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Magistri Petri Lombardi |
Master Peter Lombard |
Sententiarum Quatuor Libri |
The Four Books of Sentences |
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LIBER PRIMUS SENTENTIARUM.
DE DEI UNITATE ET TRINITATE |
THE FIRST BOOK OF THE SENTENCES
ON THE UNITY AND TRINITY OF GOD |
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DISTINCTIO XXXIX. |
DISTINCTION 39 |
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Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, |
Latin
text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, |
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Cap. I.
Utrum scientia Dei possit augeri vel minui vel aliquo modo mutari. |
Chapter I. Whether God’s Knowledge can be increased and/or lessened and/or in any manner be changed. |
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Praeterea quaeri solet, utrum scientia Dei possit augeri vel minui. Utrumque enim videtur posse probari. Quod enim divina scientia possit augeri vel mutari,1 hoc modo probatur: quia potest Deus scire quod nunquam scit. Est enim aliquis, qui non est lecturus hodie, et tamen potest esse, ut legat hodie; potest enim hodie legere. Nihil autem potest fieri, quod non possit a Deo sciri. Potest ergo Deus scire, hunc lecturum hodie, potest igitur aliquid scire, quod non scit: ergo potest eius scientia augeri vel mutari. Eademque videtur posse minui. Est enim aliquis hodie lecturus, quem Deus scit lecturum. At potest esse, ut non legat, ergo potest Deus non scire, hunc lecturum, potest igitur non scire aliquid quod scit: ergo potest minui eius scientia, vel mutari. — Ad quod dicimus, quia Dei scientia omnino immutabilis est nec augeri potest vel minui. Nam, ut ait Augustinus in decimo quinto libro de Trinitate:2 « Scientia Dei est ipsa sapientia, et sapientia est ipsa essentia sive substantia Dei; quia in illius naturae simplicitate mirabili non est aliud sapere, aliud esse, sed quod est sapere, hoc est esse ». « Ideoque novit omnia Verbum, quae novit Pater; sed ei nosse de Patre est, sicut esse; nosse enim et esse ibi unum est. Et ideo Patri, sicut esse non est a Filio, ita nec nosse. Proinde, tanquam se ipsum dicens, Pater genuit Verbum sibi coaequale per omnia. Non enim se ipsum integre perfecteque dixisset, si aliquid minus aut amplius esset in eius Verbo quam in se ipso. Hoc est ergo omnino Verbum, quod Pater, non tamen est Pater, quia iste Filius, ille Pater. Sciunt ergo invicem Pater et Filius, sed ille gignendo, iste nascendo. Et omnia quae sunt in eorum scientia, in eorum sapientia, in eorum essentia, unusquisque eorum simul videt, non particulatim aut singillatim, velut alternante conspectu hinc illinc, et inde huc et rursum inde, vel inde in aliud atque aliud, ut aliqua videre non possit, nisi non videns alia; sed omnia simul videt, quorum nullum est, quod non semper videat » et sciat. « Eius itaque scientia inamissibilis et invariabilis est. Nostra vero scientia et amissibilis est et receptibilis, quia non hoc est nobis esse, quod scire. Propter hoc, sicut nostra scientia illi scientiae Dei dissimilis est, sic et nostrum verbum, quod nascitur de scientia nostra, dissimile est illi Verbo, quod natum est de Patre scientia ». — Ex hac auctoritate clare ostenditur, scientiam Dei omnino invariabilem esse, sicut ipsa essentia Dei omnino invariabilis est; et quod Pater et Filius cum Spiritu sancto simul omnia sciunt et vident. Sicut ergo non potest augeri vel minui divina essentia, ita nec divina scientia. Et tamen conceditur, posse scire quod non scit, et posse non scire quod scit; quia posset aliquid esse subiectum eius scientiae, quod non est, et posset non esse subiectum aliquid, quod est, sine permutatione ipsius scientiae. |
Moreover there is customarily asked, whether God’s knowledge can be increased and/or lessened. For each seems to be able to be proven. For that the Divine Knowledge can be increased and/or changed,1 is proven in this manner: because God can know [scire] what He never knows. For there is someone, who is not going to read today, and yet it can be, that he reads today; for he can read today. But nothing can come to be, which cannot be known by God. Therefore, God can know, that this one (is) going to read today, therefore He can know something, which He does not know: therefore His Knowledge can be increased and/or changed. And the Same seems able to be lessened. For there is someone going to read today, whom God knows (is) going to read. But it can be, that he does not read, therefore God is able not to know, that he (is) going to read, therefore He is able not to know something which He does know: therefore His Knowledge can be lessened, and/or changed. — To which we say, that God’s Knowledge is entirely immutable nor can it be increased and/or changed. For, as (St.) Augustine says in the fifteenth book On the Trinity:2 « God’s Knowledge is Wisdom Itself, and Wisdom is the very Essence or Substance of God; because in the wonderful Simplicity of that Nature it is not one (thing) ‘to be wise’ [sapere], another ‘to be’, but