Magistri Petri Lombardi
Arch. Episc. Parisiensis

Master Peter Lombard
Archbishop of Paris

Sententiarum Quatuor Libri

The Four Books of Sentences

LIBER PRIMUS SENTENTIARUM.

 

DE DEI UNITATE ET TRINITATE

THE FIRST BOOK OF THE SENTENCES

 

ON THE UNITY AND TRINITY OF GOD

DISTINCTIO XXVII.

DISTINCTION 27

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 464-466.
Cum Notitiis Editorum Quaracchi

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 464-466.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

PARS. I.

 

PART I

Cap. I.

 

 Quae sunt illae proprietates, quibus distinguuntur personae.

Chapter I.

What are those properties, by which the Persons are distinguished.

Hic quaeri potest, utrum proprietates, quas Hilarius supra1 assignavit, scilicet quod Pater semper est Pater, et Filius semper est Filius, sint illae eaedem proprietates, quas Augustinus superius distinxit dicens, proprium esse Patris, quod genuit Filium; et proprium Filii, quod genitus est a Patre; et Spiritus sancti, quod ab utroque procedit.  Ac deinde, utrum et istae sint illae quae dicuntur paternitas, filiatio, processio.  Videtur quod non sint eaedem proprietates, quas ponit Hilarius, et illae, quas ponit Augustinus.  Si enim eaedem sunt, idem est ergo Patri esse Patrem et genuisse Filium; quod utique quidam concedunt.  Si autem hoc est; cui ergo convenit ut sit Pater, ei convenit genuisse Filium.  Natura ergo divina si Pater est, genuit Filium; si vero non genuit, Pater non est.  Sed quis audeat dicere, aut quod ipsa genuit Filium, aut quod ipsa Pater non sit.  Si autem ipsa Pater est, nec Filium genuit, non est ergo idem dicere, aliquid esse Patrem et gignere Filium.  Et ita non videtur2 una eademque esse proprietas.

Hic it can be asked, whether the properties, which (St.) Hilary assigned above,1 namely, that the Father is always the Father, and the Son is always the Son, are those same properties, which (St.) Augustine distinguished above, saying, that it is proper to the Father, that He begot the Son; and proper to the Son, that He has been begotten by the Father; and to the Holy Spirit, that He proceeds from Each.  And then, whether also these (of St. Augustine) are those (of St. Hilary), which are said (to be) the paternity, the filiation, (and) the procession.  It seems that the same are not the properties, which (St.) Hilary posits, and those, which (St.) Augustine posits.  For if they are the same, it is the same, therefore, for the Father to be the Father and to have begotten the Son; which indeed certain (authors) do concede.  But if this is; therefore, to the one to whom it befits to be the Father, to that one it befits to have begotten the Son.  Therefore if the Divine Nature is the Father, It begot the Son; if, however, It did not beget (Him), It is not the Father.  But who dares to say, either that It begot the Son, or that It is not the Father.  But if It is the Father, and has not begotten the Son, therefore it is not the same to say, that something is the Father and begets the Son.  And thus there does not seem2 to be one and the same property.

Ad quod sine praeiudicio aliorum dicimus, quod easdem proprietates notavit uterque, licet diversis verbis.  Quod enim Hilarius ait, ita intelligi debet:  proprium Patris est, quod semper Pater est, id est, proprietas Patris est, qua semper Pater est; semper vero Pater est, quia semper genuit Filium.  Ita et proprium Filii est, quod semper Filius est, id est, proprietas Filii est, qua semper Filius est; Filius vero semper est, quia semper genitus est.  Ergo proprietas, qua Pater est pater, est quia semper genuit; et haec eadem dicitur paternitas vel generatio.  Et proprietas, qua Filius semper est filius, est quia semper genitus est a Patre; et haec eadem dicitur filiatio vel genitura vel nativitas vel origo vel nascibilitas.  Sic et proprietas, qua Spiritus sanctus est spiritus sanctus vel donum, est quia procedit ab utroque; et haec eadem dicitur processio.  In praemissis ergo locutionibus eaedem significatae sunt proprietates.

