Magistri Petri Lombardi
Arch. Episc. Parisiensis

Master Peter Lombard
Archbishop of Paris

Sententiarum Quatuor Libri

The Four Books of Sentences

LIBER PRIMUS SENTENTIARUM.

 

DE DEI UNITATE ET TRINITATE

THE FIRST BOOK OF THE SENTENCES

 

ON THE UNITY AND TRINITY OF GOD

DISTINCTIO XLVI.

DISTINCTION 46

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 814-818.
Cum Notitiis Editorum Quaracchi

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 814-818.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Cap. I.

 

Quod voluntas Dei, quae ipse est, in nullo cassari potest.

Chapter I.

That the Will of God, which He Himself is, can be cancelled in nothing.

Hic oritur quaestio.   Dictum est enim in superioribus1 et auctoritatibus communitum, quod voluntas Dei, quae ipse est vocaturque beneplacitum eius, cassari non potest, quia illa voluntate quaecumque voluit, fecit in caelo et in terra:  cui, teste Apostolo, nihil resistit.  « Quaeritur ergo, quomodo accipiendum sit quod Apostolus de Domino ait:2  Qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri.  Cum enim non omnes salvi fiant, sed plures damnentur, videtur utique non fieri quod Deus vult fieri, humana scilicet voluntate impediente voluntatem Dei.  Dominus quoque in Evangelio impiam civitatem compellans:  Quoties, inquit, volui congregare filios tuos, sicut gallina congregat pullos suos sub alas, et noluisti!  Ita3 haec dicuntur, tanquam Dei voluntas superata sit hominum voluntate, et infirmissimus nolendo impedientibus, non potuerit facere potentissimus quod volebat.  Ubi est ergo illa omnipotentia, qua in caelo et in terra, secundum Prophetam, omnia quaecumque voluit, fecit?  Et quomodo voluntati eius, secundum Apostolum, nihil resistit, si colligere filiios Ierusalem voluit, et non fecit »?4  Haec enim praedictis plurimum obviare videntur.

Here there arises a question.  For it has been said in the above (sentences)1 and completely fortified by authorities, that the Will of God, which He Himself is, and (which) is called His “Good Pleasure”, cannot be cancelled, because by that Will whatsoever He has willed, He has done in Heaven and on Earth:  Which, according to the testimony of the Apostle, nothing resists.  « Therefore, it is asked, in what manner is what the Apostles says of the Lord:2  Who wills that all men to come to be saved, is to be accepted.  For since not all come to be saved, but more are damned, it seems, that indeed there is not done, what God wills to be done, namely, with a human will impeding the Will of God.  The Lord also, compelling the impious city in the Gospel, says:  How often I willed to gather thy children together, just as the hen gathers her chicks under (her) wings, and thou wouldst not!  Thus these are3 said, as if God’s Will has been overcome by the will of men, and (as if) as One most infirm in not willing (to oppose those) impeding (Him), the Most Powerful One could not do, what He wanted.  Where is, therefore, that omnipotence, by which, according to the Prophet, all whatsoever He has willed, He has done in Heaven and on Earth?  And in what manner, does nothing, according to the Apostle, resist His Will, if He willed to gather the children of Jerusalem, and did not do (it) »?4  For these seem to obviate very much the aforesaid.

Cap. II.

 

Quomodo intelligendum sit illud:  Volui congregare filios tuos, et noluisti, et illud:  Qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri.

Chapter II.

In what manner is this to be understood:  “I willed to gather thy children together, and thou wouldst not”, and this:  “He who wills all men to come to be saved”.

Sed audiamus solutionem; ac primum, quomodo accipiendum sit illud quod Dominus ait, videamus.  « Non enim ex eo sensu illud dictum est, ut ait Augustinus in Enchiridio,5 praedictam solvens quaestionem, quasi Dominus voluerit colligere filios Ierusalem, et non sit factum quod voluit, quia ipsa noluerit; sed potius illa quidem filios suos ab ipso colligi noluit, qua tamen nolente, filios eius collegit ipse omnes quos voluit; quia in caelo et in terra non quaedam voluit fecit, quaedam vero voluit et non fecit, sed omnia . . .

But let us hear the solution; and let us see first, in what manner is that, which the Lord says, to be accepted.  « For that has not been said out of this sense », as (St.) Augustine says in (his) Enchiridion,5 solving the aforesaid question, « as if the Lord willed to gather the children of Jerusalem, and what He willed was not done, because she was unwilling; but rather she indeed was unwilling that her children be gathered by Him, yet with her unwilling, He did gather all her sons whom He willed (to gather); because (it is) not (that) in Heaven and on Earth He has done certain (things which) He has willed, but certain (others) which He willed He has also not done, but all . . .

1  Dist. XLV.  —  Vat. et plures edd. paulo inferius, addito quae, sic habent:  quae beneplacitum eius vocatur.  —  Loci sequentes s. Scripturae sunt Psalm 113, 11, et Rom. 9, 19.

2  I. Tim. 2, 4.  Sequens locus est Matth. 23, 37.

3  Vat. et edd. 4, 5, 6, 9 addunt etiam; ed. 8 enim; codd. et aliae edd. legunt ut in textu.

4  Quae praecedunt excerpta sunt ex August., Enchirid. c. 97. n. 24.

5  Loc. cit.  In quo textu Vat. cum aliis edd., excepta 1, voluerit congregare pro  voluerit colligere, et paulo inferius potius ipsa pro potius illa, contradicentibus codd.

1  In Distinction XLV.  —  The Vatican edition and very many editions, a little below this, having added which [quae], thus have:  which is called His “Good Pleasure” [et quae beneplacitum eius vocatur] for and (which) is called His “Good Pleasure” [vocaturque beneplacitum eius].  —  The following passages from Sacred Scripture are Ps. 113:11, and Rm. 9:19.

2  1 Tim. 2:4.  The following passage is Mt. 23:37.

3  The Vatican edition and editions 4, 5, 6 and 9 add also [etiam]; edition 8 reads For thus these are [Ita enim haec] for Thus these are [Ita haec]; the codices and the other editions read as above.

4  The preceding have been excerpted from (St.) Augustine’s Enchiridion, ch. 97, n. 24.

5  Loc. cit..  In which text the Vatican edition, together with the other editions, except edition 1, has to gather together [congregare] for to gather [colligere], and a little below this has that one [illa] for she [ipsa], contradicting the codices.

