LIBER SECUNDUS SENTENTIARUM -- D. 3: Petri Lombardi

Magistri Petri Lombardi Arch. Episc. Parisiensis	Master Peter Lombard Archbishop of Paris
Sententiarum Quatuor Libri	The Four Books of Sentences
LIBER SECUNDUS SENTENTIARUM. DE RERUM CREATIONE ET FORMATIONE CORPORALIUM ET SPIRITUALIUM ET ALIIS PLURIBUS EO PERTINENTIBUS	THE SECOND BOOK OF THE SENTENCES ON THE CREATION AND FORMATION OF THINGS CORPORAL AND SPIRITUAL AND MANY OTHERS PERTAINING TO THIS
DISTINCTIO III.	DISTINCTION 3
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 52-54. Cum Notitiis Editorum Quaracchi	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 52-54. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
PARS. I.	PART I
Cap. I. Quales facti fuerint Angeli.	Chapter I. Angels of what kind were made?
Ecce ostensum est, ubi Angeli fuerint, mox ut creati sunt. Nunc consequens est investigare, quales facti fuerint in ipso primordio suae conditionis. Et quatuor quidem Angelis videntur esse attributa in initio subsistentiae suae,¹ scilicet essentia simplex, id est indivisibilis et immaterialis; et discretio personalis; et per rationem naturaliter insitam intelligentia, memoria et voluntas sive dilectio; liberum quoque arbitrium, id est libera inclinandae voluntatis sive ad bonum sive ad malum facultas. Poterant enim per liberum arbitrium sine violentia et coactione ad utrumlibet propria voluntate deflecti.²	Behold it has been shown, where the Angels were, as soon as they were created. Now there is the consequent investigation [investigare] of (the question), “Of what kind [quales] were they made in the very first rise of their foundation?” And indeed, there seems to be attributed to the Angels, at the start of their subsistence, four (things),¹ namely a simple essence, that is an indivisible and immaterial (essence); and a discretion of persons [discretio personalis], and through a reason naturally engrafted (in to each) an intelligence, memory and will or choice [dilectio]; also free will [liberum arbitrium], that is the free faculty of the will to incline either to good or to evil. For they could through free will, without violence and coercion, be turned aside [deflecti]² to either, by their own will.
Cap. II. An omnes Angeli fuerint aequales in essentia, sapientia, libertate arbitrii.	Chapter II. Whether all the Angels were equal in essence, wisdom, (and) liberty of judgment?
Hic considerandum est, utrum in sua substantia spirituali et sapientia rationali et libertate arbitrii, quae omnibus inerant, omnes aequales fuerint, ut sit prima consideratio de substantia, secunda de forma, tertia de potestate. Persona quippe substantia est, sapientia forma, arbitrium potestas. Et ad substantiam quidem pertinet naturae subtilitas, ad formam vero intelligentiae perspicacitas, et ad potestatem voluntatis rationalis habilitas. — Illae igitur essentiae rationales, quae personae erant et spiritus erant naturaque simplices ac vita immortales, differentem essentiae tenuitatem et differentem sapientiae perspicacitatem atque differentem arbitrii habititatem³ recte habuisse intelliguntur; sicut in corporibus nonnulla differentia est secundum essentiam ac formam et pondus: quaedam enim aliis meliorem ac digniorem essentiam et formam habent, et alia aliis leviora atque agiliora sunt. Ad hunc ergo modum credendum est, illas spirituales naturas convenientes suae puritati et excellentiae et in essentia et in forma et in facultate differentias accepisse in exordio suae conditionis, quibus alii superiores, alii inferiores Dei sapientia constituerentur, aliis maiora, aliis minora dona praestantis, ut qui tunc per naturalia bona aliis excellebant, ipsi etiam post per munera gratiae eisdem praeessent. Qui enim natura magis subtiles et sapientia amplius perspicaces creati sunt, hi etiam maioribus gratiae muneribus praediti sunt et dignitate excellentiores aliis constituti. Qui vero natura minus subtiles et sapientia minus perspicaces conditi sunt, minora gratiae dona habuerunt inferioresque constituti sunt sapientia Dei, aequo moderamine cuncta ordinantis. In ipsa facultate arbitrii differentia animadvertenda est secundum differentem naturae virtuem et differentem cognitionis et intelligentiae vim. Et sicut differens vigor et subtilitas naturae infirmitatem non adducit, minorque cognitio sapientiae ignorantiam non ingerit, sic libertas inferior nullam arbitrio necesitatis voluntatem imponit.	