Magistri Petri Lombardi
Arch. Episc. Parisiensis

Master Peter Lombard
Archbishop of Paris

Sententiarum Quatuor Libri

The Four Books of Sentences

LIBER PRIMUS SENTENTIARUM.

 

DE DEI UNITATE ET TRINITATE

THE FIRST BOOK OF THE SENTENCES

 

ON THE UNITY AND TRINITY OF GOD

DISTINCTIO XXXV.

DISTINCTION 35

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 597-598.
Cum Notitiis Editorum Quaracchi

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 597-598.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Cap. I.

 

De scientia, praescientia, providentia,
dispositione et praedestinatione Dei.

Chapter I.

On God’s knowledge, foreknowledge, providence,
disposition and predestination.

Cumque supra1 disseruerimus ac plura dixerimus de his quae communiter secundum substantiam de Deo dicuntur, eorum tamen quaedam specialem efflagitant tractatum; de quibus amodo tractandum est, id est de scientia, praescientia, providentia, dispositione, praedestinatione, voluntate et potentia.  —  Sciendum est igitur, quod sapientia vel scientia Dei, cum sit una et simplex, tamen propter varios rerum status et diversos effectus plura ac diversa sortitur nomina.  Dicitur enim non tantum scientia, sed etiam praescientia vel praevidentia, dispositio, praedestinatio et2 providentia.

And since above1 we have spoken in an orderly manner and said many (things) concerning those (names) which are said commonly of God according to substance, yet certain of these demand [efflagitant] a special treatment; concerning which there is now [amodo] to be a treatment, that is, concerning (God’s) knowledge [scientia], foreknowledge [praescientia], providence, disposition, predestination, will and power.  —  Therefore, it must be known, that God’s wisdom and/or knowledge, since it is one and simple, yet, on account of the various states of things and (its) diverse effects, obtains [sortitur] many and diverse names.  For it is not only said (to be) a “knowledge”, but also a “foreknowledge” and/or “disposition”, a “predestination” and2 a “providence”.

Cap. II.

 De quibus sit praescientia vel praevidentia.3

Chapter II.

What does (His) foreknowledge and/or foresight concern?3

Et est praescientia sive praevidentia de futuris tantum, sed de omnibus, de bonis scilicet et de malis.

And (His) foreknowledge or foresight [praevidentia] only concerns (things) futures, and indeed [sed] all, namely, the good and the evil.

Cap. III.

 De quibus dispositio.

Chapter III.

What (does His) disposition concern?

Dispositio vero de faciendis.

However, (His) disposition concerns (things) to be done.

Cap. IV.

 De quibus praedestinatio.

Chapter IV.

What (does His) predestination concern?

Praedestinatio de hominibus4 salvandis et de bonis, quibus et hic liberantur et in futuro coronabuntur.  Praedestinavit enim Deus ab aeterno homines ad bona eligendo, et praedestinavit eis bona praeparando.  Quod homines praedestinavit, Apostolus5 ostendit dicens:  Praedestinavit quos praescivit fieri conformes imaginis Filii sui.  Et alibi:  Elegit nos ante mundi constitutionem, ut essemus sancti et immaculati.  Quod autem bona eis praeparaverit, propheta Isaias ostendit dicens:  Oculus non vidit Deus absque te, quae praeparasti diligentibus vel exspectantibus te.  Ergo ab aeterno praedestinavit quosdam futuros bonos et beatos, id est elegit, ut essent boni et beati, et bona eis praedestinavit, id est praeparavit.

(His) predestination concerns the men4 (who are) to be saved and the good, which are both freed here and are crowned in the future.  For God from eternity has predestined men to good (things) by electing (them), and He has predestined good (things) for them, by preparing (them).  That He has predestined men, the Apostle5 shows, saying:  He has predestined those whom He foreknew to be conformed to the image of His Son.  And in another place:  He has elected us before the foundation [constitutionem] of the world, to be holy and immaculate.  Moreover, that He has prepared good (things) for them, the prophet Isaiah shows, saying:  Eye has not seen, o God without Thee, what Thou has prepared for (those who) love and/or wait for [exspectantibus] Thee.  Therefore from eternity He has predestined certain ones to be good and blessed, that is, He has elected, that they be good and blessed, and He has predestined, that is, He has prepared, good (things) for them.

Cap. V.

 De quibus providentia.

Chapter V.

What (does His) providence concern?

Providentia autem est gubernandorum, quae utique eodem modo videtur accipi, quo dispositio.  Interdum tamen providentia accipitur pro praescientia.

Moreover, (His) providence is of (those) to be governed, which (providence) seems to accepted in the same manner, in which (His) disposition (is).  However, sometimes (His) providence is accepted for (His) foreknowledge.

