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Magistri Petri Lombardi |
Master Peter Lombard |
Sententiarum Quatuor Libri |
The Four Books of Sentences |
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LIBER PRIMUS SENTENTIARUM.
DE DEI UNITATE ET TRINITATE |
THE FIRST BOOK OF THE SENTENCES
ON THE UNITY AND TRINITY OF GOD |
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DISTINCTIO XL. |
DISTINCTION 40 |
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Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, |
Latin
text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, |
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Praedestinatio1 vero de bonis salutaribus est et de hominibus salvandis. Ut enim ait Augustinus in libro de Praedestinatione Sanctorum,2 « praedestinatio est gratiae praeparatio, quae sine praescientia esse non potest. Potest autem sine praedestinatione esse praescientia. Praedestinatione quippe Deus ea praescivit, quae fuerat ipse facturus, sed praescivit Deus etiam quae non esset ipse facturus, id est omnia mala ». Praedestinavit eos quos elegit, reliquos vero reprobavit, id est, ad mortem aeternam praescivit peccaturos. |
On the other hand,1 (God’s) predestination concerns salutary goods and the men to be saved. For as (St.) Augustine says in the book On the Predestination of the Saints,2 « predestination is a preparation for grace, which cannot be without (God’s) Foreknowledge. But (God’s) Foreknowledge can be without predestination. Indeed by predestination God foreknows those, which He Himself was going to make, but God also foreknew (those) which He was not going to make, that is all evils ». He predestined those whom He elected, but the rest He reproved, that is, He foreknew that they (were) going to sin unto [ad] eternal death. |
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Cap. I.
An aliquis praedestinatus possit damnari, vel reprobus salvari. |
Chapter I. Whether anyone predestined can be damned, and/or (anyone) reprobate be saved. |
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Praedestinatorum nullus videtur posse damnari, nec reproborum aliquis posse salvari. Unde Augustinus in libro de Correptione et gratia:3 « In Apocalypsi,4 inquit, dicitur: Tene quod habes, ne alius accipat coronam tuam. Si alius non est accepturus, nisi iste per- / -diderit, . . . |
None of the predestined seems to be able to be damned, nor do any of the reprobate [reproborum] (seem) to be able to be saved. Whence (St.) Augustine in the book On Blame and Grace (says):3 « In the Apocalypse »,4 he says, « there is said: Hold what you have, lest another accept your crown. If another is not going to accept (it), unless he loses / (it), . . . |
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1 In codd. C D E et ed. 1 d. XL incipit cum sequente capitulo: Praedestinatorum nullius videtur. Et revera, secundum distributionem capitulorum hae quinque propositiones pertinent ad ultimum capitulum distinctionis praecedentis. S. Bonaventura autem, ut patet ex divisione textus, hic incipit distinctionem XL. 2 Cap. 10. n. 19; sed ultima verba ex Glossa ad Rom. 8, 29. 3 Cap. 13. n. 39. In codd. et edd., excepta 9, intitulatur liber de Correctione et gratia. 4 Cap. 3, 11. |
1 In codices C D and E and in edition 1, distinction XL begins with the chapter which follows: Non of the predestined etc.. And in truth, according to the distribution of chapters these 5 sentences pertain to the last chapter of the preceding Distinction. But St. Bonaventure, as is clear from (his) Division of the Text, begins Distinction XL here. 2 Chapter 10, 19; but the final words are from the Gloss on Rom. 8:29. 3 Chapter 13, n. 39. In the codices and editions, except edition 9, it is entitled the book On Correction and Grace [de Correction et gratia] for On Blame and Grace [de Correptione et gratia]. 4 Chapter 3:11. |
