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Magistri Petri Lombardi |
Master Peter Lombard |
Sententiarum Quatuor Libri |
The Four Books of Sentences |
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LIBER PRIMUS SENTENTIARUM.
DE DEI UNITATE ET TRINITATE |
THE FIRST BOOK OF THE SENTENCES
ON THE UNITY AND TRINITY OF GOD |
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DISTINCTIO XXXVIII. |
DISTINCTION 38 |
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Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, |
Latin
text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, |
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Cap. I.
An scientia vel praescientia Dei sit causa rerum, vel e converso. |
Chapter I. Whether the Knowledge and/or Foreknowledge of God is the cause of things, and/or the other way around. |
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Nunc ergo ad propositum revertentes, coepto insistamus. Supra1 dictum est, quod praescientia Dei futurorum tantum est, sed omnium tam bonorum quam malorum; scientia vero vel sapientia non modo de praeteritis,2 sed etiam de praesentibus et futuris, nec tantum de temporalibus, sed etiam de aeternis, quia se ipsum novit Deus. Hic oritur quaestio non dissimulanda, utrum scilicet scientia vel praescientia sit causa rerum, an res sint causa scientiae vel praescientiae Dei. Videtur enim praescientia Dei causa esse eorum quae ei subsunt, ac necessitatem eveniendi eis facere, quia nec aliqua futura fuissent, nisi ea Deus praescisset, nec possunt non evenire, cum Deus ea praesciverit. Si autem impossibile est, ea non evenire, quia praescita sunt, videtur igitur ipsa praescientia, qua praescita sunt, eis esse causa eveniendi. Impossibile est autem, ea non evenire, cum praescita sint, quia si non evenirent, cum praescita sint falleretur Dei praescientia. At Dei praescientia falli non potest. Impossibile est ergo, ea non evenire, cum praescita sint. Sic igitur praescientia causa eorum esse videtur, quae praescita sunt. Hoc idem et de scientia dicitur, scilicet quod, quia Deus aliqua novit, ideo sint. Cui sententiae Augustinus attestari videtur in decimo quinto libro de Trinitate3 sic dicens: « Non ista ex aliquo tempore cognovit Deus; sed futura omnia temporalia atque in eis etiam, quid et quando ab illo petituri fueramus, et quos et de quibus rebus vel exauditurus vel non exauditurus, sine initio ante praescivit. Universas autem creaturas, et spirituales et corporales, non quia sunt, ideo novit, sed ideo sunt, quia novit. Non enim nescivit, quae fuerat creaturus: quia ergo scivit, creavit, non quia creavit, scivit; nec aliter scivit creata quam creanda. Non enim eius sapientiae aliquid accessit ex eis, sed illis existentibus, sicut oportebat et quando oportebat, illa mansit ut erat. Unde in Ecclesiastico:4 Antequam crearentur, omnia nota sunt illi, sic et postquam consummata sunt. — Ecce his verbis videtur Augustinus innuere, scientiam vel praescientiam Dei causam esse eorum quae fiunt, cum dicit, ideo ea esse, quia Deus novit. Idem quoque in sexto libro5 dicere videtur: « Cum, inquit, decedant et succedant tempora, non decedit aliquid vel succedit scientiae Dei, . . . |
Now, therefore, returning to the proposed, let us pursue what has been taken up [coepto insistamus]. Above1 it has been said, that God’s Foreknowledge is only [tantum] of (things) future, but of all, both of the good and of the wicked; however (His) Knowledge and/or Wisdom (is) not only [modo] of (things) past,2 but also of (those) present and future, nor only [tantum] of (things) temporal, but also of (those) eternal, because God knew Himself. Here there arises a question not to be ignored [dissimulanda], whether, namely, (His) Knowledge and/or Foreknowledge is the cause of things, or whether things are the cause of God’s Knowledge and/or Foreknowledge. For God’s Foreknowledge seems to be the cause of those which are beneath [subsunt] to Him, and to cause the necessity of their coming forth [eveniendi], because neither were any (things) going to be, unless God foreknew them, nor can they not come forth, after God will have foreknown them. Moreover, if it is impossible, that they not come forth, because they are foreknown, therefore, (His) Foreknowledge Itself, by which they are foreknown, seems