LIBER PRIMUS SENTENTIARUM -- D. 28: Petri Lombardi

Magistri Petri Lombardi Arch. Episc. Parisiensis	Master Peter Lombard Archbishop of Paris
Sententiarum Quatuor Libri	The Four Books of Sentences
LIBER PRIMUS SENTENTIARUM. DE DEI UNITATE ET TRINITATE	THE FIRST BOOK OF THE SENTENCES ON THE UNITY AND TRINITY OF GOD
DISTINCTIO XXVIII.	DISTINCTION 28
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 492-494. Cum Notitiis Editorum Quaracchi	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 492-494. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
Cap. I. Quod non tantum tres sunt proprietates personarum.	Chapter I. That there are not only three properties of the Persons.
Praeterea considerare oportet, quod non tantum tres praedictae proprietates sive notiones in personis sunt, verum etiam aliae, quae aliis notantur nominibus. Nam etiam hoc nomen ingenitus relative dicitur de Patre tantum, et aliam designat notionem quam Pater vel Genitor. Non est enim idem esse patrem et esse ingenitum, id est, non ea notione pater dicitur, qua ingenitus. Pater enim, ut praedictum est,¹ dicitur secundum proprietatem generationis, ingenitus autem secundum proprietatem innascibilitatis. Differt ergo Pater a Filio auctoritate generationis, differt etiam proprietate innascibilitatis, id est, quia ingenitus. Unde Augustinus, distinguens inter proprietatem, qua dicitur pater, et illam, qua dicitur ingenitus, in quinto libro de Trinitate² sic ait: « Non est hoc dicere ingenitum quod est patrem dicere; quia etsi Filium non genuisset, nihil prohiberet dicere eum ingenitum. Et si gignat quisque filium, non ex eo ipse est ingenitus, quia geniti homines gignunt alios ». Non ergo ideo dicitur pater, quia ingenitus; ideoque,³ cum « de Deo Patre utrumque dicatur, alia notio est, qua intelligitur genitor, alia qua ingenitus. Genitor enim dicitur ad genitum, id est filium. Cum vero ingenitus dicitur, non quid sit, sed quid non sit, dicitur ». « Hoc exemplis planum faciendum est. Quod dicitur ingenitus, hoc ostenditur, quod non sit filius; sed genitus et ingenitus commode dicuntur, filius autem latine dicitur, sed ut dicatur infilius, non admittit loquendi consuetudo; nihil tamen intellectui demitur, si dicatur non-filius; quemadmodum etiam, si dicatur non-genitus pro eo quod dicitur ingenitus, nihil aliud dicitur. Ideo non est in rebus considerandum, quid vel sinat vel non sinat dici usu sermonis nostri, sed quis rerum ipsarum intellectus eluceat. Non ergo iam tantum dicamus ingenitum, sed etiam non-genitum, quod tantum valet. Nunquid ergo aliud dicimus, quam non-filium? Negativa porro particula non id efficit, ut quod sine illa relative dicitur, eadem praeposita, substantialiter dicatur; sed id tantum negatur, quod sine illa aiebatur, sicut in aliis praedicamentis, cum dicimus: homo est, substantiam designamus. Qui ergo dicit: non homo est, non aliud genus praedicamenti enuntiat, sed tantum illud negat. Sicut ergo secundum substantiam aio: homo est, sicut secundum substantiam nego, cum dico: non homo est. At si tantum valet quod dicitur genitus, quantum valet quod dicitur filius, tantundem ergo valet quod dicitur non-genitus, quantum valet quod dicitur non-filius. Relative autem negamus dicendo non-filius, relative igitur negamus dicendo⁴ non-genitus. Ingenitus porro quid est nisi non-genitus? Non ergo receditur a relativo praedicamento, cum ingenitus dicitur. Sicut enim genitus non ad se dicitur, sed quod ex genitore sit; ita, cum dicitur ingenitus, non ad se dicitur, sed quod ex genitore non sit, ostenditur. Utrumque tamen relative dicitur. Quod autem relative pronuntiatur non indicat substantiam. Quamvis ergo diversum sit genitus . . .	Moreover it is necessary [oportet] to consider, that there are not only the three aforesaid properties or notions in the Persons, but even others, which are noted with other names. For even this name “unbegotten” [ingenitus] is said relatively of the Father only, and it designates another notion than ‘Father’ and/or ‘Begetter’ (does). For ‘to be a father’ and ‘to be unbegotten’ is not the same, that is, not by the same notion is “father” said, as (is) “unbegotten” (said). For “father”, as has been said before,¹ is said according to the property of generation, but “unbegotten” according to the property of innascibility. Therefore the Father differs from the Son by the authorship of the generation, He differs too by the property of innascibility, that is, because (He is) unbegotten. Whence (St.) Augustine, distinguishing between the property, by which He is said (to be) a “father”, and that, by which He is said (to be) “unbegotten”, thus says in the fifth book On the Trinity:² « To say that one (is) “unbegotten” is not that which it is to say that one (is) a “father”; because even if He had not begotten the Son, nothing would prohibit saying that He (is) “unbegotten”. And if anyone begets a son, not from this is he “unbegotten”, because men (who are) begotten beget other (men) ». Therefore, not for this reason is He said (to be) a “father”, because (He is said to be) “begotten”; and for that reason,³ since « of God the Father each is said, one is the notion, by which He is understood (to be) a “begetter”, another that by which (He is said to be) “unbegotten”. For “begetter” is said as regards a begotten, that is a son. However when He is said (to be) “unbegotten”, He is said (to be), not that which He is, but (rather) that which He is not ». « This must be made clear by examples. That He is said (to be) “unbegotten”, by this it is shown, that He is not a son; but “begotten” [genitus] and “unbegotten” are fittingly [commode] said, moreover filius (i.e. son) is said in Latin, but to say infilius (i.e. un-son), the custom of speaking does not admit; yet it does not diminish the understanding (of the term), if there be said “not-a-son” [non-filius]; according to the same standard of measure, too, if “not-begotten” is said on behalf of tat which is said (to be) “unbegotten” [ingentius], nothing other is said. For that reason one must not consider in (such) things, what either may [sinat] and/or may not be said by the use of our speech, but (rather) let every [quis] understanding of these things shine forth. For at present we not only say “unbegotten”, but also “not-begotten” [non-genitum], which is worth the same. For what else do we say, than “not-a-son”? Furthermore, the negative particle “not” causes, that there be said substantially, that which is said relatively without it, placed before the same; but that only is denied, which was said without it, just as in the other predications [praedicamentis], when we say: “there is a man”, we designate a substance. He who, therefore, says, “there is no man”, expresses in words [enuntiat] no other genus for the predication, but only denies it. Therefore, just as I speak according to substance (when I say): “there is a man”, so I deny according to substance, when I say: “there is not a man”. But if that which is said (to be) “begotten” is only worth, as much as what is said (to be) a “son”, therefore just so is that which is said (to be) “non-begotten” worth as much, as what is said (to be) “not-a-son”. Moreover (since) we deny relatively, by saying “not-a-son”, therefore we deny relatively, by saying⁴ “not-begotten”. Furthermore, what is an “unbegotten” except an “not-begotten”? Therefore one does not withdraw from the predicament of relation [a relative praedicamento], when one says “unbegotten”. For just as “begotten” is not said regarding itself, but (rather is said to be) ‘that which is out of a begetter’, when “unbegotten” is said, it is not said regarding itself, but (rather) it is shown (to be)’ that which is not out of a begetter’. Moreover, what is relatively pronounced, does not indicate a substance. Therefore, though “begotten” and “unbegotten” / are diverse,
¹ Dist. XXVI. c. 2, et d. XXVII. c. 1. et seqq. ² Cap. 6. n. 7. In eodem capitulo occurrunt quae sequuntur, sed multis omissis et transpositis. ³ Vat. sola Idem, et mox cum ed. 8 dicitur pro dicatur; denique cum aliis edd., dempta 1, ostenditur pro dicitur contra codd. et originale. ⁴ Haec verba: non-filius, relative igitur negamus dicendo in Vat. et aliis edd., excepta 1, perperam omittuntur. Exstant in originali et omnibus codd.	¹ Distinction XXVI, ch. 2, and d. XXVII, ch. 1 and ff.. ² Chapter 6, n. 7. In the same chapter occur those which follow, but with many (words) omitted and transposed. ³ The Vatican edition alone has The same [Idem] for an for that reason [ideoque], and next together with edition 8 it has when . . . is said [cum . . . dicitur] for since . . . is said [cum . . . dicatur], and then with the other editions, excluding edition 1, after For [enim], it reads is shown [ostenditur] for is said [dicitur], contrary to the codices and to the original. ⁴ These words: “not-a-son”, therefore we deny relatively, by saying [non-filius, relative igitur negamus dicendo], are omitted faultily in the Vatican edition and in the other editions, except edition 1. They are extant in the original and in all the codices.

