Magistri Petri Lombardi
Arch. Episc. Parisiensis

Master Peter Lombard
Archbishop of Paris

Sententiarum Quatuor Libri

The Four Books of Sentences

LIBER PRIMUS SENTENTIARUM.

 

DE DEI UNITATE ET TRINITATE

THE FIRST BOOK OF THE SENTENCES

 

ON THE UNITY AND TRINITY OF GOD

DISTINCTIO XLV.

DISTINCTION 45

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 794-796.
Cum Notitiis Editorum Quaracchi

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 794-796.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Cap. I.

 

Dei voluntate Dei, quae essentia Dei est, et de signis eius.

Chapter I.

On God’s Will, which is God’s Essence, and on Its signs.

Iam de voluntate Dei aliquid pro sensus nostri imbecillitae dicendum est.  Sciendum est igitur, quia voluntas sive volens de Deo secundum essentiam dicitur.  Non est enim ei aliud velle et aliud esse, sed omnino idem.  Et sicut idem est ei esse bonum quod esse Deum, ita idem ei esse volentem quod esse Deum.  Nam voluntas, qua semper volens est, non affectus vel motus est, qui in Deum cadere non valet, sed divina usia, qua volens est, Deus est,1 et huiusmodi.

Now something must be said concerning God’s Will in proportion to [pro] the imbecility of our understanding [sensus].  It must be known, therefore, that “the Will” or “willing” is said of God according to essence.  For, it is not one (thing) for Him to will and another to be, but (each is) entirely the same.  And just as it is the same for Him to be good as to be God, so (it is) the same for Him to be willing as to be God.  For the Will, by which He is always willing, is not an affection [affectus] and/or a movement, which does not prevail to occur in God, but the (very) Divine Ousia (ousia), by which He is willing, is God,1 and (is) of this kind.

Cap. II.

 

Quod licet idem sit Deo velle quod esse, non tamen potest dici Deus omnia esse quae vult.

Chapter II.

That though for God it is the same to will as to be, yet God cannot be said to be all which He wills.

Et licet idem sit Deo velle quod esse, non tamen dicendum est, Deus esse omnia quae vult.  Quod quidam, de Dei voluntate non recte sentientes, nobis obiiciunt dicentes:  Si idem est Deo velle quod esse, ergo cum dicimus, Deum velle omnia quae facit, dicimus, eum esse omnia quae facit; alioquin non ibi illo verbo2 idem significatur, quod significatur hoc verbo esse, cum de Deo dicitur.  Et si ita est, non semper dicitur de Deo velle secundum essentiam.  Si vero secundum essentiam non dicitur aliquando, quomodo ergo dicitur de Deo?  Relative enim3 nunquam dicitur.  —  Ad quod dicimus, quia licet idem penitus sit Deo velle quod esse, non tamen potest dici esse omnia quae vult; sicut idem est Deo esse quod scire, nec tamen sicut dicitur scire omnia, ita quoque potest dici esse omnia.

And though it be the same for God to will as to be, yet it must not be said, that God is all (those things) which He wills.  Which certain ones, not thinking [sentientes] rightly of God’s Will, objects to us, saying:  “If it is the same for God to will as to be, therefore when we say, that God wills all which He makes, we say, that He is all which He makes; otherwise the same is not signified there by that verb,2 as is signified by this verb “to be”, when it is said of God.  And if it is thus, (then) “to will” is not always said of God according to essence.  If, however, it is sometimes not said according to essence, in what manner, therefore, is it said of God?  For (“to will”)3 is never said relatively.”  —  To which we say, that though it is thoroughly the same for God to be as to know, yet just as He neither is said “to know all”, so also can He (neither) be said “to be all”.

Cap. III.

 

De intelligentia harum locutionem:  Deus scit, vel Deus vult, Deus scit omnia vel vult aliquid.

Chapter III.

On the understanding of these expressions:  “God knows, and/or God Wills”, “God knows all and/or wills something”.