Cap. VI.

 De quibus sapientia vel scientia.

Chapter VI.

What (does His) wisdom and/or knowledge concern?

Sapientia vero vel scientia de omnibus est, scilicet bonis et malis, et de praesentibus, praeteritis et futuris, et non tantum de temporalibus, sed etiam de aeternis.  Non enim ita scit Deus ista temporalia, ut se ipsum nesciat, sed ipse solus se ipsum perfecte novit, cuius scientiae comparatione omnis creaturae scientia imperfecta est.

However, (His) wisdom and/or knowledge concerns all, namely, the good and the evil, and (things) present, past and future, and not only (things) temporal, but also eternal.  For God does not thus know these temporal (things) of ours, as one (who) knows not Himself, but He Himself alone perfectly knows Himself, in comparison to which knowledge the knowledge of every creature is imperfect.

Cap. VII.

 Utrum praescientia, vel dispositio Dei esse potuerit, si nulla essent futura.

Chapter VII.

Whether foreknowledge and/or disposition could belong to God, if there were no future (things)?

Hic considerari oportet, utrum scientia, vel praescientia, vel dispositio, vel praedestinatio potuerit esse in Deo, si nulla fuissent futura.  Cum enim praescientia sit futurorum, et dispositio faciendorum, et praedestinatio salvandorum, si nulla essent futura, si nihil esset facturus Deus, vel aliquos salvaturus, non videtur potuisse in Deo esse praescientia, vel dispositio, vel praedestinatio; potuit autem Deus nulla praescire futura, potuit non creare aliquid, vel non salvare aliquos:  potuit ergo non esse in Deo praescientia, vel dispositio, vel praedestinatio.  —  Ad hoc autem ita a quibusdam opponitur:  Si, inquiunt, potuit praescientia Dei non esse in Deo ab aeterno, et potuit non esse; si vero potuit non esse, cum praescientia Dei sit eius scientia, . . .

Here it is necessary [oportet] that one consider, whether there could be knowledge, and/or foreknowledge, and/or disposition, and/or predestination in God, if there would have been no future (things).  For since foreknowledge is of (things) future, and disposition of (things) to be done, and predestination of (those) to be saved, if there were no future (things), if God was going to make nothing, and/or save none, it does not seem that there could have been in God a foreknowledge, and/or disposition, and/or predestination; moreover, God could have foreknown no future (things), could have not created anything, and/or saved anyone:  therefore there could have not been in God a foreknowledge, and/or disposition, and/or predestination.  —  But to this, there is objected by certain (authors):  “If,” they say, “God’s foreknowledge could have not been in God from eternity, it also could not have been; but if it could not have been, since God’s foreknowledge is His knowledge, . . .

1  Dist. VIII. XIX. XXII. XXX.

2  Vat. et edd. 4, 6 omittunt praevidentia, dispositio, praedestinatio et contra omnes codd. et ed. 1 aliasque edd., quae tamen aliquantenus inter se differunt.

3  Ita melius codd. A B D, alii cum plurimis edd. providentia.  In ipso capitulo plurimae edd. falso habent sive providentia non de futuris.

4  Ita codd. A B D E et edd. 1, 6; cod. C et aliae edd. omnibus.  Non quidem excludendi sunt Angeli, sed Magister etiam in sequentibus tantum de hominibus explicite loquitur.  Immediate post Vat. cum plurimis edd. repetit omnibus ante bonis.

5  Rom. 8, 29.  Vulgata:  Nam quos praescivit, et praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui.  —  Alius locus est Ephes. 1, 4, ubi Vulgata post nos addit:  in ipso; tertius locus conflatus est ex Isai. 64, 4, et I. Cor. 2, 9.

1  In Distinctions VIII, XIX, XXII, and XXX.  [Trans. note:  Here disposition renders dispositio, but it must be noted that dispositio is that action whereby things are placed in order, and disposition is used in this sense.]

2  The Vatican edition and edition 4 and 6, omit a “foresight”, and/or “disposition”, a “predestination” and [praevidentia, dispositio, praedestinatio et], contrary to all the codices and to edition 1 and the other editions, which however differ to some extent among themselves.

3  Thus codices A B D, the others, together with very many editions, read better providence [providentia] for foresight [praevidentia].  In the chapter itself very many editions falsely have not only concerns (things) future, but  [non de futuris tantum, sed] for only concerns (things) future, and indeed [de futuris tantum, sed].