 

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quaecumque voluit, fecit », ut sit sensus:  Quoties volui congregari filios tuos, et noluisti! id est, quotquot congregavi voluntate mea semper efficaci, te nolente feci.  —  Ecce in evidenti positum est, quod1 illa Domini verba superioribus non repugnant.

whatsoever He has willed, He has done », so that the sense is:  How often I have willed to gather thy children together, and thou wouldst not! that is, “As many times as I have gathered (them) together by My ever efficacious Will, I have done (so), with thee unwilling”.  —  Behold it has been posited in an evident (manner), that1 those words of the Lord are not repugnant to (those) above.

Nunc videre restat, quomodo etiam praemissa verba Apostoli praedictis non contradicant, qui de Deo loquens ait:  Vult omnes homines salvos fieri.  Quorum occasione verborum multi a veritate deviaverunt2 dicentes, Deum multa velle fieri, quae non fiunt.  Sed non est intelligendum, ea ratione illud esse dictum, quasi Deus voluerit aliquos salvari, et non salventur.  « Quis enim tam impie desipiat, ut dicat, Deum malas hominum voluntates, quas voluerit et quando voluerit et ubi voluerit, in bonum non posse convertere?  Non est utique verum quod in Psalmo dicitur.  Quaecumque voluit, fecit, si aliqua voluit et non fecit; et quod est indignius, ideo non fecit, quoniam, ne fieret quod volebat Omnipotens, voluntas hominis impedivit ».3  Ideoque « cum audimus et in sacris Litteris legimus, quod velit omnes homines salvos fieri, quamvis certum sit nobis, non omnes homines salvos fieri,4 non tamen ideo debemus omnipotentissimae Dei voluntati aliquid derogare sed ita intelligere quod scriptum est:  Vult omnes homines salvos fieri, tanquam diceretur, nullum hominem fieri salvum, nisi quem fieri5 ipse voluerit; non quod nullus sit hominum, nisi quem salvum fieri velit, sed quod nullus fiat salvus, nisi quem velit salvari; et ideo rogandus est, ut velit, quia necesse est fieri, si voluerit ».  « Non est enim credendus Omnipotens aliquid voluisse fieri, quod factum non sit ».  « Sic etiam intelligitur illud:6  Illuminat omnem homine venientem in hunc mundum, non quia nullus hominum est, qui non illuminetur, sed quia nisi ab ipso nullus illuminatur.  Potest et alio modo illud intelligi, dum tamen credere non cogamur, Omnipotentem aliquid voluisse fieri, factumque non esse, qui sine ullis ambiguitatibus, si7 in caelo et in terra, sicut Veritas cantat, omnia quaecumque voluit fecit, profecto facere non voluit quaecumque non fecit ».  —  Ex his aperte ostenditur, quod Deus ea voluntate, quae ipse est, non vult aliquid fieri, quod non fiat, neque non fieri quod fiat.

Now it remains to see, in what manner too the aforementioned words of the Apostle do not contradict the aforesaid, who speaking of God says:  (Who) wills all men to come to be saved.  By the occasion of which words many have deviated2 from the truth, saying, that God wills that many (things) come to be, which do not come to be.  But one must not understand, that that has been said according to this reckoning, as if God willed that some be saved, and they be not saved.  « For who is so impious, as to say, that God cannot convert the evil wills of men, which (wills) He wills, and when He wills and where He wills, unto the good?  It is not, indeed, true that in the Psalm there is said:  Whatsoever He has willed, He has done, if He willed some (things) and did not do (them), and what is more unworthy, (that) He did not do (them) for this reason, since, the will of man impeded, that there would come to be, what the Omnipotent willed ».3  And for that reason « when we hear and read in the Sacred Letters, that He wills that all men come to be saved, though it is certain for us, that not all men come to be saved,4 yet we ought not derogate anything from the most Omnipotent Will of God, but understand thus what has been written:  He wills that all men come to be saved, as if there were said, that no man comes to be saved, except him whom He has willed to come to be;5 not that there is no one of men, except him whom He willed to be saved, but that none comes to be saved, except him whom He willed to be saved; and for that reason He must be aksed [rogandus], to will (it), because it is necessary that it comes to be, if He wills it ».  « For the Omnipotent is not to be believed to have willed anything to be done, which has not been done ».  « This (verse) is also understood in the same manner:6  (Who) illumines every man coming into this world, not because there is no one among men [nullus hominum], who is not illumined, but because none are illumined except by Him.  That (verse) can also be understood in another manner, yet so long as we are not driven to believe, that the Omnipotent has willed that something be done, and it has not been done, Who — if7 He has done, without any ambiguities, all whatsoever He has willed, in Heaven and on Earth, just as the Truth chants — has not, in a word, willed to do whatsoever He has not done ».  —  From these there is openly shown, that God by that Will, which He Himself is, does not will anything to be done, which is not done, nor not to be done, which is done.

Cap. III.

 

Utrum mala Deo volente vel nolente fiant.

Chapter III.

Whether evils come to be with God (being) willing and/or unwilling.

Ideoque cum constet, omnia bona, quae fiunt, eius fieri voluntate, quae si fieri nollet, nullatenus fierent; recte quaeri solet:  utrum et mala omnia, quae fiunt, id est peccata, Dei fiant voluntate, an nolente eo fiant.  —  Super hoc diversi, varie8 sentienties, sibi contradicere inveniuntur.  Alii enim dicunt, quod Deus vult mala esse vel fieri, non tamen vult mala.  Alii vero, quod nec vult mala esse nec fieri.  In hoc tamen conveniunt et hic et illi, quod utrique fatentur, Deum mala non velle.  Utrique vero rationibus atque auctoritatibus innitiuntur ad muniendam suam assertionem.

And for that reason since it is established, that all goods, which come to be, come to be by His Will, which if He will be unwilling that they come to be, would to no extent come to be; rightly it is customarily asked:  whether all evils too, that is sins, which come to be, come to be by God’s Will, or come to be with Him unwilling.  —  On this diverse (men), thinking variously,8 are found to contradict themselves.  For some say, that God wills that there are and/or come to be evils, yet does not will evils.  But others, that He neither wills evils to be nor to come to be.  Yet in this the latter and former agree, that each say, that God does not will evils.  But each strive to fortify their own assertion with reasons and authorities.