to be their cause of coming forth. But it is impossible, that they not come forth, when they have been foreknown, because if they did not come forth, when they are foreknown, God’s Foreknowledge would fail. But God’s Foreknowledge cannot fail. Therefore, it is impossible, that they not come forth, since they have been foreknown. Thus, therefore, (His) Foreknowledge seems to be the cause of those, which have been foreknown. This same is also said of (His) Knowledge, namely, that, because God knew some, for that reason they are. To which sentence (St.) Augustine seems to attest in the fifteenth book On the Trinity,3 saying thus: « God did not cognize these in some time [ex aliquo tempore]; but all (things) temporal (that were) going to be and even in regard to these, what and when we were going to ask from Him, and what and concerning which things, either He was to hear out and/or not hear out, He foreknew beforehand without a beginning. Moreover, each and every creature, both spiritual and corporal, not because they are, for that reason did He know them, but they are for this reason, because He knew (them). For He was not ignorant of those which He was going to create: therefore, because He knew, He created, not because He created, did He know; nor did He know created (things) otherwise than (they were) to be created. For nothing accedes to His Wisdom from them, but with those existing, just as it was opportune [oportebat] and when it was opportune, the Former remained as It was. Whence in Ecclesiasticus (it is written):4 Before they were created, all have been known [nota] to Him, thus too after (all) have been consummated ». — Behold with these words (St.) Augustine seems to hint, that God’s Knowledge and Foreknowledge are the cause of those which are made, when he says, that they are for this reason, because God knew (them). The same too, in the sixth book,5 does he seem to say: « Though », he says, « the seasons withdraw and approach, nothing withdraws and/or approaches God’s Knowledge, . . . |
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1 Dist. XXXV. c. 1. 2 Ita in codd. A B E et edd. 1, 6, in aliis non bene futuris. Deinde Vat. cum plurimis edd causae scientiae pro causas scientiae, refragantibus codd. et ed. 1. 3 Cap. 13. n. 22. — Paulo ante Vat. cum paucis edd. noverit loco novit. 4 Cap. 23, 29. Vulgata: Domino enim Deo, antequam crearentur, omnia sunt agnita: sic et post perfectum respicit omnia. |
1 Distinction XXXV, ch. 1. 2 Thus (is it had) in codices A B and E and in editions 1 and 6; in the others there is read not well of (things) future [de futuris]. Then, breaking with the codices and edition 1, the Vatican edition, together with very many editions, has are the causes of God’s Knowledge [sint causae scientiae etc.] for are the cause of God’s Knowledge [sint causa scientiae etc.]. 3 Chapter 13, n. 22. — A little before this the Vatican edition, together with a few editions, has will have known [noverit] for knew [novit]. 4 Eccl. 23:29. The Vulgate reads: For to the Lord God, before they were created, all have been known: thus too after (time has been) perfected He looks back upon all [Domino enim Deo, antequam crearentur, omnia sunt agnita: sic et post perfectum respicit omnia]. |
p. 667
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in qua novit omnia quae fecit per ipsam. Non enim haec quae creata sunt, ideo sciuntur a Deo, quia facta sunt, sed potius ideo facta sunt, quia immutabiliter ab eo sciuntur ». — Et hic etiam significare videtur, Dei scientiam causam esse eorum quae fiunt, dicens, non ideo Deum ea novisse, quia facta sunt, sed ideo facta, quia novit ea Deus. Ideoque videtur Dei scientia vel praescientia causa esse eorum quae novit. |
in which He knew all which He made through It. For those which have been created, are not for this reason known [sciuntur] by God, because they have been made, but rather they have been made for this reason, because they are immutably known by Him ». — And he also seems to signify, that God’s Knowledge is the cause of those which are made, saying, that not for this reason did God know [novisse] them, because they were made, but for this reason (have they been) made, because God knew them. And for this reason God’s Knowledge and/or Foreknowledge seems to be the cause of those which He knew. |