Et ubicumque Deus dicitur scire vel sciens, et4 velle vel volens, haec de eo secundum essentiam dicuntur.  Cum enim dicitur:  Deus scit vel Deus vult, sive Deus est sciens vel volens, essentia divina praedicatur et Deus esse enuntiatur.  Cum autem additur omnia vel aliquid vel aliqua, et dicitur:  Deus scit omnia, vel vult aliquid vel aliqua; essentia quidem divina praedicatur, non simpliciter et absolute, sed ita ut scientiae, quae ipse est, omnia subiecta5 monstrentur, et voluntati, quae ipsa eadem est, aliquid vel aliqua subiecta esse dicantur, ut talis fiat sensus:  Deus scit omnia, id est, Deus est, cuius scientiae, quae ipsius essentia est, omnia subiecta sunt.  Similiter:  Deus vult haec vel illa, id est, Deus est, cuius voluntati, quae ipse est, haec sive illa subiecta sunt.  Volens ergo sive velle dicitur Deus secundum essentiam, cuius voluntas essentia est sempiterna et immutabilis — licet ea varientur et transeant, quae ei subiecta sunt — quae non potest esse inusta nec mala, quia Deus est.

And wheresoever God is said “to know” and/or “(to be) knowing”, and4 “to will” and/or “(to be) willing”, these are said of Him according to essence.  For when there is said:  “God knows and/or God wills”, or “God is knowing and/or willing”, the Divine Essence is predicated and God is enunciated to be.  But when there is added “all” and/or “something” and/or “somethings”, and there is said:  “God knows all, and/or wills something and/or somethings”; the Divine Essence is indeed predicated, not simply and absolutely, but so that all may be shown (to have been)5 subjected to the Knowledge, which He Himself is, and to the Will, which the very same (Knowledge) is, something and/or somethings are said to have been subjected, so that the sense becomes such:  “God knows all”, that is, “God is (He), to whose Knowledge, which is His Essence, all have been subjected”.  Similarly:  “God wills these and/or those”, that is, “God is (He), to whose Will, which He Himself is, these or those have been subjected”.  Therefore God is said “(to be) willing” or “to will” according to essence, the Will of Whom is the sempiternal and immutable Essence — though those, which have been subject to It, vary and are transient [transeant] — Which cannot be unjust nor evil, because It is God.

1  Ita codd. A C E et ed. 1; Vat. et aliae edd. omittunt est; cod. D est, et Deus et; cod. B est, et Deus est, et.

2  Cod. C addit velle.

3  Supple:  velle, sive cum edd. 2, 3:  voluntas.

4  Vat. cum pluribus edd. vel.  Deinde codd. A C E et edd. 1, 4, 5 de Deo pro de eo.

5  Codd. B C D addunt esse.  Immediate ante ed. 1 ipsa est (scilicet essentia) pro ipse est.

1  Thus codices A C and E and edition 1; the Vatican edition and the other editions omit is [est]; codex D reads is, both God and [est, et Deus et]; codex B has is, both is God, and [est, et Deus est, et].

2  Codex C adds “to will” [velle].

3  Supply:  “to will” [velle], or with editions 2 and 3:  “will” [voluntas].

4  The Vatican edition, together with very many editions, has either [vel].  Then codices A C and E and editions 1, 4 and 5 have of God [de Deo] for of Him [de eo].

5  Codices B C and D add to have been [esse].  Immediately before (in the English, after) this, edition 1 has It Itself (i. e. the Divine Essence) is [ipsa est] for He Himself is [ipse est].

 

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Cap. IV.

 

Quod Dei voluntas summe bona causa est omnium quae naturaliter sunt, cuius causa non est quaerenda, quia prima et summa causa est omnium.

Chapter IV.

That God’s most highly Good Will is the Cause of all which naturally are, the cause of Which is not to be sought, because It is the First and Most High Cause of all.