Qui enim dicunt, Deum mala velle esse vel fieri, suam his modis muniunt intentionem.9  Si enim, inquiunt, mala non esse vel non fieri vellet, nullo modo essent vel fierent, quia, si vult ea non esse vel non feri, et non potest id efficere, scilicet ut non sint vel non fiant, voluntati eius et potentiae aliquid resistit, et non est omnipotens, quia non potest omne quod vult, sed impotens est; sicut et nos sumus, qui quod volumus quandoque non valemus.  Sed quia omnipotens est et in nullo impotens, certum est, non posse fieri mala vel esse, nisi eo volente.  Quomodo enim, invito eo et nolente, posset ab aliquo malum fieri, cum scriptum sit:  Voluntati eius quis resistit?  Supra etiam dixit Augustinus:10  « Quia necesse est fieri, si voluerit ».  Sed vult mala fieri, aut non fieri.  Si vult non fieri, non fiunt; fiunt autem:  vult ergo fieri.  —  Item, bonum est mala esse vel fieri, alioquin summe bonus non permitteret ea fieri.  Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio:  « Quamvis ea, inquit, quae mala sunt, in quantum mala sunt, non sunt bona, tamen ut non solum bona, sed etiam sint et mala, bonum est.  Nam nisi esset hoc bonum, ut essent et mala, nullo modo esse sinerentur ab omnipotenti Bono, cui proculdubio quam facile est quod vult facere, tam facile est quod non vult esse non sinere.  Hoc11 nisi credamus, periclitatur nostra confessio, qua nos in Patrem omnipotentem credere confitemur ».  —  Ecce hic aperte habes, quod bonum est mala esse, omnis autem boni Deus auctor est, qui vult, omne bonum esse quod est.  Cum ergo bonum sit mala fieri vel esse, ergo et mala vult fieri vel esse.  —  His atque aliis huiusmodi rationibus et auctoritatibus utuntur qui dicunt, Deum velle mala esse vel fieri.12

For those who say, that God wills that there are and/or come to be evils, lessen their own intention9 in these manners.  For if, they say, He would will evils not to be and/or not to come to be, they would in no manner be and/or come to be, because, if He wills them not to be and/or not to come to be, and cannot effect this, namely, that they not be and/or not come to be, (then) something resists His Will and Power, and He is not omnipotent, because He cannot (do) everything which He wills, but is impotent, just as we are too, who do not prevail (to do) what we will and when (we will it).  But because He is omnipotent and (is) in no manner impotent, it is certain, that evils cannot come to be and/or be, unless with Him willing (it).  For in what manner, with Him unwilling and not willing [invito eo et nolente] (it), could an evil come to be from something, when it has been written:  His Will, who resists (It)?.  Above (St.) Augustine10 also has said:  « Because it is necessary that it come to be, if He has willed (it) ».  But He wills that evils come to be, or not come to be.  If He wills (them) not to come to be, they do not come to be; but they do come to be:  therefore He wills (them) to come to be.  —  Likewise, it is good that evils are and/or come to be, otherwise the One most highly Good would not permit them to come to be.  Wherefore (St.) Augustine says in (his) Enchiridion:  « Though those, which are evil, inasmuch as they are evil, are not good, yet it is good not only that (there are) goods, but even (that) there are evils.  For this were good, that there are evil evils, it would in no manner be allowed by the Omnipotent Good, for Whom, far from doubt, not allowing to be what He does not will is as easy, as causing what He wills.  If  we do not believe this,11 our confession, by which we confess to believe in “the Father Almighty”, is imperiled ».  —  Behold, here you openly, have that it is good that there are evils, but of every good God is the author, who wills, that everything which is, is good.  Therefore since it is good that evils come to be and/or are, therefore He also wills that evils come to be and/or are.  —  These and also other reasons and authorities of this kind they use, who say, that God wills that evils are and/or come to be.12

Illi vero, qui dicunt, Dei voluntate mala non fieri vel non esse, inductionibus praemissis ita respondent dicentes, Deum nec velle mala fieri, nec velle non fieri, vel nolle fieri, sed tantum non velle fieri.  Si enim vellet ea fieri vel esse, faceret utique ea fieri vel esse, et ita esset auctor malorum; non est autem auctor malorum, ut Sanctorum protestantur auctoritates:  non ergo eius voluntate fiunt mala.  Item, si nollet mala fieri vel vellet non fieri, et tamen fierent, omnipotens . . .

Those, on the other hand, who say, that by the Will of God evils do not come to be and/or are not, respond thus to the aforementioned inductions, saying, that God neither wills evils to come to be, nor wills (them) not to come to be, and/or is unwilling that (they) come to be, but only does not will (them) to come to be.  For if He willed them to come to be and/or to be, He would indeed cause that they come to be and/or are, and thus He would be the an author of evils; however He is not an author of evils, as the authorities of the Saints protest:  therefore not by His Will do evils come to be.  Likewise, if He were unwilling that evils come to be and/or willed (them) not to come to be, and yet they did come to be, He would not / be omnipotent, . . .

1  Codd. et ed. 1 quia.

2  Cfr. d. XLV.  —  Paulo inferius Vat. cum paucis edd. Deus velit, edd. 2, 3, 7, 8 Deus vellet pro Deus voluerit.

3  Quae praecedunt sumta sunt ex August., Enchirid. partim ex c. 98. n. 25, partim ex c. 95. n. 24; quae autem sequuntur ex c. 103. n. 27.

4  Verba:  quamvis certum . . . fieri omittuntur in edd. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9.

5  Vat. aliaeque edd. praemittunt salvum, contradicentibus originali, ed. 1 et codd., excepta C.

6  Ioan. 1, 9.

7  Ita recte edd. 1, 8 cum originali; cod. C cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 sicut; codd. A B E et ed. 6 sive; Vat. cum cod. D omni particula caret.

