LIBER SECUNDUS SENTENTIARUM -- D. 7: Petri Lombardi

Magistri Petri Lombardi Arch. Episc. Parisiensis	Master Peter Lombard Archbishop of Paris
Sententiarum Quatuor Libri	The Four Books of Sentences
LIBER SECUNDUS SENTENTIARUM. DE RERUM CREATIONE ET FORMATIONE CORPORALIUM ET SPIRITUALIUM ET ALIIS PLURIBUS EO PERTINENTIBUS	THE SECOND BOOK OF THE SENTENCES ON THE CREATION AND FORMATION OF THINGS CORPORAL AND SPIRITUAL AND MANY OTHERS PERTAINING TO THIS
DISTINCTIO VII.	DISTINCTION 7
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 170-173. Cum Notitiis Editorum Quaracchi	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 170-173. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
PARS. I.	PART I
Cap. I. Utrum boni Angeli possint peccare, vel mali recte vivere.	Chapter I. Whether good Angels can sin, and/or evil (angels) uprightly live.
Supra¹ dictum est, quod Angeli, qui perstiterunt, per gratiam confirmati sunt, et qui ceciderunt, a gratia Dei deserti sunt. Et boni quidem in tantum confirmati sunt per gratiam, quod peccare nequerunt; mali vero per malitiam adeo sunt obstinati, quod bonam voluntatem habere sive bene velle non valent, etsi bonum sit quod aliquando volunt. Volunt enim aliquando aliquid fieri, quod Deus vult fieri, et utique illud bonum est et iustum fieri, nec tamen bona voluntate illud volunt, nec bene illud volunt.²	Above¹ it was said, that the Angels, who persisted (in the Truth), were confirmed through grace, and (that) those who fell, were deserted by God’s grace. And the good, indeed, were confirmed unto so great (a degree) through grace, that they are not able to sin; but the evil ones were so obstinate through (their) malice, that they do not prevail to have a good will or to will in a good manner, even if what they sometimes will is good. For they sometimes will something to be done, which God wills to be done, and indeed it is good and just that it be done, and yet they do not will that with a good will, nor do they will that in a good manner.²
Cap. II. Quod cum utrique habeant liberum arbitrium, non tamen ad utrumque flecti possunt.	Chapter II. That though each have free will, yet they cannot be bent to each.
Sed cum nec boni peccare possint, nec mali bene velle vel bene operari, videtur, quod iam non habeant liberum arbitrium, quia in utramque partem flecti non possunt, cum liberum arbitrium ad utrumque se habeat. Unde Hieronymus³ in tractatu de prodigo filio dicit: « Solus Deus est, in quem peccatum cadere non potest; cetera, cum sint liberi arbitrii, in utramque partem flecti possunt ». — Hic videtur dicere, quod omnis creatura in libero arbitrio constituta flecti potest ad bonum et ad malum. Quod si est, ergo et boni . . .	But since neither the good (Angels) can sin, nor the evil (angels) will in a good manner and/or work in a good manner, it seems, that presently they (both) do not have free will [liberum arbitrium], because they cannot be bent unto each side, even though free will holds itself to each. Wherefore (St.) Jerome³ in (his) treatment of the prodigal son says: « It is God alone, unto whom a sin cannot occur; all the others, since they belong to free will, can be bent unto each side ». — Here it seems that he is saying, that every creature constituted in free will can be bent to good and to evil. Which if it is, therefore, both the good . . .
¹ Dist. V. c. 1. Cfr. de hoc cap. Hugo, Sum. Sent. tr. 2. c. 4. ² Vat. cum cod. D et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 omittit haec ultima verba: nec bene illud volunt. ³ Epist. 21. ad Damas. n. 40, in quo loco pro cadere non potest originale non cadit, et in fine possunt suam flectere voluntatem pro flecti possunt. Cfr. infra d. XXV. c. 3. 4.	¹ Distinction V, ch. 1. Cf. on this chapter, Hugo (of St. Victor), Summa Sententiarum, tr. 2, ch. 2. ² The Vatican edition, together with codex C and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, omits these final words: nor do they will that in a good manner [nec bene illud volunt]. ³ Epistle 21 to Pope Damasus, n. 40, in which passage for cannot occur [cadere non potest] the original has does not occur [non cadit], and at the end has can bend their will [possunt suam flectere voluntatem] for can be bent [flecti possunt]. Cf. below d. XXV, chs. 3 and 4.