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Quod si ita est, est igitur causa omnium malorum, cum omnia mala sciantur et praesciantur a Deo; quod longe est a veritate. Si enim Dei scientia vel praescientia causa esset malorum, esset utique Deus auctor malorum, quod penitus falsum est. Non igitur scientia vel praescientia Dei causa est omnium quae ei subsunt. |
Which if It is thus, It is, is therefore, the cause of all evils, since all evils are known and foreknown by God; which is far from the truth. For if God’s Knowledge and/or Foreknowledge would be the cause of evils, God indeed would be the Author of evils, which is thoroughly false. Therefore, God’s Knowledge and/or Foreknowledge is not the cause of all which are beneath Him. |
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Neque etiam res futurae causa sunt Dei praescientiae: licet enim non essent futurae, nisi praescirentur a Deo, non tamen ideo praesciuntur, quia futurae sunt. Si enim hoc esset, tunc eius quod aeternum est, aliquid existeret causa ab eo alienum, ab eo diversum, et ex creaturis penderet praescientia1 Creatoris, et creatum causa esset increati. Origenes tamen super Epistolam ad Romanos2 ait: « Non propterea aliquid erit, quia id scit Deus futurum, sed quia futurum est, ideo scitur a Deo, antequam fiat ». Hoc videtur praemissis verbis Augustini obviare. Hic enim significari videtur, quod res futurae causa sint praescientiae; ibi vero, quod praescientia causa sit rerum futuram. |
Nor are future things the cause of God’s Foreknowledge: for though they were not going to be, unless they were foreknown by God, yet they are not foreknown for this reason, because they are going to be. For if this were, then of That, which is eternal, something would exist as (Its) cause other than It, diverse from It, and the Creator’s Foreknowledge1 would depend from creatures, and a created would be the cause of the Uncreated. Yet Origin On the Letter (of St. Paul) to the Romans2 says: « Nothing shall be on account of this, because God knows it (is) going to be, but because it is going to be, for that reason it is known by God, before it is made ». This seems to obviate the aforementioned words of (St.) Augustine. For here there seems to be signified, that future things are the cause of (God’s) Foreknowledge; but in the former, that (His) Foreknowledge is the cause of future things. |
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Hanc igitur quae videtur repugnantiam de medio tollere cupientes, dicimus, res futuras nullatenus causam esse praescientiae vel scientiae Dei, nec ideo praesciri vel sciri, quia futurae vel factae sunt; ita exponentes quod ait Origenes, quia futurum est, ideo scitur a Deo, antequam fiat, id est, quod futurum est scitur a Deo, antequam fiat, neque sciretur, nisi futurum esset, ut non notetur ibi causa, nisi sine qua non fieret.3 Ita etiam dicimus, scientiam vel praescientiam Dei non esse causam eorum quae fiunt, nisi talem, sine qua non fiunt, si tamen scientiam ad notitiam tantum referamus. Si vero nomine scientiae includitur etiam beneplacitum atque dispositio, tunc recte potest dici causa eorum quae Deus facit. His enim duobus modis, ut superius4 praetaxatum est, accipitur cognitio vel scientia Dei, scilicet pro notitia sola, vel pro notitia simul et beneplacito. Hoc modo forte accepit Augustinus dicens: Ideo sunt, quia novit, id est, quia scienti placuit, et quia sciens disposuit. Et hic sensus ex eo adiuvatur, quia de bonis ibi tantum agit Augustinus, scilicet de creaturis, et de his quae Deus facit, quae omnia novit non solum scientia, sed etiam beneplacito ac dispositione. Sic ergo ibi accipitur Dei cognitio, ut non modum notitiam, sed etiam beneplacitum Dei significet. |