Haec itaque summe bona voluntas causa est omnium quae naturaliter fiunt vel facta sive futura sunt, quae nulla praeventa est causa, quia aeterna est.  Ideoque causa ipsius quaerenda non est.  Qui enim eius causam quaerit, aliquid maius ea quaerit, cum nihil ea maius sit.  Unde Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum:1  « Qui quaerit, quare voluerit Deus mundum facere, causam quaerit voluntatis Dei.  Omnis autem causa efficens maior est eo quod efficitur.  Nihil autem maius est voluntate Dei.  Non ergo eius causa quaerenda est ».  Idem in libro de Genesi contra Manichaeos:2  « Si qui dixerunt:  Quid placuit Deo facere caelum et terram? respondendum est eis:  qui voluntatem Dei nosse desiderant, causas voluntatis3 Dei scire quaerunt, cum voluntas Dei omnium quae sunt, ipsa sit causa.  Si enim habet causam voluntas, est aliquid, quod antecedat voluntatem Dei, quod nefas est credere.  Qui ergo dicit:  Quare fecit Deus caelum et terram? respondendum est illi:  quia voluit.4  Voluntas enim Dei causa est caeli et terrae, et ideo maior est voluntas Dei quam caelum et terra.  Qui autem dicit:  Quare voluit facere caelum et terram? maius aliquid quaerit, quam est voluntas Dei; nihil autem maius inveniri potest.  Compescat se ergo humana temeritas, et id quod non est, non quaerat, ne id quod est, non inveniat ».  —  Ecce hic auctoritatibus aperte insinuatur, quod voluntatis Dei causa nulla est, et ideo quaerenda non est.

And so this most highly Good Will is the Cause of all which naturally come to be and/or (have been) made or are going to be, which no cause comes before, because It is eternal.  And for that reason no cause for It is to be sought.  For he who seeks Its cause, seeks something greater than It, though nothing is greater than it.  Wherefore (St.) Augustine in the book of Eighty-Three Questions (says):1  « He who seeks, for what reason God willed to make the world, seeks the cause of God’s Will.  But every efficient cause is greater than that which it effects.  But nothing is greater than God’s Will.  Therefore Its cause is not to be sought ».  The same (says) in the book On Genesis against the Manicheans:2  « If any have said:  “Why did it please God to make Heaven and Earth?”, it must be responded to them:  “Those who desire to know [nosse] God’s Will, seek to know [scire] the causes of God’s Will,3 though God’s Will Itself is the Cause of all which are”.  For if the Will has a cause, it is something, which antecedes God’s Will, which is a nefarious (thing) to believe.  Therefore, he who says:  “For what reason did God make Heaven and Earth? it must be responded to him:  “Because He willed4 (it)”.  For God’s Will is the cause of Heaven and Earth, and for that reason God’s Will is greater than Heaven and Earth.  Moreover, he who says:  “For what reason did He will to make Heaven and Earth?” seeks something greater, than God’s Will is; but nothing greater can be found.  Therefore let human temerity tread completely upon itself [compescat se], and that which is not, let it not seek, lest that which is, it not find ».  —  Behold here there is openly insinuated by authorities, that there is no cause of God’s Will, and for that reason one is not to be sought.

« Voluntas igitur Dei, ut ait Augustinus in tertio libro de Trinitate,5 prima et summa causa est omnium specierum atque motionum.  Nihil enim fit, quod non de interiori atque intelligibili aula summi Imperatoris egrediatur secundum ineffabilem iustitiam ».  « Ubi enim non operatur quod vult Dei omnipotentis sapientia? quae pertingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter »,6 « et non solum facit ea quae perseverantia consuetudinis admirationem non admittunt », « sed etiam ea quae propter raritatem et insolitum eventum mira videntur, ut sunt defectus luminarium et terrae motus et monstruosi animantium partus et his similia, quorum nihil fit sine7 voluntate Dei, sed plerisque non apparet.  Ideoque placuit vanitati philosophorum etiam causis aliis ea tribuere, cum omnino videre non possent superiorem ceteris omnibus causam, id est voluntatem Dei.  Itaque non nisi Dei voluntas causa prima est sanitatis, aegritudinis, praemiorum atque poenarum, gratiarum et retributionum ».  Haec igitur sola est, unde ortum est quidquid est, et ipsa non est orta, sed aetrna.