To which, without prejudice to others, we say, that each noted the same properties, though with diverse words.  For what (St.) Hilary says, thus ought to be understood:  it is proper to the Father, taht He always is the Father,that is, the property of the Father is, that by which He is always the Father; however, He is always the Father, because He always begot the Son.  Thus also it is proper to the Son, that He is always the Son, that is, the property of the Son is, that by which He is always the Son; however, the Son is always, because He is always begotten .  Therefore, the property, by which the Father is a father, is because He always has begotten; and this same is said (to be) the paternity and/or generation.  And the property, by which the Son is always a son, is because He has always been begotten by the Father, and this same is said (to be) the filiation and/or begetting [genitura] and/or the nativity and/or the origin and/or the nascibility.  Thus too, the property, by which the Holy Spirit is a holy spirit and/or a gift, is because He proceeds from Each; and this same is said (to be) the procession.  In the aforesaid expressions, therefore, the same properties have been signified.

Cap. II.

 

Quod non est omnino idem dicere, esse Patrem et genuisse vel habere Filium.

Chapter II.

That it is not entirely the same to say, that He is the Father and that He has begotten and/or has a Son.

Nec tamen videtur nobis, omnino esse idem dicere aliquid esse Patrem et genuisse Filium; vel aliquid esse Filium et habere Patrem, vel esse Spiritum sanctum et procedere ab utroque.  Alioquin Pater non esset nomen hypostasis, id est personae, sed proprietatis tantum; similiter Filius et Spiritus sanctus:  et ita non per3 tria nomina significarentur tres personae.  Ideoque dicimus, quia Patris nomen non tantum relationem notat, sed etiam hypostasim, id est subsistentiam significat, ita et Filius et Spiritus sanctus.  Relationum vero vocabula, scilicet paternitas, filiatio, processio, vel gignere, gigni, procedere, ipsas tantum relationes, non hypostases significant, sive habere filium et habere patrem.  Ut verbi gratia, cum dicimus:  Deus est pater, nomine patris et relationem notamus et divinam hypostasim significamus, ut sit intelligentia talis:  Deus vel divina essentia est Pater, id est ille qui genuit, scilicet4 . . .

Nor yet does it seem to us, that it is entirely the same to say that Something is the Father and that It has begotten the Son; and/or that Something is the Son and that It has a Father, and/or that (Something) is the Holy Spirit and that It proceeds from Each.  Otherwise the Father would not be the name of a Hypostasis, that is, of a Person, but only a property; similarly the Son and the Holy Spirit:  and thus through3 three Names there would not be signified three Persons.  And for that reason we say, that the Name of the Father does not only note a relation, but also a Hypostasis, that is, it signifies a subsistence, thus also the Son and the Holy Spirit.  However, the words for the relations, that is, “the paternity”, “the filiation”, “the procession”, and/or “to beget”, “to be begotten”, “to proceed”, signify only the relations themselves, not the Hypostases, or (that is, that they signify, for example) ‘to have a son’ and ‘to have a father’.  For the sake of an example [ut verbi gratia], when we say:  “God is a father”, by the name for father we both note the relation and signify the Divine Hypostasis, so that the understanding is such:  ‘God and/or the Divine Essence is the Father’, that is, ‘He who begot”, namely4 . . .

1  Dist. praeced. c. 3, et est XII. de Trin. n. 23.  —  Codd. B E assignaverat pro assignavit.  —  Locus Augustini habetur ibid., et est V. de Trin. c. 5. n. 6.

2  Vat.cum edd. 4, 6, 8 videbitur.

3  Vat. addit haec.  —  De ipsa huius capitis quaestione cfr. Comment. hic p. I. q. 1.

4  Vat. et omnes aliae edd. id est contra codd.

1  In the preceding Distinction, ch. 3, which quotes from his own On the Trinity, Bk. XII, n. 23.  —  Codices B and E have had assigned [assignaverat] for assigned [assignavit].  —  The passage of (St.) Augustine is had ibid., and is found in his On the Trinity, Bk. V, ch. 5, n. 6.

