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Magistri Petri Lombardi |
Master Peter Lombard |
Sententiarum Quatuor Libri |
The Four Books of Sentences |
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LIBER PRIMUS SENTENTIARUM.
DE DEI UNITATE ET TRINITATE |
THE FIRST BOOK OF THE SENTENCES
ON THE UNITY AND TRINITY OF GOD |
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DISTINCTIO XLIV. |
DISTINCTION 44 |
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Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, |
Latin
text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, |
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Cap. I.
An Deus possit facere aliquid melius, quam facit, vel alio vel meliori modo. |
Chapter I. Whether God can make something better, than He has made (it), and/or in another and/or better manner, (than He has). |
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Nunc illud restat discutiendum, utrum melius aliquid Deus1 possit facere, quam facit. Solent enim illi scrutatores dicere, quod ea quae facit Deus, non potest meliora facere, quia si posset facere et non faceret, invidus esset et non summe bonus. Et hoc ex simili astruere conantur. Ait enim Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum:2 « Deus quem genuit, quoniam meliorem se generare non potuit — nihil enim Deo melius — generare debuit aequalem. Si enim voluit et non potuit, infirmus est; si potuit et noluit, invidus. Ex quo conficitur, aequalem genuisse filium ». A simili volunt dicere, quod si potest Deus rem meliorem facere, quam facit, invidus est. — Sed non valet huius similitudinis inductio, quia filium genuit de substantia sua; ideoque, si posset gignere aequalem et non gigneret, invidus esset. Alia vero, quae non de substantia sua facit, meliora facere potest. |
Now it remains to be discussed, whether God1 can make something better, than He makes (it). For those scrutinizers (of this question) are accustomed to say, that those which God makes, He cannot make better, because if He could make (them better) and did not make (them such), He would be envious and not most highly good. And they strive to construe [astruere] this from a simile. For (St.) Augustine says in the book of Eighty-Three Questions:2 « God, since He could not generate Him, whom He begot, better than Himself — for nothing (is) better than God — ought to generate, Him as an equal (to Himself). For if He wanted to and could not, He is infirm; if He could and was unwilling, (He is) envious. From which it is concluded [conficitur], that He has generated an equal Son ». From the simile they want to say, that if God can make a thing better, than He makes (it), He is envious (for not having done so). — But the induction of this similitude is not valid, because He begot the Son from His own Substance; and for that reason, if He could beget an Equal and did not beget (Him), He would be envious. However, the other (things), which He does not make from His own Substance, He can make better. |
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Verum hic ab eis responderi deposco, cur dicant, rem aliquam sive etiam rerum universitatem, in qua maior consummatio expressa est, non posse esse meliorem, quam est: sive ideo, quia summe bona est, ita ut nulla omnino boni perfectio ei desit, sive ideo, quia maius bonum, quod ei deest, capere ipsa non valeat. Sed si ita summe bona dicitur, ut nulla ei perfectio boni desit, iam creatura Creatori aequatur. Si vero ideo non potest melior esse, quia bonum amplius, quod ei deest, capere ipsa non valeat; iam hoc ipsum non posse defectionis est, non consummationis; et potest esse melior, si fiat capax melioris boni, quod ipse potest qui eam fecit. Potest ergo Deus meliorem rem facere, quam faciat. Unde Augustinus super Genesim:3 « Talem potuit Deus hominem fecisse, qui nec peccare posset nec vellet; et si talem fecisset, quis dubitat, eum meliorem fuisse »? — Ex praedictis constat, quod potest Deus et alia facere, quam facit, et quae facit meliora ea facere, quam facit. |
However, here I demand that there be an response [responderi] from them, why they say, that some thing or even the university of things, in which there has been expressed a greater consummation (of the good), cannot be better, than it is: whether for this reason, because it is most highly good, such that entirely no perfection of the good is lacking to it, or for this reason, because the greater good, which is lacking to it, it does not prevail to grasp? But if it is thus said (to be) “most highly good”, such that no perfection of the good is lacking to it, (then) a creature is already equated to the Creator. However, if it cannot be better for this reason, because the more ample good, which is lacking to it, it does not prevail to grasp; this very ‘not being able’ already belongs to a defection (from the good), not to a consummation (in the good); and it can be better, if it becomes capable of a better good, which (greater good) He who made it is able (to work). Therefore God can make a thing better, than He makes (it). Wherefore (St.) Augustine on Genesis (says):3 « God could have made man such, that he could neither sin nor want (to sin); and if He would have made (him) such, who doubts, that he was better »? — From the aforesaid it is established, that God both can make (things) other, than He makes (them), and (can) make those which He makes, better than He makes (them). |