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Angeli et mali ad utrumque flecti possunt: ergo et boni possunt fieri mali, et mali boni. — Ad quod dicimus, quia boni tanta gratia confirmati sunt, ut nequeant fieri mali, et mali in malitia adeo obdurati sunt, ut non valeant fieri boni; et tamen utrique habent liberum arbitrium, quia et boni non aliqua cogente necessitate, sed propria ac spontanea voluntate, per gratiam quidem adiuti, bonum eligunt et malum respuunt; et mali similiter spontanea voluntate, a gratia destitui, bonum vitant et malum sequuntur; et habent mali liberum arbitrium, sed depressum atque corruptum, quod surgere ad bonum non valent.¹

Angels and the evil ones can be bent to each: therefore both the good can become evil, and the evil good. — To which we say, that because the good have been confirmed by so great a grace, that they are unable to become evil, and the evil were so hardened [obdurati] in malice, that they do not prevail to become good; and yet each have free will, because both the good (Angels), not driven by any necessity, but by their own and spontaneous will, helped indeed through grace, choose good and reject evil; and the evil similarly by a spontaneous will, destitute of grace, avoid good and follow evil; and the evil (angels) have free will, but a depressed and corrupted one, on which account they do not prevail¹ to rise to the good.

Cap. III.

Quod boni post confirmationem liberius habent arbitrium quam ante.

Chapter III.

That the good (Angels) have a more free judgment after (their) confirmation than before.

Boni vero arbitrium habent multo liberius post confirmationem quam ante. Ut enim Augustinus tradit in Enchiridio:² « Non ideo carent libero arbitrio, quia male velle non possunt; multo quippe liberius est arbitrium, quod non potest servire peccato. Neque culpanda est voluntas, aut voluntas non est, aut libera dicenda non est, qua beati esse sic volunt, ut esse miseri non solum nolint, sed nec prorsus velle possint ». Non possunt itaque boni Angeli velle malum, vel velle esse miseri; neque hoc habent ex naturae, sed ex gratiae beneficio. Ante gratiae namque confirmationem potuerunt peccare Angeli, et quidam etiam peccaverunt et daemones facti sunt. Unde Augustinus in libro contra Maximinum:³ « Creaturarum natura caelestium mori potuit, quia peccare potuit. Nam et Angeli peccaverunt et daemones facti sunt, quorum diabolus est princeps, et qui non peccaverunt peccare potuerunt; et cuicumque creaturae rationali praestatur, ut peccare non possit, non est hoc naturae propriae, sed Dei gratiae. Ideoque solus Deus est, qui non gratia cuiusquam, sed natura sua nec potuit nec potest nec poterit peccare ». — Ecce hic insinuatur, quod Angeli ante confirmationem peccare potuerunt, sed post confirmationem non possunt. Et quod potuerunt, fuit eis ex libero arbitrio, quod est eis naturale; quod vero modo non possunt peccare, non est eis ex natura, id est libero arbitrio, sed ex gratia, ex qua gratia etiam est, ut ipsum liberum arbitrium iam non possit servire peccato.

However, the good (Angels) have a much more free judgment [multo liberius arbitrium] after (their) confirmation than before. For as (St.) Augustine hands down in (his) Enchiridion:² « They do not for this reason lack free will [libero arbitrio], because they cannot will in an evil manner; indeed much more free is the judgment, which cannot serve sin. Nor is the will to be faulted, or is there no will, or is (that will) not to be said (to be) “free”, by which they will thus to be blessed, so that they not only do not will to be wretched, but (rather) in a word cannot even will (to be such) ». And thus the good Angels cannot will evil, and/or will to be wretched; nor do they have this from (the benefice) of nature, but from the benefice of grace. For indeed before the confirmation of grace the Angels could sin, and certain ones even sinned and became demons. Wherefore (St.) Augustine in (his) book Against Maximinus (says):³ « The nature of celestial creatures could not die, because it could not sin. For Angels both sinned and became demons, whose prince is the Devil, and those who did not sin could have sinned; and (that) there is entrusted [praestatur] to each rational creature, to be able not to sin, this does not belong to their own nature, but to God’s grace. And for that reason it is God alone, who not by the grace of anyone, but by His own Nature neither could nor can nor will be able to sin ». — Behold here there is hinted at, that the Angels before (their) confirmation could sin, but after (their) confirmation could not. And that they could, was theirs from free will, which is natural to them; but that they now cannot sin, is not their from nature, that is according to free will, but from grace, out of which grace it also is, that free will itself can no longer serve sin.