Here one must consider, whether in their own spiritual substance and rational wisdom and freedom of judgment [libertate arbitrii], which was in all (of them), they were all equal, so that the first consideration concerns (their) substance, the second (their) form, the third (their) power [potestate]. Indeed, a person is a substance, wisdom (is) a form, (and) judgment (is) a power. And, indeed, to (their) substance there pertains a subtlety of nature, but to (their) form a perspicacity of intelligence, and to (their) power the ability [habilitas] of a rational will. — Therefore those rational essences, which were persons and were spirits, simple according to nature and immortal according to life, are understood rightly to have had a different refinement [tenuitatem] of essence and a different perspicacity of wisdom and also a different ability³ of judgment; just as among bodies there is some [nonnulla] difference according to essence and form and weight: for certain (things) have a better and more worthy essence and form than others, and some are lighter and more agile than others. Therefore, according to this manner it must be understood, that those spiritual natures, convening according to their purity and excellent both in essence and in form and in faculty, accepted differences at the origin [exordio] of their foundation, according to which some were constituted superiors, others inferiors, according to the Wisdom of God, proffering greater gifts [dona] to some, lesser ones to others, so that those who then excelled others through natural goods, would also themselves, through the gifts [munera] of grace, precede [praeessent] the same. For (those) who were created more subtle according to nature and more amply perspicacious according to wisdom, these were endowed [praediti sunt] with greater gifts [munera] of grace and constituted more excellent in dignity. But (those) who were founded less subtle according to nature and less perspicacious according to wisdom, (these) had less gifts [dona] of grace and were constituted inferior according to the Wisdom of God, ordering all by an equal manner of guidance [aequo moderamine]. In the very faculty of judgment a difference is to be adverted to [animadvertenda est] according to the different virtue of nature and the different force of cognition and intelligence. And just as a different vigor and subtlety of nature does not lead to infirmity, and a lesser cognition of wisdom does not engender ignorance, so an inferior liberty imposes upon judgment no will of necessity.
Cap. III. Quae communia et aequalia habuerunt Angeli.	Chapter III. What common and equal (goods) did the Angels have?
Et sicut in paredictis Angeli differebant, ita et quaedam communia et aequalia habebant: quod spiritus erant, quod indissolubiles et immortales erant, commune omnibus et aequale erat; in subtilitate vero essentiae et intelligentia sapientiae et libertate voluntatis differentes erant. Has discretiones⁴ intelligibiles invisibilium naturarum ille solus comprehendere potuit et ponderare, qui cuncta fecit in pondere, numero et mensura.⁵	And just as in the aforesaid the Angels differed, so also did they have certain common and equal (goods): that they were spirits, that they were indissoluble and immortal, was common and equal to all; but in the subtlety of essence and the intelligence of wisdom and the liberty of will they were different. These intelligible dividing lines [discretiones]⁴ of invisible natures He alone could comprehend and ponder, who made all in weight, number and measure.⁵
PARS. II.	PART II
Cap. IV. An boni, vel mali creati sint, et an aliqua mora fuerit inter creationem et lapsum.	Chapter IV. Whether they were created good, and/or evil, and whether there was any delay between (their) creation and fall?
Illud quoque investigatione dignum videtur, quod est a pluribus quaeri solet, utrum boni vel mali, iusti vel iniusti creati sint Angeli, et an aliqua mora fuerit inter creationem et lapsum, vel sine mora in ipso creationis exordio ceciderint. — Putaverunt enim quidam, Angelos qui ceciderunt, creatos esse malos et non libero arbitrio in malitiam declinasse, sed in malitia a Deo factos esse, nec aliquam fuisse moram inter creationem et lapsum, sed ab initio apostatasse; alios . . .	That also seems to be worthy of investigation, which is customarily asked by several (authors), whether the Angels were created good and/or evil, just and/or unjust, and whether there was any delay between (their) creation and fall, and/or whether they fell down without delay at the very origin [exordio] of (their) creation. — For certain (authors) though, that the Angels who fell down, were created evil and did not turn aside [declinasse] by free will into malice, but were made in malice by God, and that where was no delay between (their) creation and fall, but that they apostatized from the start; but that the others . . .