2  The Vatican edition, together with editions 4, 6 and 8, reads there will not seem [videbitur].

3  The Vatican edition adds these [haec].

4  The Vatican edition and all the other editions have that is [id est], contrary to the codices.

 

p. 465

hypostasis, quae habet filium.  Similiter  Deus est filius, id est hypostasis genita vel habens patrem.  Ita etiam Deus est spiritus sanctus,* id est hypostasis procedens ab utroque, sive ille qui procedit.  Cum vero nomina relationum ponimus in praedicatis, notiones ipsas tantum significamus, non hypostases, ut cum dicitur:1  Deus genuit, id est habet filium; et Deus genitus est, id est habet patrem.  Et tunc oportet intelligi in subiectis hypostases tantum, non essentiam, quae illis proprietatibus determinatur.

the Hypostasis, which has a son.  Similarly God is a son, that is, a Hypostasis begotten and/or having a father.  Thus too, God is a holy spirit,* that is, a Hypostasis proceeding from Each, or He who proceeds.   When, however, we posit the names of the relations in the predicates (of sentences), we signify only the notions themselves, not the Hypostases, such as when there is said:1  “God begot, that is, has a son”; and “God has been begotten, that is, has a father”.  And then it is necessary that there be understood in the subjects (of the sentences) only the Hypostases, not the Essence, which is determined by those properties.

Cap. III.

 

Quod proprietates determinant hypostases, non substantiam, id est naturam.

Chapter III.

That the properties determine the Hypostases, not the Substance, that is, the Nature.

Illae enim proprietates singulae singulis proprie conveniunt personis, et per eas personae determinantur et a se invicem differunt, sed a se non secedunt.  Unde Ioannes Damascenus:2  « Non differunt ab invicem hypostases secundum substantiam, sed secundum characteristica idiomata, id est determinativas proprietates.  Characteristica vero, id est determinativa, sunt hypostaseon, et non naturae; etenim hypostases determinant ».  Item:3  « Esse quidem intemporaliter et aeternaliter dicimus divinam Verbi hypostasim, simplicem, omnia habentem, quae habet Pater, ut eius homoousion, id est consubstantialem, nativitatis modo et habitudine a paternali hypostasi differentem, nunquam vero a paternali hypostasi secedentem ».  Idem, apertius exprimens personales proprietates, in eodem ait:4  « Differentiam hypostaseon, id est personarum, in tribus proprietatibus, id est paternali et filiali et processibili, recognoscimus, insecessibiles autem ipsas hypostases et indistabiles invicem et unitas quidem inconfusibiliter — tres enim sunt, etsi unitae — divisas autem indistanter.  Etenim singula perfecta est hyposastis et propriam proprietatem, scilicet existentiae modum proprium possidet; sed unitae sunt substantia et non distant neque secedunt a paternali hypostasi ». Ecce hic habes distinctas tres illas proprietates, quae supra5 diversis significatae sunt modis.

For those properties each properly convene with each Person, and through them those Persons are determined and differ from One another, but do not secede from  Themselves.  Whence (St.) John Damascene (says):2  « The Hypostases do not differ from One another according to substance, but according to Their own characteristics [characteristica idiomata], that is, the determinative properties.  However, the characteristics, that is, the determinatives, are of the Hypostases, and not of the Nature; for indeed they determine the Hypostases ».  Likewise (he says):3  « Indeed, we say that there is atemporally [intemporaliter] and eternally a Hypostasis of the Word, simple, having all, which the Father has, as (One who is) homousion to Him, that is, consubstantial (to Him), differing by the manner of the nativity and by habitude from the Hypostasis of the Father [a paternali hypostasi], but never seceding from the Hypostasis of the Father ».  The same, expressing more openly the personal properties, says in the same (book):4  « We recognize the difference of the Hypostases, that is, of the Persons, in three properties, that is, (that) of the Father, (that) of the Son and (that) of the One processing, moreover (we recognize) the Hypostases Themselves, unable to secede [insecessibiles] and unable to be made distant from One another [indistabiles invicem] and united, indeed in a manner in which They cannot be confused [inconfusibliter] — for They are three, even if united — but divided in a manner without distance [indistanter].  For indeed Each is a perfect Hypostasis and possesses His own property, that is, His own mode of existence; but They have been united according to substance and are not distant nor do they secede from the Hypostasis of the Father ».  Behold here you have those three, distinct properties, which have been signified in diverse manners above.5

 

PARS. II.