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per- / -diderit, certus est electorum numerus », id est, non potest augeri vel minui. — Ad hoc autem obiiciunt quidam, nitentes probare, numerum electorum posse augeri et minui, sic: posset Deus non apponere gratiam quibus apponit, et posset subtrahere quibus non subtrahit; quod si fieret,2 utique damnarentur. Possent ergo damnari isti, qui tamen salvabuntur. Posset itaque minui electorum numerus; ita etiam posset augeri, quia posset apponi gratia quibus non apponitur, per quam salvarentur. Possent ergo salvari, habita gratia, qui tamen sine ea damnabuntur: posset itaque augeri numerus electorum. — Quibus respondemus, ex ea ratione dictum esse et verum esse, numerum electorum non posse augeri vel minui, quia non potest utrumque simul esse, scilicet, ut aliquis salvetur et non sit praedestinatus, vel ut aliquis praedestinatus sit et damnetur. Intelligentia enim conditionis implicitae veritatem facit in dicto, et impossibilitatem in vero. Si vero simpliciter intelligatur, impossibilitas non admittitur, ut cum dicitur: praedestinatus potest vel non potest damnari, et reprobus potest salvari. In his enim et huiusmodi locutionibus ex ratione dicti diiundicanda est sententia dictionis. Alia namque fit intelligentia, si per coniunctionem haec accipiantur dicta, atque alia, si per disiunctionem, ut supra,2 cum de praescientia agebatur, praetaxatum est. Si enim, cum dicis: praedestinatus non potest damnari, intelligas ita: id est, non potest esse, ut praedestinatus sit et damnetur, verum dicis, quia coniunctim intelligis; falsum autem, si disiunctim, ut si intelligas, istum non posse damnari, quem dico praedestinatum. Potuit enim non esse praedestinatus, et ita damnaretur. |
he loses / (it), there is a certain number of the Elect », that is, it cannot be increased and/or lessened. — But to this certain (authors) object, striving (as they do) to prove, that the number of the Elect can be increased and lessened, thus: “God could not apportion [apponere] grace to those whom He apportions (it), and He could subtract (grace) from those whom He does not subtract (it); which if it were done,1 they indeed would be damned. Therefore, those could be damned, who will yet be saved. And so the number of the Elect could be lessened; thus too it could be increased, because the grace, through which they are saved, could be apportioned to those whom it is not apportioned. Therefore, they could be saved, having the grace, who yet without it shall be damned: and so the number of the Elect could be increased.” — To which we respond, that for this reason it has been said and is true, that the number of the Elect cannot be increased and/or lessened, because each cannot be together, namely, that someone be saved and not be predestined, and/or that someone be predestined and be damned. For the understanding of the implicit condition causes the truth in the saying, and (causes) an impossibility in a true one [in vero]. However, if it is simply understood, the impossibility is not admitted, such as when there is said: “the one predestined can and/or cannot be damned”, and “the reprobate can be saved”. For in these expressions and (those) of this kind the thought of the saying [sententia dictionis] is to be judged from the reckoning of what has been [ex ratione dicti]. And indeed one understanding comes to be, if these sayings are accepted through a conjunction, and another, if through a distinction, as was touched upon above,2 when (God’s) Foreknowledge was dealt with. For if, when you say: “the one predestined cannot be damned”, you thus understand: “that is, it cannot be, that he be predestined and be damned”, you understand the truth, because you understand (it) conjointly; but false, if (you understand it) disjointly, such as if you understand, that there cannot be damned, (him) whom I say (has been) predestined. For He could be not predestined, and thus be damned. |
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Verumtamen adhuc instant et secundum coniunctionem argumentando ita procedunt. Non enim, inquiunt, potest esse, ut aliquis praedestinatus sit et damnetur. Utrumque istorum simul esse non potest; sed alterum horum non potest non esse, scilicet, quin iste sit praedestinatus: ab aeterno enim praedestinatus est et non potest modo non esse praedestinatus. Cum ergo impossibile sit, simul utrumque esse, et impossibile sit, alterum non esse, videtur, quod non posse alterum esse, scilicet ut damnetur. Quod si est, ergo non potest esse, ut non salvetur. — In huius questionis solutione mallem alios audire quam docere. Dicimus tamen, similem de praescientia posse moveri quaestionem; ideoque, tam hic quam ibi, unam facimus responsionem dicentes, determinandum fore illud, cui innitur tota haec quaestio, scilicet impossibile est, alterum3 non esse, scilicet, quin iste modo sit praedestinatus; ab aeterno enim iste praedestinatus est. Distinguendum enim est, cum ait: iste non potest modo non esse