¹ Haec et fere totam distinctionem Magister accepit ex Hugone, I. de Sacram. p. 5. c. 6. seqq., et Sent. tr. 2. c. 3. seqq. — Paulo inferius codd. B C D E propter rationem loco per rationem. ² Ed. 1 melius flecti. ³ Vat. cum edd., exc. 1, voci habilitatem praemittit libertatem et. ⁴ Vat. cum nonnullis edd. distinctiones. ⁵ Sap. 11, 21.	¹ These (words) and nearly the whole Distinction, Master (Peter) accepted from Hugo (of St. Victor)’s, On the Sacraments, Bk. I, part 5, ch. 6 ff., and Sentences, tr. 2, ch. 3 ff. — A little below this codices B C D and E have on account of the reason [propter rationem] for through a reason [per rationem]. [Trans. note: Concerning a discretion of persons, cf. the Rationale for the Translation of Peculiar Latin Terms, in the Introduction to this English Translation.] ² Edition 1 read better bent [flecti] for turned aside [deflecti]. ³ The Vatican edition, with the editions, except edition 1, to the word ability [habilitatem] the words liberty and [libertatem et]. ⁴ The Vatican edition, together with not a few editions, has distinctions [distinctiones]. ⁵ Wis. 11:21.

p. 87

vero creatos fuisse plene beatos. Qui opinionem suam muniunt auctoritate Augustini super Genesim¹ ita dicentis: « Non frustra putari potest, ab initio temporis diabolum cecidisse nec cum sanctis Angelis pacatum aliquando vixisse et beatum, sed mox apostatasse; unde Dominus ait: Ille homicida erat ab initio et in veritate non stetit, ut intelligamus, quia in veritate non stetit ex quo creatus est, qui staret, si stare voluisset ». Idem in eodem:² « Non frustra, inquit, putandum est, ab ipso initio temporis vel conditionis suae diabolum cecidisse et nunquam in veritate stetisse. Unde quidam in hanc malitiam libero arbitrio non esse flexum, sed in hac, quamvis a Deo, putant esse creatum, secundum illud beati Iob: Hoc est, inquit, initium figmenti Dei, quod fecit Deus, ut illudatur ei ab Angelis eius; et Propheta ait: Draco iste, quem formasti ad illudendum ei, tanquam primo factus sit malus et invidus diabolus,³ non voluntate depravatus ». — His aliisque testimoniis utuntur qui dicunt, Angelos, qui ceciderunt, creatos fuisse malos et sine mora corruisse; eos vero, qui perstiterunt, perfectos et beatos fuisse creatos, astruunt auctoritate Augustini, qui super Genesim⁴ dicit, per caelum significari creaturam spiritualem, quae ab exordio, quo facta est, et perfecta et beata est semper.	had been created fully blessed. Who fortify their own opinion with the authority of (St.) Augustine On Genesis, thus saying: « It cannot be thought in vain [frustra], that from the start of time the Devil fell down nor that he lived at any time at peacel [pacatum] and blessed with the holy Angels, but immediately [mox] apostatized; wherefore the Lord says: He was a murderer from the start and did not stand in the Truth, so that we may understand, that he did not stand in the Truth out of which he as created, to stand, if he had wanted to stand ». The same says in the same:² « Not in vain must it be thought, that from the start of time and/or of his foundation the Devil fell down and never stood in the Truth. Wherefore certain (authors) think that he was not bent unto this malice by free will, but that he was created in it, though by God, according to that (verse) of Blessed Job: This is, he says, the start of God’s ruse [figmenti], which God wrought, to make sport of [illudatur] him by His Angel; and the Prophet says: That Dragon, which Thou has formed to make sport of him, as if the Devil was made at first evil and envious,³ not (that he was) depraved by (his own) will ». — These and other testimonies do they use, who say, that the Angels, who fell down, were created evil and fell to the earth [corruisse] without delay; but that those, who stood firm [perstiterunt], were created perfect and blessed, they construe [astrue] from the authority of (St.) Augustine, who says On Genesis,⁴ that through “Heaven” [caelum] there is signified the spiritual creature, which from the origin [ab exordio], in which it was made, was ever both perfected and blessed.