4  Thus codices A B D and E, and editions 1 and 6; codex C and the other editions have all [omnibus] for the men [hominibus].  Not that the Angels are to be excluded, but because Master (Peter) speaks explicitly in the following (passages) only of men.  Immediately after this the Vatican edition, together with very many editions, repeats all [omnibus] before the good [bonis].

5  Rm. 8:29.  The Vulgate reads:  For those whom He has foreknown, He has also predestined to become conformed to the image of His own Son [Nam quos praescivit, et praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui].  —  The other passage is Eph. 1:4, where the Vulgate has in Him [in ipso] after us [nos]; the third passage is conflated from Isaiah 64:4 and 1 Cor. 2:9.

 

p. 598

 

et scientia sit eius essentia:  potuit ergo non esse ab aeterno id quod est divina essentia.  Ita et de dispositione et praedestinatione, quae est divina essentia, obiiciunt.  Addunt quoque et alia, ita dicentes:  Si potuit Deus non praescire aliqua, cum idem sit Deo praescire quod scire, et scire quod esse; potuit ergo non esse.  Item, cum idem sit Deo1 praescium esse et Deum esse, si potuit non esse praescius, potuit non esse Deus; potuit autem non esse praescius, si potuit nulla praescire; at potuit nulla praescire, quia potuit nulla facere.

and (His) knowledge is His Essence:  therefore that which is the Divine Essence could have not been from eternity.”  Thus also do they object concerning (His) disposition and predestination, which is the Divine Essence.  They also add even other (arguments), saying thus:  “If God could have not foreknown some (things), since it is the same for God ‘to foreknow’ as ‘to know’, and ‘to know’ and ‘to be’; therefore He could have not been. Likewise, since it is the same for God1 ‘to be foreknowing’ and ‘to be God’, if He could have not been foreknowing, He could have not been God; moreover, He could have not been foreknowing, if He could have foreknown nothing [nulla]; but He could have foreknown nothing, because He could have made nothing.”

Ad hoc iuxta modulum nostrae intelligentiae ita dicimus:  Praescientia, vel dispositio, vel praedestinatio ad aliquid dici videntur. Sicut enim creator ad creaturam relative dicitur, ita praescientia vel praescius ad futura referri videtur, et dispositio ad facienda, ac praedestinatio ad salvanda.  Verumtamen creator ita relative dicitur, ut essentiam non significet.  Praescientia vero vel praescius et in respectu futurorum dicitur, et essentiam designat; ita etiam dispositio et praedestinatio.  Ideoque cum dicitur:  si nulla essent futura, non esset in Deo praescientia, vel non esset Deus praescius, quia varia est ibi causa dicendi, distingui oportet rationem dicti.  Cum ergo dicis:  si nulla essent futura, non esset in Deo praescientia, vel non esset praescius,2 si in dicendo hanc causam attendis, scilicet quia nulla essent subiecta eius praescientiae, unde ipsa possit dici praescientia, vel ipse praescius, quod utrumque dicitur propter futura; verus est intellectus.  Sin autem ea ratione id dicis, quod non sit in eo scientia, qua praescit futura, vel quod ipse non sit Deus, qui est futurorum praescius, falsa est intelligentia.  Similiter et illae louctiones determinandae sunt:  potuit non esse praescientia Dei, vel potuit non esse praescius, et potuit Deus non praescire aliqua; id est, potuit esse, quod nulla futura subiecta essent eius scientiae, et ita non posset dici praescius vel praescire, vel eius scientia praescientia; non tamen eo minus ipse esset vel eius scientia, sed non posset dici praescius vel praescire vel praescientia, si eius scientiae futura nulla forent subiecta.  Similiter de dispositione et praedestinatione vel providentia.  Haec enim, ut dictum est, ad temporalia referuntur et de temporalibus tantum sunt.