« Therefore God’s Will », as (St.) Augustine says in the third book On the Trinity,5 « is the First and Most High Cause of all species and motions.  For nothing comes to be, which does not step forth from the interior and intelligible inner-court [aula] of the Most High Emperor ».  « For where is there not worked that which the Wisdom of the Omnipotent God wills? Which reaches thoroughly from end unto end strongly, and disposes all (things) sweetly »,6 « and does not only do those which do not admit of admiration from (their) continual customariness [perseverantia consuetudinis] », « but even those which on account of (their) rarity and an unusual event seem to be wonderful, such as are the failings of the lights (of Heaven) and the movements of the Earth and monstrous births of living things and (those) similar to these, none [nihil] of which comes to be without7 God’s Will, nor [sed . . . non] appears to very many.  And for that reason it pleased the vanity of philosophers to grant even these to other causes, since they could not entirely see the Cause superior to all others, that is the Will of God.  And so non but God’s Will is the First Cause of health, sickness, rewards and punishments, graces and retributions ».  Therefore It is the sole (Cause), from which has arisen whatever is, and It Itself has not arisen, but (is) eternal.

Cap. V.

 

Quibus modis accipitur Dei voluntas.

Chapter V.

In what manners is God’s “will” accepted.

Hic non est praetereundum nobis, quod sacra Scriptura de voluntate Dei variis modis loqui consuevit; et tamen non est Dei voluntas diversa, sed locutio diversa est de voluntate, quia nomine voluntatis diversa accipit.  Nam voluntas Dei vere ac proprie dicitur quae in ipso est et ipsius essentia est; et haec una est nec multiplicitatem recipit nec mutabilitatem, quae inexpleta esse non potest, de qua Propheta ait:8  Omnia quaecumque voluit, Dominus fecit.  Et Apostolus:  Voluntatis eius quis resistit?  Et alibi:  Ut probetis, quae sit voluntas Dei bona et beneplacens et perfecta.  Et haec voluntas recte appellatur beneplacitum Dei sive dispositio.

Here it must not be overlooked by us, that Sacred Scripture is accustomed to speak of God’s Will in various manners; and yet God’s Will is not diverse, but there is a diverse expression of the Will, because it accepts diverse (things) under the name of “will”.  For God’s Will is truly and properly said to be (That) which is in Him and is His Essence; and This is one, nor does It receive a multiplicity nor a mutability, which cannot be unfulfilled, concerning Which the Prophet says:8  All (things) whichsoever He has willed, the Lord has made.  And the Apostle (says):  His Will, who resists (It)?.  And in another place:  So that you may show, that God’s Will is good and well pleasing and perfect. And this Will is rightly named God’s “good pleasure” or “disposition”.

Cap. VI.

 

Quod praeceptio, prohibitio, permissio, consilium, operatio nomine voluntatis interdum intellguntur.

Chapter VI.

That (God’s) preception, prohibition, permission, counsel, (and) operation are sometimes understood by the name of “will”.

Aliquando vero secundum quandam dicendi figuram voluntas Dei vocatur quod secundum proprietatem non est voluntas eius, ut praeceptio, prohibitio, consilium, nec non permissio et operatio.  Ideoque pluraliter aliquando Scriptura voluntates Dei, pronuntiat.  Unde Propheta:9  Magna opera Domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius.  Cum non sit nisi una voluntas Dei, quae ipse est, pluraliter tamen dicit voluntates, quia voluntas Dei variis modis ac pro diversis accipitur, ut dictum est.  Ita enim idem Propheta propter multos effectus misericordiae et iustitiae pluraliter dicit:10  Misericordias Domini in aeternum cantabo.  Et alibi:  Iustitiae Domini rectae, laetificantes corda, cum tamen in Deo una sit misericordia, una iustitia, eademque11 sit misericordia quae iustitia, scilicet divina usia.

