LIBER SECUNDUS SENTENTIARUM -- D. 1: Petri Lombardi

Magistri Petri Lombardi Arch. Episc. Parisiensis	Master Peter Lombard Archbishop of Paris
Sententiarum Quatuor Libri	The Four Books of Sentences
LIBER SECUNDUS SENTENTIARUM. DE RERUM CREATIONE ET FORMATIONE CORPORALIUM ET SPIRITUALIUM ET ALIIS PLURIBUS EO PERTINENTIBUS	THE SECOND BOOK OF THE SENTENCES ON THE CREATION AND FORMATION OF THINGS CORPORAL AND SPIRITUAL AND MANY OTHERS PERTAINING TO THIS
DISTINCTIO I.	DISTINCTION 1
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 11-13. Cum Notitiis Editorum Quaracchi	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 11-13. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
PARS. I.	PART I
Cap. I. Quod unum est principium, non plura.	Chapter I. That there is one Beginning, not more.
« Creationem rerum insinuans Scriptura, Deum esse creatorem initiumque temporis atque omnium visibilium vel invisibilium creaturarum, in primordio sui ostendit » dicens:⁵ In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. « His etenim verbis Moyses, Spiritu Dei afflatus, in uno principio a Deo creatore mundum factum refert », elidens errorem quorundam, plura sine principio fuisse principia opinantium. « Plato namque tria initia existimavit, Deum scilicet et exemplar et materiam, et ipsam increatam sine principio, et Deum quasi artificem, non creatorem ». Creator enim est qui de nihilo aliquid facit.	« Scripture introducing at its first beginning [primordio] the creation of things, shows that God is the Creator and the Beginning [initium] of time and even of all creatures, visible and/or invisible », saying:⁵ In the beginning God created Heaven and Earth. « For indeed with these words Moses, inspired [afflatus] by the Spirit of God, reports that the world (had) been made in one beginning [principio] by God the Creator », crushing the error of certain (men), opining that there were more beginnings without a beginning. « For even Plato estimated that (there were) three beginnings [initia], namely God and the Exemplar and matter, and that the latter (was) uncreated without a beginning [principio], and God (was) a quasi craftsman, not a creator ». For a “creator” is he who makes something from nothing.
Cap. II. Quid sit creare, quid facere.	Chapter II. What it is to create, what to make.
Et creare proprie est de nihilo aliquid facere, facere vero non modo de nihilo aliquid operari, sed etiam de materia. Unde et homo vel Angelus dicitur aliqua facere, sed non creare, vocaturque factor sive artifex, sed non creator. Hoc enim nomen soli Deo proprie congruit,⁶ qui et de nihilo quaedam et de aliquo aliqua facit. Ipse est ergo creator et opifex et factor, sed creatoris nomen sibi proprie retinuit, alia vero etiam creaturis communicavit. In Scriptura⁷ tamen saepe creator accipitur tanquam factor, et creare sicut facere, sine distinctione significationis.	And “to create” is properly ‘to make something from nothing’, but “to make” (is) ‘to work something not only from nothing, but also from matter’. Whence even a man and/or an Angel is said “to make” something, but not “to create”, and he is called a “maker” [factor] or an artisan [artifex], but not a “creator”. For this name properly befits⁶ God alone, who both makes certain (things) from nothing and somethings from something. He is, therefore, a “creator” and a “worker” [opifex] and a “maker”, but He properly retained for Himself the name of “the Creator”, but He communicated the others even to creatures. However in Scripture⁷ creator is often accepted as “maker”, and creare as “to make”, without distinction of signification.
Cap. III. Secundum quam rationem dicuntur de Deo huiusmodi verba: agere, facere.	Chapter III. According to what reckoning are words of this kind: “to do”, “to make”, said of God.
Verumtamen sciendum est, haec verba, scilicet creare, facere, agere, et alia huiusmodi de Deo non posse dici secundum eam rationem, qua dicuntur de creaturis.⁸ Quippe cum dicimus, eum aliquid facere, non aliquem in operando motum illi intelligimus inesse, vel aliquam in laborando passionem, sicut nobis solet . . .	Nevertheless it must be known, that these verbs, namely “to create”, “to make” (and) “to do”, and others of this kind cannot be said of God according to that reckoning, by which they are said of creatures.⁸ Indeed when we say, that He makes something, we do not understand that there is any movement in Him in operating, and/or any passion in working, just as there is accustomed to befall / us, . . .