praedestinatus, vel non potest modo esse, quin sit praedestinatus. Hoc enim et coniunctim et disiunctim intelligi potest. Non enim potest esse, ut ab aeterno sit praedestinatus et modo non sit praedestinatus, nec potest esse simul, ut sit praedestinatus et non sit praedestinatus; sed tamen potuit esse ab aeterno, quod non esset praedestinatus. Et sicut ab aeterno Deus potuit eum non praedestinare, ita conceditur a quibusdam, quod et modo potest Deus eum non praedestinasse. Ab aeterno ergo potest Deus non praedestinasse eum: ergo potest iste non fuisse praedestinatus. Si vero non fuisset praedestinatus, nec modo esset praedestinatus: ergo potest modo non esse praedestinatus. Ita et de praescientia et de praescitis dicunt; quod in actionibus vel in operationibus Dei et hominum nullatenus concedent. Ex quo enim aliquid factum est vel dictum, non concedunt, quod possit non esse vel non fuisse, immo impossibile est, non esse vel non fuisse quod factum est vel dictum, referentes possibilitatem vel impossibilitatem ad naturam rei existentis. Cum vero de praescientia vel praedestinatione Dei agitur, possibilitas vel impossibilitas ad potentiam Dei refertur, quae semper eadem fuit et est,4 quia praedestinatio, praescientia, potentia unum in Deo est. |
Nevertheless, they still insist [instant] and by arguing according to the conjunction proceed thus. “For it cannot be”, they say, “that someone be predestined and be damned. Each of these cannot be together; but one of the two of these can not be, namely, that he is not predestined: for from eternity he has been predestined and he cannot now not be predestined. Therefore, since it is impossible, that each be together, and (since) it is impossible, that one of the two not be, it seems, that it cannot be that the other of the two be, namely that he be damned. Which if it is, therefore it cannot be, that he not be saved.” — In the solution of this question we prefer to hear others, than to teach. Yet we say, that a similar question can be moved concerning (God’s) Foreknowledge; and for that reason, both in this and in that, we will make [facimus] one response, saying, that that must be determined, upon which this whole question is supported, namely, “it is impossible, that one of the two3 not be”, namely, that he is now predestined; for from eternity he has been predestined. For it must be distinguished, when he says: “this one cannot now not be predestined” and/or “it cannot now be, that he is not predestined”. For this can be understood both conjointly and disjointly. For it cannot be, that from eternity he be predestined and now not be predestined, nor can it be together, that he be predestined and not be predestined; but yet it could be from eternity, that he was not predestined. And just as from eternity God was able not to predestine him, so it is conceded by certain (authors), that even now God is able to not have predestined him. Therefore, from eternity God is able to not have predestined him: therefore he is able to not have been predestined. However, if he had not been predestined, neither would he now be predestined: therefore he is able now to not be predestined. Thus they speak both of the Foreknowledge and of the foreknown; which in God’s and men’s actions and/or operations they concede to no extent. For from this that something has been made and/or said, they do not concede, that it can not be and/or not have been, nay it is impossible, that that which has been made and/or said, not be and/or not have been, referring (as they do) the possibility and/or impossibility to the nature of the existing thing. However, when dealing with God’s Foreknowledge and/or predestination, possibility and/or impossibility is referred to God’s power, which always was and is4 the same, because predestination, Foreknowledge, and Power are one [unum] in God. |
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Cap. II. Quid sit reprobatio Dei, et in quibus consideretur, et quis sit praedestinationis effectus. |
Chapter II. What is God’s reprobation, and in whom is it considered, and what is the effect of predestination? |