However, sometimes under a certain figure of speech [dicendi] that which is not His Will according to a property is called the “will” of God, such a (God’s) preception [praeceptio], prohibition, counsel, and also permission and operation.  And for that reason Scripture sometimes pronounces (these) in the plural God’s “wills”.  Wherefore the Prophet (says):9  Great (are) the works of the Lord, exquisite in all His wills [in omnes voluntates eius].  Since there is naught but one Will of God, which is Himself, yet it says in the plural “wills”, because God’s “will” is accepted in various manners on behalf of diverse (things), as has been said.  For thus the same Prophet, on account of (experiencing) many effects of (God’s) Mercy and Justice, says in the plural:10  The mercies of the Lord shall I sing in eternity.  And in another place:  The justices of the Lord (are) upright, gladdening hearts, yet though in God there is one Mercy, one Justice, and the Same11 is (His) Mercy which (is His) Justice, namely the Divine Ousia.

Ideo autem praeceptio et prohibitio atque consilium, cum sint tria, dicitur tamen unumquodque eorum Dei voluntas, quia ista signa sunt divinae voluntatis; quemadmodum et signa irae dicuntur ira, et dilectionis signa dilectio appellantur; et dicitur iratus . . .

Moreover for this reason (God’s) preception and prohibition and even (His) counsel, though they are three, yet each one of them is said (to be) God’s “will”, because these are the signs of the Divine Will; according to which standard of measure both the signs of (God’s) anger [ira] are said (to be His) “anger”, and the signs of (His) dilection are named (His) “dilection”; and God is said / (to have been) “angered” [iratus] . . .

1  Quaest. 28.

2  Libr. I. c. 2. n. 1.

3  Codd. et edd., exceptis Vat. et ed. 8, causas et voluntatem, et immediate post quod voluntas pro cum voluntas.

4  Vat. et edd. 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 vult.

5  Cap. 4. n. 9; sed originale habet:  . . . omnium corporalium specierum atque motionum.  Nihil enim fit visibiliter et sensibiliter, quod non de interiore, invisibili atque intelligibili aula summi Imperatoris aut iubeatur aut permittatur (cod. D Imperatoris vel eo permittente vel faciente egrediatur) secundum ineffabilem iustitiam.  —  Sequens locus est ibid. c. 1. n. 6, tertius ibid. c. 2. n. 7, et quartus ibid. c. 3. n. 8, et c. 4. n. 9.

6  Sap. 8, 1.

7  Codd. A B C E et ed. 1 nisi.  Paulo inferius solummodo Vat. cum originali licuit vanitati pro placuit vanitati, denique codd. A D et omnes edd., excepta 1, attribuere pro tribuere, sed refragante originali.

8  Psalm. 113, 11; loci sequentes sunt Rom. 9, 19, et 12, 2.

9  Psalm. 110, 2.

10  Psalm. 88, 2; alius locus  est Psalm. 18, 9.

11  Vat. aliaeque edd. praemittunt eademque,* refragantibus codd. et ed. 1.

1  Question 28.

2  Book I, ch. 2, n. 1.

3  The codices and editions, except the Vatican edition and edition 8, have the causes and the Will of God [causas et voluntatem Dei], and immediately after this have wherefore [quod] for though [cum].

4  The Vatican edition and editions 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 read wills [vult].

5  Chapter 4, n. 9; but the original has:  . . . of all corporal species and motions. For nothing comes to be visibly and sensibly, which is not from the interior, invisible and intelligible inner-court of the Most High Emperor commanded or permitted (codex D has:  does not . . .Emperor step forth either with Him permitting it and/or causing it) according to (His) ineffable Justice.  —  The following passage is ibid., ch. 1, n. 6, the third is ibid., ch. 2, n. 7, and the fourth is ibid., ch. 3, n. 8, and ch. 4, n. 9.