 

PART II

Hic non praetermittendum, quod sicut Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus nomina personarum sunt et proprietates personales designant, ita etiam sunt et alia nomina personarum, id est, quae ipsas personas significant et earum proprietates denotant, et easdem quas et nomina praedicta, unde et relative dicuntur, scilicet genitor, genitus, verbum, imago.  Unde Augustinus in quinto libro de Trinitate:6  « Videndum est, inquit, hoc significari, cum dicitur genitus, quod significatur, cum dicitur filius.  Ideo enim filius, quia genitus, et quia filius, utique genitus ».  « Sicut autem filius ad patrem, sic genitus ad genitorem refertur, et sicut pater ad filium, ita genitor ad genitum ».  Idem in sexto libro de Trinitate:7  « Verbum quidem solus Filius accipitur, non simul Pater et Filius, tanquam ambo sint unum verbum.  Sic enim verbum dicitur, quomodo imago, non autem Pater et Filius simul ambo imago, sed Filius solus est imago Patris, quemadmodum et filius ».  Idem in septimo libro de Trinitate:8  « Verbum, secundum quod sapientia est et essentia, hoc est quod Pater; secundum quod verbum, non hoc est quod Pater, quia verbum non est pater, et verbum relative dicitur, sicut filius ».  Item in eodem:  « Sicut filius ad patrem refertur, ita et verbum ad eum cuius est verbum, refertur, cum dicitur verbum.  Et propterea non eo verbum, quo sapientia dicitur; quia verbum non ad se dicitur, sed tantum relative ad eum cuius est verbum, sicut filius ad patrem ».  « Eo quippe est filius, quo verbum, et eo est verbum, quo filius; sapientia vero, quo essentia, et ideo, quia Pater et Filius sunt una essentia et una sapientia ».  Item in eodem:9  « Non est Pater ipse verbum, sicut nec filius nec imago ».  « Quid autem absurdius quam imaginem ad se dici »?  Idem in quinto:10  « Dicitur relative filius, relative etiam dicitur verbum et imago, et in omnibus his vocabulis ad Patrem refertur, nihil autem horum pater dicitur ».

Here it must not be overlooked, that just as “the Father” and “the Son” and “the Holy Spirit” are the Names of the Persons and designate the personal properties, so also there are other names for the Persons, that is, which signify the Persons Themselves and denote Their properties, the same (properties), which (are) also the aforesaid names, whence they are also said relatively, namely, Begetter, Begotten, Word, Image.  Whence (St.) Augustine in the fifth book On the Trinity (says):6  « It must be seen », he says, « that when “begotten” is said, there is signified that, which is signified, when “son” is said.  For, a son (is) for that reason, that (he has been) begotten, and because (he is) a son, indeed (he has been) begotten ».  « Moreover, just as a son is referred to a father, so a begotten to a begetter, and just as a father (is referred) to a son, so a begetter to a begotten ».  The same (says) in the sixth book On the Trinity:7  « The Word, indeed, is taken (to be) the Son alone, not the Father and the Son together, as if Both are the one Word.  For “the Word” is said in thus, as Image, but the Father and the son (are) not Both and image, but the Son alone is the Image of the Father, according to the measure that (He is) also a son ».  The same (says) in the seventh book On the Trinity:8 « The Word, according to which He is Wisdom and the Essence, is that which the Father (is); according to which (He is) the Word, He is not that which the Father (is), because a word is not a father, and a “word” is said relatively, just as “son” (is) ».  Likewise in the same (book he says):  « Just as a son is referred to a father, so also a word is referred to him to whom the word belongs, when the word is said.  And on this account it is not said (to be) a “word” for this, by which (it is said to be) wisdom; because “word” is not said regarding itself, but only relatively regarding him to whom the word belongs, just as a son (is said) regarding a father ».  « Indeed He is a son by this, whereby (He is) a word, and He is a word by this, whereby (He is) a son;  but (He is) Wisdom (by this), whereby (He is) the Essence, and for this reason, because the Father and the Son are the One Essence and the one Wisdom ».  Likewise in the same (book he says):9  « The Father Himself is not a word, just as (He is) neither a son nor an image ».  « Moreover, what (is) more absurd than that an image be said regarding itself  »?  The same (says) in the fifth (book):10  « “Son” is said relatively, “word” and “image” are also said relatively, and in all these words He is referred to the Father, but none of these is a father said (to be) ».