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et ingenitus, non tamen indicat diversam substantiam, quia sicut filius ad patrem, et non-filius ad non-patrem refertur, ita genitus ad genitorem, et non-genitus ad non-genitorem referatur necesse est ».¹ Ecce evidenter ostendit, quod ingenitus relative dicitur et de solo Patre accipitur, aliaque notio est, qua dicitur ingenitus, alia, qua pater. Atque tantum valet, cum dicitur ingenitus, quantum non-genitus vel non-filius.	and “unbegotten” / are diverse, yet it does not indicate a diverse substance, because just as a “son” is referred to a “father”, and “not-a-son” to “not-a-father”, so is it necessary that “begotten” be referred to “begetter”, and “not-begotten” to “not-begetter” ».¹ Behold he evidently shows, that “unbegotten” is said relatively and is accepted of the Father alone, and that one is the notion, by which He is said (to be) “unbegotten”, another, by which (He is said to be) a “father”.
Cap. II. An solus Pater debeat dici non-genitus vel non-filius, sicut dicitur ingenitus.	Chapter II. Whether the Father alone ought to be said (to be) “not-begotten” and/or “not-a-son”, just as He is said (to be) “unbegotten”.
Ideo solet quaeri: utrum, sicut solus Pater dicitur ingenitus, ita ipse solus debeat dici non-genitus vel non-filius, ut nec etiam Spiritus sanctus possit dici non-filius vel non-genitus. Quibusdam videtur, quod Pater solus debeat dici non-genitus vel non-filius; Spiritus vero sanctus, sicut non dicitur ingenitus, ita, inquiunt, non est dicendus non-genitus vel non-filius. Debet quidem dici et credi Spiritus sanctus non esse genitus, vel non esse filius, sed non debet dici esse non-genitus vel non-filius. — Aliis autem videtur, quod cum Spiritus sanctus non possit dici ingenitus, potest tamen dici non-genitus vel non-filius. Quod vero Augustinus supra ait, tantum valere, cum dicitur ingenitus, quantum, cum dicitur non-genitus vel non-filius, etymologiam nominis ostendendo eum hoc dixisse dicunt, non ratione praedicationis.	For this reason one is accustomed to ask: whether, just as the Father alone is said (to be) “unbegotten”, so He alone ought to be said (to be) “not-begotten” and/or “not-a-son”, so that the Holy Spirit cannot be said (to be) “not-a-son” and/or “not-begotten”. To certain (authors) it seems, that the Father alone ought to be said (to be) “not-begotten” and/or “not-a-son”; however, the Holy Spirit, just as He is not said (to be) “unbegotten”, thus, they say, is not to be said (to be) “not-begotten” and/or “not-a-son”. Indeed, the Holy Spirit ought to be said and to be believed to not be begotten, and/or to not be a son, but He ought not be said to be “not-begotten” and/or “not-a-son”. — But to others it seems, that though the Holy Spirit cannot be said (to be) “unbegotten”, yet He can be said (to be) “not-begotten” and/or “not-a-son”. On the other hand, what (St.) Augustine says above, that when there is said “unbegotten”, it is only worth, as much as, when there is said “not-begotten” and/or “not-a-son”, they say that he said this by showing the etymology of the name, not (that he said this) according to the reckoning of predication [ratione praedicationis].