6  Wis. 8:1.

7  Codices A B C and E and edition 1 have but by [nisi] for without [sine].  A little below this only the Vatican edition, together with the original, has it was licit for [licuit] in place of it pleased [placuit], and finally codices A and D and all the editions, except edition 1, have to attribute [attribuere] for to grant [tribuere], but breaking with the original.

8  Ps. 113:11; the passages which follow are Rom. 9:19 and 12:2.

9  Ps. 110:2.  [Tran. note:  In regard to little before this: ‘to precept’ is to command by establishing a principle of conduct.  Even though in English preception no longer retains the meaning of the verb, but is employed a technical term regarding legacies in Roman Law, preception will be used for praeceptio in this English translation, as signifying the same as prohibition does in regard to ‘to prohibit’, that is an act of the verb.]

10  Ps. 88:2; the other passage is Ps. 18:9.

11  The Vatican edition and the other editions omit and the Same [eademque],*, breaking with the codices and edition 1.

*  [Trans. nota:  Hic evidenter perperam nota originalis legivit et una pro eademque, quae vocula sumta est ex textu criticalis superius.]

*  [Trans. note:  Here the original note evidently erred in having and the One [et una] for and the Same [eademque], since the former is nowhere found it the critical text above; the latter being placed here in the footnote from the critical text, to correct the footnote.]

 

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Deus, et tamen non est ira in eo aliqua:  sed signa tantum, quae foris fiunt, quibus iratus ostenditur, ira ipsius nominantur.  Et est figura dicendi, secundum quam non est falsum quod dicitur, sed verum, quod dicitur, sub tropi nubilo obumbratur.  Et secundum hos tropos diversae voluntates Dei dicuntur, quia diversa sunt illa quae per tropum voluntas Dei dicuntur.

God is said / (to have been) “angered”, and yet there is no anger in Him:  but yet the signs, which come to the fore [foris fiunt], by which He is shown (to be) angered, are named His “anger”.  And it is a figure of speech, according to which what is said is not false, but what is said is true, overshadowed as it is [obumbratur] under the cloud of a trope. And according to these tropes there are said (to be) diverse “wills” of God, because those which are said through a trope (to be) God’s “will” are diverse.

Pro praecepto Dei atque consilio potest accipi voluntas, ut ibi:1  Fiat voluntas tua, sicut in caelo et in terra.  Et alibi:  Qui facit voluntatem Patris mei, qui in caelis est, ipse frater meus et soror et mater est.  Et contra hanc voluntatem multa fiunt.  Unde Augustinus in libro de Spiritu et littera:2  « Infideles, inquis, contra voluntatem Dei faciunt, cum eius Evangelio non credunt ».

On behalf of God’s precept and even counsel “will” can be accepted, as in this (verse):1  Thy Will be done, on Earth as it is in Heaven.  And in another  place:  He who does the Will of My Father, who is in Heaven, he is My brother and sisters and mother.  And many (things) are done against this “will”.  Wherefore (St.) Augustine (says) in the book On Spirit and Letter:2  « The infidels », he says, « work against God’s Will, when they do not believe His Gospel ».

Cap. VII.

 

Quod Deus velit ab omnibus fieri ea quae praecipit, vel non fieri quae prohibet.

Chapter VII.

That God wills that by all there be done those (things) which He precepts, and/or not be done those which He prohibits.

