Magistri Petri Lombardi
Arch. Episc. Parisiensis

Master Peter Lombard
Archbishop of Paris

Sententiarum Quatuor Libri

The Four Books of Sentences

LIBER SECUNDUS SENTENTIARUM.

 

DE  RERUM  CREATIONE  ET  FORMATIONE  CORPORALIUM ET  SPIRITUALIUM
ET  ALIIS  PLURIBUS  EO  PERTINENTIBUS

THE SECOND BOOK OF THE SENTENCES

 

ON THE CREATION AND FORMATION OF THINGS CORPORAL AND SPIRITUAL AND MANY OTHERS PERTAINING TO THIS

DISTINCTIO XXXVI.

DISTINCTION 36

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 840-842.
Cum Notitiis Editorum Quaracchi

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 840-842.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Cap. I.

 

Quaedam simul sunt peccatum et poena peccati, quaedam peccatum et causa peccati, alia vero peccatum et causa et poena peccati.

Chapter I.

Certain (acts) are a sin an a punishment for sin, certain ones a sin and a cause of sin, but others a sin and a cause of and a punishment for sin.

Sciendum est tamen, quaedam sic esse peccata, ut sint etiam poenae peccatorum.  Unde Augustinus super illum locum Psalmi quinquagesimi septimi:1  Supercecedit ignis, et non viderunt solem, ait:  « Ignis superbiae et concupiscentiae et irae intelligitur.  Istas poenas pauci vident; ideo eas maxime commemorat Apostolus in Epistola ad Romanos et enumerat multa, quae sunt peccata et poena peccati.  Inter primum enim peccatum apostasiae et ultimam poenam ignis aeterni media quae sunt, et peccata sunt et poena peccati ».  Gregorius quoque super Ezechielem2 ait:  « Contemnenti, qui  non vult poenitere, ponit Deus offendiculum, ut scilicet gravius impingat.  Peccatum enim, quod per poenitentiam citius non deletur, aut peccatum est et causa peccati, aut peccatum et poena peccati, aut peccatum simul et causa et poena peccati.  Unde Moyses:  Nondum sunt completa peccata Ammorhaeorum; et David inquit:  Appone iniquitatem super iniquitatem eorum; et alius Propheta:  Sanguinis sanguinem tetigit, id est, peccatum peccato additum est.  Paulus quoque ait:  Propterea tradidit illos Deus in passiones ignominae etc.; et idem:  Ut impleant peccata sua semper.  Ioanni quoque per Angelum dicitur:  Qui in sordibus est sordescat adhuc ».  —  Ex his testimoniis colligitur, peccatum aliquod et peccatum esse et poenam peccati.

It must be understood [sciendum], however, that certain (acts) are thus sins, as to also be punishments for sins.  Wherefore (St.) Augustine on that passage of the Fifty-seventh Psalm:1  Fire fell upon (them), and they did not see the Sun, says:  « The fire of pride and concupiscence and wrath is understood (here).  Few see these as punishments; for that reason the Apostle commemorates them most of all in (his) Letter to the Romans and enumerates many (sins), which are sins and a punishment for sin [poena peccati].  For the intermediaries which are between the first sin of apostasy and the last punishment of the eternal fire, are both sins and punishments for sin ».  (Pope St.) Gregory (the Great) also says On Ezekiel:2  « To the one contemning (God), who does not want to repent, God puts a stumbling-block [offendiculum], to, that is, dash (himself) more gravely upon [impingat]  For the sin, which is not swiftly blotted out [deletur] through penitence [poenitentiam], is either a sin and a cause of sin, or a sin and a punishment for sin, or at once a sin and a cause of and a punishment for sin.  Wherefore Moses (says):  There have not yet been completed the sins of the Amorites; and (King) David says:  Add iniquity upon their iniquities; and another Prophet (says):  Blood has touched blood, that is, sin has been added to sin.  (The Apostle St.) Paul also says:  On that account God handed them over to passions of ignominy etc.; likewise:  So that theirs sins be fulfilled always.  To (The Apostle St.) John there is also said through an Angel:  He who is amongst sordid (things), let him grow sordid still ».  —  From these testimonies there is gathered, that some sin is both a sin and a punishment for sin.

Cap. II.

 

An peccatum sit causa peccati, in quantum est peccatum.

Chapter II.

Whether a sin is a cause of sin, inasmuch as it is a sin?