Cap. III. De proprietate, quam notat ingenitus	Chapter III. On the property, which “unbegotten” notes.
Si autem vis scire, quae sit proprietas, secundum quam Pater dicitur ingenitus, audi Hilarium ipsam vocantem innascibilitatem, in quarto libro de Trinitate² ita aientem: « Est unus ab uno, scilicet ab Ingenito Genitus, proprietate videlicet in unoquoque et innascibilitatis et originis. Significata ergo in Scripturis personarum intelligentia, et distincto innascibilitatis nativitatisque sensu, solitarius Deus non est opinandus. Discretio ergo vel distinctio personarum in Scripturis posita est, in nullo autem naturae distinctio ».	If, however, you wish to know, what the property, according to which the Father is said (to be) “unbegotten”, is, hear (St.) Hilary calling the same “the innascibility”, in the fourth book On the Trinity,² thus saying: « There is One from One, that is, a Begotten from an Unbegotten, by a property in each one, both (that) of innascibility and (that) of origin. With the understanding, therefore, of the Persons, signified in the Scriptures, and having distinguished the sense of innascibility and nativity, a solitary God must not be thought of [non est opinandus]. A discretion, therefore, and/or a distinction of Persons has been posited in the Scriptures, but in no manner [in nullo] a distinction of Nature ».
Cap. IV. Responsio Ambrosii contra Arianos de Ingenito.	Chapter IV. The response of (St.) Ambrose against the Arians concerning the Unbegotten.
Illud etiam taceri non oportet, quod Ariani ex eo probare nitebantur, alterius substantiae esse Patrem, alterius Filium, quia ille ingenitus, et iste genitus dicitur, cum diversum sit esse ingenitum, et esse genitum. Unde Ambrosius eorum quaestioni respondens dicit, se in divinis Scripturis hoc nomen, scilicet ingenitus, non legisse, ita inquiens in libro de Incarnationis dominicae sacramento:³ « Cum dudum audierint quidam, dicentibus nobis, Filium Dei, qui generatus est, Patri, qui generavit, inaequalem esse non posse, quamvis ille generatus sit, iste generaverit, quia generatio non potestatis, sed est naturae; adversus quidem illam quaestionem vocem sibi arbitrantur occlusam, sed tergiversatione damnabili in eodem loco vestigium vertunt, ut putent, mutationem fieri quaestionis mutatione sermonis, dicentes: Quomodo possunt ingenitus et genitus esse unius naturae atque substantiae? Ergo ut respondeam mihi propositae quaestioni, primo omnium in divinis Scripturis ingenitum nusquam invenio, non legi, non audivi. Cuius ergo mutabilitatis sunt homines huiusmodi, ut nos dicant ea usurpare, quae non sunt scripta, cum ea quae sunt scripta dicamus, et ipsi obiiciant quod scriptum non sit? Nonne ipsi sibi adversantur et auctoritatem calumniae suae derogant »? Attende, lector, quoniam hoc nomine ingenitus nolebat uti Ambrosius propter haereticos. Ita et nos subticere quaedam oportet propter calumniantium insidias, quae catholicis ac piis lectoribus secure credi possunt. Sunt etenim quaedam, quae non tantae sunt religionis et auctoritatis, ut eis nos oporteat semper confidendo ac recipiendo inservire, verum silentio praeteriri quaeunt aliquando; nec illius tamen sunt perversitatis, quin, cum opportunum fuerit, eis uti liberum habeamus.⁴	One also must not be silent about this, that the Arians strove to prove from this (name), that the Father was of one substance, the Son of another, because the Former is said (to be) “Unbegotten”, and the Latter “Begotten”, since ‘to be unbegotten’ and ‘to be begotten’ is (something) diverse. Whence (St.) Ambrose, responding to their question, says, he has not read in the divine Scriptures of this name, namely, “unbegotten”, thus saying in the book On the Sacrament of the Lord’s Incarnation:³ « Since some time ago, certain (persons) heard, that we said, that the Son of God, who has been generated, cannot be unequal to the Father, though the Former has been generated, the Latter generated, because generation (is) not of a power, but of a nature; they indeed judged for themselves