Et si illa tria dicuntur Dei voluntas, ideo quia signa sunt divinae voluntatis, non est tamen intelligendum, Deum omne illud fieri velle, quod cuicumque praecepit, vel non fieri quod prohibuit.  Praecepit enim Abrahae immolare filium, nec tamen voluit; nec ideo praecepit, ut id fieret, sed ut Abrahae probaretur fides.3  Et in Evangelio praecepit sanato, ne cui diceret; ille autem praedicavit ubique, intelligens, Deum non ideo prohibuisse, quin vellet opus suum praedicari, sed ut daret formam homini laudem humanam declinandi.

And if those three are said to be God’s “will”, for this reason, because they belong to the Divine Will, yet it must not be understood, that God wills that every that, which He has precepted, be done, and/or which He has prohibited, not be done.  For He precepted Abraham to immolate (his) son, yet He did not will (it); nor for that reason did He precept, so that it would be done, but so that Abraham’s faith would be proven.3  And in the Gospel He precepted the healed man, lest he speak of his own (healing); but he preached (it) everywhere, understanding, that God had not prohibited (it) for this reason, that He willed that His own work not be preached, but so that He would give a form for turning away human praise from (Christ) the Man.

Permissio quoque Dei et operatio voluntas Dei appellantur, qualiter accipit Augustinus in Enchiridio4 dicens:  « Non fit aliquid, nisi Omnipotens fieri vellit, vel sinendo, ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo.  Nec dubitandum est, Deum facere bene etiam sinendo fieri, quaecumque fiunt male.  Non enim hoc nisi iusto iudicio sinit, et profecto bonum est omne quod iustum est ».  —  Ecce manifeste hic habes,5 Dei voluntatem appellari ipsius operationem vel permissionem, cum dicit, non fieri aliquid, nisi Omnipoens fieri velit, ubi includit et bona et mala omnia, quae fiunt.  Ideoque aperte distinguit, quomodo Deum velle dixerit, ne eadem ratione intelligeretur velle bona et mala, subdens vel sinendo, ut fiat — hoc quantum ad mala dicit — vel ipse faciendo — hoc quantum ad bona.  Mala enim sinit fieri, sed non facit; bona vero ipse facit.  Ideoque dixit, eum velle, quia et volens6 mala sinit et volens bona operatur; et ob hoc permissio et operatio voluntas Dei dicuntur.

God’s permission and operation are also called God’s “will”, in the manner that (St.) Augustine accepts (them) in (his) Enchiridion,4 saying:  « Nothing comes to be, unless the Omnipotent wills (it) to come to be, either by allowing, that it comes to be, and/or by Himself causing (it).  Nor must it be doubted, that God causes in a good manner even by allowing to come to be, whichsoever come to be in an evil manner.  For He does not allow this except by a just judgment, and indeed everything which is just is good ».  —  Behold here you manifestly have,5 that God’s Will is named His operation and/or permission, when he says, that nothing comes to be, unless the Omnipotent wills it to come to be, where he includes both all good and evil (things), which come to be.  And for that reason he openly distinguishes, in what manner he said that God willed, lest there would be understood that He wills good and evil (things) for the same reason, subjoining either by allowing, it to come to be — this he says as much as regards evil (things) — and or by Himself causing (it) — this (he says) as much as regards good (things).  For He allows evil (things) to come to be, but does not cause (them); however He does cause good (things).  And for that reason he said, that He wills, because He, both, as One willing,6 allows evil (things) and, as One willing, works good ones; and because of this (His) permission and operation are said (to be) God’s “will”.

Quinque igitur supra posita sunt, quae dicuntur secundum tropum Dei voluntas, quia signa sunt divinae voluntatis, quae una est et immutabilis, scilicet Dei beneplacitum.  Ideoque diligenter distinguat lector, ubi7 de voluntate Dei Scriptura commemorat, iuxta quem modum accipi oporteat, utrum scilicet pro beneplacito Dei, an pro aliquo signorum eius.  Magna enim est adhibenda discretio in cognitione divinae voluntatis, quia et beneplacitum Dei est voluntas eius, et signum beneplaciti eius dicitur voluntas eius.  Sed beneplacitum eius aeternum est, signum vero beneplaciti eius non; et consonat rerum effectibus beneplacitum ipsius, et ipsi effectus rerum ab illo non discordant.  Fit enim omne quod beneplacito vult fieri, et omne quod non vult fieri, nequaquam fit.  Non ita autem est de signis, quia praecepit Deus multis ea quae non faciunt, et prohibet quae non cavent, et consulit quae non implent.8