8  Ita in codd. A B D E et ed. 1, in Vat. et aliis edd. varia.

9  Codd. A D assertionem.  Paulo inferius codd. A B D omittunt non ante fiant.

10  Enchirid. c. 103. n. 27; et locus qui sequitur est c. 96. n. 24.

11  Ita originale, codd. A B C E et ed. 1; in aliis edd. haec.  Infra ante et mala codd. A B D E et ed. 1 omittunt ergo.

12  Cod. B hic addit:  Gregorius super Genesim [sed est Moral. VI. c. 18. n. 33.]:  « Deus alia concedit propitius, alia permittit iratus, atque quae permittit sic tolerat, ut [haec] in usum sui consilii vertat. Unde [miro modo] fit, ut quod fit sive voluntate Dei agitur, voluntati Dei contrarium non sit:  quia dum in bonum usum mala facta vertuntur, eius consilio militant etiam quae eius consilio repugnant.  Hinc etiam per Psalmistam (Psalm. 110, 2.) dicitur:  Magna opera Domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius ».  Aliqua ex ed. Gregorii supplevimus.

1  The codices and edition 1 have that [quia] for that [quod].

2  Cf. d. XLV.  —  A little before this the Vatican edition, together with a few editions, has as if God wills [Deus velit], editions 2, 2, 7 and 8 have as if God would will [Deus vellet] for as if God willed [Deus voluerit].

3  The preceding have been taken from (St.) Augustine, Enchiridion, partly from ch. 98, n. 25, partly from ch. 95, n. 24; but those which follow from ch. 103, n. 27.

4  The words:  though it is certain . . . to be saved [are omitted in editions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 9].

5  The Vatican edition and the other editions add saved [salvum], contradicting the original, edition 1 and the codices, except codex C.

6  Jn. 1:9.

7  Thus rightly editions 1 and 8, with the original; codex C, together with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 9 have just as [sicut] for if [si]; codices A B and E and edition 1 or [sive] for the same; the Vatican edition, together with codex D, lacks any particle.

8  Thus in codices A B D and E and edition1; in the Vatican edition and the other editions various (things) [varia].

9  Codices A and D have his assertion [suam . . . assertionem] for his intention [suam . . . intentionem] [Trans. note:  here intention has the sense of intended meaning].  A little below this codices A B and D omits not before come to be, (then) [fiant].

10  Enchiridion., ch. 103, n. 27; and the passage which follows is ch. 96, n. 24.

11  Thus the original, codices A B C and E, and edition 1, in the other editions there is read these [haec] for this [hoc].  Below before He also wills [et mala vult] codices A B D and E and edition 1 omit therefore [ergo].

12  Codex B here adds:  (St.) Gregory on Genesis (even though it is from his Morals, Bk. VI, ch. 18, n. 33):  « God propitiously concedes some, as One angered permits others, and what He permits He so tolerates, that He turns (them) unto the use of His counsel.  Wherefore (in a wonderful manner) it comes to be, that what come to be or is done by the Will of God, is not contrary to the Will of God:  because while evils done are turned unto a good use, those which are repugnant to His counsel also militate for His counsel.  Hence also through the Psalmist (Ps. 110:2) there is said:  Great the works of the Lord, exquisite in all His wills ».  We have supplied some words from the edition of (St.) Gregory’s works.

 

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non esset, cum eius voluntas humanae voluntatis effectu impediretur.  Ideoque non concedunt, Deum velle mala fieri, ne malorum auctor intelligatur; nec concedunt, eum velle mala non fieri vel nolle fieri, ne impotens esse videatur; sed tantum dicunt, eum non velle mala fieri, ut non auctor, sed permissor malorum monstretur.  Unde et Evangelista, ubi ostendit, Deum auctorem esse omnium bonorum, dicens:1  Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, consequenter malorum auctorem esse negat dicens:  Et sine ipso factum est nihil, id est peccatum.  Non dixit, per eum factum esse, vel eo nolente et invito, sed tantum sine eo, id est sine eius voluntate, quia non eius voluntate fit peccatum.  Non ergo Deo volente vel non volente, sed non volente fiunt mala, quia non subest Dei voluntati, ut malum fiat vel non fiat, sed ut fieri sinat, quia bonum est sinere mala fieri; et utique volens sinit, non volens mala, sed volens sinere,2 ut ipsa fiant; quia nec mala sunt bona, nec ea fieri vel esse bonum est.

He would not / be omnipotent, since His Will would be impeded by the effect of a human will.  And for that reason they do not concede, that God wills evils to come to be, lest He be understood (to be) an author of evils; nor do they concede, that He wills evils not to come to be and/or (that) He is unwilling that (they) come to be, lest He seem to be impotent; but they say only, that He does not will evils to come to be, so that He may be shown (to be) not an author, but a permitter of evils.  Whence even the Evangelist, where he shows, that God is the Author of all goods, saying:1  All were made through Him, consequently denies that He is an author of evils, saying:  And without Him nothing, that is sin, is made.  He did not say, “through Him it was made”, and/or “with Him unwilling and not willing”, but only “without Him”, that is “without His Will”, because sin does not come to be by His Will.  Therefore, not with God willing and/or not being unwilling, but with (Him) not willing evils come to be, because it is not subject [subest] to God’s Will, that an evil come to be and/or not come to be, but (only) that He allow it to come to be, because it is good that He allow evils to come to be; and indeed as One willing He allows (it), not as One willing evils, but as One willing to allow,2 that they come to be; because neither are evils good, nor is it good that they come to be and/or are.

Cap. IV.

 

Quomodo intelligendum sit illud Augustini:  mala fieri bonum est.

Chapter IV.

In what manner is this (saying) of (St.) Augustine to be understood:  “It is good that evils come to be”.

Quod vero Augustinus3 ait:  Mala fieri bonum est, nec sinerentur mala ab omnipotenti Bono fieri, nisi hoc esset bonum, ut ea essent; ea ratione dictum esse asserunt, quia ex malis, quae fiunt, Deus bona elicit; nec ipse permitteret ea fieri, nisi de eis boni4 aliquid faceret.  Unde Augustinus in eodem libro Enchiridion,5 aperte indicans, praedictorum verborum talem esse intelligentiam, ait:  « Deus omnipotens, cui rerum est summa potestas, cum summe bonus sit, nullo modo sineret, aliquid mali esse in operibus suis, nisi usque adeo esset omnipotens et bonus, ut bene faceret etiam de malo ».  Item in eodem:  « Melius iudicavit Deus de malis bona facere quam mala nulla permittere ».  Ex hoc itaque sensu dictum est ac verum est, bonum esse mala fieri, quia ex malis, quae fiunt, bonis, qui secundum propositum vocati sunt Sancti,6 accidit bonitas, id est utilitas.  Talibus enim, ut ait Apostolus, in bonum cooperantur omnia, etiam mala, quia eis prosunt, quae aliis facientibus obsunt.  Unde etiam aliquando in Scriptura legitur, malum appellari bonum, ut Hieronymus super Marcum:7  Malum, inquit, Iudae, bonum fuit, scilicet nobis.  Nec si bonum est illi vel illi, inde sequitur, quod simpliciter bonum sit.  Proprie enim ac simpliciter bonum est, quod in se et facienti bonum est.