⁵ Genesis 1, 1. — Paulo ante cod. C omittit sui. — Hanc primam propositionem, nonnullis mutatis, Magister sumsit ex Beda, I. Hexaëm. Init. Sed sequentem usque ad elidens, et deinde a Plato namque usque ad creatorem ex Strabone, Prothem. in Gloss. Patrolog. Lat. tom. 113, codl. 64. a. Tum Beda, tum Strabo has sententias mutuarunt ex S. Ambros., I. Hexaëm. c. 1. et 2. n. 1-7. ⁶ Codd. B C E convenit, et mox pro creatoris codd. cum edd., exc. 1, 8, incongrue creationis. Deinde pro sicut facere Vat. et edd. 2-7 tanquam facere. ⁷ Cfr. Genes. 1, 27. et Eccli. 17, 1. ⁸ Cfr. August., I. de Gen. ad lit. c. 18. n. 36.	⁵ Genesis 1:1. — Before this codex C omits its [sui]. — Master (Peter) has taken this first proposition, with not a few (words) changed, from (St.) Bede (the Venerable), On the Six Days, Bk. I, at the beginning. But the following one up to crushing [elidens], and then from For even Plato up to a creator [Plato . . . creatorem] (he has taken) from (Dom. Walafrid) Strabo (O.S.B., Abbot of Reichenau), Prothem. in Gloss., Patrologia Latina, tom. 113, col. 64a. Both (St.) Bede, a s well as Strabo have changed these sentences from St. Ambrose, On the Six Days, Bk. I, chs. 1 and 2, nn. 1-7. [Trans. note: Not all the senses of the Latin in uno principio here are rendered by the English in one beginning; as can be seen in here in St. Bonaventure’s Commentary on this Distinction, Doubt 2.] ⁶ Codices B C and E have convenes properly [proprie convenit] for propterly befits [proprie congruit], and then for of “the Creator” [creatoris] the codices, together with the editions, except editions 1 and 8, have incongruously of “creation” [creationis]. Then (after footnote 7) for as “to make” [sicut facere] the Vatican edition and editions 2-7 have as “to make” [tanquam facere]. ⁷ Cf. Genesis 1:17 and Ecclesiasticus 17:1. ⁸ Cf. (St.) Augustine, On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. I, ch. 18, n. 36.

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accidere, sed eius sempiternae voluntatis novum aliquem significamus effectum, id est aeterna eius voluntate aliquid noviter existere. Cum ergo dicitur aliquid facere, tale est, ac si dicatur, iuxta eius voluntatem vel per eius voluntatem aliquid noviter contingere vel esse, ut in ipso nihil novi contingat, sed novum aliquid, sicut in eius aeterna voluntate fuerat, fiat sine aliqua motione vel sui mutatione. Nos vero operando mutari dicimur, quia movemur; non enim sine motu aliquid facimus. Deus ergo agere vel facere aliquid dicitur, quia causa est rerum noviter existentium, dum eius voluntate res novae esse incipiunt, quae ante non erant, absque ipsius agitatione; ut actus proprie dici non queat, cum videlicet actus omnis in motu consistat, in Deo autem motus nullus est. Sicut ergo ex calore solis aliqua fieri contingit, nulla tamen in ipso vel in eius calore facta motione vel mutatione auctoris, qui est unum et solum principium omnium. Aristoteles vero duo¹ principia dixit, scilicet materiam et species, et tertium operatorium dictum; mundum quoque semper esse et fuisse.	/ us, but we signify that there is some new effect of His Sempiternal Will, that is that something newly exists by His Eternal Will. Therefore, when He is said “to make something”, it is such, as if to say, that something newly happens [contingere] and/or is in accord with His Will and/or through His Will, such that in Him nothing new [nihil novi] happens, but something new, just as was in His Eternal Will, comes to be without any motion and/or mutation of His own. However, we, by working, are said “to be changed”, because we move; for not without movement do we make anything. Therefore God is said “to act” and/or “to make” something, because He is the Cause of things newly existing, so long as the new things, which before were not, start to be according to His Will, apart from His own agitation; so that it is not able [queat] to be properly said (to be) an “act”, since, namely, the act of everything consists in movement, but in God it is no movement. Therefore, just as from the heat of the Sun somethings come to be, yet no motion and/or mutation of the author comes to be in Him and/or in His heat, who is the One and Sole Principle of all. But Aristotle said that (there are) two¹ principles, namely, matter and species, and a third called [dictum] the “operative (cause)” [operatorium]; also that the world always is and was.