Therefore five were posited above, which are said according to a trope (to be) God’s “will”, because they are signs of the Divine Will, Which is one and immutable, namely God’s Good Pleasure [Dei beneplacitum].  And for that reason the reader must distinguish diligently, where7 Scripture reminds (us) of God’s “will”, in accord with the manner it must [oporteat] be accepted, whether, that is, on behalf of God’s Good Pleasure, or on behalf of any of the signs for this.  For great discretion is to be employed in the recognition [cognitione] of the Divine Will, because both God’s Good Pleasure is His Will, and the sign of His Good Pleasure is said (to be) His “will”.  But His Good Pleasure is eternal, however the sign of His Good Pleasure is not; and His Good Pleasure is consonant with the effects of things, and the very effects of things are not discordant from It.  For everything which He wills to come to be by (His) Good Pleasure, come to be, and everything which He does not will to come to be, never comes to be.  But not thus does it concern the signs, because God precepted to many those which they do not, and prohibits those which they do not beware of, and counsels those which they do no fulfill.8

1  Matth. 6, 10; sequens locus est ibid. 12, 50.  Vulgata:  Quicumque enim facerit etc.

2  Cap. 33. n. 58.

3  Respicitur Gen. 22, 2. seqq., et deinde Marc. 1, 44.

4  Cap. 95. 96. n. 24; in quo textu Vat. cum aliis edd., excepta 1, haec nisi pro hoc nisi, contradicentibus codd. nec non originali.

5  Vat. cum plurimis edd. habemus.

6  Solummodo Vat. nolens, sed perperam, et deinde cum ed. 1 et codd. A C omittit et post sinit.

7  Codd. B D ubicumque.  Paulo post Vat. cum pluribus edd. omittit scilicet.

8   In tractatu de voluntate divina Petrus Lombardus plures propositiones ad verbum expressas, alias vero secundum sensum deprompsit ex duobus opusculis Hugonis a S. Victore:  Summa Sententiarum tr. I. c. 13, et I. de Sacramentis p. IV. c. 2. seqq.  Iam pluris observavimus, Magistrum passim non pauca ex Hugone, Abaelardo et fortasse etiam ex aliis auctoribus qui ante ipsum Sententias conscripserunt, in suos usus convertisse.

1  Mt. 6:10; the following passage is Mt. 12:10.  The Vulgate reads: For whosoever has done etc. [Quicumque enim facerit etc.].

2  Chapter 33, n. 58.

3  A reference to Gen. 22:2 ff., and then to Mk. 1:14.

4  Chapters 95 and 96, n. 24; in which text the Vatican edition, together with the other editions, except edition 1, have these except [haec nisi] for this except [hoc nisi], contradicting the codices and even the original.

5  The Vatican edition, together with very many editions, has we . . . have [habemus].

6  Only the Vatican edition has One unwilling [nolens], but faultily, and then with edition 1 and codices A and C it omits and [et] after allows [sinit].

7  Codices B and D have wheresoever [ubicumque].  A little after this the Vatican edition, together with very many editions, omits that is [scilicet].

8  In (his) Tract on the Divine Will, Peter Lombard has taken very many of the propositions which he expresses word for word, others, however, according to (their) sense, from two opuscula of Hugh of St. Victor:  Summa Sententiarum, tr. I, ch. 13, and de Sacramentis, Bk. I, p. IV, ch. 2 ff.  We have already observed on many occasions, that Master (Peter) has converted to his own use not a few (words) of Hugh, Abelard and perhaps even other authors, who composed Books of Sentences before him.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.