that that question (had) a concealed meaning [vocem occlusam], but by a damnable backsliding [teriversatione] they changed course [vertunt vestigium] on the same spot, so that they think, that a change of question comes to be by a change of speech, saying: “In what manner can an unbegotten and a begotten be of one nature and substance?” Therefore, to respond to my own proposed question, first of all I never find, I have not read, (and) I have not heard (the word) “unbegotten” in the divine Scriptures. Therefore, of what mutability are men of this kind, that they say that we have put into use those (words), which have not been written, though we do say those which are written, and they object that it has not been written? Do they not turn against themselves and derogate the authority of their own calumny »? Attend, o reader, since (St.) Ambrose does not want to use this name “unbegotten” on account of the heretics. Thus too is it opportune [oportet] that, on account of the snares of calumniators, we remain silent concerning certain (things) [subticere quaedam], which can be believed securely by catholic and pious readers. For indeed, there are certain (things), which are not of such great religion and authority, that it is opportune for us to be a slave to them by confessing and receiving (them) always, but (which) can sometimes be passed over in silence; nor yet are they of that perversity, which, when there will be an opportune (moment), that we not have free use of them.⁴
Cap. V. An diversum sit esse patrem et esse filium.	Chapter V. Whether ‘to be a father’ and ‘to be a son’ is diverse.
Praeterea quaeri solet, cum supra⁵ dictum sit, quod aliud est dicere ingenitum, aliud patrem, et quod diversum sit genitus et ingenitus, utrum similiter diversum sit esse patrem et essem filium, an idem. — Ad quod dicimus, quia ex eodem sensu, quo dicitur diversum genitus et ingenitus, et quo dicitur, non esse idem dicere genitum et ingenitum, potest dici, non esse idem, sed diversum esse patrem et esse filium, vel esse spiritum sanctum, quia non ea notione Pater est pater, qua Filius est filius, vel qua Spiritus sanctus est spiritus sanctus. Ideoque ex hoc sensu concedimus, quod aliud est esse patrem, et aliud est esse filium, quia alia notio est, qua Pater est pater, alia, qua Filius est filius. Sed si transponas, ut⁶ dicas, aliud est patrem esse, aliud filium esse, varratur intelligentia; et ideo non conceditur. Est enim sensus talis, ac si dicatur, aliud est, quo Pater est, non quidem pater, sed est, aliud, quo Filius est, non quidem filius, sed est; quod penitus falsum est. Eo enim Pater est, quo . . .	Moreover, one is accustomed to ask, since it has been said above,⁵ that it is one (thing) to say that He (is) “unbegotten”, another that He (is) a “father”, and that “begotten” and “unbegotten” are diverse, whether similarly ‘to be a father’ and ‘to be a son’ are diverse, or the same. — To which we say, that out of the same sense, by which “begotten” and “unbegotten” is said (to be) diverse, and by which there is said, that it is not the same to say “begotten” and “unbegotten”, it can be said, that it is not the same, but diverse ‘to be a father’ and ‘to be a son’, and/or ‘to be a holy spirit’, because not by the same notion is the Father a father, by which the Son is a son, and/or by which the Holy Spirit is a holy spirit. And for that reason out of this sense we do concede, that it is one (thing) ‘to be a father’, and it is another ‘to be a son’, because one is the notion, by which the Father is a father, another, by which the Son is a son. But if transposing, so that⁶ you say, it is one (thing) that a father is, another that a son is, the understanding is varied; and for that reason it is not conceded. For the sense is such, as if there be said, that by which the Father is, is one (thing), not indeed (that He is) a father, but (that He) is, another, by which the Son is, not indeed a son, but (that He) is; which is thoroughly false. For the Father is by this, by which . . .