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Cumque praedestinatio sit gratiae praeparatio, id est divina electio, qua elegit quos voluit ante mundi constitutionem, ut ait Apostolus;5 reprobatio e converso intelligenda est praescientia iniquitatis quorumdam et praeparatio damnationis eorundem. Sicut enim praedestinationis effectus illa gratia est, qua in praesenti iustificamur atque ad recte vivendum et in bono perseverandum adiuvamur, et illa qua in futuro beatificamur; ita reprobatio Dei, qua ab aeterno non eligendo quosdam reprobavit, secundum duo consideratur, quorum alterum praescit et non praeparat, id est iniquitatem, alterum praescit et praeparat, scilicet aeternam poenam. Unde Augustinus ad Prosperum et Hilarium:6 « Haec, inquit, regula inconcusse tenenda est, peccatores in peccatis praescitos esse, non praeparatos, poenam autem esse praeparatam ». « Praeparavit enim Deus, ut ait Augustinus in libro de bono perseverantiae,7 in praescientia sua, quibus voluit bona sua; et quibuscumque donat, proculdubio se donaturum esse praescivit ». « Praeparavit etiam Deus, ut ait Fulgentius,8 malis ignem aeternum, illis utique, quos iuste praeparavit ad luenda supplicia; nec tamen . . . |
And since predestination is a preparation for grace, that is, a divine election, by which He elects those whom He willed before the constitution of the world, as the Apostle says;5 reprobation, conversely, is to be understood as the foreknowledge of the iniquity of certain ones and the preparation for the damnation of the same. For just as the effect of predestination is that grace, in which we are justified in the present and are assisted to live uprightly and persevere in the good, and that according to which we are beatified in the future; so God’s reprobation, by which from eternity, by not electing certain ones, He reproved (them), is considered according to two (aspects), the one of which He foreknows and does not prepare, that is (their) iniquity, the other He foreknows and prepares, namely, (their) eternal punishment. Whence (St.) Augustine (says) To Prosperus and To Hilary:6 « This rule », he says, « is to be held in an unshaken manner, that sinners have been foreknown in (their) sins, not prepared, but (their) punishment has been prepared ». « For God prepared », as (St.) Augustine says in the book On the Good of Perseverance,7 « in His Foreknowledge, (those) for whom He willed His own goods; and to whomsoever He grants (it), far from doubt, He foreknew that He is going to give Himself ». « God also prepared », as (St.) Fulgentius (of Ruspe) says,8 « for the wicked an eternal fire, for those indeed, whom He justly prepared to pay the penalty [ad luenda supplicia]; yet He did not . . . |
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1 Ita in codd. et ed. 1 (5 in margine); in aliis faceret. 2 Dist. XXXVIII. c. 2. — Paulo superius post dicta, atque Vat. et edd. 4, 6, 8, 9 omittunt alia. 3 Vat.et aliae edd. contra codd. et ed. 1 addunt istorum. 4 Cod. D addit et erit. 5 Ephes. 1, 4. 6 Non invenitur in citatis libris, sed in VI. Hypognosticon c. 6. Vide etiam Glossam ad Rom. 8, 29. apud Lyranum, unde Magister plura quae sequuntur, nonnullis mutatis, depromsit. 7 Vel de Dono perseverantiae, c. 17. n. 41. 8 Libr. I. ad Monimum, c. 25; secundum sensum, sed ad verbum in Glossa (loc. cit.). In quo textu codd. B E ante ad facienda peccata praemittunt eos. — Paulo inferius codd. A B D et edd. 2, 3, 7, 8 (5 in margine) iniustiam admittendam pro iustitiam amittendum. |
1 Thus in the codices and edition 1(edition 5 in the margin); in the others He were to do [faceret] for it were done [fieret]. 2 Distinction XXXVIII, ch. 2. — A little above this the Vatican edition and editions 4, 6, 8 and 9 omits another [alia]. 3 The Vatican edition and the other editions, contrary to the codices and edition 1, add of these [istorum]. 4 Codex D adds and will be [et erit]. 5 Eph. 1:4. 6 (Which) is not found in the cited books, but in Hypognosticon, Bk. VI, ch. 6. See also the Gloss on Rm. 8:29 in (Nicholas) of Lyra, from which Master (Peter) has transcribed more of what follows, having changed not a few )words). 7 And/or On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 17, n. 41. 8 To Monimus, Bk. I, ch. 25; according to its sense, but literally in the Gloss (loc. cit.). In which text codices B and E before to commit sins [ad facienda peccata] prefix them [eos]. — A little below this codices A B and D, and editions 2, 3, 7, and 8 (5 in the margin) have admit injustice [iniustitiam admittendam] for lose justice [iustitiam amittendum]. |
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praeparavit ad facienda peccata. Praeparavit enim Deus, quod divina aequitas redderet, non quod humana iniquitas admitteret. Non enim, sicut praeparavit Sanctos ad iustitiam percipiendam, sic praeparavit iniquos ad iustitiam amittendam, quia pravitatis praeparator nunquam fuit ». |
