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Magistri Petri Lombardi |
Master Peter Lombard |
Sententiarum Quatuor Libri |
The Four Books of Sentences |
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LIBER PRIMUS SENTENTIARUM.
DE DEI UNITATE ET TRINITATE |
THE FIRST BOOK OF THE SENTENCES
ON THE UNITY AND TRINITY OF GOD |
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DISTINCTIO XLIII. |
DISTINCTION 43 |
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Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, |
Latin
text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, |
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Cap. I.
Invectio contra illos qui dicunt, Deum nil posse, nisi quod vult et facit. |
Chapter I. An invective against those who say, that God can (do) nothing, but what He wills and does. |
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Quidam tamen de suo sensu gloriantes, Dei potentiam coarctare sub mensura conati sunt. Cum enim dicunt: hucusque potest Deus et non amplius, quid est hoc aliud, quam eius potentiam, quae infinita est, concludere et restringere ad mensuram? Aiunt enim: Nam potest Deus aliud facere, quam facit; nec melius facere id quod facit; nec aliquid praetermittere de his quae facit. Istamque primam1 suam opinionem verisimilibus argumentis causisque commentitiis nec non et sacrarum auctoritatum testimoniis munire nituntur dicentes: Non potest Deus facere, nisi quod bonum est et iustum fieri. Non est autem iustum et bonum fieri ab eo, nisi quod facit. Si enim aliud iustum est et bonum eum facere, quam facit, non ergo facit omne quod iustum est et bonum eum facere. Sed quis audeat hoc dicere? |
Certain (authors), glorying in their own sense, have tried to constrain God’s Power under a measure. For when they say: “God is able up to this point [hucusque] and not more”, what is this, other than to enclose and restrict His Power, which is infinite, to a measure? For they say: “For God can do other, than He does; and (He can) not do better that which He does, nor omit something from those which He does.” And they strive to fortify this first1 opinion of theirs with seemingly true [verisimilibus] arguments and invented [commentitiis] causes and with even the testimonies of sacred authorities, saying: “God can cause naught, but that what is good and just come to be. But there is no coming to be of the just and good from Him, except [nisi] that He cause (it). For if ‘that He cause the just and good’ is other, than He does, therefore He does not cause Himself to cause everything which is just and good. But who dares to say this? |
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Addunt etiam: Non potest facere, nisi quod iustitia eius exigit; sed non exigit eius iustitia, ut faciat, nisi quod facit: non ergo potest facere, nisi quod facit. Eademque iustitia exigit, ut id non faciat, quod non facit; non autem potest facere contra iustitiam suam: non ergo potest aliquid eorum facere, quae dimittit. |
They also add: “He cannot do, but [nisi] what His Justice demands; but His Justice does not demand, that He do, but what He does: therefore He cannot do, but what He does. And the same Justice demands, that He does not do that, which He does not do; but He cannot work against His own Justice: therefore He cannot do any of those, which He leaves off [dimitit] (doing).” |
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His autem respondemus, duplicem verborum intelligentiam aperientes et ab eis involuta evolventes sic: Non potest Deus facere, nisi quod bonum est et iustum, id est, non potest facere, nisi illud quod, si faceret, bonum esset et iustum, verum est; sed multa potest facere, quae non bona sunt nec iusta, quia nec sunt nec erunt, nec bene fiunt nec fient, quia nunquam fient. |
But to these we respond, opening the twofold understanding of the words and unrolling (those) involuted in them [ab eis involuta evolventes] thus: “God cannot do, but what is just and good”, that is, (the proposition): “He cannot do, except that which, if He would do (it), would be good and just” is true; but He can do many (things), which are not good nor just, because they neither are not will be, nor come to be nor will come to be well, because they never will come to be. |