Et ideo merito quaeritur, utrum, in quantum peccatum est, sit poena peccati.  —  Quod non videtur, cum omnis poena peccati iusta sit.  Unde Augustinus in libro Retractationum:3  « Omnis poena peccati iusta est et supplicium nominatur ».  Si ergo peccatum, quod est peccatum et poena peccati, in quantum peccatum est, poena peccati est; cum omnis poena iusta de iustitia Dei veniat, videtur, in quantum peccatum est, iustum esse et a Deo provenire.  —  Ad quod illi respondent, peccatum sic dici poenam peccati, quia per peccatum, in quod merito praecedentis peccati homo labitur, deserente Deo, corrumpitur bona natura.  Sicut ignis aeternus dicitur poena malorum, quia ea cruciantur, nec tamen ipse cruciatus malorum ignis est, sed per ignem fit in homine.  Ita per peccatum corrumpitur natura, et imminuitur4 bonum naturae; et est ipsa imminutio et corruptio boni passio et poena; et non est essentialiter ipsum peccatum, per quod fit, sed ideo peccatum dicitur, ut praemissum est, quia per peccatum illico, ut peccat homo, fit in homine illa corruptio, quae tamen fit Deo auctore.  Illa enim poena sive passio, quae est boni corruptio, a Deo est.  Illius tamen, ut sic dicam, materia et causa est peccatum, quod a Deo non est.5  Quod videtur Augustinus notasse et iuxta hunc sensum intellexisse, cum ait in libro de Praedestinatione Sanctorum:6  « Praedestinatione Deus ea praescivit, quae fuerat ipse facturus.  Sed praescivit Deus etiam quae non est ipse facturus, id est omnia mala, quia, etsi sunt quaedam, quae ita peccata sunt, ut etiam poenae sint peccati, secundum illud Apostoli:  Tradit illos Deus in passiones etc., non tamen peccatum Dei est, sed iudicium », scilicet poena.  In Scriptura enim saepe nomine iudicii poena intelligitur.  —  Hic diligenter intendentibus insinuare videtur:  ea quae peccata sunt et poenae peccati, non in quantum peccata sunt, sed in quantum poenae, Dei esse dicuntur.7  Nam cum dixisset, Deum non esse facturum mala aliqua, id est peccata; quia posset ei obiici, quaedam peccata esse etiam poenas peccati —  et poena peccati omnis iusta est, et ideo a Deo est — quasi determinando, secundum quod faciat ea, vel secundum quid non faciat, addidit reliqua.  Iuxta vero praedictam intelligentiam peccata sane dicuntur poenae.  Unde Apostolus appellat ea passiones ignominiae, quia, ut ait auctoritas,8 « licet quaedam peccata sint, quae delectat, sunt tamen passiones naturae non nominandae », quia per ea corrumpitur natura.

And for that reason there is deservedly asked, “Whether, inasmuch as it is a sin, it be a punishment for sin?”  —  Which it does not seem (to be), since every punishment for sin is just.  Wherefore (St.) Augustine in (his) book of Retractations:3 « Every punishment for sin is just and is named a supplicium ».  Therefore if a sin, which is a sin and a punishment for sin, inasmuch as it is a sin, is a punishment for sin; since every just punishment comes down from [de] God, it seems, that inasmuch as it is a sin, it is just and comes forth from [a] God.  —  To which they respond, that a sin is thus said to be a “punishment for sin”, because through the sin, in which the man, having deserted God, fell [labitur] in merit of a preceding sin, (his) good nature is corrupted.  Just as the eternal fire is said (to be) “the punishment of the wicked” [poena malorum], because they are tortured [cruciantur] by it, yet neither is the fire the very torturing [cruciatus] of the wicked, but through the fire this is wrought in the man.  Thus through sin the nature is corrupted, and the good of nature lessened [imminutur];4 and both the lessening [imminutio] and corruption of the good is the suffering [passio] and the punishment; and it is not essentially the sin itself, through which (this) is wrought, but it is said (to be) a “sin” for this reason, as has been aforementioned, because through the sin in this [illico], that man sins, there comes to be in the man that corruption, which, however, is wrought by God as author.  For that punishment or suffering, which is the corruption of a good, is from God.  Yet of that, as I thus say, the matter and cause is the sin, which is not from God.5  Which (St.) Augustine seems to have noted and understood in according with this sense, when he says in the book On the Predestination of the Saints:6  « By (the act of) predestination God foreknew those, which He himself was going to do.  But God foreknew also those which he is not going to do, that is all evils, because, even if there are certain ones, which are thus sins, that they are also punishments for sin, according to that (verse) of the Apostle:  He handed them over unto passions etc., yet the sin does not belong to God, but the judgment (does) », that is the punishment.  For in Scripture by the name of “judgment” [iudicium] there is often understood a punishment.  —  He to those understanding this diligently [diligenter intendentibus] he seems to insinuate:  that those which are sins and punishments for sin, not inasmuch as they are sins, but inasmuch as (they are) punishments, are said to be of God.7  For since he said, that God was not going to work any evils, that is sins; because there could have been objected to him, that certain sins are also punishments for sin — and every punishment for sin is just, and therefore from God — quasi determining (the sense), according to which He works them, and/or according to what He does not work them, he adds the rest.  However in accord with the aforesaid understanding sins are sanely called “punishments”.  Wherefore the Apostle names them passions of ignominy [passiones ignominiae], because, as the authority8 says, « though there are certain sins, which delight, yet there are certain passions of nature (which are) not to be named », because nature is corrupted through them.