Therefore, desiring to remove from the midst that which seems (to be) a repugnance, we say, that future things are to no extent the cause of God’s Foreknowledge and/or Knowledge, nor for that reason are they foreknown and/or known, because they are going to be and/or have been made; thus expounding what Origin says, ‘because it is going to be, for that reason it is known by God, before it is made’, that is, ‘what is going to be, is known by God, before it is made, nor would it be known, unless it were going to be’, so that no cause is noted there, except that without which it would not be made.3 Thus too do we say, that God’s Knowledge and/or Foreknowledge is not the cause of those which are made, unless (as) the such, without which they are not made, if, however, we only refer “knowledge” to a “being known” [ad notitiam]. However, if by the name for knowledge there is included also good pleasure and disposition, then It can rightly be said (to be) the cause of those which God makes. For in these two manners, as has been touched upon before, above,4 God’s Cognition and/or Knowledge is accepted, namely for a being-known [notitiam] alone, and/or for a being-known and a good pleasure [beneplacito] together. In this manner, perhaps, (St.) Augustine accepted (it), saying: They are for this reason, because He knew (them), that is, because it pleased the Knower (to know them), and because Knowing (them) He set (them) in order [sciens disposuit]. And this sense is assisted from this, because (St.) Augustine deals only with the good there, namely with creatures, and with those which God makes, all of which He knew not only by (His) Knowledge, but also by (His) good pleasure and disposition. Therefore, in this manner is God’s Cognition accepted there, to not only signify being-known, but also God’s good pleasure. |
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Mala vero scit Deus et praescit, antequam fiant, sed sola notitia, non beneplacito. Praescit enim Deus et praedicit etiam quae non est ipse facturus, sicut praescivit et praedixit infidelitatem Iudaeorum, sed non facit. Nec ideo, quia praescivit, ad peccatum infidelitatis eos coegit, nec praescisset vel praedixisset eorum mala, nisi essent ea habituri. Unde Augustinus super Ioannem:5 « Deus, inquit, futurorum praescius per Prophetam praedixit infidelitatem Iudaeorum, sed non fecit, neque praescisset mala eorum, nisi ea haberent. Non enim ideo quemquam ad peccandum cogit, quia futura hominum peccata praenovit; illorum enim praescivit peccata, non sua. Ideoque si ea quae ille praescivit ipsorum, non sunt ipsorum,6 non vere ille praescivit. Sed quia illius praescientia falli non potest, sine dubio non alius, sed ipsi peccant, quos Deus peccaturos esse praescivit. Et ideo, si non malum, sed bonum facere voluissent, non malum facturi praeviderentur ab eo qui novit, quid sit quisque facturus ». — His verbis aperte ostenditur, si diligenter attendamus,7 praescientiam Dei non esse causam malorum, quae praescit, quia non ea praescit tanquam facturus nec tanquam sua, sed illorum qui sunt ea facturi vel habituri. Praescivit ergo illa sola notitia, non beneplacito auctoritatis. Unde datur intelligi, quod Deus e converso praescit bona tanquam sua, tanquam ea quae facturus est, ut in8 illa praesciendo simul fuerit ipsius notitia et auctoriatis beneplacitum. |
However, God knows and foreknows evils, before they come to be, but by their) being known alone, not by (His) good pleasure. For God foreknows and foretells even those which He Himself is not going to cause [non facturus], just as He foreknew and foretold the infidelity of the Jews, but did not cause (it). Nor for that reason, because He foreknew (it), did He drive them to the sin of infidelity, nor would have he foreknown and/or foretold their evils, if they were not going to be had. Whence (St.) Augustine On (the Gospel of St.) John (says):5 « God », he says, « foreknowing (the things that are) going to be, He foretold through the Prophet the infidelity of the Jews, but He did not cause (it), nor would He have foreknown their evils, unless they had them. For not for this reason does He drive anyone to sin, because He foreknew [praenovit] the future sins of men; for He foreknew [praescivit] their sins, not His own. And for that reason if those which He foreknew (were to going to belong) to them, do not belong to them,6 He did not truly foreknow (them). But because His Foreknowledge cannot fail, without doubt no other, but they themselves sin, whom God foreknew were going to sin. And for that reason, if they willed to do not evil, but good, (those who were) going to do no evil would have been foreseen by Him who knew, what anyone is going to do ». — With these words there is openly shown, if we diligently attend (to them),7 that God’s Foreknowledge is not the cause of the evils, which He foreknows, because He does not foreknow them as One (who is) going to cause (them) nor as His own, but (as belonging) to those who are going to do and/or have them. Therefore He foreknew these by (their) being-known alone, not by the good pleasure of an author. Whence one is given to understand, that God, conversely, foreknows good (things) as His own, as those which He is going to do, so that in8 foreknowing them there was together (their) being-known by Him [ipsius notitia] and the good pleasure of (their) Author. |