Horum ergo et similium errorem Spiritus sanctus evacuans veritatisque disciplinam tradens, Deum in principio temporum mundum creasse et ante tempora aeternaliter exstitisse significat, ipsius aeternitatem et omnipotentiam commendans; cui voluisse facere est,² quia, ut praediximus, ex eius voluntate et bonitate res novae existunt. « Credamus igitur, rerum creatarum caelestium vel terrestrium, visibilium vel invisibilium causam non esse nisi bonitatem Creatoris, qui est Deus unus est verus. Cuius tanta est bonitas, ut summe bonus beatitudinis suae, qua aeternaliter beatus est, alios velit esse participes; quam videt³ et communicari posse et minui omnino non posse. Illud igitur bonum, quod ipse erat et quo beatus erat, sola bonitate, non necessitate aliis communicari voluit, quia summe boni erat prodesse velle, et omnipotentissimi nocere non posse ».⁴	Refuting [evacuans] the error, therefore, of these and similar (men) the Holy Spirit, handing down the discipline of truth, signifies that God at the beginning of times created the world and before times eternally existed, commending (thereby) His Eternity and Omnipotence; to Whom “to have willed” is “to make”,² because, as we have said before, out of His Will and Goodness new things have stood forth [existunt]. « Let us believe, therefore, that there is no cause of created things, celestial and/or terrestrial, visible and/or invisible except the Goodness of the Creator, who is the One and True God. Whose Goodness is so great, that as One most highly Good, He wills that others be sharers [participes] of His own Goodness, by which He is eternally blessed; which He sees³ and can communicate and cannot entirely diminish. Therefore that Good, which He was and by which He was Good, He willed by Goodness alone, not by necessity, to communicate to others, because it belonged most highly to the Good to will to go forth, and to the Most Omnipotent to be unable to harm ».⁴
PARS. II.	PART II
Cap. IV. Quare rationalis creatura facta sit, id est homo vel Angelus.	Chapter IV. For what reason has a rational creature been made, that is man and/or Angel.
« Et quia non valet eius beatitudinis participes existere aliquis, nisi per intelligentiam, quae quanto magis intelligitur, tanto plenius habetur; fecit Deus rationalem creaturam, quae summum bonum intelligeret et intelligendo amaret et amando possideret ac possidendo frueretur. Eamque hoc modo distinxit, ut pars in sui puritate permaneret nec corpori uniretur, scilicet Angeli, pars corpori iungeretur, scilicet animae. Distincta est itaque rationalis creatura in incorpoream et corpoream; et incorporea quidem Angelus, corporea vero homo vocatur, ex anima rationali et carne subsistens. Conditio ergo rationalis creaturae primam causam habuit Dei bonitatem ».⁵	« And because one cannot prevail to exist as a sharer of His Beatitude, except through intelligence, which as much as It understands more, so much is It more fully had; God made the rational creature, which would understand the Most High Good and by understanding love (It) and by loving posses (It, and by possessing enjoy (It). And in this manner He distinguished it, so that part would remain in its purity and not be united with a body, namely the Angels, part would be joined to a body, namely souls. And so the rational creature is distinguished into the incorporeal and the corporeal; and indeed the incorporeal (is called) an “Angel”, but the corporeal is called a “man”, subsisting out of a rational soul and the flesh. Therefore the foundation [conditionis] of the rational creature had (as its) First Cause the Goodness of God ».⁵
« Ideoque, si quaeratur, quare creatus sit homo vel Angelus, brevi sermone responderi potest: propter bonitatem eius. Unde Augustinus in libro de Doctrina christiana:⁶ Quia bonus est Deus, sumus; et in quantum sumus, boni sumus ».	« And for this reason, if it be asked, “For what reason was man and/or Angel created?”, one can respond with a brief sermon: “On account of His Goodness”. Wherefore (St.) Augustine in the book On Christian Doctrine (says):⁶ “Because God is good, we are; and inasmuch as we are, we are good” ».