Cap. III.

 

Quod non omne peccatum est poena peccati.

Chapter III.

That not every sin is a punishment for sin.

Et licet ex hoc sensu omne peccatum mortale possit dici poena, non tamen omne9 potest dici poena peccati.  Poena enim peccati, ut praedictum est, est illud cuius causa est aliud praecedens peccatum.  Nam peccatum sic dicitur poena peccati respectu praecedentis, sicut dicitur causa peccati respectu sequentis.  Quo fit, ut idem peccatum et causa sit et poena peccati, sed alterius peccati poena et alterius causa.  Ut enim Gregorius in Moralibus ait:  « Peccatum, quod poenitentia non diluitur, suo pondere mox ad aliud trahit.  Unde . . .

And though out of this sense every mortal sin can be said (to be) a “punishment”, yet not every one9 can be said (to be) a “punishment for sin”.  For a punishment for sin, as has been said before, is that of which the cause is another preceding sin.  For a sin is said (to be) a “punishment for sin” in respect of a preceding (sin), just as it is said (to be) a “cause of sin” in respect to a following (sin).  With which done, as the same sin is both the cause of and the punishment for sin, but of the one a punishment for the sin and the cause of the other.  For as (Pope St.) Gregory (the Great) says in (his) Morals (on the Book of Job):  « The sin, which is not washed away [diluit] by penitence, by its weight soon draws to another (sin).  Wherefore . . .

1  Vers. 9. Enarrat. n. 18.  —  Locus Scripturae est Rom. 1, 23. seqq.  —  Pro poena peccati edd. 1, 8 poenae peccati.

2  Libr. I. hom. 11. n. 23. 24. 25. Vide etiam XXV. Moralium, c. 9. n. 22. 23.  Loci Scripturae:  Gen. 15, 16; Ps. 68, 28; Ose. 4, 2; Rom. 1, 26; I. The. 2, 16; Apoc. 22, 11.

3  Libr. I. c. 9. n. 5, et III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 51.

4  Ed. 1 minuitur et minutio; paulo superius edd. 1, 8 eo cruciantur pro ea cruciantur, quae etiam infra pro Illius tamen habent Illius autem.

5  Aliam sententiam Magister hic c. 4. satis approbat; quae communis est posterioribus (cfr. Comment. hic a. 1. q. 1.).

6  Cap. 10. n. 19 (cum interpolationibus).  Locus Apostoli est Rom. 1, 26.

7  Vat. cum paucis edd. et codd. omittit dicuntur.

8  Glossa ad Rom. 1, 26.  —  Paulo superius Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 7 eas passiones pro ea passiones.

9  Edd. 1, 8 addunt peccatum.

10  Libr. XXV. c. 9. n. 22.

1  Verse 9, Enarrations on the Psalms, n. 18.  —  The passage from Scripture is Rom. 1:23 f..  —  For a punishment for sin [poena peccati] editions 1 and 8 have punishments for sin [poenae peccati].

2  Book I, homily 11, nn. 23, 24, 25.  See also Morals on the Book of Job, Bk. XXV, ch. 9, nn. 22, 23.  The passages from Scripture are:  Gen. 15:16; Ps. 68;28; Hosea 4:2; Rom. 1:26; 1 Thess. 2:16; Apoc. 22:11.