Aliis autem videtur, omnes Angelos creatos esse bonos et in ipso creationis primordio⁵ bonos exstitisse, id est sine vitio, iustosque fuisse, id est innocentes, sed non iustos, id est virtutum exercitium habentes. Nondum enim praediti erant virtutibus, quae stantibus appositae fuerunt in confirmatione per gratiam, aliis per liberum arbitrium superbientibus, et ideo cadentibus. Aliquam etiam fuisse morulam aiunt inter creationem et lapsum ac confirmationem; et in illa brevitate temporis omnes boni erant, non quidem per usum liberi arbitrii, sed per creationis beneficium; et tales erant, qui stare poterant, id est, non cadere per bona creationis, et cadere per liberum arbitrium. Poterant enim peccare et non peccare, sed non poterant proficere ad meritum vitae, nisi gratia superadderetur, quae addita est quibusdam in confirmatione. Et ad hoc confirmandum utuntur testimonio Augustini, qui super Genesim⁶ dicit, angelicam naturam primo informiter creatam et caelum dictam, postea formatam et lucem appellatam, quando ad Creatorem est conversa, perfecta dilectione ei inhaerens. Unde prius dictum est: In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, et postea subditum: Dixit Deus: Fiat lux, et facta est lux, quia in primo agitur de creatione spiritualis naturae informis, postea de formatione eiusdem. — Ratio quoque obviat illis qui dicunt, Angelos creatos fuisse malos. Non enim potuit Creator optimus auctor mali esse; et ideo totum bonum erat, quod ex ipso illis erat, et totum bonum erat, quoniam ex ipso totum erat. Hoc modo probatur, quod boni erant omnes Angeli, quando primo facti sunt, sed ea bonitate, quam natura incipiens acceperat.	But to others it seems, that all the Angels were created good and at the very first rise [primordio]⁵ of (their) creation existed as good, that is without vice, and that they were just, that is innocent, but that (they were) not just, that is having the exercise of the virtues. For they were not yet endowed [praediti erant] with the virtues, which had been apportioned [appositae fuerunt] in confirmation to (those) standing through grace, when the others were proud through free will, and for that reason fell down. They say that there was also some, small delay [morulam] between (their) creation and fall and confirmation; and in that brevity of time all were good, not indeed through the use of free will, but through the benefice of (their) creation; and they were such, that they could stand, that is, not fall down, through the goods of (their) creation, and (could) fall down through free will. For they could sin and not sin, but they could not progress [proficere] to the meriting of life, unless grace was superadded, which was added in confirmation to certain ones. And to confirm this they use the testimony of (St.) Augustine, who says On Genesis,⁶ that the angelic nature (was) first created in a formless manner [informiter] and called [dictam] “Heaven”, afterwards (was) formed and named “light”, when it was converted to the Creator, cleaving to Him by perfect love [dilectione]. Wherefore first there was said: In the beginning God created Heaven and Earth, and afterwards (there was) subjoined: God said: “Let there be light,” and light was made, because in the first it deals with the creation of the formless, spiritual nature, afterwards of the formation of the same. — Reason also goes against [obviat] those who say, that the Angels were created evil. For God could not be the best Author of evil; and for that reason the whole (of creation) was good, which was from Him for them, and the whole was good, since it was whole from Him. In this manner it is proven, that all the Angels were good, when they were first made, but (they were such) by that goodness, which (their) incipient nature had accepted.