Cap. IV.

Quod non possunt ex natura peccare, sicut ante.

Chapter IV.

That (the good Angels) cannot sin from (their) nature, just as (they could) before.

Non ergo post confirmationem Angeli de natura, sicut ante, peccare potuerunt, non quod liberum arbitrium eorum debilitatum sit per gratiam, sed ita potius confirmatum, ut iam per illud non possit bonus Angelus peccare; quod utique non est ex ipso⁴ libero arbitrio, sed ex gratia Dei. Quod ergo Hieronymus ait: « Cetera, cum sint liberi arbitrii, possunt flecti in utramque partem », accipi oportet secundum statum, in quo creata sunt. Talis enim et homo et Angelus creatus est, qui ad utrumque flecti poterat; sed postea boni Angeli per gratiam ita sunt confirmati, ut peccare non possint; et mali ita in vitio obdurati, ut bene vivere nequeant. Similiter etiam illud Isidori⁵ intelligendum est: « Angeli mutabiles natura, immutabiles sunt gratia », quia ex natura in primordio suae conditionis mutari potuerunt ad bonum, sive ad malum; sed post per gratiam ita bono addicti sunt, ut inde mutari nequeant. Ad hoc enim repugnat gratia, non natura.

Therefore, the (good) Angels could not sin from nature after (their confirmation), just as (they could) before, not because their free will was debilitate through grace, but (because it was) rather so confirmed, that a good Angel can no longer sin through it; which indeed is not from free will itself,⁴ but from the grace of God. Therefore what (St.) Jerome says: « All the others, since they belong to free will, can be bent unto each side », must [oportet] be accepted according to the state, in which they were created. For man and Angel have been created such, that they could be bend to each; but afterwards the good Angels were so confirmed through grace, that they cannot sin; and the evil ones so hardened [obdurati] in vice, that they are not able to live well. Similarly too is that (verse of St.) Isidore⁵ to be understood: « The Angels, mutable by nature, are immutable by grace », because out of (their) nature they could in the first rise of their foundation be changed for the good, or for evil; but after were, through grace, so bound [addicti sunt] to the good, that they could not thereafter be changed. For grace, not nature, fights against this [ad hoc repugnat].

PARS. II.

PART II

Cap. V.

Quibus modis mali angeli noscant veritatem temporalium rerum.

Chapter V.

In what manners evil angels may know the truth of temporal things.

Et licet mali angeli ita per malitiam sint obdurati, vivaci tamen sensu non penitus sunt privati. Nam, ut tradit Isidorus,⁶ triplici acumine scientiae vigent daemones, scilicet subtilitate naturae, experientia temporum, revelatione superiorum⁷ spirituum. De hoc etiam Augustinus⁸ ait: « Spiritus mali quaedam vera de temporalibus rebus noscere permittuntur, partim subtilitate sensu, partim experientia temporum, calidiores propter tam magnam longitudinem vitae, partim a sanctis Angelis, quod ipsi ab omnipotenti Deo discunt, iussu eius sibi revelantibus. Aliquando autem iidem nefandi spiritus et quae ipsi facturi⁹ sunt, velut divinando, praedicunt ».

And though the evil angels have been hardened thus through malice, yet they have not been thoroughly deprived of a vivacious sense. For, as (St.) Isidore⁶ (of Seville) hands down, demons are vigorous in [vigent] the threefold sharpness of (their) knowledge, namely, according to (their) subtlety of nature, (their) experience of times, (and) the revelation of superior⁷ spirits. Of this (St.) Augustine⁸ also says: « The evil spirits are permitted to know [noscere] certain truths concerning temporal things, partly by the subtlety of (their) sense, partly by (their) experience of times, more cunning on account of such a great length of life, partly from the Holy Angels, what they themselves learn from the Omnipotent God, revealing (this) to them at His command [iussu]. But sometimes the same abominable [nefandi] spirits even predict, as if divining, (the things) which they themselves⁹ are going to do ».

Cap. VI.

Quod magicae artes virtute et scientia diaboli valent, quae est eis a Deo.

Chapter VI.

That the arts of magic prevail by the virtue and knowledge of the Devil, which is theirs from God.