3  Book I, ch. 9, n. 5, and On Free Will, Bk. III, ch. 18, n. 51.

4  Edition 1 has is lessened [minuitur] and lessening [minutio]; a little above this editions 1 and 8 have by it (i. e. the fire) [eo] for by it (i.e. the punishment) [ea].

5  Master (Peter) approves the other sentence here in ch. 4, as sufficient; which is common to later theologians (cf. St. Bonaventure’s Commentary, here in a. 1, q. 1).

6  Chapter 10, n. 19 (with interpolations).  The passage from the Apostle is Rom. 1:26.

7  The Vatican edition, together with a few editions and codices, read they are of God [Dei esse] for they are said to be of God [Dei esse dicuntur].

8  The Gloss on Romans 1:26.  —  A little above this the Vatican edition, together with editions 2, 3, 4 and 7 has names them (i. e. these punishments) [eas passiones] for names them (i. e. these sins) [ea passiones].

9  Editions 1 and 8 read every sin [omne peccatum] for every one (i.e. each sin) [omne].

10  Book XXV, ch. 9, n. 22.

 

p. 841

 

fit, ut non solum peccatum sit, sed et causa peccati, ex illo quippe culpa subsequens oritur.  Peccatum vero, quod ex peccato oritur, non solum peccatum, sed et poena peccati est, quia iusto iudicio Deus cor peccantis obnubilat, ut praecedentis peccati merito etiam in alia cadat.  Quem enim liberare noluit deserendo percussit ».  Proinde, ut Augustinus1 ait:  « Praecedentis est haec poena peccati, et tamen etiam ipsa peccatum est ».  « Iudicio enim iustissimi Dei traditi sunt, ut ait Apostolus de quibusdam — sive deserendo, sive alio modo explicabili, vel inexplicabili —  in passiones ignominae, ut crimina criminibus vindicarentur, et supplicia peccantium non tantum sint tormenta, sed et vitiorum incrementa ».  Illa ergo peccata, quae enumerat Apostolus, quia de superbia sunt, non solum peccata, sed etiam supplicia sunt.  —  Ecce ex his iam fit perspicuum, quaedam peccata etiam poenas et causas peccati esse; et illud peccatum esse poenam peccati, quod causam praecedentem habet peccatum; atque illud peccatum esse causam peccati, quod est meritum sequentis culpae.

it comes to be, that it is not only a sin, but even the cause of a sin, out of which, indeed, there arises the subsequent fault.  But the sin, which arises out of a sin, is not only a sin, but also a punishment for sin, because by a just judgment God beclouds the heart of the sinner, to that by merit of the preceding sin he also falls into others.  For him whom He does not want to liberate, He strikes by deserting ».  Therefore [Proinde], as (St.) Augustine1 says:  « Of a preceding (sin) this one is a punishment for the sin, and yet it itself is also a sin ».  « For by the judgment of a most just God they have been handed over, as the Apostle says of certain (sinners) — whether by deserting (them), or by another explicable, and/or inexplicable manner — to passions of ignominy, so that crimes might be avenged [vindicarentur] by crimes, and the capital punishments [supplicia] of sinners might not only be torments, but also the increments of vices ».  Therefore those sins, which the Apostle enumerates, because they are from pride, are not only sins, but are also capital punishments.  —  Behold out of these now becomes perspicacious, that certain sins are punishments and causes of sins; and that sin is a punishment for the sin, which has a sin as (its) preceding cause; and that sin is a cause of the sin, which is worthy of the following fault.

Cap. IV.

 

Utrum peccata aliqua essentialiter sint poenae peccati.

Chapter IV.

Whether some sins are essentially punishments for sin?