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Item, quod secundo propositum2 fuit: Non potest facere, nisi quod iustitia sua exigit; et non potest id . . . |
Likewise, what has been proposed2 second: “He cannot do, but what His own Justice demands; and He cannot do / that, . . . |
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1 Edd. 2, 5 pravam. Deinde Vat. et aliae edd., excepta 1, conantur pro nituntur, contradicentibus omnibus codd. 2 Solummodo Vat. et edd. 4, 6, 8 oppositum. Immediate post cod. C exigat, ut fiat; et pro exigit; et. |
1 Editions 2 and 5 have depraved [pravam] for first [primam]. Then the Vatican edition and the other editions, except edition 1, have they try [conantur] for they strive [nituntur], with all the codices contradicting it. 2 Only the Vatican edition and editions 4, 6 and 8 have opposed [oppositum]. Immediately after this codex C reads demands, Him to do; and [exigat, ut fiat; et] for demans; and [exigit; et]. |
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facere, quod iustitia sua exigit, ut non fiat; dicimus, quia exactionis verbum de Deo congrue non dicitur nec proprie accipitur. Et in illis locutionibus duplex est sensus. Si enim intelligas: non potest facere, nisi quod iustitia sua exigit, id est, nisi quod iusta voluntas sua vult, falsum dicis. Iustitia enim Dei ipsius aequissima voluntas accipitur, qualiter accipit Augustinus,1 illa verba Domini in Genesi loquentis ad Loth: Non possum quidquam facere, donec illo introeas, exponens: « Non posse, inquit, se dixit, quod sine dubio poterat per potentiam, sed non poterat per iustitiam »; quasi dicat:2 poterat quidem, sed non volebat, et illa voluntas iusta erat. Si ergo per haec verba intelligas, eum non posse facere nisi illud quod, si fieret, iustitiae eius conveniret, verum dicis. Similiter distingue illud: Non potest facere quod sua iustitia exigit, ut non faciat, id est, non potest facere id quod ipse, qui est summa iustitia, non vult facere, falsum est. Si autem intelligas his verbis, eum non posse facere id quod iustitiae eius convenire non potest, verum dicis. |
do / that, which His own Justice demands, that He not do”; we say, because a verb of demanding [exactionis] is not congruously said of God, nor is it properly accepted. And in those expressions there is a twofold sense. For if you understand: “He cannot do, but what His own justice demands”, that is, “but what His own just Will wills”, you speak a falsehood. For the Justice of God is accepted as His Most Equitous Will [aequissima voluntas], in which manner (St.) Augustine1 accepts (it), (when) expounding those words of the Lord, in Genesis, speaking to Lot: I cannot do anything, until you enter in there, he says: « He said that He cannot (do), that which without doubt He could (do) through (His) Power, but (which) He could not (do) through (His) Justice »; as if to say:2 “He indeed could (do it); but He did not want to, and that Will was just.” Therefore, if you understand through these words, “that He cannot do except that which, if He would do, it would convene with His Justice”, you speak the truth. Similarly distinguish this: “He cannot do what His Justice demands, that He not do”, that is, “He cannot do that which He himself, who is the Most High Justice, does not want to do”, (thus) it is false. But if you understand by these words, “that He cannot do that which cannot convene with His Justice”, you speak the truth. |
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Addunt quoque et alia dicentes: Non potest Deus facere nisi quod debet; non autem debet facere nisi quod facit. Si enim debet alia facere, non ergo facit omne quod debet; si vero facit omne quod debet, nec potest facere nisi quod debet: non ergo potest facere nisi quod facit. — Item, aut debet dimittere quod dimittit, ne faciat, aut non debet. Si non debet, non recte dimittit; si vero debet dimittere: ergo non debet facere. Si autem non debet, nec decet nec3 oportet eum facere; et si non decet nec oportet eum facere, ergo non potest facere: non ergo potest facere nisi quod facit. Nec potest illud dimittere quod facit, quin faciat, quia debet illud facere; et quod debet facere, non potest illud dimittere. — Sed ut mihi videtur, hoc verbum debet venenum habet. Multiplicem enim et involutam continet4 intelligentiam, nec Deo proprie competit, qui non est debitor nobis, nisi forte ex promisso, nos vero ei debitores sumus ex commisso: Ut autem venenum evacuetur, distingue verbi sensus: non potest Deus facere nisi quod debet, id est, nisi quod vult, falsum est; sic enim potest ipse dici debere aliquid, quia vult illud. Si autem dicatur: non potest nisi quod debet, id est non potest nisi illud quod, si faceret, ei bene conveniret, verum est. |