Ideoque Augustinus, exterminans opinionem eorum, qui Angelos creatos fuisse malos putant, auctoritate et ratione probat, bonos fuisse creatos; et verba praemissa beati Iob, quae illi pro se inducebant, quomodo sint intellgenda, aperit ita dicens super Genesim:⁷ « Omnia, inquit, fecit Deus valde bona. Naturam igitur Angelorum bonam fecit. Et quia iniustum est, ut nullo merito hoc in aliquo, quod creavit, Deus damnet; non naturam, sed voluntatem malam puniendam esse credendum est, nec eius naturam significatam esse, cum dicitur: Hoc est initium figmenti Dei etc., sed corpus aëreum, quod tali voluntati aptavit Deus, vel ipsam ordinationem Dei, in qua eum etiam invitum fecit utilem bonis, vel ipsius Angeli facturam; quia, etsi praesciret Deus, voluntate malum futurum, fecit tamen eum, providens, quanta de illo sua bonitate esset facturus. Figmentum ergo Dei dicitur, quia, cum sciret Deus, eum voluntate malum futurum, ut bonis noceret, creavit tamen illum, ut de illo bonis prodesset; hoc autem fecit, ut illudatur ei. Illuditur enim ei, cum Sanctis proficit tentatio eius; sicut et mali homines, quos Deus, malos futuros praevidens, creavit tamen ad Sanctorum utilitatem, illuduntur, cum praestatur Sanctis eorum tentatione profectus. Sed ipse est initium, quia praecedit antiquitate⁸ et principatu malitiae. Haec autem illusio fuit angelis malis et hominibus malis per Angelos sanctos, quia subdit eis angelos malos et homines malos, ut, non quantum nituntur, sed quantum sinuntur, possint ». — Ecce aperte ostendit, qualiter praedicta verba Iob intelligenda sint, et angelicam naturam bonam creatam asseruit.⁹	And for that reason (St.) Augustine, putting an end to [exterminans] the opinion of those, who think that the Angels had been created evil, proves by authority and reason, that they were created good; and in what manner the aforesaid words of Blessed Job, which they brought forward in their defense [pro se], are to be understood, he reveals [aperit] thus, saying On Genesis:⁷ « God », he says, « made all (things) very good. Therefore He made the nature of the Angels good. And because the unjust one is, as one meriting nothing in anything, which He created, God damns (him); not the nature, but the evil will one must believe is to be punished, nor (is one to believe) that his nature is signified, when there is said: This is the start of God’s ruse etc., but (rather one is to understand by the word “start”) the airy body, which God adapted to such a will, and/or the very ordination of God, in which He made him also unwilling [invitum] to be useful for good (men), and/or the making [facturam] of the Angel himself; because, even if God foreknew, that (he was) going to be evil by (his own) will, yet He made him, foreseeing, what great (things) He was going to work from him according to His own Goodness. Therefore he is (said to be) “God’s ruse” [Figmentum Dei], because, even though God knew, that he (was) going to be evil by (his own) will, to harm the good, yet He created him, so that the good might profit from him; but He did this, to make sport of him. For He makes sport of him, when his temptation profits the Saints; just as evil men, whom God, foreseeing that (they are) going to be evil, created nevertheless for the utility of the Saints, are made sport of, when having set out he is presented before the Saints for their temptation. But he himself is the “start”, because he precedes in antiquity⁸ and in the principality of malice. Moreover there was this ‘making sport of’ [illusio] evil angels and evil men through the holy Angels, because He subjected the evil angels and evil men to Them, so that, (the former) might be able (to do), not as much as they strive (to do), but as much as they are allowed (to do) ». — Behold he openly shows, in what manner the aforesaid words of Job are to be understood, and has asserted that the angelic nature (was) created good.⁹
Deinde, qualiter verba Domini, quae supra posuit, accipienda sint, Augustinus aperit, ut etiam sua quae praedixit verba determinat, evidenter docens, Angelos bonos fuisse creatos et post creationem, interposita aliqua morula, cecidisse, ita inquiens:¹⁰ « Quod putatur diabolus, nunquam in veritate stetisse, nunquam beatam vitam duxisse, sed ab initio cecidisse, non sic accipiendum est, ut malus a bono Deo creatus esse putetur, quia¹¹ ab initio non cecidisse diceretur. Non enim cecidit, si talis, id est malus, factus est. A quo . . .	Then, (St.) Augustine shows, in what manner the words of the Lord, which he has posited above, are to be accepted, to determine also his own words which he had spoken before, teaching in an evident manner, that the Angels had been created good and after (their) creation, with some small delay interposed, (the Devil) fell down, inquiring thus:¹⁰ « That the Devil is thought, never to have stood in the Truth, never have lead a blessed life, but that he fell down from the beginning, is not to be accepted thus, that he be thought to have been created evil by the good God, because¹¹ it was not said that “he had fallen down” from the beginning. For he did not fall down, if he was made such, that is, evil. For from where . . .
