begotten and/or have been begotten, by which same (power) the Father is able, to generate and/or to have generated,” it is false; just as there is said:  “the Father has a power, by which He can be the Father; however the Son does not have a power, by which He can be the Father” and conversely, “the Son has a power, by which He can be the Son, however the Father does not have a power, by which He can be the Son:10  therefore the Father has some (power), which the Son does not have” and conversely.  Far be it; because the same is the power of the Father, by which He can be the Father, and of the Son, by which He can be the Son.  Thus also the same is the Will, by which the Father wills to be the Father, not the Son, and the Son wills to be the Son, not the Father:  and the same is the Will of the Son, by which He wills to be begotten, and that the Father to have begotten; and of the Father, by which He wills to be the Begetter, and that the Son has been the Begotten.11

1 Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 hic repetit alicuius.
2 Vat. cum edd. 4, 5, 6 accipiatur.
3 Mendum Vat. omittentis non castigatur ex codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10. Paulo ante cod. D Potest autem loco Potest ergo.
4 Codd. hic repetunt ex.
5 Dist. XXVI.
6 Vat. contra codd. et edd. 2, 3, 5, 9, 10 hoc.  Mox pot quae fide codd. et edd. 1, 3, 5, 6, 8 expunximus in Vat. additum non.  Paulo infra post dicimus quod codd. et edd. 1, 8 omittunt Pater.
7 Vat., repugnantibus codd. et edd. 1, 2, 9, 10 addit et.
8 Vat. cum edd. 4, 6, 8 significas.  Paulo supra post posse gignere codd. A D E addunt et.
9 Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 8 scilicet.
10 Vat. cum ed. 4 indebite omittit Pater vero non habet potetiam, qua possit esse Filius.
11 In codd. B D E et ed. 1 deest esse.

1 The Vatican text, contrary to the codices and editions 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8, here repeats of anyone [alicuius].
2 The Vatican text together with editions 4, 5 and 6, reads is . . . accepted [accipiatur].
3 The fault of the Vatican text of omitting not [non] is corrected from the codices and editions 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10.  A little before this codex D has Moreover it can [Potest autem] in place of Therefore it can [Potest ergo].
4 The codices here have out of [ex] 5 Distinction XXVI.
6 The Vatican text, contrary to editions 2, 3, 5, 9, and 10 has this (thing) [hoc].  Then after which [quae], trusting in the codices and editions 1, 3, 5, 6 and 8, we have expunged the added not [non] of the Vatican text. A little below this after we say, that [dicimus, quod] the codices and editions 1 and 8 omit the Father [Pater].
7 The Vatican text, disagreeing with the codices and editions 1, 2, 9, and 10, adds and [et].
8 The Vatican text together with editions 4, 6, and 8, has the indicative you signify [significas].  A little above this after to be able to beget [posse gignere] codices A D and E add and [et].
9 The Vatican text, contrary to the codices and editions 1, and 8, has that is [scilicet].
10 The Vatican text together with edition 4 unduly omits however the Father does not have a power, by which He can be the Son.
11 In codices B D E and edition 1 there is lacking has [esse].

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation that that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.