Quorum scientia atque virtute etiam magicae artes exercentur; quibus tamen tam scientia quam potestas a Deo data est vel ad fallendum fallaces, vel ad monendum fideles, vel ad exercendam probandamque iustorum patientiam. Unde Augustinus in libro tertio de Trinitate:¹⁰ « Video, inquit, infirmae cogitationi . . .

By whose knowledge and virtue the arts of magic are also exercised; yet to whom both knowledge and power has been given by God either to deceive the deceitful, and/or to warn the faithful, and/or to exercise and prove the patience of the just. Wherefore (St.) Augustine in the third book On the Trinity¹⁰ says: « I see what can / happen to infirm thought; . . .

¹ Vat. cum paucis edd. et cod. B valet.

² Cap. 5. n. 105, n. 28, in quo textu pro qua beati Vat. cum paucis edd. quia beati. — Paulo inferius pro ex naturae eadem Vat. cum aliquibus edd. ex natura.

³ Lib. II. c. 12. n. 2. — In fine aliqua verba textus omissa sunt.

⁴ Auctoritate codd. A C D nec non edd. 1, 8 interseruimus ipso.

⁵ Sent. (de Sum. Bono) I. c. 10. n. 2. — Paulo ante pro in vitio codd. A B C D cum edd. 1, 8 vitio.

⁶ Loc. cit. n. 17.

⁷ Ita ed. 1 et originale; in aliis supernorum. Pro spirituum originale potestatum.

⁸ Libr. II. de Gen. ad lit. c. 17. n. 37, nonnullis omissis et interpositis.

⁹ Vat. cum aliquibus edd. facturi, omissa voce ipsi.

¹⁰ Cap. 7. n. 12. Locus s. Scripturae, qui deinde respicitur, est Exod. 7, 8.

¹ The Vatican edition, together with a few editions and codex B, has one does not prevail [non valet] for they do not prevail [non valent].

² Chapter 5, n. 105, n. 28, in which text for by which [qua] the Vatican edition, together with a few editions, has because [quia]. — A little below this for from (the benefice) of nature [ex naturae] the same Vatican edition, together with some editions, has from nature [ex natura].

³ Book II, ch. 12, n. 2. — At the end some of the words of the text have been omitted.

⁴ On the authority of codices A C and D and also editions 1 and 8, we have inserted itself [ipso].

⁵ Sentences (or On the Most High Good), Bk. I, ch. 10, n. 2. — A little before this for in vice [in vitio] codices A B C and D, together with editions 1 and 8, have by vice [vitio].

⁶ Loc. cit., n. 17.

⁷ Thus edition 1 and the original; in the others there is read supernal [supernorum] for superior [superiorum]. For spirits [spirituum] the original has Powers [potestatum].

⁸ On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. II, ch. 17, n. 37, with not a few (words) omitted and interposed.

⁹ The Vatican edition, together with some editions, omits themselves [ipsi].

¹⁰ Chapter 7, n. 12. The passage from Sacred Scripture, which is then referred to, is Exodus 7:8.

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quid possit occurrere; cur scilicet ista miracula etiam magicis artibus fiant. Nam et magi Pharaonis serpentes fecerunt et alia. Sed illud est amplius admirandum, quomodo magorum potentia, quae serpentes facere potuit, ubi ad muscas minutissimas, scilicet cinifes, ventum est, omnino defecit: qua tertia plaga Aegyptus caedebatur. Ibi certe defecerunt magi dicentes: Digitus Dei est hic. Unde datur intelligi, ne ipsos quidem transgressores angelos et aëreas potestates, in imam istam caliginem tanquam in sui generis carcerem ab illius sublimis aethereae puritatis habitatione detrusos, per quos magicae artes possunt quidquid possunt, aliquid¹ valere, nisi data desuper potestate. Datur autem vel ad fallendum fallaces, sicut in Aegyptios — et in ipsos etiam magos data est, ut in eorum spirituum operatione viderentur admirandi, a quibus fiebant damnandi — vel ad monendum fideles, ne tale aliquid facere pro magno desiderent, propter quod etiam nobis in Scriptura sunt prodita; vel ad exercendum, probandum manifestandamque iustorum patientiam ».