¹ Libr. XI. c. 16. n. 24, sed apud Magistr. contracte. — Deinde locus s. Scripturae est Ioan. 8, 14. — Paulo inferius ante voluisset codd., at non edd., omittunt stare. ² Cap. 19. 20. n. 26. 27. Infra locus Iob est 40, 19 (secund. Septuag.) et sequens locus Ps. 103, 26. Cfr. in Ioan. tr. 42. n. 11. ³ Sic ed. 1; codd. cum Vat. et reliquis edd. minus bene malus, invidus et diabolus. ⁴ Libr. I. c. 1. n. 3. ⁵ Vat. cum cod. A et nonnullis edd. initio. Aliquanto inferius post aliis omnes edd., excepta Vat., interiiciunt vero. ⁶ Libr. I. c. 1. n. 3, c. 3. n. 7, c. 4. n. 9. Tamen August., potius inquirendo quam asserendo loquitur. ⁷ Libr. XI. c. 21. n. 28, et c. 22. n. 29, sed cum additamentis et mutationibus. — Paulo ante pro exterminans ed. 1 examinans. ⁸ Respicitur Apoc. 12, 9: Serpens antiquus, qui vocatur diabolus et satanas. — Immediate ante pro est initium ed. 1 dicitur initium. ⁹ Vat. sola creatam esse asserit. ¹⁰ Libr. XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 23. n. 30. (nonnullis additis). — Paulo ante pro docens Vat. cum paucis edd. dicens. — Ad verba post creationem cod. Eft. annotat: Illud non dicit Augustinus. Ad ea quae non multo post sequuntur verba: prius, statim idem cod. annotat: In originali non habetur prius, sed sic: sed factus, continuo etc. ¹¹ Vat. cum edd., exc. 1, 8, quasi, refragantibus codd. Deinde Vat. cum ed. 8 quam non utique acceptam fastidivit, ad quae verba cod. Eft. annotat, hanc esse lectionem originalis, simulque adiungit: istam quaestionem de morula determinat August., XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 15.	¹ Book XI, ch. 16, n. 24, but in a contracted manner in Master (Peter)’s (text). — Then the passage from Sacred Scripture is Jn. 8:14. — A little below this the codices, but not the editions, omits to stand [stare] at he had wanted [stare]. ² Chapters 19 and 20, nn. 26 and 27. Below the passage from Job is 40:19 (according to the Septuagint) and the following passage is Ps. 103:26. Cf. (St. Augustine’s), On John, tract 42, n. 11. ³ Thus edition 1; the codices together with the Vatican edition and the rest of the editions have less well he was became . . . evil, envious and the Devil [malus, invidus et diabolus] for the Devil was made . . . evil and envious [malus et invidus diabolus]. ⁴ Book I, ch. 1, n. 3. ⁵ The Vatican edition, together with codex A and not a few editions, has start [initio] for first rise [primordio]. ⁶ Book I, ch. 1, n. 3, ch. 3, n. 7; (and) ch. 7, n. 9. Yet (St.) Augustine, speaks by inquiring, rather than by asserting. ⁷ Book XI, ch. 1, n. 28, and ch. 22, n. 29, but with additions and changes. — A little before this for exterminating [exterminans], edition 1 has examining [examinans]. ⁸ A reference to Apoc. 12:9: The ancient Serpent, who is called the Devil and Satan [Serpens antiquus, qui vocatur diabolus et satanas]. — Immediately before this for is the “start” [est initium] edition 1 has is said (to be) “the start”. ⁹ The Vatican edition alone has asserts . . . was created [creatam esse asserit], for has asserted . . . (was) created [creatam asseruit]. ¹⁰ On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. XI, ch. 23, n. 30 (with not a few things added). — A little before this for teaching [docens] the Vatican edition, together with a few editions, reads saying [dicens]. — At the words after (their) creation [post creationem] the Erfurt codex notes: Augustine does not say this. At those words which follow not much after this (on the next page), beforehand, . . . immediately [prius, statim] the same notes: In the original beforehand is not had, but (it reads thus): But having been made, he immediately etc. [sed factus, continuo etc.]. ¹¹ The Vatican edition, together with the editions, except editions 1, and 8, has as if [quasi], breaking with the codices. Then (on the following page) the Vatican edition, together with edition 8, has which he loathed, not indeed as (something) accepted [quam non utique acceptam fastidivit], at which words the Erfurt codex notes, that this is the reading of the original, and adjoins at the same time: this question concerning a small delay Augustine determines, On the City of God, Bk. XI, ch. 15.