¹ Omnia praecedentia a verbis: Hoc exemplis sumta sunt ex V. de Trin. c. 7. n. 8, paucis mutatis. — Paulo post Vat. perperam alia pro aliaque, ed. 1 alia quoque. ² Num. 33. Ultima propositio est ibi n. 35. et sic legitur: Discretio tantum personae in te et tuus posita est, in nullo tamen naturae distincta confessione. ³ Codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8: IV. de Spiritu sancto, sed est liber de Incarnatione Domini, c. 8. n. 79. In quo textu post Scripturis Vat. cum ceteris edd. ingenitus pro ingenitum, refragantibus codd. et originali. Circa finem ante adversantur Vat. sola perperam omittit sibi. ⁴ Codd. B C addunt arbitrarium. ⁵ Cap. I. ⁶ Codd. A D et.	¹ All the preceding from the words: This must be made clear by examples [Hoc exemplis], (on the preceding page), have been taken from On the Trinity, Bk. V, ch. 7, n. 8, with a few things changed. — A little after this the Vatican edition faultily reads that one [alia] for and that one [aliaque], edition 1 has that one also [alia quoque]. ² Number 33. The final proposition is from n. 35, and reads thus: A discretion only of a Person, regarding “Thee” and “Thy”, as been posited, however in no manner a distinct confession of nature. ³ The codices and editions 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 8, read: On the Holy Spirit, Bk. IV [IV. de Spiritu sancto], but it is rather the book on the Incarnation of the Lord, ch. 8, n. 79. In which text after (before in the English) Scriptures [Scripturis], the Vatican edition, together with all the other editions, reads I have not heard of an unbegotten [ingenitum], breaking with the codices and original. Near the end only the Vatican edition omits themselves [sibi]. ⁴ Codices B and C read that we have not a free-will use of them [eis uti liberum habeamus arbitrarium]. ⁵ Chapter I. ⁶ Codices A and D have and [et] for so that [ut].

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Pater Deus est, id est per essentiam vel naturam; at Filius eo Deo est, quo Pater est Deus: eo igitur Filius est, quo Pater est, et ita idem est Patrem esse et¹ Filium esse; sed non est idem esse patrem et esse filium. Unde Augustinus in quinto libro de Trinitate² ait: « Quamvis diversum sit esse patrem et esse filium, non est tamen diversa substantia, quia non hoc secundum substantiam dicitur, sed secundum relativum; quod tamen relativum non est accidens, quia non est mutabile ». Ecce diversum esse dicit esse patrem et esse filium; quod iuxta rationem praedictam accipi oportet, quia scilicet alia notio est, qua est pater, alia, qua est filius. Non enim secundum essentiam Pater dicitur pater, vel Filius filius, sed secundum relationem.	the Father is God, that is, through the Essence and/or the Nature; but the Son is God by this, by which the Father is God: therefore the Son is by this, by which the Father is, and thus that the Father is and¹ that the Son is, is the same, but ‘to be a father’ and ‘to be a son’ is not the same. Whence (St.) Augustine in the fifth book On the Trinity² says: « Although ‘to be a father’ and ‘to be a son’ is diverse, yet (Their) substance is not diverse, because this is not said according to substance, but according to a relative (name); which relative, however, is not an accident, because it is not mutable ». Behold he says that ‘to be a father’ and ‘to be a son’ is diverse; which must [oportet] be accepted in accord with the aforesaid reckoning, namely, because one is the notion, by which (the Father) is a father, another, by which (the Son) is a son. For the Father is not said (to be) a “father” according to essence, nor (is) the Son (said to be) a “son”, according to relation.
Cap. VI. Si sapientia genita dicitur secundum relationem, vel secundum substantiam.	Chapter VI. Whether wisdom is said (to be) begotten according to relation, and/or according to substance.