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Post haec considerandum est, utrum alio modo vel meliori, quam facit, possit ea facere quae facit. Si modus operationis ad sapientiam opificis referatur, nec alius nec melior4 esse potest. Non enim potest facere aliquid aliter vel melius, quam facit, id est alia sapientia vel maiori sapientia; nihil enim sapientius potest facere, quam facit. Si vero referatur modus ad rem ispam, quam facit Deus, dicimus, quia et alius et melior potest esse modus. Et secundum hoc concedi potest, quia ea quae facit, potest facere melius et aliter, quam facit, quia potest quibusdam meliorem modum existendi praestare, et quibusdam alium. Unde Augustinus in decimo tertio libro de Trinitate5 dicit, quod fuit et alius modus nostrae liberationis possibilis Deo, qui omnia potest; sed nullus alius nostrae miseriae sanadae fuit convenientior. Potest igitur Deus eorum quae facit, quaedam alio modo meliori, quaedam alio modo aeque bono, quaedam etiam minus bono facere, quam facit; ut tamen modus referatur ad qualitatem6 creaturae, non ad sapientiam Creatoris. |
After these one must consider, whether He can make those, which He makes, in another and/or better manner, than He does make (them). If the manner of operation is referred to the wisdom of the worker, it cannot be other nor better.4 for He cannot make something in another manner and/or better, than He makes (it), that is by another wisdom and/or by a greater wisdom; for He can make nothing more wisely, than He makes (it). But if the manner is referred to the thing itself, which God makes, we say, that there can be another and better manner. And according to this it can be conceded, that those which he makes, He can make better and in another manner, than He does make (them), because He can offer to certain ones a better manner of existing, and to certain ones another (manner of existing). Wherefore (St.) Augustine in the thirteenth book On the Trinity5 says, that another manner of our liberation was possible to God, who can (do) all (things); but no other (manner) of healing our wretchedness was more convenient. Therefore God can, of whose which He makes, make certain ones in another better manner, certain ones in an another, equally good manner, certain ones even in a less good (manner), than He does make (them); yet so that the manner be referred to the quality6 of the creature, not to the Wisdom of the Creator. |
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Cap. II.
Utrum Deus semper possit omne quod potuit. |
Chapter II. Whether God can always (do) everything which He could (do). |
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Praeterea quaeri solet, utrum Deus semper possit omne quod olim potuit. Quod quibusdam non videtur dicentibus: Potuit Deus incarnari et potuit mori et resurgere, et alia huiusmodi, quae modo non potest. Potuit ergo quae modo non potest, et ita habuit potentiam, quam modo non habet. Unde videtur eius potentia imminuta. — Ad quod dicimus, quia sicut omnia semper scit, quae aliquando scivit, et semper vult, quae aliquando voluit, nec unquam aliquam scientiam amittit, vel voluntatem mutat, quam habuit: ita omnia semper potest, quae aliquando potuit, nec unquam aliqua potentia sua privatur. Non est ergo privatus potentia incarnandi vel resugendi, licet non possit modo incarnari vel resurgere. Sicut enim potuit olim incarnari, ita et potest modo incarnatus esse, in quo eiusdem rei potentia monstratur. Ut enim olim scivit, se resurrecturum, et modo scit, se resurrexisse, nec est alia scientia illud olim scivisse, et hoc modo scire, sed eadem omnino; et sicut voluit olim resurgere, et modo resurrexisse, in quo unius rei voluntas exprimitur; ita potuit olim nasci et resurgere, et modo7 potest natus fuisse et resurrexisse: et est eiusdem rei potentia. Si enim posset modo nasci et resurgere, non esset idem posse. Verba enim diversorum temporum, diversis prolata temporibus et diversis adiuncta adverbiis, eundem faciunt sensum,8 ut modo loquentes dicimus: iste potest legere hodie, cras autem dicemus: iste potest legisse, vel potuit legere heri, ubique9 . . . |