p. 88

enim caderet? Factus ergo prius, statim a veritate se avertit, propria potestate delectatus, beataeque vitae dulcedinem non gustavit, quam acceptam non fastidivit, sed nolendo accipere amisit. Sui ergo casus praescius esse non potuit, quia sapientia fructus est pietatis.¹ Continuo autem ut factus est, cecidit, non ab eo quod accepit, sed ab eo quod accepisset, si Deo subdi voluisset ». — Ecce hic aperte declarat, Angelos bonos esse creatos et post creationem cecidisse; et fuit ibi aliqua morula, licet brevissima. Quod Origenes confirmat super Ezechielem² dicens: « Serpens hostis est contrarius veritati, non tamen a principio neque statim super pectus et ventrem suum ambulavit; sicut Adam et Eva non statim peccaverunt, ita et serpens aliquando fuit non serpens, cum in paradiso deliciarum moraretur; Deus enim malitiam non fecit ». — Ecce aperte dicit, post creationem, interposita morula, cecidisse. Ideoque illa verba sic accipienda videntur: Homicida erat ab initio³ vel mendax, id est, statim post initium, quando sibi aequalitatem Dei promisit et se ipsum occidit, qui homo dicitur in Evangelio. Nec in veritate stetit, quia in ea non fuit, sed ab initio temporis, id est statim post initium temporis, apostatavit. Potest etiam sic accipi illud: Ab initio homicida fuit vel mendax, id est, ex quo homo fuit conditus, quem per invidiam in mortem praecipitavit et fallaciter seduxit.	did he fall down? Therefore having been made beforehand, he immediately turned himself away from the Truth, having delighted in his own power [potestate], and he did not taste the sweetness of the blessed life, which he did not loathe as (something) accepted, but lost as one not willing to accept (it). Therefore he could not be prescient of his own downfall, because wisdom is the fruit of piety.¹ Moreover as soon as [continuo] he was made, he fell down, not from that which he accepted, but from that which he would have accepted, if he had willed to be subject [subdi] to God ». — Behold here he openly declares, that the Angels were created good and after (their) creation fell down; and there was some small delay there, though a very brief one. Which Origin confirms On Ezekiel,² saying: « The Serpent Foe is contrary to the Truth, yet he did not walk from the beginning nor immediately upon his chest and belly; just as Adam and Eve did not immediately sin, so also the Serpent was for some time not a serpent, but lingered in the Paradise of delights; for God did not make (their) malice ». — Behold he openly says, that after (their) creation, with a small delay interposed, that he fell down. And for that reason those words seem to be accepted thus: He was a murderer from the start³ and/or a liar, that is, immediately after the start, when he promised [promisit] God’s equality to himself and slew his very self, he who is called [dicitur] a “the man” in the Gospel. Nor did he stand in the Truth, because he was not in It, but from the start of time, that is immediately after the start of time, he apostatized. That (verse) can also be accepted thus: From the start he was a murderer and/or a liar, that is, from that (start in which) man had been founded, whom through envy he precipitated into death and fallaciously seduced.