can / happen to infirm thought; namely, why even those miracles come to be by magical arts. For the mages of Pharaoh made serpents and other (things). But this is more to be admired, in what manner the power of the mages, which could make serpents, entirely failed, when [ubi] it came to the most minute flies, namely, sciniphs (ash flies): by which third plague Egypt was slain. In that (his) mages certainly failed, saying: The Finger of God is here. From which it is given to be understood, that indeed the arts of magic cannot prevail (to do) anything,¹ whatever they can (do), through the very transgressor angels and powers of the air (who have been) thrust down from the habitation of that sublime Ether of purity into this lowest gloom, as into a prison for their own kind, unless power (had) been given (them) from above. Moreover, (power) is either given (to them) to deceive the deceitful, just as unto the Egyptians — and it was even given unto the mages themselves, so that they might seem to be admired in the operation of their spirits, by whom they came to be damned — and/or to warn the faithful, lest they desire to work any such (miracle) for vainglory [pro magno]; on account of which (such miracles) have been handed down to us even in Scripture; and/or to exercise, prove and manifest the patience of the just ».

Cap. VII.

Quod malis angelis non servit ad nutum materia visibilium rerum.

Chapter VII.

That the matter of visible things does not serve the evil angels at will.

« Nec putandum est, istis transgressoribus angelis ad nutum servire hanc visibilium rerum materiam, sed Deo potius, a quo haec potestas datur, quantum incommutabilis iudicat ».²

« Not must it be thought, that this matter of visible things serves those transgressor angels at will [ad nutum], but rather as much as (it is) incommutable, it judges according to God (when to obey them), from Whom this power has been given ».²

Cap. VIII.

Quod non sunt creatores, licet per eos magi ranas et alia fecerint; sicut nec boni, etsi per eorum ministerium fiant creaturae.

Chapter VIII.

That (the evil angels) are not creators, though through them mages make frogs and other (things); just as neither do the good (Angels), even if through their ministry creatures come to be.

« Nec sane creatores illi mali angeli dicendi sunt, quia per illos magi ranas et serpentes fecerunt; non enim ipsi eas creaverunt. Omnium quippe rerum, quae corporaliter visibiliterque nascuntur, occulta quaedam semina in corporeis mundi huius elementis latent, quae Deus originaliter eis indidit. Ipse ergo creator est omnium rerum, qui creator est invisibilium seminum; quia quaecumque nascendo ad oculos nostros exeunt, ex occultis seminibus accipiunt progrediendi hic primordia et incrementa debitae magnitudinis distinctionesque formarum ab originalibus, ut ita dicam, regulis sumunt. Sicut ergo nec parentes dicimus creatores hominum, nec agricolas creatores frugum, quamvis, eorum extrinsecus adhibitis motibus, ista³ creanda Dei virtus interius operetur; ita non solum malos, sed nec bonos Angelos fas est putare creatores; sed pro subtilitate sui sensu et corporis semina istarum rerum nobis occultiora noverunt et ea per congruas temperationes elementorum latenter spargunt, atque ita et gignendarum rerum et accelerandorum increamentorum praebent occasiones. Sed nec boni haec, nisi quantum Deus iubet, nec mali haec iniuste faciunt, nisi quantum iuste ipse permittit. Nam iniqui malitia voluntatem suam habet iniustam; potestatem autem non nisi iuste accipit, sive ad suam poenam, sive ad aliorum, vel poenam malorum, vel laudem bonorum ».⁴

« Nor are those evil angels sanely to be said (to be) “creators”, because through them the mages (of the Pharaoh) made frogs and serpents; for they did not create them. Indeed, of all things, which are corporally and visibly born, there lie hidden certain concealed seeds among the corporeal elements of this world, which God originally endowed them. Therefore He is the Creator of all things, who is the Creator of the invisible seeds; because whatsoever according to our eyes comes forth [exeunt] by being born, accepts from concealed seeds the first beginnings [primordia] of progressing in this and take up (their) increments of due magnitude and the distinctions of (their) forms from, as I shall thus say, original rules. Therefore just as neither do we say that parents (are) “the creators” of men, nor farmers “the creators” of the fruits of the earth [frugum], even though, by their exteriorly employed movements, God’s Virtue works interiorly those (things)³ to be created; so it is not only not permitted [non solum . . .nec . . . fas est] to think of the evil (angels) as “creators”, but even of the good Angels; but (rather) they know [noverunt] in virtue of the subtlety of their sense and body the seeds of these things (which are) more concealed to us and they sprinkle these in a hidden manner throughout the fitting organizing principles [temperationes] of the elements, and thus the proffer [praebent] occasions of begetting things and of accelerating the increments (of things). But neither (do) the good (Angels do) these (things), unless as much as God commands, nor do the evil ones unjustly do them, except as much as He Himself justly permits. For the malice of an iniquitous (Angel) has its own unjust will; but not (its own) power unless it justly accepts (this), whether for its own punishment, or for the punishment of others and/or of the wicked, and/or (for) the praise of the good ».⁴

Cap. IX.