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Cap. II. Utrum praescientia Dei possit falli. |
Chapter II. Whether God’s Foreknowledge can fail. |
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Ad hoc autem, quod supra dictum est, scilicet praescientiam Dei falli non posse, solet a quibusdam sic opponi: Deus praescivit hunc lecturum, vel aliquid huiusmodi; sed potest esse, ut iste non legat: ergo potest aliter esse, quam Deus praescivit, ergo potest falli Dei praescientia. — Quod omnino falsum est. Potest equidem non fieri aliquid, et illud tamen praescitum est fieri; non ideo tamen potest falli Dei praescientia, quia si illud non fieret, nec a Deo praescitum esset fieri. |
But regarding that, which has been said above, namely that God’s Foreknowledge cannot fail, it was customarily opposed by certain (authors) in this manner: God foreknew this one (was) going to read, and/or something of this kind; but it can be, that he does not read: therefore it can be otherwise than God foreknew, therefore God’s foreknowledge can fail. — Which is entirely false. Of course it can (be) that something does not come to be, and yet that it has been foreknown to come to be; yet for this reason God’s Foreknowledge cannot fail, because if that were not to come to be, neither would it have been foreknown by God to come to be. |
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Sed adhuc urgent quaestionem dicentes: aut aliter potest fieri, quam Deus praescivit, aut non aliter; si non aliter: ergo necessario cuncta eveniunt; si vero aliter: potest ergo Dei praescientia falli vel mutari. Sed potest aliter fieri, quia potest aliter fieri, quam fiat; ita autem fit, ut praescitum est: aliter ergo potest fieri, quam praescitum est. — Ad quod dicimus, illam locutionem multiplicem facere intelligentiam, scilicet: aliter potest fieri, quam Deus praescivit, et huiusmodi, ut: potest non esse quod Deus praescivit, et: impossibile est, non esse quod Deus praescivit, et: impossibile est, non esse praescita omnia quae fiunt, et huiusmodi. Possunt enim haec coniunctim intelligi ut . . . |
But they still urge the question saying: either it can come to be [fieri] otherwise, than God has foreknown, or not otherwise; if not otherwise: therefore necessarily all shall turn out (as God foreknows it) [cuncta eveniunt]; if, however, otherwise: therefore God’s Foreknowledge can fail and/or be changed. But it can come to be otherwise, because it can come to be otherwise, than it comes to be; but thus does it come to be, as it has been foreknown: therefore it can come to be otherwise, than it has been foreknown. — To which we say, that that expression, namely: “it can come to be otherwise, than God foreknew”, and (those) of this kind, can cause a multiple understanding, to (signify): “what God foreknew cannot be”, and “it is impossible, that what God has foreknow not be”, and “it is impossible, that all the foreknown which come to be, not be”, and (expressions) of this kind. For these can be understood conjointly [coniunctum], so that . . . |
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1 Ita in codd. et ed. 1; in Vat. et aliis scientia. Immediate ante Vat. et edd. 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 dependeret pro penderet. 2 Libr. VII. n. 8. (ad Rom. 8, 30). 3 Codd. A B C et ed. 1 (5 in margine) fit, cod. E fiat. 4 Dist. XXVI. c. 2. 5 Tract. 53. n. 4; sed tantum secundum sensum. 6 Ita codd. A C D E, edd. 1, 6 et originale August., in aliis omittitur ipsorum. Deinde codd. A B C E et omnes edd., excepta Vat., vera pro vere, sed contra originale et cod. D. Deinde, praeter originale et ed. 1, Vat. cum aliis peccatores esse pro peccaturos esse. 7 Codd. B C D E et ed. 1 intendamus, cod. A inspiciamus. 8 Vat. aliaeque edd., excepta 1, omittunt in, refragantibus codd. |