that which it is ‘to be wise’, that it is ‘to be’ ». « And for that reason the Word knew [novit] all, which the Father knew; but His knowing of the Father is, just as (His) ‘being’; for ‘to know’ and ‘to be’ is one (thing) There. And for that reason, just as the Father’s ‘being’ is not from the Son, so neither (His) knowing. Consequently [Proinde], as One speaking His very self, the Father begot the Word coequal to Himself through all (things). For He would not have spoken Himself integrally and perfectly, if there were something less or more ample in His Word than in His very Self. Therefore, this Word is entirely, what the Father (is), yet He is not the Father, because the Former (is) the Son, the Latter (is) the Father. Therefore the Father and the Son know One another, but the Former by begetting, the Latter by being born. And all which are in Their Knowledge, in Their Wisdom, in Their Essence, each one of these He sees together, not piece by piece [particulatim] or one by one [singillatim], as if alternately by a gaze on this side (and) that side, and from there to here and then back, and/or from there unto one and another, as if He cannot see some, without not seeing others; but He sees all together, none of which is, that which He does not always see » and know [sciat]. « And so His Knowledge is incapable of being lost and varied [inamissibilis et invariabilis]. But our knowledge is capable of being lost and of being received, because for us ‘to be’ is not that which (it is) ‘to know’. On this account, just as our knowledge is dissimilar to that Knowledge (which is) God’s, so also our word, which is born from our knowledge, is dissimilar to that Word, which has been born from the Father according to knowledge ». — From this authority there is clearly shown, that God’s Knowledge is entirely invariable, just as the very Essence of God is entirely invariable; and that the Father and the Son with the Holy Spirit know and see all at once. Therefore, just as the Divine Essence cannot be increased and/or lessened, so neither the Divine Knowledge. And yet it is conceded, that He can know what He does not know, and that He is able not to know what He does know; because something could have been the subject of His Knowledge, which is not, and something could not have been a subject, which is, without a thorough change [permutatione] of the Knowledge Itself. |
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Cap. II. An Deus possit noviter vel ex tempore scire vel praescire aliquid. |
Chapter II. Whether God can newly either know in time and/or foreknow something. |
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Hic opponitur a quibusdam ita: si Deus potest scire vel praescire quod nunquam scivit vel praescivit, potest ergo ex tempore aliquid scire vel praescire. — Ad quod dicimus: potest quidem Deus scire vel praescire omne quod potest facere, et potest facere quod nunquam fiet. Potest igitur scire vel praescire, quod nunquam fiet nec est nec fuit. Nec illud scit vel scivit, neque praescit vel praescivit, quia scientia eius non est, nisi de his quae sunt vel fuerunt vel erunt; et praescientia non est nisi de futuris. Et licet possit scire vel prae- / -scire . . . |
This is opposed by certain ones thus: if God can know and/or foreknow what He never knew and/or foreknew, He can, therefore, know and/or foreknow something on account of time. — To which we say: God can indeed know and/or foreknow everything which He can make, and He can make what never will come to be. Therefore, He can know and/or foreknow, what will never come to be, nor is, nor was. Nor that does He know and/or did He know, nor does He foreknow and/or did He foreknow, because His Knowledge is naught, but of those which are and/or were and/or will be; and (His) Foreknowledge is not but of future (things). And though He can know and/or fore- / -know . . . |
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1 Cod. D minui, cod E minui vel mutari. 2 Cap. 13. n. 22. Sequens locus est c. 14. n. 23; sed a Magistro aliquae propositiones transponuntur et aliquae omittuntur. Tertius locus est ibid. iterum c. 13. n. 22. — In ultimo textu solummodo Vat. et edd. 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 post inamissibilis addunt et invariabilis, refragante etiam originali. Immediate post pro quod scire legit Vat. quod sapere vel scire; originale quod scire vel sapere. |
1 Codex D has lessened [minui], codex E has lessened and/or changed [minui vel mutari]. 2 Chapter 13, n. 22. The following passage is ch. 14, n. 23, but some propositions have been transposed and others omitted by Master (Peter). The third passage is again ibid., ch. 13, n. 22. — In the last text only the Vatican edition and editions 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9, after incapable of being lost [inamissibilis] add and varied [et invariabilis], breaking with even the original. Immediately after this for that which (it is) ‘to know’ [quod scire] the Vatican edition reads that which (it is) ‘to be wise’ and/or ‘to know’ [quod sapere vel scire]; the original reads that which (it is) ‘to know’ and/or ‘to be wise’ [quod scire vel sapere]. |