« Et si quaeritur, ad quid creata sit rationalis creatura, respondetur: ad laudandum Deum, ad serviendum ei, ad fruendum eo; in quibus proficit ipsa, non Deus. Deus enim perfectus et summa bonitate plenus nec augeri potest nec minui. Quod ergo rationalis creatura facta est a Deo, referendum est ad Creatoris bonitatem et ad creaturae utilitatem ».⁷ « Cum ergo quaeritur, quare vel ad quid facta sit rationalis creatura, brevissime responderi potest: propter Dei bonitatem, et suam utilitatem. Utile nempe ipsi est servire Deo et frui eo ». « Factus ergo Angelus sive homo propter Deum dicitur esse, non quia creator Deus et summe beatus alterutrius indiguerit officio, qui bonorum nostrorum non eget,⁸ sed ut serviret ei ac frueretur eo, cui servire regnare est. In hoc enim proficit serviens, non ille cui servitur ». « Et sicut factus est homo propter Deum, id est, ut ei serviret, ita mundus factus est propter hominem, scilicet ut ei serviret. Positus est ergo homo in medio, ut et ei serviretur et ipse serviret, ut acciperet utrinque,⁹ et reflueret totum ad bonum hominis, et quod accepit obsequium, et quod impendit. Ita enim voluit Deus sibi ab homine serviri, ut ea servitute non Deus, sed homo serviens iuvaretur; et voluit, ut mundus serviret homini, et exinde similiter iuvaretur homo. Totum igitur bonum hominis erat, et quod factum est propter ipsum, et propter quod factus est ipse. Omnia enim, ut ait Apostolus,¹⁰ nostra sunt, scilicet superiora et aequalia et inferiora. Superiora quidem nostra sunt ad perfruendum, ut Deus-Trinitas, aequalia ad convivendum, scilicet Angeli, qui, etsi modo nobis superiores sint, in futuro erunt aequales; qui et modo nostri sunt, quia ad usum nobis sunt, sicut res dominorum dicuntur esse famulorum, non domino, sed quia sunt ad usum eorum. Ipsique Angeli in quibusdam Scripturae locis¹¹ nobis servire dicuntur, dum propter nos in ministerium mittuntur ».	« And if there is asked, “For what has the rational creature been created?”, one responds: “To praise God, to serve him, (and) to enjoy Him”; in which it, not God, profits. For God, perfect and full of Most High Goodness, can neither be increased nor diminished. Therefore, that the rational creature has been made by God, must be referred to the Goodness of the Creator and to the utility of the creature ».⁷ « When, therefore, it is asked, “For what reason and/or for what has the rational creature been made?”, one can respond in the briefest manner: “For the sake of God’s Goodness, and its own utility.” Namely, it is useful for it to serve God and to enjoy Him ». « Therefore Angel and man is said to have been made for God’s sake [propter Deum], not because God, the Creator and most highly blest, needed the service [officio] of either of the two, (He) who does not need our goods,⁸ but so that (each) would serve Him and enjoy Him, whom to serve is to reign. For in this the one serving profits, not Him whom is served ». « And just as man has been made for God’s sake, that is, so that he might serve Him, so the world has been made for man’s sake, that is, so that it might serve him. Therefore man has been placed in the middle, so that he might be served and himself serve, so that he might accept from each side [utrinque],⁹ and the whole might redound [reflueret] to the good of man, both the obsequium which he accepts, and which he pays out. For thus has God willed that He be served by man, so that by that servitude not God, but man, serving, might be helped; and He willed, that the world would serve man, and from this, similarly, that man might be helped. Therefore the whole good belonged to man, both what has been done for his sake, and (that Good) for the sake of which he has been made. For all, as the Apostle says,¹⁰ are ours, namely (things) superior and equal and inferior. Indeed (things) superior are ours to thoroughly enjoy, such as God the Trinity, (things) equal to live with [ad convivendum], that is the Angels, who, even if they are now superior to us, in the future they will be (our) equals; who even now belong to us, because they are for our use, just as the things of lords are said “to belong” to (His) household servants, not to the lord, but because they are for their use. And the Angels themselves in certain passages¹¹ of Scripture are said “to serve” us, so long as they are sent in ministry for our sake ».