They also add, saying even other (things): “God cannot do but what He ought (to do); however, He ought not do but what He does. For if He ought to do others, therefore He does not do everything which He ought; but if He does everything which He ought, He cannot do but what He ought: therefore He cannot do but what He does.” — Likewise, “either He ought to leave off (doing) what He leaves off, to do, or He ought not. If He ought not, He does not rightly leave off (doing); but if He ought to leave off doing: therefore He ought not do. But if He ought not, and it is not fitting [decet] nor3 necessary [oportet] that He do (them), therefore He cannot do (them): therefore He cannot do but what He does. Nor can he leave off (doing) that which He does, so as not to do it, because He ought to do that; and that which He ought to do, He cannot leave off (doing).” — But as it seems to be, this verb “He ought” has a poison. For it contains4 a multiple and involuted understanding, nor does it properly befit [competit] God, who is not a debtor to us, except [nisi] perhaps on account of a promise, but we are debtors to Him on account of (what we have) committed. Moreover to empty out (its) poison, distinguish the senses of the verb: “God cannot do but what He ought”, that is, (in the sense of) “but what He wills”, (then) it is false, for thus He Himself can be said to owe something, because He wills it. But if there be said: “He cannot (do) but what He ought”, that is, “He cannot (do) except that which, if He would do, would well convene with Him”, (then) it is true. |
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Addunt5 quoque illi dicentes: Nihil facit aut dimittit, nisi optima et rationabili causa, licet nobis occulta sit, secundum quam oportet eum facere ac dimittere quae facit vel dimittit. Ratio enim penes eum est, qua illa facit et illa dimittit; quae ratio aeterna est et semper manens, praeter quam non potest aliquid facere vel dimittere. Illa ergo manente, non potest quod facit dimittere, nec quod dimittit facere, et ita non potest facere nisi quod facit. — Et ad hoc respondemus, ambiguitatem locutionis determinantes. Cum enim dicitur: ratio vel causa optima penes Deum est, qua facit cuncta quae facit, et dimittit ea quae dimittit, verum quidem est, quia in eo voluntas est aequissima et rectissima, qua facit et dimittit quae vult, contra quam facere non potest, nec praeter eam facere potest. Nec utique contra eam faceret nec praeter eam, si ea quae facit dimitteret, vel quae dimittit faceret; sed eadem manente ratione et causa, alia potuit facere et ista dimittere. Licet ergo ratio sit penes eum, qua alia facit, alia dimittit, potest tamen secundum eandem rationem et dimittere quae facit, et facere quae dimittit. |
They also add5 saying: “He can do or leave off (doing) nothing, except for the best and reasonable cause, though it has been hidden from us, according to which (cause) it is necessary [oportet] that He do and leave off (doing), what He does and/or leaves off (doing). For the reason is from within Him, by which He does these and leaves off (doing) those; which reason is eternal and remaining always, besides which He cannot do and/or leave off (doing) anything. Therefore with that remaining, He cannot leave off (doing) what He does, nor do what He leaves off (doing), and thus He cannot do but what he does.” — And to this we respond, determining the ambiguity of the expression. For when there is said: “The reason and/or best cause is from within God, by which He does all which He does, and leaves off (doing) those which He does”, it is indeed true, because in Him the Will is Most Equitous and Most Upright, by which He does and leaves off (doing) what He wills, against which He cannot work, and besides which [praeter eam] He cannot work. Nor indeed would He work against It nor besides It, if He would leave off (doing) those which He does, and/or would do those which He leaves off (doing); but with the reason and cause remaining the same, He could do other (things) and leave off (doing) these. Therefore though the reason is from within Him, by which He does some, leaves off (doing) others, yet He can according to the same reason both leave off (doing) what He does, and do what He leaves off (doing). |