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prae- / -scire quod nunquam est nec erit; non tamen potest aliquid scire vel praescire ex tempore. Potest utique scire vel praescire quod nunquam est nec erit, nec illud scitum vel praescitum est ab aeterno; non tamen potest incipere scire vel praescire illud, sed ita potest modo scire vel praescire, sicut potest scisse vel praescisse ab aeterno. Si enim dicas, eum modo posse scire vel praescire quod ab aeterno non scivit vel praescivit, id est, ita quod ab aeterno non sciverit vel praesciverit, quasi utrumque simul esse possit; falsum est. Si vero dicas, eum posse modo scire vel praescire quod ab aeterno non scivit vel praescivit, id est, habere potentiam sciendi vel praesciendi ab aeterno et modo aliquid, nec illud tamen praescitum est vel futurum; verum est. Non potest ergo noviter vel ex tempore scire vel praescire aliquid, sicut non potest noviter vel ex tempore velle aliquid; et tamen potest velle quod nunquam voluit. |
fore- / -know what never is nor will be; yet He cannot know and/or foreknow something on account of time. He can, indeed, know and/or foreknow what never is nor will be, nor has that been known and/or foreknown from eternity; yet He cannot start to know and/or foreknow that, but He can thus now know and/or foreknow, just as He could have known and/or foreknown from eternity. For if you say, that He now can know and/or foreknow what He did not know and/or foreknow from eternity, that is, so that from eternity He did not know and/or foreknow, as if each can be together; it is false. However if you say, that He can now know and/or foreknow what He did not know and/or foreknow from eternity, that is, that He has a power of knowing and/or foreknowing from eternity even something now, and yet it has not been foreknown nor is going to be; it is true. Therefore, He cannot newly either on account of time know and/or foreknow something, just as He cannot newly and/or on account of time will something; and yet He can will what He has never willed. |
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Cap. III. Utrum Deus possit scire plura, quam scit. |
Chapter III. Whether God can know more, than He knows. |
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Item a quibusdam dicitur Deus posse plura scire, quam sciat, quia potest scire omnia quae scit, et potest aliqua facere, quae nunquam erunt, et illa potest scire. Non enim aliqua incognita facere potest. Si vero omnia essent, quae modo sunt, et alia quaedam faceret, quae non sunt nec erunt, et illa omnia sciret, pro certo plura sciret, quam modo sciat. Nec tamen eius scientia augeri potest,1 quia hoc totum fieri potest sine mutabilitate scientiae. Constat ergo, Dei scientiam omnino esse immutabilem nec augeri posse vel minui, sed ei subiecta. |
Likewise by certain ones God is said to be able to know more, than He knows, because He can know all which He knows, and He can make some, which never will be, and those He can know. For He can make some (which are) unknown [incognita]. But if all were, which now are, and He would make certain others, which are not nor will be, and would know them all, for certain [pro certo] He would know more, than He now knows. And yet His Knowledge cannot be increased,1 because all this [hoc totum] can come to be without the changeability of knowledge. Therefore it is established, that God’s Knowledge is entirely immutable nor can it be increased and/or lessened, but Its subjects (can). |
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Cap. IV. Quod Deus et semper et simul scit omnia. |
Chapter IV. That God, both always and together, knows all. |
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Ei vero quod praedictum est, scilicet quod Deus omnia semper videt et simul, videtur obviare, quod ait Hieronymus in expositione Habacuc:2 « Absurdum est, inquit, ad hoc deducere Dei maiestatem, ut sicat per momenta singula, quot culices nascantur, quotve moriantur, quot pulicum et muscarum sit multitudo, quotve pisces natent in aquis et similia. Non simus tam fatui adulatores Dei, ut dum providentiam eius etiam ad ima retrudimus, in nos ipsos iniuriosi simus, eandem irrationabilium et rationabilium providentiam esse dicentes ». Hic videtur dicere Hieronymus, quod Deus illorum minimorum scientiam sive providentiam non habeat. Quodsi hoc est, tunc non omnia simul scit et semper. — Ex tali itaque sensu illud dictum esse noverimus, ut Deum illa alternatim vel particulatim scire neget, nec per diversa temporum momenta sic illa cognovit, sicut per varia momenta illorum quaedam deficiunt, quaedam incipiunt. Neque illis aliisque irrationabilibus ita providet, quemadmodum rationabilibus. Nunquid enim, ut ait Apostolus,3 cura est Deo de bobus? Et sicut non est cura Deo de bobus, ita nec de aliis irrationabilibus. Dicit tamen Scriptura, quia ipsa cura est de omnibus. Providentiam ergo et curam universaliter de cunctis, quae condidit, habet, ut habeat unumquodque quod sibi debetur et