Sciendum quoque est, quod sicut solus Filius dicitur verbum vel imago, ita etiam ipse solus dicitur sapientia nata vel genita. Et ideo quaeritur, utrum hoc relative dicatur, et si relative dicitur, an secundum eandem relationem, qua dicitur verbum et imago. De hoc Augustinus in septimo libro de Trinitate³ ita ait: « Id dici accipiamus, cum dicitur verbum, ac si dicatur nata sapientia, ut sit et Filius et Imago; et haec duo cum dicuntur, id est nata sapientia, in uno eorum, eo quod est nata, et Verbum et Imago et Filius intelligitur — et in his omnibus nominibus non ostendatur essentia, quia relative dicuntur — at in altero, quod est sapientia, etiam essentia demonstraretur, quoniam et ad se dicitur. Se ipsa enim sapiens est, et hoc est eius esse quod sapere; unde Pater et Filius simul una sapientia, quia una essentia ». — Cave, lector, qualiter hoc intelligas, quod hic dicit Augustinus. Videtur enim dicere, quod cum dicitur nata sapientia, ibi sapientia essentiam significet, et nata relationem notet. Quod si ita est, cogimur dicere, essentiam divinam esse natam; quod superioribus repugnat. — Sed ad hoc dicimus, quod in altero, id est in eo quod nata est, eadem notio intelligitur,⁴ quae notatur cum dicitur verbum et imago. In altero vero, scilicet sapientia, demonstratur essentia, id est, demonstratur, quod Filius sit essentia, quia sapientia secundum esentiam dicitur. Et ideo cum dicitur nata sapientia, intelligitur, quod ipse, quia natus est, essentia est. Ibi tamen sapientia non pro essentia, sed pro hypostasi facit intelligentiam, ut, sicut quando dicitur verbum vel filius, intelligitur hypostasis cum sua proprietate, ita, cum dicitur nata sapientia, idem intelligatur,⁵ id est genita hypostasis. Ideo vigilanter ait, idem esse intelligendum, cum dicitur verbum, et cum dicitur nata sapientia, id est eadem relatio eademque hypostasis, cui inest illa proprietas. Et ex hoc adiuvatur illud quod supra⁶ diximus, scilicet quod cum dicitur Pater vel Filius vel Spiritus sanctus, non tantum illae proprietates significantur, ut cum dicitur paternitas, filiatio, sed etiam hypostases cum suis proprietatibus.	It also must be known, that just as the Son alone is said (to be) a “word “ and/or “image”, so also He alone is said (to be) “wisdom born” and/or “(wisdom) begotten” [sapientia nata vel genita]. And for that reason there is asked, whether this is said relatively, and if it is said relatively, whether according to the same relation, by which He is said (to be) a “word” and “image”. Of this, (St.) Augustine in the seventh book On the Trinity³ thus says: « Let us accept that, when He is said (to be) a “word”, that this is said, as if He is said (to be) “born wisdom” [nata sapientia], so that He is both the Son and the Image (of God); and these two, when they are said, that is “born” “wisdom”, in one of them, by that (name) which is “born”, both the Word and the Image and the Son is understood — and (so that) in all these names there is shown the Essence, because they are said relatively — but in the other (name), which is “wisdom”, the Essence would also be demonstrated, since it is also said regarding Itself. For by Its very self It is wise, and this (name) belongs to that “being” which (is) being-wise [eius esse quod sapere]; whence the Father and the Son together (are) one Wisdom, because (They are) the One Essence ». — Be on guard, reader, in what manner you understand that, which (St.) Augustine says here. For he seems to say, that when “born wisdom” is said, there “wisdom” signifies the Essence, and “born” notes a relation. Which if it is thus, we are driven to say, that the Divine Essence has been born; which is repugnant to what has been said above [superioribus repugnat]. — But to this we say, that in the one, that is in that (name) which is “born”, the same notion is understood,⁴ which is noted when there is said “word” and “image”. However, in the other, namely “wisdom”, the Essence is demonstrated, that is, there is demonstrated, that the Son is the Essence, because “wisdom” is said according to essence. And for that reason when He is said (to be) “born wisdom”, one understands, that He Himself, because He has been born, is the Essence. However, there “wisdom” does not cause an understanding on behalf of the Essence, but on behalf of a Hypostasis, so that, just as when He is said (to be) a word and/or a son, a Hypostasis is understood with its property, thus, when He is said (to be) “born wisdom”, the same is understood,⁵ that is a begotten hypostasis (is understood). For that reason, he say vigilantly, that the same must be understood, when He is said (to be) a “word”, and when He is said (to be) “born wisdom”, that is the same relation and the same Hypostasis, in which that property is. And from this that which we have said above⁶ is aided, namely, that when there is said “the Father” and/or “the Son” and/or “the Holy Spirit”, not only are those properties signified, as when there is said “the paternity”, “the filiation”, but also the Hypostases with their properties.