However, what (St.) Augustine3 says:  “It is good that evils come to be”, and “evils would not be allowed by the Omnipotent Good to come to be, unless it were good, that they be”; they assert has been said for this reason, because out of the evils, which come to be, God elicits goods, and that He Himself would not permit them to come to be, unless He worked something of good4 from them.  Wherefore (St.) Augustine in the same book, the Enchiridion,5 openly indicating, that such is the understanding of the aforesaid words, says:  « The Omnipotent God, to whom belongs the highest power over things [rerum est summa potestas], since He is most highly good, would in no manner allow, that anything of evil be in His own works, unless He were always to such an extent [usque adeo] omnipotent and good, that He even worked well from evil ».  Likewise in the same (he says):  « God judged that (it was) better to work goods from evils than to permit no evils ».  And so out of this sense it has been said and is true, that it is good that evils come to be, because out of the evils, which come to be, there accedes a goodness, that is a utility, for the good, who according to (His) proposal (to have mercy) have been called (to be) Saints.6  For to such, as the Apostle says, all (things) cooperate unto the good, even evils, because (the evils) which stand in the way [obsunt] of others doing (them), benefit [prosunt] these (Saints).  Whence there is even sometimes written in Scripture, that evil is named “good”, as (St.) Jerome says on (the Gospel of St.) Mark:7  “The evil of Judas, was good, that is, for us”.  Nor if it is good for this one and/or that one [illi vel illi], does it follow from this, that it is simply good.  For (speaking) properly and simply the good is, that which in itself and to the one doing (it) is good.

Cap. V.

 

De multiplici acceptione boni.

Chapter V.

On the multiple acceptation of the “good”.

Est enim aliquid, quod in se bonum est et cui fit, sed non est bonum facienti, ut cum subvenitur pauperi, sed non propter Deum.  Et est aliquid bonum in se et facienti, sed non ei cui fit, cum veritas propter Deum alicui non obedienti praedicatur.  Et est aliquid in se et facienti et ei cui fit bonum, ut cum veritas praedicatur propter Deum credenti.  Unde Apostolus:8  bonus odor sumus Deo, aliis odor vitae, aliis odor mortis.  Est autem aliud, quod nec in se bonum est et facienti nocet et damnat, nisi poeniteat, ut malum, valet tamen ad aliquid.  Ut enim ait Augustinus in Enchiridio:9  « A summe et aequaliter et immutabiliter bona Trinitate creata sunt omnia, nec summe nec aequaliter nec immutabiliter bona; sed tamen bona etiam singula.  Simul vero universa valde bona, quia ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis pulcritudo; in qua etiam illud quod malum dicitur, bene ordinatum et loco suo positum, eminentius commendat bona, ut magis placeant et laudabiliora sint, dum comprarantur malis ».

For there is something, which in itself and for whom it is done is good, but is not good to the one doing (it), such as when one comes to the aid of a poor man, but not for God’s sake.  And there is something good in itself and to the one doing (it) and to him to whom it is done, such as when the Truth is preached for God’s sake to the one believing (It).  Wherefore the Apostles (says):8  to God we are a good fragrance [odor], to some the fragrance of life, to others the odor [odor] of death.  Moreover there is another, which is also not good in itself and hurts and damns the one doing (it), unless he repent, such as an evil (deed), (which) however prevails for something.  For as (St.) Augustine says in the Enchiridion:9  « By the most highly and equally and immutably Good Trinity all have been created neither most highly nor equally nor immutably good; but yet each (are) good.  But one and all [universa] together (are) very good, because out of (them) all consists the admirable beauty of the university (of things); in which even that which is said (to be) “evil”, well ordered and placed in its own place, commends more eminently (those which are) good, so that they are more pleasing and more worthy of praise, while they are compared to (those which are) evil ».

Cap. VI.

 

Quod mala universitati valent.

Chapter VI.

That evils have value for the university (of things).

Hinc patet, quod ex malis, quae fiunt, aliquod provenit bonum, dum bona magis placent et laudabiliora existunt.  Ipsis etiam facientibus ex malis, quae faciunt, interdum bona proveniunt, si secundum propositum vocati sunt Sancti.  « Talibus enim, ut ait Augustinus in libro de Correctione et gratia,10 usque adeo Deus omnia cooperatur in bonum, ut, si qui horum deviant et exorbitant, etiam hoc ipsum eis faciat proficere in bonum, quia humiliores redeunt atque doctiores », ut Petrus.  « Illa etiam mala, quae ab iniquis fideles pie perferunt, ut ait Augustinus in libro de Trinitate,11 ipsis utique prosunt vel ad delenda peccata, vel ad exercendam probandamque iustitiam, vel ad demonstrandam huius vitae miseriam ».  Ideoque et . . .

Hence it is clear, that out of the evils, which come to be, some good comes forth, so long as (the things which are) good are more pleasing and stand forth as more praiseworthy.  Even to those doing (them), out of the evil (deeds), which they do, there sometimes come forth good (things), if according to (His) proposal they have been called (to be) Saints.  « For to such », as (St.) Augustine says in the book On Correction and Grace,10 « God always [usque] cooperates with all unto the good to such an extent, that, if any of them deviate and be dispossessed [exorbitant], He even causes that this very (thing) profits [proficere] them unto the good, because they return more humble and more learned », as (St.) Peter.  « Even those evils, which the faithful piously endure [perferunt] from the iniquitous », as (St.) Augustine says in the book On the Trinity,11 « indeed benefit them either to blot out sins, and/or to exercise and prove (their) justice, and/or to demonstrate the misery of this life ».  And for that reason even . . .