To this, in accord with the small measure of our intelligence, we thus say:  “Foreknowledge”, and/or “disposition”, and/or “predestination” seem to be said regarding something.  For just as “creator” is said relatively regarding the creature, so “foreknowledge” and/or “foreknowing” seems to be referred to (things) future, and “disposition” to (things) to be done, and “predestination” to (things) to be saved.  Nevertheless “creator” is said in a relative manner thus, that it does not signify the Essence.  However “foreknowledge” and/or “foreknowing” is also said in respect of (things) future, and designates the Essence; thus also “disposition” and “predestination”.  And for that reason when there is said:  “if there were no future (things), there would not be foreknowledge in God, and/or God would not be foreknowing”, because the cause for saying that varies [vaira est ibi], it is necessary [oportet] that one distinguish the reason for the saying.  Therefore, when you say:  “if there were no future (things), there would not be foreknowledge in God, and/or He2 would not be foreknowing”, if in saying this you attend to the cause, namely, because there would be no subjects of His foreknowledge, of which there could be said (to be) a foreknowledge, and/or (that) He Himself (is) foreknowing, because each is said on account of (things) future; the understanding is true.  But if, however [Sin] for this reason you say this, “that there is not in Him a knowledge, by which He foreknows (things) future, and/or which is not God Himself, who is foreknowing of (things) future”, the understanding is false.  These expressions are also to be similarly determined:  “God’s foreknowledge could have not been”, and/or “He could have not been foreknowing”, and “God could have not foreknown anything”; that is, it could have been, that there would be no future subjects of His knowledge, and thus He could have been said (to be) not “foreknowing” and/or (not) “to foreknow”, and/or His knowledge (could have been said not to be) a “foreknowledge”; yet not for this would He and/or His knowledge been less, but He could have been said (to be) not “foreknowing” and/or (not) “to foreknow” and/or (not to have) a “foreknowledge”, if there were to be no future subjects of His knowledge.  Similarly, concerning (His) disposition and predestination and/or providence.  For these, as has been said, are referred to (things) temporal and only concern (things) temporal.

Cap. VIII.

Quod scientia Dei est de temporalibus et aeternis.

Chapter VIII.

That God’s knowledge concerns (things) temporal and eternal.

Scientia vero vel sapientia non tantum de temporalibus, sed etiam de aeternis; ideoque, etsi nulla fuissent futura, esset tamen in Deo scientia eadem, quae modo est, nec minor esset quam modo, nec maior est quam esset.3  Scivit ergo Deus ab aeterno aeternum et omne quod futurum erat, et scivit immutabiliter.  Scit quoque non minus praeterita vel futura quam praesentia, et sua aeterna sapientia et immutabili scit ipse omnia quae sciuntur.  « Omnis enim ratio supernae et terrenae sapientiae, ut ait Ambrosius,4 in eo est, quia omnem sapientiam et essentiam capit sua immensa scientia ».

However (God’s) knowledge and/or wisdom concern not only (things) temporal, but also (things) eternal; and for that reason, even if there were no future (things), yet there would be in God the same knowledge, which there is now, nor would it be less than now, nor is it greater than it would be.3  Therefore God from eternity knew eternity and everything which was going to be, and He knew (both) immutably.  He also knows (things) past and/or future no less than (things) present, and by His eternal and immutable wisdom He Himself knows all which are known.  « For every reckoning of supernal and terrestrial wisdom », as (St.) Ambrose4 says, « is in Him, because He grasps by His own immense wisdom every wisdom ».

Cap. IX.

 Quodmodo omnia dicantur esse in Deo et vita in eo.

Chapter IX.

In what manner are all said to be “in God” and (to be) “life in Him”?

Propterea5 omnia dicuntur esse in Deo et fuisse ab aeterno.  Unde Augustinus super Genesim:6  « Haec visibilia, inquit, antequam fierent, non erant.  Quomodo ergo Deo nota erant quae non erant?  Et rursus:  Quomodo ea faceret, quae sibi nota non erant? non enim quidquam fecit ignorans.  Nota ergo fecit, non facta cognovit.  Proinde, antequam fierent, et erant et non erant:  erant in Dei scientia, non erant in sua natura.  Ipsi autem Deo non audeo dicere alio modo notuisse, cum ea fecisset, quam illo quo ea noverat, ut faceret, apud quem non est transmutatio, nec vicissitudinis obumbratio ».  —  Ecce hic habes, quod haec visibilia antequam fierent, in Dei scientia erant.  Ex hoc igitur sensu omnia dicuntur esse in Deo, et omne quod factum est dicitur7 esse vita in ipso:  non ideo, quod creatura sit Creator, vel quod ista temporalia essentialiter sint in Deo, sed quia in eius scientia semper sunt, quae vita est.

On which account5 all are said to be and to have been “in God” from eternity.  Whence (St.) Augustine (says) On Genesis:6  « These visibles », he says, « before they came to be, were not.  In what manner, therefore, were they, which were not, known to God?  And again:  In what manner did He make them, which were not known to Him? for He did nothing as one ignorant.  Therefore He made (them) known, He did not cognize (what had) been made.  Consequently [Proinde], before they came to be, they both were and were not:  they were in God’s knowledge, they were not in their own nature.  Moreover, of God Himself I do not dare to say that “He knew (them), when He made them”, in a manner other than, (that “He knew) in that manner, in which He knew them, to make (them)”, with Whom there is no transmutation, nor overshadowing of alteration ».  —  Behold, here you have, that these visibles, before they came to be, were in the knowledge of God.  In this sense, therefore, all are said to be “in God”, and everything which had been made is said7 to be “life in Him”:  not for this reason, that the creature is the Creator, and/or that those temporal (things) are essentially in God, but because they are always in His knowledge, which is Life.