Cap. VII. De imagine.	Chapter VII. On “image”.
Illud etiam sciri oportet, quia cum supra⁷ dictum sit, imaginem relative dicit* de Filio, sicut verbum vel filius, interdum tamen reperitur secundum substantiam dici. Unde Augustinus in libro de Fide ad Petrum⁸ dicit, quod una est sanctae Trinitatis essentialiter divinitas et imago, ad quam factus est homo. Hilarius etiam in quinto libro de Trinitate⁹ sic ait: « Homo fit ad communem imaginem. Nomen non discrepat, natura non differt. Una est enim ad quam homo creatus est species ». Ex his verbis ostenditur, quod imago aliquando essentiae intelligentiam facit, et tunc ad se dicitur et non relative.	This too must be known [sciri oportet], because though it was said above,⁷ that “image” [imaginem] is said* relatively of the Son, just as “word” and “son” (are), yet now it is found that it is said according to substance. Whence (St.) Augustine in the book On the Faith to Peter⁸ says, that there is essentially one Divinity and image of the Holy Trinity, according to which [ad quam] man has been made. (St.) Hilary too in the fifth book On the Trinity⁹ says in the same manner: « Man is made according to a common image. The name (for ‘image’) does not differ in sound [discrepat], the nature (of ‘image’) does not differ. For there is one species according to which man has been created ». From these words it is shown, that “image” sometimes causes the understanding of an essence, and then it is said regarding (the Essence) itself and not relatively.
¹ Vat. et edd. 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 quod contra codd. et alias edd. ² Cap. 5. n. 6. ³ Cap. 2. n. 3. ⁴ Vat. cum aliis edd. contra codd. et edd. 1, 8 intelligatur. ⁵ Vat. cum aliis edd. perperam intelligatur, refrangantibus codd. et ed. 8. ⁶ Dist. XXVII. pars. II. in princip. — Vat. cum plurimis edd. superius pro supra, et post scilicet omittit quod. ⁷ Ibid. pars II. c. 3. circa finem. ⁸ Cap. 1. n. 6. Hunc librum non esse S. Augustini, sed Fulgentii Ruspensis, supra in Prolegomenis pag. LXXXIV dictum est. ⁹ Num. 8.	¹ The Vatican edition and edition 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9, read thus that the Father is, is the same as that the Son is, etc. [ita idem est Pater esse quod Filius esse etc.]., contrary to the codices and the other editions. ² Chapter 5, n. 6. ³ Chapter 2, n. 3. ⁴ The Vatican edition, together with the other editions, contrary to the codices and editions 1 and 8, reads faultily, let the same notion be understood [eadem notio intelligatur] for the same notion is understood [eadem notion intelligitur]. ⁵ The Vatican edition, together with the other editions, reads let the same be understood [idem intelligatur] for the same is understood [idem intelligitur], breaking with the codices and edition 8. ⁶ Distinction XXVII, part II, at the beginning. — The Vatican edition, together with very many editions, has above [superius] for above [supra], and after namely [scilicet] it omits that [quod]. ⁷ Ibid., part II, ch. 3, near the end. ⁸ Chapter 1, n. 6. That this book is not by St. Augustine, but by (St.) Fulgentius of Ruspe, see what has been said above in the Prolegomena, p. LXXXIV. ⁹ Number 8.
* [Trans. nota. Videtur quod hic oportet legi dici pro dicit, ut exigeat contextum pro sermoni indirecto.]	* [Trans. note: Here he says [dicit] is read as is said [dici], since the context requires an infinitive form of the verb for indirect discourse. Yet it could be read he says [dicit], though this would be very awkward: because when it was said above, he says “image” relatively of the Son etc..]

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

Sententiarum Quatuor Libri

The Four Books of Sentences