Aperte ostensum est, quod sicut filius vel genitus relative dicitur ad patrem, ita verbum et imago; et quod eo dicitur verbum sive imago, quo filius, id est, eadem proprietate sive notione dicitur verbum et imago, qua filius; sed non eo quo verbum, dicitur sapientia vel essentia, quia non notione, qua dicitur verbum, dicitur sapientia.  Nam sapientia dicitur secundum essentiam, non secudum relationem.

There has been openly shown, that just as “son” and/or “begotten” is said relatively to “father”, so “word” and “image”; and that He is said (to be) a “word” or “image” by this, whereby (He is) a son, that is, He is said (to be) a “word” and “image” by the same property or notion, by which (He is) a “son”; but not by this, whereby (He is) a “word”, is He said (to be) “wisdom” and/or “the Essence”, because not by the notion, whereby He is said (to be) a “word”, is He said (to be) “wisdom”.  For He is said (to be) “wisdom” according to essence, not according to relation.

* [Trans. nota:  Hic textus criticalis originalis legivit Spiritus sanctus, tamen contextus exigit spiritus sanctus.]

1  Vat. et aliae edd., excepta 1, dicimus contra codd.

2  De Fide orthodoxa, III. c. 6.  In nova versione legitur:  Quo fit, ut personae inter se non differant ratione essentiae, sed accidentium, quae quidem sunt propriae et certae notae, quibus sigillatur hypostasis, non natura; hypostasis enim definitur essentia cum accidentibus ( atina eisi ta caracteristica xaraxteristica de upostasewV, cai ou jusewV.  Kai gar thn upostasin orizontai, ousian meta sumbebhcotwn ).

3  Ibid. c. 7, paucis hic omissis; ceterum versio fere ad verbum originali respondet.

4  Ibid. c. 5.  Antiqua versio fidelis est; aliqua tamen omittuntur:  pro paternali et filiali et processibli recognoscimus legitur in originali th anaitiw cai patrich cai th aitiath cai uich, cai th aitiath ecporeuth epigignwscomen (versio in Patrolog. Migne:  quod unus sine causa sit et Pater, alter a causa et Filius, alter idem a causa et procedens esse positum agnoscimus).    

5  Dist. XXVI. c. 2, et hic c. 1.

6  Cap. 7. n. 8.  Sequens locus est ibid. c. 6.n. 7.

7  Cap. 2. n. 3.

8  Cap. 3. n. 4; et sequens textus est ibid. c. 2. n. 3, ex quo capitulo etiam sequens textus depromptus est.  In secundo textu post tantum relative Vat. et plurimae edd. addunt dicitur; in tertio post ideo sola Vat. omittit quia.

9  Ibid. c. 1. n. 1.  Ultima propositio est ibid. n. 2.

10  Cap. 13. n. 14; in quo textu Vat. cum cod. C et edd. 4, 5 omittit etiam ante dicitur verbum, in originali dicitur et verbum.

* [Trans. note:  Here the original Latin text read the Holy Spirit [Spiritus sanctus]; however, the context requires a holy spirit [spiritus sanctus].]

1  The Vatican edition and the other editions, except ed. 1, have we say [diximus] for there is said [dicitur], contrary to the codices.

2  On the Orthodox Faith, Bk .III, ch. 6.  In the new version there is read:  By which it comes to be, that persons do not differ among themselves by a reckoning of essence, but (by one) of accidents, which, indeed, are proper and certain notes, by which a hypostasis is marked out [sigilatur], not a nature; for a hypostasis is defined as an essence with accidents [atina eisi ta caracteristica xaraxteristica de upostasewV, cai ou jusewV.  Kai gar thn upostasin orizontai, ousian meta sumbebhcotwn].

3  Ibid., ch. 7, with a few things omitted here; the version of all the others responds nearly word for word with the original.

4  Ibid., ch. 5.  The ancient version is faithful; yet some (words) are omitted:  for We recognize . . . (that) of the Father, (that) of the Son and (that) of the One processing [paternali et filiali et processibli recognoscimus] there is read in the original th anaitiw cai patrich cai th aitiath cai uich, cai th aitiath ecporeuth epigignwscomen (or in Migne’s Latin Patrology:  we acknowledge that there has been posited that there is both One without cause, the Father, and Another from a Cause, the Son, and Another Same from a Cause and proceeding [quod unus sine causa sit et Pater, alter a causa et Filius, alter idem a causa et procedens esse positum agnoscimus]).