¹ Vat. omittit duo, refragantibus codd. nec non edd., et pro dixit exhibet posuit contra codd. et edd. 1, 8. — Hanc sententiam Magister sumsit ex Ambros., I. Hexaëm. c. 1. n. 1:* « . . . alii quoque, ut Aristoteles cum suis, disputandum putavit, duo principia ponerent, materiam et speciem, et tertium cum iis, quod operatorium dicitur ». De hac sententia, quae Aristoteli istam opinionem attribuit, cfr. Comment. S. Bonav. hic dub. 3. ² Cfr. I. Sent. d. XLV-XLVII. ³ Codd. B C E et edd. 1, 8 vidit, et paulo inferius pro aliis edd. alii. ⁴ Hug. de S. Vict, I. de Sacram. p. II. c. 1. Cfr. de Diligendo Deo, c. 2. (inter opera August.). ⁵ De diligendo Deo loc. cit., et Hugo loc. cit. ⁶ Lib. I. c. 32. n. 35. Cfr. Magister, I. Sent. d. I. c. 3. ⁷ Verba praecedentia et quae sequuntur usque ad finem capituli sumta sunt ex libro de Diligendo Deo, c. 2. et. 3. et ex Hugone, I. de Sacram. p. II. c. 4. ⁸ Psalm. 15, 2. ⁹ Vat. cum codd. A D E et nonnullis edd. perperam utrumque. ¹⁰ I. Cor. 3, 22. Cfr. Rom. 8, 32, ubi in Glossa, quae sumta est ex August., II. quaest. evang. c. 33, 35, inveniuntur verba quae sequuntur. ¹¹ Hebr. 1, 14.	¹ The Vatican edition omits two [duo], breaking with the codices and even with the editions, and for said [dixit] exhibits posited [posuit], contrary to the codices and editions 1 and 8. — Master (Peter) takes this sentence from (St.) Ambrose, On the Six Days, Bk. I, ch. 1, n. 1:* « . . . others also, such as Aristotle, with his (disciples), (who) thought (it) must be debated, posited two principles, matter and species, and a third together with these, which is said (to be) the “operative (cause)” [operatorium] ». On this sentence, which attributes this opinion to Aristotle, cf. St. Bonaventure’s Commentary, here in Doubt 3. ² Cf. the First Book of Sentences, dd. XLV-XLVII. ³ Codices B C and E and editions 1 and 8 read saw [vidit], and a little below this for to others [aliis] the editions have to another [alii]. ⁴ Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments, Bk. I, p. II, ch. 1. Cf. On Loving God, ch. 2 (among the Works of St. Augustine). ⁵ On Loving God, loc. cit., and Hugh (of St. Victor), loc. cit.. ⁶ Bk. I, ch. 32, n. 35. Cf. Master (Peter), First Book of Sentences, d. I, ch. 3. ⁷ The preceding words and those which follow to the end of the chapter have been taken from the book On Loving God, chs. 2 and 3, and from Hugh (of St. Victor), On the Sacraments, Bk. I, p. II, ch. 4. ⁸ Ps. 15:2. ⁹ The Vatican edition, together with codices A D and E and not a few editions, has faultily each [utrumque] for from each side [utrinque]. ¹⁰ 1 Cor. 3:22. Cf. Rom 8:32, where in the Gloss, which is taken from (St.) Augustine, Questions on the Gospel, Bk. II, chs. 33 and 35, there are found the words which follow. ¹¹ Heb. 1:14.
* [Trans. nota: Hic nota originalis mendose omittit :.]	* [Trans. note: Here the original footnote faultily omits the colon.]

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Cap. V. Quomodo dicitur homo factus propter reparationem angelici casus.	Chapter V. In what manner man is said (to have) been made “for the sake of the reparation of the downfall of the Angels”.
De homine quoque in scriptura interdum reperitur,¹ quod factus sit propter reparationem angelicae ruinae. Quod non ita est intelligendum, quasi non fuisset homo factus, si non peccasset Angelus; sed quia inter alias causas, scilicet praecipuas, haec etiam nonnulla causa exstitit. Nostra igitur sunt superiora et aequalia; nostra etiam sunt inferiora, quia ad serviendum nobis facta.	Concerning man it is also sometimes found in writing [in scriptura],¹ that he has been made for the sake of the reparation of the ruin of the Angels [angelicae ruinae]. Which must not be thus understood, as if man would not have been made, if an Angel had not sinned; but because among the other causes, namely, the chief ones, this additional [nonnulla] cause also existed. Ours, therefore, are (things) superior and equal; ours, too, are (things) inferior, because (they have) been made to serve us.