Moreover, it is customarily asked, whether God always can (do) everything which He once could (do). Which does not seem to certain ones who say: “God could become incarnate and He could die and rise again, and other (things) of this kind, which He now cannot (do). Therefore, He could (do), what He cannot now (do), and thus He had a power, which He does not now have. Wherefore it seems that His Power (is) diminished. — To which we say, that just as He always knows all, which He has at any time known, and always wills, what He has at any time willed, neither does He ever loose any knowledge, and/or change the Will, which He had: thus He always can (do) all, which He at one time could (do), nor is He ever deprived of any of His Power. Therefore, He has not been deprived of the power to become incarnate and/or to rise again, though He cannot now be incarnated and/or rise again. For just as He could once [olim] be incarnated, so also He is now able to have been incarnate, in which there is demonstrated a power for the same thing [eiusdem rei potentia]. For as He once knew, that He was going to rise again, and now knows, that He has risen again, nor is it that He once knew this by another knowledge, and now knows this (by another), but by entirely the same (knowledge); and just as He will once to rise again, and now that He has risen again, in which a will for one thing [unius rei voluntas] is expressed; so He could once be born and rise again, and now He7 is able to have been born and to have risen again: and (His) power is for the same thing. For if He could now be born and rise again, (His) ‘being able’ would not be the same. For words for diverse times, pronounced in different tenses and adjoined to different adverbs, cause the same sense,8 as speaking of the now, we say: “this one can read today”, but tomorrow we say, “this one is able to have read, and/or could read yesterday”, where there is also9 . . . |
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1 Edd., excepta 1, omittunt Deus, refragantibus codd. Paulo post codd. A B post si posset addunt meliora. Deinde codd. A B D E a simili pro ex simili. 2 Quaest. 50. (cfr. II. contra Maximin. c. 7.). — Vat. cum pluribus edd. et codd. A C E omittit generare ante debuit; cod. B et ed. 1 genuit pro debuit. 3 Ad lit. XI. c. 7. n. 9. — Immediate ante Vat. et aliae edd., excepta 1, refragantibus codd. facit pro faciat. 4 Vat. aliaeque edd., excepta 1, repetunt modus, contradicentibus codd. 5 Cap. 10. n. 13; secundum sensum. 6 Vat. et aliae edd. addunt operis, id est, refragantibus codd. et ed. 1. 7 Vat. cum plurimis edd addit ipse. 8 De hac opinione Magistri cfr. Comment. hic a. 2. q. unica. 9 Codd. et edd. 1, 5 ubi. |
1 The editions, except edition 1, omits God [Deus], breaking with the codices. A little after this codices A and B after if He could make [si posset] add them better [meliora]. Then codices A B D and E have from a simile [a simili] for from a simile [ex simili]. 2 Question 50 (cf. Against Maximinus, Bk. II; ch. 7). — The Vatican edition, together with very many editions and codices A C and E, omits the second generate [generare]; codex B and edition 1 have He begot [genuit] for He ought to [debuit]. 3 On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. XI, ch. 7, n. 9. — Immediately before this the Vatican edition and the other editions, except edition 1, breaking with the codices, have the indicative He makes [facit] for He makes [faciat]. 4 The Vatican edition and the other editions, except edition 1, repeat a manner [modus], with the codices contradicting this. 5 Chapter 10, n. 13, according to sense. 6 The Vatican edition and the other editions add of the work, that is [operis, id est], breaking with the codices and edition 1. 7 The Vatican edition, together with very many editions, adds explicitly He [ipse]. 8 On this opinion of Master (Peter), cf. (St. Bonaventure’s) Commentary, here in a. 2, q. sole. 9 The codices and editions 1 and 5 have where [ubi] for where . . . also [ubique]. |
p.
780
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uius rei monstratur potentia. Si autem diversis temporibus loquentes eiusdem temporis verbis et adverbiis utamur, dicentes hodie: iste potest legere hodie, et dicentes cras: iste potest hodie legere; non idem, sed divera dicimus eum posse. Fateamur igitur, Deum semper posse quidquid semel potuit, id est habere omnem illam potentiam, quam semel habuit, et illius omnis rei potentiam, cuius semel habuit; sed non semper posse facere omne illud, quod aliquando potuit facere; potest quidem facere aut fecisse quod aliquando potuit. Similiter quidquid voluit, et vult, id est, omnem quam habuit voluntatem et modo habet; et cuiuscumque rei voluntatem habuit, et modo habet; non tamen vult esse vel fieri omne, quod aliquando voluit esse vel fieri, sed vult fuisse vel factum esse. Ita et de scientia Dei dicendum est. |
demonstrated a power for one thing. But if speaking of diverse times, we use verbs and adverbs of the same tense, saying today: “this one can read today”, and saying tomorrow: “this one can read today”; we do not say, that He can (do) the same (act), but diverse (acts). Therefore, let us say, that God always can (do) whatever He at one time [semel] could (do), that is, that He has all that power, which He at one time had, and the power for that every thing, for which He had (it) at one time; but not that He always can do every that, which He at some time could do; indeed He is able to do or to have done what He could at one time (do). Similarly whatever He willed, He also wills, that is, everything for which He has and now has a will; and for whatsoever thing He had a will, He also now has (one); yet He does not will that there be and/or come to be everything, which He at some time willed to be and/or to come to be, but He does will that it was and/or was made. |
The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.