5  Distinction XXVI, ch. 2, and here in ch. 1.

6  Chapter 7, n. 8.  The following passage is ibid., ch. 6, n. 7.

7  Chapter 2, n. 3.

8  Chapter 3, n. 4, and the passage which follows is ibid., ch. 2, n. 3, from which chapter the passage following it has also been taken.  In the second quote after only relatively [tantum relative], the Vatican edition and very many editions add is said [dicitur]; in the third after for this reason [ideo], the Vatican edition alone omits because [quia].

9  Ibid., ch. 1, n. 1.  The final proposition is ibid., n. 2.

10  Chapter 13, n. 14; in which text the Vatican edition, together with codex C and editions 4 and 5, omits also [etaim]; in the original there is read both “word” and “image” are relatively said [relative dicitur et verbum et imago].

 

p. 466

Cap. IV.

 

De generali regula eorum quae ad se, et eorum quae relative dicuntur.

Chapter IV.

On the general rule for those which regard themselves, and for those which are said relatively.

Et est hic advertenda quaedam generalis regula eorum quae ad se, et eorum quae relative dicuntur de Patre et Filio.  « Quidquid enim ad se dicuntur, ut ait Augustinus in sexto libro de Trinitate,1 non dicitur alter sine altero, id est, quidquid dicuntur quod substantiam eorum ostendat, ambo simul dicuntur.  Ergo nec Pater est Deus sine Filio, nec Filius sine Patre, sed ambo simul Deus », sed non ambo simul pater, non ambo simul filius vel verbum vel imago.

And here one must adverted to a certain general rule for those which regard themselves, and for those (names) which are said relatively of the Father and the Son.  « For whatever are said regarding themselves », as (St.) Augustine says in the sixth book On the Trinity,1 « the one is not said (to be) without the other, that is, whatever are said (to be that) which shows their substance, both are said (to be) together.  Therefore neither is the Father God without the Son, not the Son (God) without the Father, but Both together (are) God », but not Both together (are) a father nor Both together a son and/or word and/or image.

Cap. V.

 

An secundum substantiam dicatur Deus de Deo, et huiusmodi.

Chapter V.

Or whether according to substance there is said “God from God”, and (sayings) of this kind.

Hic quaeritur, cum dicitur:  Deus de Deo, lumen de lumine, et huiusmodi, utrum dicantur secundum substantiam.  Nam secundum relationem constat ista non dici.  Si vero secundum substantiam dicuntur, simul ambo, scilicet Pater et Filius, possunt dici Deus de Deo, lumen de lumine, secundum praedicatam regulam.  —  Ad quod dicimus, quia licet Deus secundum substantiam dicatur et lumen et sapientia et huiusmodi, et nunquam relative accipiantur; aliquando tamen pro relativis, id est pro personis, sed non relative accipiuntur, ut, cum dicitur:  Deus genuit Deum, alterum pro Patre, alterum pro Filio ponimus; similiter, cum dicitur:  Deus de Deo, lumen de lumine.  In aliis quoque locutionibus saepe reperiuntur nomina essentiae ad significationem personarum deducta, ut cum dicitur:  Deus natus, Deus mortus, Deus passus, ubi Filius tantum significatur.  Ita et de solo Filio intelligitur, cum dicitur:  Deus de Deo, et huiusmodi.  Unde Augustinus quaerens, quomodo huiusmodi dicantur, in sexto libro de Trinitate ait:2  « quomodo Deus de Deo, lumen de lumine dicitur?  Non enim simul ambo Deus de Deo, sed solus Filius de Deo, scilicet Patre; nec ambo simul lumen de lumine, sed solus Filius de lumine Patre ».