Cap. VI. Quare ita homo sit institutus, ut unita sit anima corpori.	Chapter VI. For what reason has man been thus instituted, that (his) soul has been united to a body.
Solet etiam quaeri, cum maioris dignitatis videretur² esse anima, si absque corpore permansisset, cur unita sit corpori. — Ad quod primo dici potest: quia Deus voluit, et voluntatis eius causa quaerenda non est.³ Secundo autem potest dici, quod ideo Deus voluit, eam corpori uniri, ut in humana conditione ostenderet novum exemplum beatae unionis, quae est inter Deum et spiritum, in qua diligitur ex toto corde et videtur facie ad faciem. Putaret enim creatura, se non posse uniri Creatori suo tanta propinquitate, ut eum tota mente diligeret et cognosceret, nisi videret spiritum, qui est excellentissima creatura, tam infimae, id est carni, quae de terra est, in tanta dilectione uniri, ut non valeat arctari ad hoc, ut velit eam relinquere, sicut Apostolus⁴ ostendit dicens: Nolumus corpore exspoliari, sed supervestiri; per quod ostenditur, spiritum creatum Spiritui increato ineffabili amore uniri. « Pro exemplo ergo futurae societatis, quae inter Deum et spiritum rationalem in glorificatione eiusdem perficienda erat, animam corporeis indumentis et terrenis mansionibus copulavit, luteamque materiam fecit ad vitae sensum vegetare, ut sciret homo, quia, si potuit Deus tam disparem naturam corporis et animae in foederationem unam et in amicitiam tantam coniungere, nequaquam ei impossibile futurum, rationalis creaturae humilitatem, licet longe inferiorem ad suae gloriae participationem sublimare. Quia ergo pro exemplo rationalis spiritus in parte usque ad consortium terreni corporis humiliatus est, ne forte in hoc nimis depressus videretur, addidit Dei providentia, ut postmodum cum eodem corpore glorificato ad consortium illorum qui in sua permanserunt⁵ puritate, sublimaretur, ut quod minus ex dispensatione Creatoris sui acceperat conditus, postmodum per gratiam eiusdem acciperet glorificatus. Sic ergo conditur noster Deus rationales spiritus varia sorte pro arbitrio voluntatis suae disponens, illis, quos in sua puritate reliquerat, sursum in caelo mansionem; illis vero, quos corporibus terrenis sociaverat, deorsum in terra habitationem constituit; utriusque regulam imponens obedientiae, quatenus et illi ab eo ubi erant, non caderent, et isti ab eo ubi erant, ad id ubi non erant, ascenderent. Fecit itaque Deus hominem ex duplici substantia, corpus de terra fingens,⁶ animam vero de nihilo faciens ».⁷ Ideo etiam unitae sunt animae corporibus, ut in eis Deo famulantes maiorem mereantur coronam.	It is also customarily asked, “Since the soul would seem² to be of greater dignity, if it remained [permansisset] apart from the body, why has it been united to a body?” — To which it can be first said: “Because God willed (it so), and the cause of His Will is not to be sought.”³ But second it can be said, that God willed, that it be united to the body, for this reason, that in the foundation of man [in humana conditione] a new example would be shown of the blessed union, which is between God and spirit, in which He is loved with one’s whole heart and is seen face to face. For the creature would think, that it could not be united to its Creator in so great a proximity, to love and cognize Him with (its) whole mind, unless it saw a spirit, which is the most excellent creature, united to such a very low one [infimae], that is to the flesh, which is of the earth, in such great love, that it could not [non valeat] be constrained to this, to will to relinquish it, just as the Apostle⁴ showed, saying: We do not want to be despoiled in body, but to be clothed over; through which it is shown, that the created spirit is united to the uncreated Spirit by an ineffable love. « Therefore, as an example of the society to come, which was going to be perfected between God and the rational spirit in its own glorification, He joined the soul to corporeal garments and earthly mansions, and made the matter of yellow clay [luteamque materiam] be a nourishment for the sense of life [ad vitae sensum vegetare], so that man might know, that, if God could conjoin so disparate the nature of body and soul in one federation and in friendship, that it would (be) by no means impossible for Him, that He raise the humility of a rational creature, though by far inferior, to the participation in His Glory. Therefore, because (man), as an example to the rational spirit, was in part humbled unto the sharing of the lot [usque ad consortium] of an earthly body, lest perhaps in this he would seem to be exceedingly depressed, God’s Providence added, that after a while when having been glorified with the same body, he would be raised to the sharing of the lot [ad consortium] of those who remained⁵ in their own purity, so that because he had accepted less out of the dispensation of his own Creator as one founded, he would after a while accept through the grace of the Same (to be) glorified. Thus, therefore, God our Founder, disposing rational spirits according to differing lots [varia sorte] in virtue of the judgment of His own Will, established for those, whom He had left in their purity, a mansion above in Heaven; but those, whom He associated with earthly bodies, a dwelling below on Earth; imposing a rule of obedience for each, to the extent that both the former from that where they were, would not fall down, and these latter from that where they were, would not ascend to that where they were not. And so God made man from a twofold substance, molding [fingens]⁶ (his) body from the earth, but making (his) soul from nothing ».⁷ For that reason souls have been united even to bodies, so that serving God familiarly in them they might merit a greater crown.