prepare (them) to commit sins [ad facienda peccata]. For God prepared, that the Divine Equity would render (punishment), not that human iniquity would be admitted. For not, just as He prepared the Saints to lay hold of justice [ad iustitiam percipiendam], did He thus prepare the iniquitous to lose justice, because He never was a preparer of depravity ». |
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Sicut ergo praedestinatio Dei proprie est praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, quibus certissime liberantur quicumque liberantur;1 ita reprobatio Dei est praescientia malitiae in quibusdam non finiendae et praeparatio poenae non terminandae. Et sicut praedestinationis effectus est gratiae appositio, ita reprobationis aeternae quodammodo effectus esse videtur obduratio. « Nec obdurat Deus, ut ait Augustinus ad Sixtum,2 impertiendo malitiam, sed non impertiendo gratiam, sicut nec digni sunt. Quibus enim non impertitur nec digni sunt nec merentur; potius ut non impertiatur, hoc digni sunt, hoc merentur ». Unde Apostolus3 ait: Cuius vult miseretur Deus, et quem vult indurat; misericordiam appellans praedestinationem et praecipue praedestinations effectum, id est gratiae apprositionem, obdurationem vero gratiae privationem. « Non enim, ut ait Augustinus ad Simplicianum,4 intelligendum est, quod Deus ita induret, quasi quemquam peccare cogat; sed tamen quibusdam peccatoribus misericordiam iustificationis suae non largitur, et ob hoc eos indurare dicitur, quia non eorum miseretur, non quia impellit, ut peccent. Eorum autem non miseretur, quibus gratiam non esse praebendam aequitate occultissima et ab humanis sensibus remotissima iudicat »; « quam non aperit, sed miratur Apostolus dicens: O altitudo divitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Dei »! |
Therefore, just as God’s predestination is properly a foreknowledge and preparation for God’s benefices, by which there are most certainly liberated whosoever are liberated;1 so God’s reprobation is a foreknowledge of the malice (which is) not to end in certain ones and the preparation of a punishment (which is) not to be terminated. And just as the effect of predestination is an apportioning of grace, so the effect of the eternal reprobation seems in a certain manner to be the obduration (to grace). « For does God harden (sinners) against (grace) », as (St.) Augustine (says) To Sixtus,2 by imparting [impertiendo] malice, but by not imparting grace, just as neither are they worthy. For (those) to whom He does not impart (grace) are neither worthy (of it) nor merit (it); rather that He does not impart (it), this they are worthy of, this they merit ». Wherefore the Apostle3 says: On whom He wills God has mercy, and whom He wills He hardens; calling “mercy” a predestination and chiefly the effect of predestination, that is an apportioning of grace, but “obduration” a privation of grace. « For it must not be understood », as (St.) Augustine says To Simplicianus,4 « that god thus hardens, as if to drive anyone to sin; but yet He does not bestow [largitur] to certain sinners the mercy of His justification, and because of this He is said to harden them, because He does not have mercy upon them, not because He impels them, to sin. But He does not have mercy upon them, to whom He judges grace not to be proffered according to an equity most secret and most removed from human senses »; « which the Apostle does not reveal [aperit], but wonders at, saying: O height of the riches of the Wisdom and Knowledge of God »! |
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1 August., de Dono persever. c. 14. n. 35. 2 Epist. 194. c. 3. n. 14. 3 Rom. 9, 18. 4 Libr. I. quaest. 2. n. 16; sed plurimis a Magistro omissis. Ultima verba quam non aperit etc. sumta sunt ex Epist. modo citata ad Sixtum, c. 2. n. 5. — Locus s. Scripturae est Rom. 11, 33. |
1 (St.) Augustine, On the Gift of Perseverance, ch 14, n. 35. 2 Epistle 194, c. 3, n. 14. 3 Rm. 9:18. 4 Book I, q. 2, n. 16; but with very may (words) omitted by Master (Peter). The final words which . . . does not reveal etc. [quam non aperit etc.] have been taken from the just cited epistle to Sixtus, ch. 2, n. 5. — The passage from Scripture is Rm. 11:33. |
The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.