Here there is asked, when there is said:  “God from God, Light from Light”, and (expressions) of this kind, whether they are said according to substance.  For according to relation it is established that these are not said.  If, however, they are said according to substance, Both, namely, the Father and the Son, can be said together (to be) “God from God, Light from Light”, according to the aforesaid rule.  —  To which we say, that though “God” is said according to substance, and “Light” and “Wisdom” and (Names) of this kind, and (though these) are never accepted relatively; yet sometimes they are accepted on behalf of relatives, that is, on behalf of Persons, but not relatively, as when there is said:  “God begot God”, we posit the former on behalf of the Father, the latter on behalf of the Son; similarly, when there is said:  “God from God, Light from Light”.  Also, in the other expressions there are often found Names for the Essence deduced for the signification of the Persons, as when there is said:  “the God (who has been) born” [Deus natus], “the God (who has) died” [Deus mortus], “the God (who has) suffered” [Deus passus], where only the Son is signified.  Thus also, when there is said: “God of God”, and (expressions) of this kind, it is understood of the Son alone.  Whence (St.) Augustine seeking, in what manner (expressions) of this kind are said, says in the sixth book On the Trinity:2  « in what manner is there said, “God from God, Light from Light”?  For not Both together (are) “God from God”, but the Son alone (is) from God, namely, (from) the Father; nor (are) Both together “Light from Light”, but the Son alone (is) from the Light of the Father ».

Et est sciendum, quod secundum nomina substantiae tantum dicitur illud de illo, licet ibi illa nomina substantiam non significent.  Secundum vero eadem nomina personarum nunquam dicitur illud de illo, sicut Verbum de Verbo, vel Filius de Filio, quia huiusmodi nomina diversis personis convenire non possunt.  Quod Augustinus, licet obscure, in eodem libro3 ita dicit:  « Hoc solum de eis dici non potest illud de illo, quod simul ambo non sunt »:  id est, illo solo nomine non possumus uti ad ostendendum unum de uno, quod simul ambobus non convenit, « sicut Verbum de Verbo dici non potest, quia non simul ambo Verbum, nec Imago de Imagine, nec Filius de Filio, quia non simul ambo Filius, vel Imago ».  —  Et sicut nomina substantiae aliquando intelligentiam personarum distinctae faciunt, ita etiam interdum totius Trinitatis simul.  Unde Augustinus in quinto libro4 ait:  « In Patris nomine ipse Pater per se pronuntiatur, in Dei vero nomine et ipse Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, ut cum dicitur:  Nemo bonus nisi solus Deus, quia Trinitas est unus Deus ».

And it must be known, that only according to the Names for the Substance is there said a “that from that”, though there those Names do not signify the Substance.  However, according to the same Names for the Persons there is never said “that of that”, just as (there is never said) “the Word from the Word”, and/or “the Son from the Son”, because the Names of this kind cannot convene with diverse Persons. Which (St.) Augustine, though obscurely, in the same book3 thus says:  « This alone of Them cannot be said, “that from that, which Both together are not” »:  that is, we cannot use that name alone to show that One (is) from One, which does not befit Both, « just as “the Word from the Word” cannot be said, because together Both (are) not the Word, nor “the Image from the Image”, nor “the Son from the Son”, because together Both (are) not the Son, and/or the Image ».  —  And just as the Names for the Substance sometimes cause the understanding of distinct Persons, so also (they cause) now and then (an understanding) of the whole Trinity together.  Whence (St.) Augustine in the fifth book4 says:  « In the Name of “the Father” the Father Himself per se is pronounced, but in the Name of “God” both the Father Himself and the Son and the Holy Spirit, such as when there is said:  No one (is) good, except God alone, because the Trinity is the One God ».

1  Cap. 2. n. 3.  In originali legitur:  Ergo nec Deus est Pater sine Filio, nec Filius Deus sine Patre, sed ambo simul Deus.

2  Cap. 2. n. 3.

3  Ibid., sicut et sequens locus.

4   Cap. 8. n. 9.  —  Locus s. Scripturae est Luc. 18, 19.  —  In fine textus Vat. cum pluribus edd. post unus addit solus.

1  Chapter 2, n. 3.  In the original there is read:  Therefore, neither is God the Father without the Son, nor the Son God without the Father, but Both together (are) God.

2  Chapter 2, n. 3.

3  Ibid., just as also (is) the following passage.

4  Chapter 8, n. 9.  —  The passage of Sacred Scripture is Lk. 18:19.  —  At the end of the text the Vatican edition, together with very many editions, reads the one, only God [unus solus Deus].

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.