1  Ioan. 1, 3.

2  Ita codd. et edd. 2, 3, 7; in aliis edd. non bene additur sinit.

3  Enchirid. c. 96. n. 24.

4  Omnes codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 bene, quae lectio sumta videtur ex verbis Augustini infra sequentibus, in quo loco tamen deest aliquid.

5  Cap. 11. n. 3.  Locus sequens est c. 27. n. 8.

6  Rom. 8, 28.  —  Paulo superius Vat. cum pluribus edd. bonum est pro bonum esse, et immediate post edd. 1, 6 humilitas pro utilitas.

7  Cap. 14:  « Multi bonum, ut Iudas, facient; sed omnino illis non proficit ».  Commentarius illa non est S. Hieronymi.

8  II. Cor. 2, 15. 16.

9  Cap. 10. 11. n. 3.

10  Cap. 9. n. 24.  —  Paulo superius pro bona proveniunt codd. A C D et ed. 1 bona veniunt, cod. B eveniunt.  —  Quoad S. Petrum cfr. Luc. 22, 61. 62.

11  Libr. XIII. c. 16. n. 20.  In quo textu codd. B C D E et ed. 1 demenda peccata pro delenda peccata; originale emendanda peccata.  Quoad Iob cfr. c. 19, 21, et c. 42; quoad S. Paulum cfr. II. Cor. 12, 7.  —  Circa finem ante profecit codd. omittunt bene.

1  Jn. 1:3.

2  Thus the codices and editions 2, 3, and 7; in the other editions there is added not well allows [sinit].

3  Enchiridion., ch. 96, n. 24.

4  All the codices and editions 1, 2, and 3 have well [bene] for of good [boni], which (differing) reading seems to have been taken from the words of (St.) Augustine following below, in which passage, however, something [aliquid] is missing.

5  Chapter 11, n. 3.  The following passage is ch. 27, n. 8.

6  Rm. 8:28.  —  A little above this the Vatican edition, together with very many editions, has “it is good that evils come to be” [bonum est etc.] for that it is good that evils come to be [bonum esse etc], and immediately after this editions 1 and 6 have humility [humilitas] for a utility [utilitas].

7  Chapter 14:  « Many, such as Judas, will do good; but it does not entirely profit them ».  The commentary on this passage (of St. Mark) is not that of (St.) Jerome.

8  2 Cor. 2:15,16.

9  Chapters 10-11, n. 3.

10  Chapter 9, n. 24.  —  A little above this for there . . . comes forth good (things) [bona proveniunt] codices A C and D and edition 1 have there . . . comes good (things) [bona veniunt], codex B has there . . . comes forth good (things) [bona eveniunt].  —  In regard to St. Peter, cf. Lk 22:61-62.

11  Bk. XIII, ch. 16, n. 20.  In which text codices B C D and E and edition 1 have for demanded sins [ad demanda peccata] for to blot out sins [ad delenda peccata]; the original reads to emend sins [ad emendanda peccata].  In regard to Job, cf. chs. 19, 21 and 42; in regard to St. Paul, cf. 2 Cor. 12:7.  —  Near the end before profited [profecit], the codices omit well [bene].

 

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Iob Dei manum, et Apostolus satanae stimulum sensit; et uterque bene profecit, quia malum bene portavit.

Job felt the Hand of God, and the Apostle the goad of Satan; and each profited well, because he bore the evil well.

Si quis igitur diligenter attendat quae scripta sunt, facile est ei percipere, ex malis bona provenire, et ex ea ratione dictum esse, quod bonum est mala fieri vel esse, non quia malum sit bonum, vel quia bonum sit malum fieri.  Non est enim bonum malum fieri ab aliquo, quia non est bonum, ut aliquis faciat malum.  Si enim hoc esset bonum, profecto huius Deus auctor esset, qui est auctor omnis boni.  Quodsi huius Deus auctor est, eo ergo auctore homo agit malum,1 et ita eo auctore homo fit deterior.  Et si eo auctore homo fit deterior, tunc eo volente homo fit deterior.  Idem est enim dicere aliquid fieri Deo auctore, quod Deo volente; Deo autem auctore homo non fit deterior:  ergo nec Deo volente, ut Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum2 aperte astruit a minori dicens ita:  « Nullo sapiente homine auctore fit homo deterior; tanta enim est ista culpa, quae in sapientem hominem cadere nequeat.  Est autem Deus omni homine sapiente praestantior:  multo enim est praestantior Dei voluntas quam hominis sapientis.  Illo autem auctore cum dicitur, illo volente dicitur.  Est ergo vitium voluntatis,3 quo est homo deterior.  Quod vitium, si longe abest a Dei voluntate, ut ratio docet, a quo sit, quaerendum est ».  —  Ecce aperte dicit hic Augustinus, Deo auctore vel volente hominem non fieri deteriorem, sed vitio voluntatis suae.  Non est ergo Deo auctore, quod malum fit ab aliquo, et ita Deo volente mala non fiunt.

If anyone, therefore, diligently attends to (those things) which have been written, it is easy for him to perceive, that out of evils good (things) do come forth, and (that) from this reckoning it has been said, that it is good that evils come to be and/or are, not because an evil is good, and/or because it is good that an evil come to be.  For it is not good that an evil come to be from someone, because it is not good, that anyone work evil.  For if this were good, in a word, the God, who is the Author of every good, would be its author.  Wherefore if God is its author, therefore with Him as author man does evil,1 and thus with Him as author man comes to be worse [deterior].  And if with Him as author man comes to be worse, then with Him willing man comes to be worse.  For it is the same to say that something comes to be “with God as author”, as “with God willing”; but with God as author man does not come to be worse:  therefore neither with God willing, as (St.) Augustine in the book of Eighty-Three Questions2 openly argues [astruit] a minori, saying thus:  « By no wise man as author does a man come to be worse; for so great is that fault, that it cannot befall [cadere in] a wise man.  But God is more outstanding [praestantior] than every wise man:  for God’s Will is much more outstanding than (that) of a wise man.  Moreover when there is said “with Him as author”, there is said “with Him willing”.  Therefore (that) by which a man is worse, is a vice of the3 will.  Which vice, if it is far away [longe abest] from God’s Will, as reason teaches, one must seek, from whom it is ».  —  Behold here (St.) Augustine openly says, that with God as author and/or willing man does not come to be worse, but (rather he does so) by a vice of his own will.  Therefore it is not with God as author, that an evil comes to be from someone, and thus with God willing evils do not come to be.