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Ipsi autem6 addunt: Ratio est, eum facere quae facit et non alia; et non potest facere, nisi quod ratio est eum facere: et ita non potest facere nisi quod facit. Item, ratio est, eum dimittere quod dimittit; et non potest non dimittere quod ratio est eum dimittere: et ita non potest non dimittere quod dimittit. — Et ad hoc dicimus, locutiones ambiguas esse, et ideo determinandas. Si enim, cum dicitur: non potest facere, nisi quod ratio est eum facere, intelligas, eum non posse facere, nisi ea quae rationabilia sunt, et ea quae, si fierent, rationabilia essent, verus est sensus. Si autem intelligas, eum non posse facere alia rationabilia et bona, nisi ea quae vult et facit, falsus est intellectus. |
Moreover6 they add: “There is a reason, that He does what He does and not other (things); and He cannot do, except (that) on account of which there is a reason that He does (it): and thus He cannot do but what He does. Likewise, there is a reason, that He leaves off (doing) what He leaves off (doing); and He cannot not leave off (doing that) on account of which there is a reason that He leave off (doing it): and thus He cannot not leave off (doing) what He leaves off (doing).” — And to this we say, that the expressions are ambiguous, and for that reason (they are) to be determined. For if, when there is said: “He cannot do, except (that) on account of which there is a reason that He do (it)”, you understand, “that He cannot do, except those thing which are reasonable, and those which, if He would do (them), they would be reasonable”, the sense is true. But if you understand, “that He cannot do other reasonable and good (things), except those which He wills and does”, the understanding is a false one. |
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Item aliud adiungunt dicentes: Si potest Deus aliud facere quam facit, potest igitur facere quod non praescivit; et si potest facere quod non praescivit, potest sine praescientia operari, quia omne quod facturum se praescivit facit, nec facit aliquid quod non praescivit. Quod si praeter praescientiam eius aliquid fieri impossibile est, omne quod praescitum est, fieri necesse est: ergo aliud fieri, quam fit, nulla ratione possibile est: non ergo potest a Deo fieri, nisi quod fit. — Haec autem quaestio de praescientia facile determinari potest per ea quae superius7 dicta sunt, cum de praescientia ageretur. |
Likewise they adjoin another, saying: “If God can do other than He does, He can therefore do what He has not foreknown; and if He can do what He has not foreknown, He can work without foreknowledge, because everything, which He foreknew He (was) going to do, He does, nor does He do something which He did not foreknow. Which, if it is impossible that anything come to be apart from [praeter] His Foreknowledge, it is necessary that everything which has been foreknown, come to be: therefore it is possible according to no reckoning, that there comes to be (something) other, than comes to be: therefore there cannot come to be from God, but what comes to be.” — But this question concerning (God’s) Foreknowledge can easily be determined through those which have been said further above,7 when the Foreknowledge was dealt with. |
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His autem illi scrutatores, qui defecerunt scrutantes scrutinia, Sanctorum annectunt testimonia. Dicit enim Augustinus in libro de Symbolo:8 « Hoc solum non potest Deus, quod non vult ». Per quod videtur non posse facere aliquid, nisi quod vult; sed non vult nisi quod facit: et ita videtur non posse nisi quod facit. — Illud autem ita intelligendum est: id solum non potest Deus, quod non vult, scilicet se posse. — Idem in septimo libro Confessionum9 ad Deum loquens ait: « Nec cogeris invitus ad aliquid, quia voluntas tua non est maior quam potentia; esset autem maior, si te ipso tu ipse maior esses ». Ex hoc videtur, quod Deus non possit plura, quam vult, sicut non vult plura, quam potest. Sicut enim voluntas non est maior potentia, ita . . . |