Inde est etiam, quod omnia dicuntur ei praesentia esse, non solum ea quae sunt, sed etiam ea quae praeterierunt, et ea quae futura sunt, secundum illud:  Qui vocat ea quae non sunt, tanquam ea quae sunt:  « quia, ut ait Ambrosius in libro de Trinitate,9 ita cognoscit ea quae non sunt, ut ea quae sunt ».  Et hac ratione omnia dicuntur esse in eo vel apud eum sive ei praesentia.  Unde Augustinus super illum locum Psalmi:10  « Et pulcritudo agri mecum est, ideo, inquit, mecum est, quia apud Deum nihil praeteriit, nihil futurum est.  Cum illo sunt omnia futura, et ei non detrahuntur praeterita.  Cum illo sunt omnia cognitione quadam ineffabili sapientiae Dei ».  —  Ecce hic aperit Augustinus, ex qua intelligentia accipienda sint huiusmodi verba:  omnia sunt Deo praesentia, in Deo sunt omnia, vel cum Deo, vel apud Deum, vel in eo vita; quia ineffabilis omnium cognitio in eo est.

Hence it is too, that all are said to be present to Him, not only those which are, but also those which have passed away, and those which are to be, according to that (verse):  Who calls those which are not, as those which are:  « because », as (St.) Ambrose says in (his) book On the Trinity,9 « He cognizes thus those which are not, as those which are ».  And for this reason all are said to be in Him and/or with Him or present to Him.  Whence (St.) Augustine (says) on that passage of the Psalm:10  « And the beauty of the field is with Me, He says “it is with Me” for this reason, that with God nothing passes away, nothing is to be.  With Him are all future (things), and from Him past (things) do not detract.  With Him are all by a certain, ineffable cognition of God’s wisdom ».  —  Behold here (St.) Augustine reveals [aperit], out of what understanding words of this kind are to be accepted.  “all are present in God”, “in God are all (things)”, and/or “with God [cum Deo vel apud Deum] and/or in Him (is) life”; because the ineffable cognition of all (things) is in Him.

1  Vat. cum plurimis edd. Deum contra codd. et ed. 1.

2  Cod. D addit Deus; et paulo inferius idem cum codd. A E et ed 1 ex ea ratione pro ea ratione.

3  Ita recte codd. C D cum omnibus edd., cod. A maior esset quam modo, B E maior quam modo.

4  In Epistolam ad Colos. 2, 3; nonnullis immutatis.  In quo textu fide codd. A B D E, ed. 1 et orginalis restituimus terrenae pro aeternae.

5  Codd. A C E Praeterea.

6  Libr. V. c. 18. n. 36.  —  Locus s. Scripturae est Iac. 1, 17.

7  Ioan. 1, 3. 4, secundum lectionem antiquam:  quod factum est, in ipso vita erat.

8  Rom. 4, 17.

9  Id est V. de Fide ad Gratian. c. 16. n. 198.

10  Psalm. 49, 11; August. in hunc Psalm. n. 18, nonnullis a Magistro omissis vel mutatis.

1  The Vatican edition, together with very many editions, has that God is foreknowing and that God is [Deum praescium esse et Deum esse] in place of for God ‘to be foreknowing’ and ‘to be God’ [Deo praescium esse et Deum esse], contrary to the codices and edition 1.

2  Codex D has God [Deus] for He, and a little below this, the same, together with codices A and E, and edition 1, has for this reason [ex ea ratione] in place of for this reason [ea ratione].

3  Thus rightly codices C and D, together with all the editions; codex A has nor would it be greater than now [nec maior esset quam modo], codices B and E have or greater than now [nec maior quam modo].

4  On the Epistle of St. Paul to the Colossians, 2:3; with not a few (words) changed.  In which text, trusting in codices A B D and E, edition 1 and the original, we have restored terrestrial [terrenae] for aeternal [aeternae].

5  Codices A C and E have Moreover [Praeterea] for On which account [Propterea].

6  Book V, ch. 18, n. 36.  —  The passage from Sacred Scripture is Jm. 1:17.

7  Jn. 1:3-4, according to the ancient reading:  what has been made, in Him was life [quod factum est, in ipso vita erat].

8  Rm. 4:17.

9  That is, On the Faith to Gratian, Bk. V, ch. 16, n. 198.

10  Psalm 49:11; (St.) Augustine on this Psalm, n. 18, with not a few (words) omitted and/or changed by Master (Peter).

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.