Cap. VII.

 

Quod in Deo non est causa, ut sit homo deterior.

Chapter VII.

That the cause, that man is worse, is not in God.

Deinde idem Augustinus4 quaerens, quae sit causa, ut homo sit deterior, in Deo non esse asserit, in eodem libro sic dicens:  « Ut sit homo deterior, aut in ipso causa est, aut in alio, aut in nihilo.  Si in nihilo, nulla causa est; si in alio, aut in Deo, aut in alio5 quolibet homine, aut in eo quod neque Deus neque homo sit.  Sed non in Deo; bonorum enim Deus tantum causa est:  ergo aut in homine est, aut in eo quod nec Deus nec homo, aut in nihilo ».6  —  Ex his aperte ostenditur, quod non est bonum, ut sit homo deterior, quia non est Deus eius rei causa, qui tantum causa bonorum est.  Et si non est bonum, ut homo fiat deterior, non est igitur bonum, ut ab eo fiat malum:  non igitur vult Deus, ut ab eo fiat malum.

Then the same (St.) Augustine4 seeking, what is the cause, that man is worse, asserts that it is not in God, in the same book, saying thus:  « The cause, that man is worse, either is in him, or in another, or in nothing.  If in nothing, (then) there is no cause; if in another, either in God, or in any other5 man, or in that which is neither God nor man.  But (it is) not in God; for God is only the cause of good (things):  therefore either it is in man, or in that which (is) neither God nor man, or in nothing ».6  —  From these it is openly shown, that it is not good, that man is worse, because God, who is only the cause of good (things), is not the cause of that thing.  And if it is not good, that man comes to be worse, therefore it is not good, that evil be done by him:  therefore God does not will, that evil be done by him.

Item aliter etiam ostenditur, quod Deo auctore, id est volente, non fiunt mala, quia ipse non est causa tendendi ad non-esse.  Tendere enim ad non-esse malum est.  Ipse autem auctor mali non est; tendit vero ad non-esse qui operatur malum:  non ergo Deo auctore est, quod aliquis operatur malum.  Non est ergo bonum, quod aliquis operatur malum, quia tantum boni Deus auctor est.  Hoc autem Augustinus in eodem libro7 aperte explicat ita dicens:  « Qui omnium quae sunt, auctor est, et ad cuius bonitatem id pertinet, ut sit omne quod est, boni tantummodo causa est.  Quocirca mali auctor non est, et ideo ipse summum bonum est, a quo in nullo deficere bonum est; et malum est deficere:  non est igitur causa deficiendi, id est tendendi ad non-esse, qui, ut ita dicam, essendi causa est; quia omnium quae sunt, auctor est, quae in quantum sunt, bona sunt ».  —  Ecce aperte habes, quod deficere a Deo, qui summum est bonum, malum est:  mala ergo facere malum est:  non ergo Deo auctore vel volente mala fiunt.

Likewise it is also shown in another manner, that with God as author, that is with (Him) willing, evils do not come to be, because He is not a cause of tending to non-being [tendendi ad non-esse].  For to tend to non-being is evil.  Moreover He Himself is not an author of evil; but he who works evil tends to non-being:  therefore it is not with God as author, that anyone works evil.  Therefore it is not good, that anyone works evil, because God is only an author of good.  Moreover (St.) Augustine openly explains this in the same book,7 saying thus:  « He who is the Author of all which are, and to whose Goodness it pertains, that everything, which is, be, is the Cause only of the good.  Wherefore [Quocirca] He is not an author of evil, and for that reason He is the Most High Good, from Whom there is in none a lacking [deficere] of the good; and evil is a lacking (of the good):  therefore He is not a cause of the lacking (of the good), that is of a tending to non-being, Who, as I say, is the Cause of being [essendi causa]; because He is the Author of all which are, which inasmuch as they are, are good ».  —  Behold, you openly have, that to fail from God [deficere a Deo], who is the Most High Good, is evil:  therefore it is evil to work evils:  therefore not with God as author and/or willing do evils come to be.

Iam sufficienter ostensum est, quod Deo auctore non fiunt mala.  Quidam tamen sophistice incedentes, et ideo Deo odibiles,8 probare conantur, ex Deo auctore esse, quod mala fiunt, hoc modo.  Quod mala fiunt, verum est; omne autem verum, quod est, est a veritate, quae Deus est:  a Deo igitur est, quod mala fiunt.  Quod autem omne verum a Deo sit, confirmant auctoritate Augustini in libro Octaginta trium Quaestionum9 ita dicentis:  « Omne verum a veritate verum est; est autem veritas Deus:  Deum igitur habet auctorem omne verum ».  Est autem verum, quod mala fiunt vel sunt:  Deo ergo auctore est, quod sunt vel fiunt mala.

It has already been sufficiently shown, that with God as author evils do not come to be.  Yet certain (authors) proceeding [incedentes] sophistically, and for that reason hateful to God,8 strive to prove, that it is from God as author, that evils come to be, in this manner:  ‘That evils come to be, is true; moreover every truth [verum], which is, is from the Truth [veritate], which is God:  therefore it is from God, that evils come to be’.  Moreover, that every truth is from God, they confirm by the authority of (St.) Augustine in (his) book of Eighty-Three Questions,9 saying thus:  « That every truth (is) from the Truth, is true, but the Truth (is) God:  therefore every truth has God (as its) author ».  But it is true, that evils come to be and/or are:  therefore with God as author it is, that there are and/or come to be evils.

Quibus facile est nobis respondere; sed indignum responsione videtur quod dicunt:  « Omne namque verum a Deo est », ut ait Augustinus, cui consonat Ambrosius,10 qui tractans illud verbum Apostoli:  Nemo potest dicere:  Dominus Iesus, nisi in Spiritu sancto, dicit, quod « omne verum, a quocumque dicitur, a Spiritu sancto est ».  Cum itaque verum sit, quod mala . . .

To which it is easy for us to respond; but unworthy of a response seems that which they say:  « For indeed every truth is from God », as (St.) Augustine says, with whom (St.) Ambrose10 is consonant, who treating of that verse of the Apostle:  No one can say:  “The Lord Jesus”, except in the Holy Spirit, says, that « every truth, by whomsoever it is said, is from the Holy Spirit ».  And thus since it is true, that evils . . .