convenit. Sed specialem providentiam atque curam habet de rationabilibus, de quibus4 praecepta tradidit eisque recte vivendi legem praescripsit ac praemia promisit. Hanc providentiam et curam de irrationabilibus non habet. Ideo Apostolus dicit, quia non est cura Deo de bobus. Providet tamen omnibus et curat, id est gubernat omnia, qui omnibus solem suum oriri facit et pluviam dat.5 Scit itaque Deus, quanta sit multitudo pulicum, culicum ac muscarum et piscium, et quot nascantur, quotve moriantur; sed non scit hoc per momenta singula, immo simul et semper6 omnia, neque ita scit ut eandem habeat providentiam irrationabilium et rationabilium, id est, ut eodem penitus modo provideat irrationabilibus et rationabilibus. Rationabilibus enim et praecepta dedit et Angelos ad custodiam delagavit. |
However, that which has been aforesaid, that is, that God sees all always and together, seems to be obviated, by what (St.) Jerome says in (his) Exposition of Habacuc:2 « It is absurd », he says, « to lead the Majesty of God to this, that He knows through single moments, how many gnats [culices] are born, or how many died, how many is the multitude of flees [pulicum] and flies, or how many fish swim in the waters and similar (things). Let us not be flatterers of God’s utterance, as to be injurious unto ourselves, while we push back His Providence to the lowest depths [ad ima], saying that there is the same Providence for irrational and rational (things) ». Here (St.) Jerome seems, to say, that God does not have a Knowledge or Providence for those least (of things). Which if this is (true), then He does not know all together and always. — And so let us know that that has been said in such a sense, as to deny that God knows them alternately and/or piece by piece, nor did He cognize them thus through diverse moments of the seasons, just as through various moments certain of them fail, certain ones begin. Nor does He thus provide for those and other irrational (beings), according to the measure which (He does) for rational ones. For is not God’s care, as the Apostle says,3 ever for the cattle? And just as God’s care does not concern the cattle, so neither (does it) concern the other irrational (things). Yet Scripture says, that that care if for all. Therefore He has a providence and care universally for all, which He has founded, so that each one has what is due to and convenes with it. But He has a special providence and care for rational (beings), concerning whom4 He has handed down [tradidit] the precepts and for them He prescribed a Law for living uprightly and promised rewards. This providence and care He does not have for irrational (beings). For this reason the Apostle says, that [quia] God’s care is not for the cattle. Yet He provides and cares for all, that is, He governs all, He who causes His sun to rise and grants rain5 for all. And so God knows, how many are the multitude of fees, gnats and of flies and fish, and how many are born, and how many die; but He does not know this through single moments, nay all together and always,6 nor thus does He knows that He has the same providence for irrational and rational (beings), that is, that He provides in thoroughly the same manner for irrational and rational (beings). For to (those) rational He gave both precepts and delegated Angels for (their) guard. |
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Simul itaque et immutabiliter scit Deus omnia quae fuerunt et sunt et erunt, tam bona quam mala; praescit quoque omnia futura, tam bona quam mala. |
And so God knows together and immutable all which were and are and will be, both good and evil; He also foreknows all future (things), both good and evil. |
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1 Cod. D addit vel minui. 2 Ad c. 1, 14. 3 I. Cor. 9, 9; alius locus est Sap. 12, 13. 4 Intellige: respectu quorum dedit septem praecepta posteriora decalogi. Haec est lectio codd. et ed. 1; aliae edd. minus bene omittunt de, quia tunc sensus verborum idem est cum eo, quem exprimunt verba, quae sequuntur; eisque recte vivendi legem praescripsit. 5 Respiciuntur Matth. 5, 45: Qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos et malos et pluit super iustos et inustos. 6 Solummodo Vat. ed edd. 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 semel. |
1 Codex D adds and/or lessened [vel minui]. 2 Hab. 1:14. 3 1 Cor. 9:9; the other passage is Wis. 12:13. 4 Understand: in respect of those which He gave the seven final precepts of the Decalogue. This is the reading of the codices and edition 1; the other editions, less well, omit concerning [de], because then the sense of the words is the same as that, which the following words express: and to them He prescribed a Law for living uprightly [eisque recte vivendi legem praescripsit]. 5 A reference to Mt. 5:45: He who causes His sun to rise upon the good and the wicked and rains upon the just and unjust. 6 Only the Vatican edition and editions 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 have once [semel]. |
The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.