Ex praedictis ergo liquet, Angelos omnes bonos esse creatos, et post creationem quosdam cecidisse a bono, quod habuissent, si perstitissent.	Therefore, from the aforesaid it is clear [liquent], that all the Angels were created good, and after (their) creation certain ones fell from the good, which they would have had, if they has persisted (in the good).
Cap. V. De triplici sapientia Angelorum ante casum vel confirmationem.	Chapter V. On the threefold wisdom of the Angels before (their) downfall and/or confirmation.
Hic inquiri solet, quam sapientiam habuerunt ante casum vel confirmationem. Erat in eis triplex naturalis cognitio, qua sciebant, quod facti erant, et a quo facti erant, et cum quo facti erant, et habebant aliquam boni et mali notitiam, intelligentes, quid appetendum, vel respuendum illis foret.	Here there is customarily asked [inquiri], “Which wisdom did they have before (their) downfall and/or confirmation?” There was in them a threefold natural cognition, by which (cognition) they knew, on which account they had been made, and by Whom they had been made, and with whom they had been made, and they had some knowledge of good and evil, understanding, what was to be desired [appentendum], and/or rejected them.
Cap. VI. An aliquam habuerint Dei dilectionem vel sui ante casum.	Chapter VI. Whether they had any love for God and/or for themselves before (their) downfall?
Solet etiam quaeri, utrum aliquam Dei vel sui invicem dilectionem habuerint. Ad quod dici potest, quod⁴ naturalem dilectionem habebant, ut memoriam, intellectum et ingenium, qua Deum et se aliquatenus diligebant, per quam tamen non merebantur.	There is also customarily asked [quaeri], “Whether they had some love [dilectionem] for God and/or for one another?” To which it can be said, that⁴ they had a natural love, such as memory, intellect and genius, by which they loved God and themselves to some extent, yet through which they did not merit.
¹ Respicitur Eccli. 43, 37: Et pie agentibus dedit sapientiam. — Paulo inferius pro accepisset codd. et edd., exc. 2, minus bene acciperet. ² Hom. 1. n. 3. (nonnullis omissis). ³ Ioan. 8, 14. Verba sequentia aequalitatem Dei promisit alludunt ad Isai. 14, 13, et illa alia verba qui homo dicitur in Evangelio ad Matth. 13, 28. Denique verba paulo inferius occurentia per invidiam etc. respiciunt Sap. 2, 24. — Ad verba Potest etiam etc. in cod. Erf. annotatur: Ista est sententia Augustini, XI. super Genesim, c. 8 [vide pag. 87, nota 2.], et haec expositio Augustini super Ioan. Hom. 42. ⁴ Codd. B C D E et edd. 1, 8 quoniam.	¹ A reference to Eccli. 43:41: And to those acting piously He gave wisdom [Et pie agentibus dedit sapientiam]. — A little below this for would have accepted [accepisset] the codices and editions, except edition 2, have less well would accept [acciperet]. ² Homily 1, n. 3 (with not a few omissions). ³ Jn. 8:14. The following words, he promised God’s equality [aequalitatem Dei promisit], are an allusion to Isaiah 14:13, and the other words who is called “the man” in the Gospel [qui homo dicitur in Evangelio], (an allusion) to Mt. 13:28. Then the words occurring a little below this whom through envy [quem per invidiam] refer to Wis. 2:24. — At the words That (verse) can also etc. [Potest etiam etc.] there is noted in the Erfurt codex: This is the sentence of Augustine, On Genesis, Bk. XI, ch. 8 (see footnote 2 on the previous page), and this (is) the exposition of Augustine On John, Homily 42. ⁴ Codices B C D and E, and editions 1 and 8, have since [quoniam].

This English Translation and the digitization of the Latin and English texts, the HTML markup, all emendations and corrections of the Latin text, and all notes by the Translator, are © 2007, 2008 by Br. Alexis Bugnolo. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator.
Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

Sententiarum Quatuor Libri

The Four Books of Sentences