1  Ita codd. et ed. 1, Vat. et aliae edd. mala.

2  Quaest. 3, nonnullis a Magistro omissis.

3  Contra originale et edd. 1, 6 in Vat. et aliis edd. non bene addicitur humanae, ut patet ex sequenti propositione.  Paulo inferius post aperte dicit plures edd. omittunt hic.

4  Ibid. q. 4.  —  Paulo inferius post in Deo Vat. cum paucis edd. addit eam.

5  Codd. et ed. 1 aliquo, originale aliquo alio.

6  Ita edd., excepta Vat., et omnes codd.  Verba Augustini contracta sunt.  In originali enim post Deus tantum causa est ita continuatur:  « Si ergo in homine, aut vi, aut suasione.  Sed vi nullo modo, ne sit Deo valentior.  Siquidem Deus ita optime hominem fecit, ut si vellet manere optimus, nullo resistente impediretur.  Suasione autem alterius hominis si concedimus hominem depravari, rursum quaerendum erit, suasor ipse a quo depravatus sit.  Non enim potest pravis non esse talium suasor.  Restat nescio quid, quod nec Deus nec homo sit; sed tamen hoc, quidquid est, aut vi intulit aut suasit.  De vi hoc respondetur quod supra; de suasione autem quiquid est, quia suasio non cogit invitum, ad eiusdem hominis voluntatem causa depravationis eius redit, sive aliquo sive nullo suadente depravatus sit ».  Vat. autem brevius sic habet:  si ergo in homine est, aut vi aut suasione, sed neutro modo:  neque etiam in eo est, quod neque Deus, neque homo sit:  et ex his.

7  Quaest. 21; sed plurimis a Magistro mutatis et transpositis.

8  Respicitur illud Eccli. 37, 23:  Qui sophistice loquitur, odibilis est.

9  Quaest. 1.  Ultima verba in originali sunt:  auctorem, ut sic anima.

10  In Epist. I. ad Cor. c. 12, 3:  Quidquid enim verum a quocumque dicitur, a sancto dicitur Spiritu.

1  Thus the codices and edition 1; the Vatican edition and the other editions have evils [mala].

2  Question 3, with not a few things omitted by Master (Peter).

3  Contrary to the original and editions 1 and 6, there is added in the Vatican edition and the other editions, not well human [humanae], as is clear from the following proposition.  A little below this after Behold [aperte dicit] very many editions omit here [hic].

4  Ibid., q. 4.  —   A little below this after asserts [in Deo] the Vatican edition, together with a few editions, adds explicitly it [eam].

5  The codices and edition 1 read some [aliquo], the original reads any other [aliquo alio].

6  Thus the editions, except the Vatican, and all the codices.  The words of (St.) Augustine have been contracted.  For in the original after for God is only the cause of good (things) [bonorum Deus tantum causa est], there is had:  « Therefore, if in a man, either by force, or by persuasion.  But in no manner by force, lest he be stronger [valentior] than God.  If indeed God made man so optimally, that if he wanted to remain the best, he would be impeded by nothing resisting.  However by the persuasion of another man, if we concede that man is depraved, again it will have to be asked, by whom was the persuader himself depraved.  For the persuader of such cannot not be depraved.  It remains (therefore, that) I do not know what, that which is neither God nor man, (is); but yet this, whatever it is, either was borne upon (him) by force or persuaded (him).  Concerning force it is responded as above; but concerning persuasion whatever it is, because persuasion does not move the unwilling, the cause of his depravation returns to the will of the same man, whether with someone or with no one persuading (him), he was depraved ».  But the Vatican edition thus reads more briefly:  if, therefore, it is in man, either (it is) by force or by persuasion, but (it is) in neither manner:  neither is it even in that, which neither God, nor man: and from these [si ergo in homine est, aut vi aut suasione, sed neutro modo:  neque etiam in eo est, quod neque Deus, neque homo sit:  et ex his]. 

7  Question 21; but with very many (words) changed and transposed by Master (Peter).

8  A reference to Ecclesiasticus 37:23:  Who speaks sophistically, is hateful [Qui sophistice loquitur, odibilis est].

9  Question 1.  The final words in the original are:  therefore it has God as (its) author, as thus the soul (does) [Deum igitur habet auctorem, ut sic anima].

10  1 Cor. 12:3:  For whatever truth is said by whomsoever, is said by the Holy Spirit [Quidquid enim verum a quocumque dicitur, a sancto dicitur Spiritu.]

 

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fiunt, hoc verum, quod dicitur illa locutione, scilicet mala fiunt, a Deo est; sed non inde sequitur, quod a Deo sit, ut mala fiant.  Si enim hoc diceretur, auctor malorum Deus esse intelligeretur.  Quod ex simili manifeste falsum ostenditur:  Deus prohibet furtum fieri; sed furtum fieri verum est:  ergo prohibet verum.  Non sequitur.

come to be, this truth, which is said by that expression, namely “evils come to be”, is from God; but from this it does not follow, that from God it is, that evils come to be.  For if this were said, God would be understood to be the Author of evils.  Which is shown (to be) manifestly false from a simile:  ‘God prohibits theft to be done, but “that theft is done” is true:  therefore He prohibits a truth’. A non sequitur.

Haec igitur et alia huiusmodi inania reliquentes, praemissae quaestionis parti saniori faventes, quae Sanctorum testimoniis plenius approbatur, dicamus, Deum non velle mala fieri, nec tamen velle non fieri, neque nolle fieri.  Omne enim1 quod vult fieri, fit, et omne quod vult non fieri, non fit.  Fiunt autem multa, quae non vult fieri, ut omnia mala.

Therefore leaving this and the other inane (arguments) of this kind, (and) favoring the saner side of aforementioned question, which is more fully approved by the testimonies of the Saints, let us say, that God does not will that evils come to be, yet neither does He will that they not come to be, nor is He unwilling that they come to be.  For1 everything which He wills to come to be, comes to be, and everything which He wills not to come to be, does not come to be.  But many come to be, which He does not will to come to be, such as all evils.

1  Vat. aliaeque edd. perperam ergo, contradicentibus codd. et ed. 1.

1  The Vatican edition and the other editions have faultily Therefore [ergo], contradicting the codices and edition 1.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.