Moreover, to these those scrutinizers, who failed scrutinizing scrutinies, adjoined the testimonies of the Saints. For (St.) Augustine says in the book On the Creed:8 « This alone God cannot (do): what He does not will (to do) ». Through which it seems that He cannot do anything, but what He wills; but He does not will but what He does: and thus it seems that He cannot (do) but what He does. — But that most be understood thus: “this alone God cannot (do): what He does want, namely, Himself to be able (to do).” — He says the same in the seventh book of The Confessions,9 speaking to God: « Nor art That thought (to be) unwilling regarding anything, because Thy Will is not greater than (Thy) Power; moreover, It would be greater, if Thou Thyself would be greater than Thy very Self ». From this it seems, that God cannot (do) more, than He wills, just as He does not will more, that He can (do). For just as (His) Will is not greater than (His) Power, so . . . |
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1 Libr. I. contra Gaudentium, c. 30. n. 35. — Locus s. Scripturae est Gen. 19, 22. Vulgata: Quia non potero facere quidquam, donec ingrediaris illuc. 2 Ita ed. 8; aliae edd. et omnes codd. omittunt dicat; solummodo Vat. Quod. 3 Vat. et edd. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 non bene non. 4 Codd. A B D E et ed. 1 tenet. 5 Codd. C D E et ed. 1 Adiiciunt (quod et habet S. Bonav.). 6 Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9 etiam. Paulo inferius Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 dimittere quae dimittit pro dimittere quod dimittit. 7 Dist. XXXVIII. XXXIX. 8 Serm ad Catech. c. 1. n. 2. In praecedentibus alluditur ad Psalm. 63, 7, ubi Vulgata et edd. 2, 9 habent scrutantes scrutinio. 9 Cap. 4. n. 6. |
1 Against Gaudentius, Bk. I, ch. 30, n. 35. — The passage of Sacred Scripture is Gen 19:22. The Vulgate reads: Because I will be able to do nothing, until you will enter unto there [Quia non potero facere quidquam, donec ingrediaris illuc]. 2 Thus edition 8; the other editions and all the codices omit to say [dicat]; only the Vatican edition reads Which [Quod]. 3 The Vatican edition and editions 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 have not so well it is not [non]. 4 Codices A B D E and edition 1 have has [tenet]. 5 Codices C D and E and edition 1 read adjoin [Adiiciunt] (which St. Bonaventure also has in his Division of the Text). 6 The Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 9 have They also [Ipsi etiam] for Moreover they [Ipsi autem]. A little below this the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9 read that He leaves off (doing) those which He leaves off (doing) [dimittere quae dimittit] for that He leaves off (doing) what He leaves off (doing) [dimittere quod dimittit]. 7 In Distinctions XXXVIII and XXXIX. 8 In the Sermon To Catechumens, ch. 1, n. 2. In the preceding there is an allusion to Ps. 63:7, where the Vulgate and editions 2 and 9 have scrutinizing by a scrutiny [scrutantes scrutinio]. 9 Chapter 4, n. 6. |
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nec potentia maior est voluntate. Ideoque, sicut plura non vult, quam potest, ita eum non plura posse quam velle dicunt. — Sed ad hoc dicimus, quia nec voluntas potentia, nec potentia voluntate maiore est, quia una et eadem res est potentia et voluntas, scilicet ipse Deus, qui esset maior se ipso, si voluntas esse maior potentia, vel potentia voluntate. Nec hac auctoritate negatur, Deum plura posse quam velle, quia plura sunt subiecta eius potentiae quam voluntati. |
neither is (His) Power greater than (His) Will. An for that reason, just as He does not will more, than He can (do), so (He does not will) that He can do more than they say He wills. — But to this we say, that neither is the Will greater than the Power, nor the Power than the Will, because the Power and the Will are one and the same Thing, namely, God Himself, who would be greater than Himself, if the Will would be greater than the Power, and/or the Power than the Will. Nor is it denied by this authority, that God can (do) more than He wills, because more have been subjected to His Power than to (His) Will. |