1 Thus (is it had) in the codices and edition 1; in the Vatican edition in an the others, there is had Knowledge [scientia]. Immediately before this (in the Latin, and after this in the English), the Vatican edition and editions 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9, have would depend [depederet] for would depend [penderet]. 2 Book VII, n. 8 (on Romans 8:30). 3 Codices A B and C and edition 1 (ed. 5 in the margin) have it is made [fit] for it would be made [fieret]; codex E has the subjunctive it is made [fiat]. 4 Distinction XXVI, ch. 2. 5 Tract 53, n. 4; but only according to its sense. 6 Thus codices A C D and E, editions 1 and 6, and (St.) Augustine’s original; in the others there is read are not [non sunt] for do not belong to them [non sunt ipsorum]. Then codices A B C and E and all the editions, except the Vatican, have He did not foreknow (them) as true [non vera ille praescivit] for He did not truly foreknow (them) [non vere ille praescivit], but contrary to the original and codex D. Then, contrary to original and edition 1, the Vatican edition, together with the others, has are sinners [peccatores esse] for were going to sin [peccaturos esse]. 7 Codices B C D and E and edition 1 have understand (them) [intendamus], codex A has look into (them) [inspiciamus]. 8 The Vatican edition and the other editions, except edition 1, breaking with the codices, have by foreknowing [praesciendo] for in foreknowing [in . . . praesciendo]. |
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conditio sit implicta, et disiunctim. Si enim ita intelligas: non potest aliter fieri, quam Deus praescivit, id est, non potest utrumque simul esse, scilicet quod Deus ita praesciverit fieri, et aliter fiat; verum intelligis. Si autem per disiunctionem intelligas, ut dicas, hoc aliter non posse evenire, quam evenit et1 quo modo futurum Deus praescivit; falsum est. Hoc enim aliter potest evenire, quam evenit, et tamen Deus hoc modo futurum praescivit. Similiter et alia determinatio, scilicet impossibile est, illud non evenire, quod Deus praescivit, vel cum Deus praescierit; si coniunctim intelligas, verum dicis; si disciunctim, falsum. Ita etiam et illud: impossibile est, non esse praescitum omne quod fit, id est, non potest esse utrumque simul, scilicet, ut fit, et non sit praescitum, hic sensus verus est. Si vero dicis, Deum non potuisse non praescire omne quod fit, falsum est. Potuit enim facere, ut non fieret, et ita non esset2 praescitum. |
there is an implicit condition, and disjointly. For if you understand: “it cannot come to be otherwise, than God has foreknown”, that is, so that each cannot be together, namely that ‘God thus will have foreknown it to come to be, and it comes to be otherwise’, you understand (it) truly. However, if you understand (it) through a disjunction, as to say, that ‘this cannot turn out otherwise, than it did turn out and1 in that manner God foreknew (that it was) going to be’, it is false. For it can turn out otherwise, than it did turn out, and yet God foreknew that (it was) going to be in this manner. Similarly also the other determination, namely, ‘it is impossible, that that not turn out, which God foreknew, and/or though He foreknew (it)’; if you understand (it) conjointly, you speak the truth; if disjointly, a falsehood. Thus also even this: ‘it is impossible, that everything which comes to be not have been foreknown’, that is, that each cannot be together, namely, ‘that it come to be’, and ‘(that) it not have been foreknown’, this is the true sense. However if you say, that ‘God could not foreknow everything which comes to be’, it is false. For He could have caused it not to come to be, and thus it would2 not have been foreknown. |
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1 Codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9 omittunt et. 2 Ita codd. B C D; in aliis codd. et omnibus edd. esse. |
1 The codices and editions 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 9, omits and [et]. 2 Thus codices B C and D; in the other codices and in all the editions there is read thus not to have been [esse] for thus it would not have been [esset]. |
The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.