Quod solus Deus sic operatur creationem rerum, sicut iustificationem mentis.

Chapter IX.

That God alone so works the creation of things, just as (He does) the justification of the mind.

« Sicut ergo mentem nostram iustificando formare non potest nisi Deus, praedicare autem extrinsecus Evangelium etiam homines possunt, non solum boni per veritatem, sed etiam mali per occasionem; ita creationem rerum visibilium Deus interius operatur. Exteriores autem operationes atque contemperationes sive occasiones ab Angelis tam bonis quam malis, vel etiam ab hominibus adhibentur ».⁵ « Sed haec ab hominibus tanto difficilius adhibentur, quantum desunt sensuum subtilitates et corporum mobilitates in membris terrenis et pigris. Unde qualibuscumque Angelis vicinas causas ab elementis contrahere quanto facilius est, tanto mirabiliores in huiusmodi operibus eorum existunt celeritates. Sed non est creator, nisi qui principaliter ista format; nec quisquam hoc potest nisi unus creator Deus ».⁶ « Aliud est enim ex intimo ac summo causarum cardine condere ac ministrare creaturam, quod facit solus creator Deus; aliud autem pro distributis ab illo viribus et facultatibus aliquam operationem forinsecus admovere, ut tunc vel tunc, sic vel sic exeat quod creatur. Ista quippe originaliter et primordialiter in quandam textura elementorum cuncta iam creata sunt, sed acceptis opportunitatibus prodeunt ».⁷

« Therefore just as none can form our mind, by justifying (it), except God, but even men can preach the Gospel exteriorly, not only the good through truth, but even the wicked through an occasion; so God works interiorly the creation of visible things. But the exterior operations and co-organizing principles [contemperationes] or occasions are employed by Angels both good and evil, and/or even by men ».⁵ « But these are employed by men with as greater difficulty, as they lack the subtlety of sense and mobilities [mobilitates] of bodies in (their) earthly and sluggish members. Wherefore it is as easier for whatsoever manner of Angels to gather together the proximate [vicinas] causes from the elements, as they exist more wonderfully swift in their works of this kind. But none is a creator, except He who principally forms them; nor can anyone (do) this except the God, the One Creator ».⁶ « For it is one (thing) to found and take care of [ministrare] a creature from the most profound [intimo] and highest hinge [cardine] of causes, which God the Creator alone does; but another to engage in [admovere] some operation outwardly [forinsecus] in virtue of forces and faculties distributed by Him, so that now and/or then, in this manner and/or that there goes forth that which is created. Indeed, all these (things) were already created originally and primordially as certain textures of the elements, but appear [prodeunt] according to accepted opportunities ».⁷

Cap. X.

Quod angeli mali multa possunt per naturae vigorem, quae non possunt propter Dei prohibitionem.

Chapter X.

That evil angels can do many (things) through (their own) natural vigor, which they cannot (do) on account of God’s prohibition.

Illud quoque sciendum est, quod angeli mali quaedam possunt per naturae subtilitatem, quae tamen non possunt propter Dei, vel bonorum Angelorum prohibitionem, id est, quia non permitttuntur illa facere a Deo, vel ab Angelis bonis. Possent utique fecisse cinifes qui ranas serpentesque fecerunt. Quaedam vero non possunt facere, etiamsi permittantur ab Angelis superioribus, quia non permittit Deus. Unde Augustinus in libro tertio de Trinitate:⁸ « Ex ineffabili potentatu Dei fit, ut quod possent mali angeli, si permitterentur, ideo non possunt, quia non permittuntur. / Neque . . .

This also must be known, that the evil angels can (do) certain (things) through the subtlety of (their) nature, which they however cannot (do) on account of God’s, and/or the good Angels’ prohibition, that is, because they are not permitted to do them by God, and/or by the good Angels. They, who made the frogs and serpents, could have indeed made the sciniphs. But certain (things) they cannot do, even if they be permitted by superior Angels, because God does not permit (it). Wherefore (St.) Augustine (says) in the third book On the Trinity:⁸ « From the ineffable Ruling Authority of God [potentatu Dei] it comes to be, that what the evil angels could (do), if they were permitted, they cannot (do) for this reason, that they are not permitted. . . .