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Fateamur itaque, Deum multa1 posse facere, quae non vult, et posse dimittere quae facit. Quod ut certius firmiusque teneatur, Scripturae testimoniis afferamus, Deum plura posse facere, quam faciat. Veritas ipsa secundum Matthaeum2 ait: An putas, quia non possum rogare Patrem meum, et exhibebit mihi modo plus quam duodecim legiones Angelorum? Ex quibus verbis patenter innuitur, quia et Filius poterat rogare quod non rogabat, et Pater exhibere quod non exhibebat. Uterque igitur poterat facere quod non faciebat. Augustinus etiam in Enchiridio3 ait: Omnipotens voluntas multa potest facere, quod non vult nec facit: potuit enim facere, ut duodecim legiones Angelorum pugnarent contra illos qui Christum ceperunt. Item in eodem:4 « Cur apud quosdam non factae sunt virtutes, quae si factae fuissent, egissent illi homines poenitentiam; et factae sunt apud eos qui non erant credituri? Tunc non latebit quod nunc latet. Nec utique iniuste Deus noluit salvos fieri, cum possent salvi esse, si vellet.5 Tunc in clarissima Sapientiae luce videbitur quod nunc piorum fides habet, antequam manifesta cognitione videatur, quam certa et immutabilis et efficacissima sit voluntas Dei, quae multa possit et6 non velit, nihil autem quod non possit, velit ». Idem in libro de Natura et gratia:7 « Dominus Lazarum suscitavit in corpore. Nunquid dicendum est, non potuit Iudam suscitare in mente? Potuit quidem, sed noluit ».8 |
And so let us say, that God can do many1 (things), which He does not will, and that He can leave off (doing) those which He does. Which, so that it may be more certainly and firmly held, let us show [afferamus] by the testimonies of Scripture, that God can do more, than He does. The Truth Himself, according to (the Gospel of St.) Matthew,2 says: « Or do you think, that I cannot ask My Father, and He will bring forth [exhibebat] for Me now more than twelve legions of Angels? From which words there is patently hinted, that the Son could ask for what He did not ask for, and the Father bring forth what He did not bring forth. Therefore Each could do, what He did not do. (St.) Augustine also in (his) Enchiridion says:3 “(His) Omnipotent Will can do many (things), which He does not will nor does: for It could cause, twelve legions of Angels to fight against those who seized Christ.” Likewise in the same (he says):4 « Why among certain (men) were deeds of power [virtutes] not worked, which if they had been worked, those men would have done penance; and (why) were they worked among those who were not going to believe? Then there would not lie hidden [non latebit], what now lies hidden. Nor, indeed, was God unjustly unwilling that they be saved, since they could have been saved, if He willed (it).5 Then shall there be seen in the most clear light of Wisdom what the faith of the pious holds (fast to now), before it is seen by (that) manifest cognition, (namely) how certain and immutable and most efficacious is God’s Will, which can do many (things) and6 (yet) does not will (to do so), but (which) wills nothing which It cannot (do) ». Likewise in the book On Nature and Grace (he says):7 « The Lord raised up Lazarus in body. Is it to be said, that He could not raise up Judas in mind? Indeed He could, but He was unwilling ».8 |
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His auctoritatibus aliisque multis aperte docetur, quod Deus multa possit facere, quae non vult. Quod etiam ratione probari potest. Non enim vult Deus omnes homines iustificare, et tamen quis dubitat, eum posse? Potest ergo Deus aliud facere, quam facit, et tamen, si aliud faceret, alius ipse non esset. Et potest aliud velle, quam vult, et tamen eius voluntas nec alia nec nova nec mutabilis aliquo modo esse potest. Etsi enim9 possit velle quod nunquam voluit, non tamen noviter nec nova voluntate, sed sempiterna tantum voluntate velle potest. Potest enim velle quod ab aeterno potest voluisse. Habet enim potentiam volendi et nunc et ab aeterno, quod tamen nec modo vult nec ab aeterno voluit. |