Ex praemissis apparet, rationalem creaturam in angelicam et humanam fuisse distinctam, quarum altera tota est spiritualis, id est angelica; altera ex parte spiritualis et ex parte corporalis, id est humana. Cum itaque de his tractandum sit, scilicet de spirituali et corporali creatura et de rationali et non rationali,⁸ primo de rationali et spirituali, id est de Angelis agendum videtur, ut a contuitu Creatoris ad cognitionem creaturae dignioris ratio nostra intendat; deinde ad considerationem corporeae tam illius quae est rationalis, quam illius quae non est rationalis, descendat, ut Trinitatis increatae sacramentum tripartitae creaturae eique concretorum atque contingentium sequatur documentum.	From the aforementioned it appears, that the rational creature had been distinguished into the angelic and the human, one of which is wholly spiritual [tota spiritualis], that is the angelic; the other in part spiritual and in part corporal, that is the human. And so since there is to be a treatment of these, namely of the spiritual and corporal creature and of the rational and non-rational,⁸ it seems that first one must deal with the rational and spiritual, that is with the Angels, so that our reckoning may extend [indendat] from the contuition of the Creator to the cognition of the more worthy creature; then to descend to the consideration of the corporeal, both of that which is rational, and of that which is not rational, so that (to) the sacrament of the Uncreated Trinity there may follow the document of the tripartite creature and to that (the document) of (things) concrete and contingent.
¹ Cfr. August., Enchirdi. c. 29; XXII. de Civ. Dei, c. 1. ² Vat. cum nonnullis edd. videatur. ³ Cfr. I. Sent. d. XL. c. 4. Infra respicitur Matth. 22, 37; et I. Cor. 13, 12. ⁴ II. Cor. 5, 4. ⁵ Cod. C perstiterunt, codd. A D cum edd. 1, 8 perstiterant; subinde Vat. perperam sublimetur, omnibus codd. et edd refragantibus. ⁶ Vat. cum nonnullis edd. componens. ⁷ Libr. de Spiritu et anima, c. 14. (inter opera August.), et iterum Hugo a S. Vict., I. de Sacram. p. VI. c. 1. ⁸ Sola Vat. omittit verba et de rationali et non rationali primo.	¹ Cf. (St.) Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 29, and On the City of God, Bk. XXII, ch. 1. ² The Vatican edition, together with not a few editions, has seems [videatur] for would seem [videretur]. ³ Cf. The First Book of Sentences, d. XL, ch. 4. Below there is a reference to Mt. 22:37, and to 1 Cor. 13:12. ⁴ 2 Cor. 5:4. ⁵ Codex C has persisted [perstiterunt], codices A and C, together with editions 1 and 8, have had persisted [perstiterant]; then the Vatican edition has faultily will be raised [sublimetur] for would be raised [sublimaretur], breaking with all the codices and the editions. ⁶ The Vatican edition, together with not a few editions, has composing [componens]. ⁷ In the book On Spirit and the Soul, ch. 14 (among the Works of St. Augustine, and again Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments, Bk. I, p. VI, ch. 1. ⁸ The Vatican edition alone omits the words and of the rational and non-rational, . . . first [et de rationali et non rationali, primo].

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Sententiarum Quatuor Libri

The Four Books of Sentences