¹ Vat. refragantibus codd. et edd. 1, 8, incongrue praefigit non autem. Mox pro operatione Vat. sola seductione, et subinde cum edd. 6, 8 verbo damnandi praemittit a Dei veritate.

² August., loc. cit. c. 8. n. 13.

³ Vat. cum paucis edd. voci ista praefigit ad, et paulo post sola Vat. si pro subtilitate pro sed pro subtilitate.

⁴ Hoc totum cap. mutuatum est ex August., loc. cit., pluribus omissis et mutatis.

⁵ Ibid. n. 14, nonnullis omissis. — In Vat. sola desiderantur verba: atque contemperationes sive occasiones.

⁶ Ibid. c. 9. n. 17 et n. 16, multis mutatis et omissis.

⁷ Ibid. n. 16. — In hoc cap. plura correximus ex codd. simul cum originali.

⁸ Cap. 9. n. 18. In hoc textu ed. August. exhibet Digitus Dei est hic (secund. Septuag.).

¹ The Vatican edition, breaking with the codices and editions 1 and 8, incongruously prefixes but not [non autem]. Next for in the operation [in operatione] the Vatican edition alone has in the seduction [in seductione], and then together with editions 6 and 8, it prefixes by God’s Truth [a Dei veritate] to to be damned [damnandi].

² (St.) Augustine, loc. cit., ch. 8, n. 13.

³ The Vatican edition, together with a few editions, has to create those (things) [ad ista creanda] for those (things) to be created [ista creanda], and a little after this the Vatican edition alone has if [si] for but (rather) [sed].

⁴ This entire chapter has been changed from (St.) Augustine’s (text), loc. cit., with several (words) omitted and changed.

⁵ Ibid., n. 14, with not a few (words) omitted. — In the Vatican edition alone there are wanting the words: and co-organizing principles or occasions [atque contemperationes sive occasiones].

⁶ Ibid., ch. 9, n. 17 and n. 16, with many (words) changed and omitted.

⁷ Ibid., n. 16. — In this chapter we have corrected several (words) from the codices, together with the original.

⁸ Chapter 9, n. 18. In this text the edition of (St.) Augustine’s (works) exhibits The Finger of God is here [Digitus Dei est hic], according to the Septuagint.

p. 173

Neque enim occurit alia ratio, cur non potuerunt facere cinifes qui ranas serpentesque fecerunt, nisi quia maior aderat dominatio prohibentis Dei per Spiritum sanctum; quod etiam magi confessi sunt dicentes: Digitus Dei est hic. Quid autem per naturam possint, nec tamen possint propter prohibitionem, et quid per ipsius naturae suae conditionem facere non sinatur, homini explorare difficile est, immo impossibile ». « Novimus, hominem posse ambulare, et neque hoc posse, si non permittatur; volare autem non posse, etiamsi permittatur. Sic et illi angeli quaedam possunt facere, si permittantur ab Angelis potentioribus ex imperio Dei; quaedam vero non possunt, etiamsi ab eis permittantur, quia ille non permittit, a quo illis est talis naturae modus, qui etiam per Angelos suos illa plerumque non permittit, quae concessit, ut possint ».

For neither does another reason occur, why they, who made frogs and serpents, could not make sciniphs, unless because there was present [aderat] a greater domination of the prohibiting God, through the Holy Spirit; which (the Pharaoh’s) mages even confessed, saying: The Finger of God is here. But what they can (do) through nature, they yet cannot (do) on account of a prohibition, and what is not allowed (them) to make through the foundation of their very own nature, is difficult for a man to explore, nay impossible ». « We know, that a man can walk, and that he can neither do this, if he is not permitted; but that he cannot fly, even if he is permitted. Thus too those angels can do certain (things), if they are permitted by more powerful Angels on account of God’s command [ex imperio Dei]; but certain (things) they cannot (do), even if they are permitted by these, because He does not permit, from Whom the measure [modus] of such a nature is theirs, Who does not even permit, for the most part, through His own Angels, those (things), which He has conceded (to them), to be able (to do) ».

This English Translation and the digitization of the Latin and English texts, the HTML markup, all emendations and corrections of the Latin text, and all notes by the Translator, are © 2007, 2008 by Br. Alexis Bugnolo. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator.
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Sententiarum Quatuor Libri

The Four Books of Sentences