By these authorities and many others there is openly taught, that God can do many (things), which He does not will (to do). Which also can be proven by reason. For God does not want to justify all men, and yet who doubts, that He can? Therefore God can do (something) other, than He does, and yet, if He would do (something) else, He would not be different [alius]. And He can will (something) other, than He wills, and yet His Will can neither be other nor new nor mutable in any manner. For9 even if He can will what He never has willed, yet He cannot will newly nor by a new Will, but only by (His) sempiternal Will. For He can will what He could have willed from eternity. For He has the power of willing both now and from eternity, what He, however, never wills now nor has willed from eternity. |
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1 Vat. cum plurimis edd. plura. 2 Cap. 26, 53. 3 Cap. 95. n. 24; et de Spiritu et littera, c. 1. et 35, ex quibus locis quae sequuntur secundum sensum sumta sunt. Eadem verba invenies apud Abaelardum, in libr. Sic et Non, c. 35. (Migne, Patrol. Lat. tom. 178.). 4 Enchirid. loc. cit., sed multis a Magistro omissis et transpositis. In textu respicitur illud Mathh. 11, 21: Quia si in Tyro et Sidone factae essent virtutes, quae factae sunt in vobis, olim in cilicio et cinere poenitentiam egissent. 5 Praeter Vat. et ed. 4 aliae edd. vellent; editio August. nunc vellent, alias vellet. Codd. nostri vellet, sed B C a secunda manu in margine vellent. Utraque lectio in bono sensu intelligi potest; unde nihil mutavimus, praesertim cum vellet magis convenit cum re, de qua sermo est. 6 Codd. A C quod. 7 Cap. 7. n. 8. — Locus s. Scripturae, ad quem respicitur, est Ioan. 11, 43. 8 Solummodo ed. 8 repetit: Vel sic tantum: quia Dominus Lazarum suscitavit, sine dubio potuit; quia vero Judam non suscitavit, nunquid dicendum est, non potuit? potuit ergo, sed noluit; quae verba genuinum textum Augustini exhibent. 9 Ita codd. et ed. 1; Vat. cum aliis edd. Quod etsi. Deinde pro possit cod. D posset. Denique omnes codd. omittunt voluntate post tantum. |
1 The Vatican edition, together with very many editions, has more [plura]. 2 Chapter 26:53. 3 Chapter 95, n. 24; and On Spirit and Letter, chs. 1 and 35, from which passages those which follow have been taken according to sense. You will find the same words in Abelard’s, Sic et Non, ch. 35 (Migne, Patrologia Latina, tome 178). 4 Enchiridion, loc. cit., but with many (things) omitted and transposed by Master (Peter). In the text there is a reference to Mt. 11:21: Because if in Tyre and Sidon there can been done the deeds of power [virtutes], which have been done in your (towns), they would have at once done penance in cilice and ashes [Quia si in Tyro et Sidone factae essent virtutes, quae factae sunt in vobis, olim in cilicio et cinere poenitentiam egissent]. 5 Besides the Vatican edition and edition 4, the other editions have if they willed (it) [si vellent]; the edition of (St.) Augustine’s (works) now reads if they willed (it) [si vellent], the others have if He willed (it) [si vellet]. Our codices have if He willed (it) [si vellet], but codices B and C, by a second hand in the margin, have if they willed (it) [si vellent]. Each reading can be understood in a good sense, wherefore we have changed nothing, especially since if He willed (it) [si vellet] is more fitting with the subject of the discourse. 6 Codices A and C have which it [quod] for and [et]. 7 Chapter 7, n. 8. — The passage of Sacred Scripture, which is referred to, is Jn 11:43. 8 Only edition 8 repeats: And/or thus only: because the Lord raised up Lazarus, without doubt He could; but because He did not raise up Judas, is it to be said, that He could not? therefore He could, but He was unwilling [Vel sic tantum: quia Dominus Lazarum suscitavit, sine dubio potuit; quia vero Judam non suscitavit, nunquid dicendum est, non potuit? potuit ergo, sed noluit]; which words the genuine text of (St.) Augustine exhibit. 9 Thus the codices and edition 1; the Vatican edition, together with the other editions, has Wherefore even if [Quod etsi] in place of For even if [Etsi enim]. Then for He can [possit] codex D has He could [posset]. Then all the codices omit Will [voluntate] after only [tantum]. |
The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.