Sed cum ait, crimina criminibus vindicari, videtur insinuare, ea ipsa, quae peccata sunt, essentialiter esse poenas peccati, id est punitiones peccati.  Ad hoc autem inquiunt illi, haec et similia dicta esse secundum rationem praedictam, et ideo intelligenda fore secundum praemissam expositionem.  « Intelligentia enim dictorum ex causis est assumenda dicendi.2

But when he says, that crimes are avenged by crimes, he seems to insinuate, that those themselves, which are sins, are essentially the punishments for sin [poenas peccati], that is the acts of punishing sin [punitiones peccati].  But to this they say, that these and similar sayings according to the aforesaid reckoning, are to be, therefore, also understood according to the aforesaid exposition.  « For the understanding of sayings is to be assumed out of the causes for speaking ».2

In nullo tamen praeiudicium fieri veritati putatur, si quis dicat, ipsa eadem, quae peccata sunt, essentialiter, ut ita dicam, esse poenas, id est punitiones peccatorum praecedentium, quae iustae sunt et a Deo sunt.  Nec tamen, in quantum peccata, a Deo sunt, nec in quantum peccata sunt, poenae peccati sunt; et tamen, in quantum peccata sunt, privationes boni sunt; sed ut supra3 dictum est, causaliter et active dicuntur privationes.

Yet in nothing is there thought to be a prejudice done against the truth, if one says, that those very ones, which are sins, essentially, as I thus say, are punishments [poenas], that is the acts of punishing preceding sins [punitiones peccatorum praecedentium], which (acts) are just and are from God.  Yet neither, inasmuch as (they are) sins, are they from God, nor inasmuch as they are sins, are they punishments for sin; and yet, inasmuch as they are sins, they are privations of a good; but as has been said above,3 they are called “privations” causally and actively.

Cap. V.

 

Quod, cum peccatum etiam sit poena peccati, peccatum est ab homine, poena a Deo.

Chapter V.

That, though a sin be a punishment for sin, the sin is from the man, the punishment from God.

Quod autem quaedam peccata poenae sint, et ipsa poena iusta sit et a Deo sit, evidenter tradit Augustinus, in libro Retractationum primo4 dicens, quaedam necessitate fieri ab homine, quae mala sunt, et eadem iusta poena peccati sunt.  « Sunt, inquit, quaedam necessitate facta improbanda, ubi homo vult recte facere et non potest.  Unde est illud Apostoli:  Non quod volo facio bonum, sed quod odi malum, hoc ago.  Et illud:  Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem.  Haec invicem sibi adversantur, ut non ea quae vultis, faciatis; sed haec omnia ex illa mortis damnatione sunt.  Nam si non est ista poena hominis, sed natura, nulla ista peccata sunt.  Si enim non receditur ab eo modo, quo naturaliter factus est homo, cum haec facit, ea utique facit, quae debet.  Si autem homo, quia ita est, non est bonus nec habet in potestate, ut sit bonus — sive non videndo, qualis esse debeat, sive videndo et non valendo esse, qualem se esse debere videt — poenam istam esse, quis dubitet?  Omnis autem poena, si peccati poena est, iusta est et supplicium nominatur.  Si autem iniusta est poena — quoniam poenam esse, nemo ambigit — iniusto aliquo dominante homini imposita est.  Porro, quia de omnipotentia5 Dei et iustitia dubitare dementis est, iusta est haec poena et pro peccato aliquo impenditur.  Non enim quisquam iniuste dominans aut surripere hominem potuit, veluti ignoranti Deo, aut extorquere invito tanquam invalidiori, ut hominem iniusta poena cruciaret.  Relinquitur ergo, ut haec poena iusta de damnatione hominis veniat ».  —  His atque aliis pluribus testimoniis docetur, quaedam esse peccata et poenas peccati essentialiter.

Moreover, that certain sins are punishments, and the punishments themselves are just and from God, (St.) Augustine evidently hands down in the first book of Retractations4 saying, that certain (things), which are evil, are wrought by man by necessity, and the same are a just punishment for sin.  « Certain (acts) », he says, « done by necessity are not to be approved, where a man wants to work rightly and cannot.  Wherefore there is that (verse) of the Apostle:  I do [facio] not the good which I want, but the evil which I hate, this I put into action [ago].  And that (other which says):  The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh.  These are the adversaries of one another, so that not those which you want, do you do; but these are all on account of that damnation of death.  For if this is not man’s punishment, but (his) nature, none of these are sins.  For if one does nor recede from that manner, in which man was naturally made, when he does these (things), he in a word does those, which he ought.  But if man, because he is thus, is not good nor has (it) in his power, to be good — whether by not seeing, to what kind he ought to belong, or by seeing and not prevailing to be, the kind he sees he ought to be — that this is a punishment, who doubts?  Moreover, every punishment, if it is a punishment for sin, is just and is named a supplicium.  But if the punishment be unjust — since that it is a punishment, no one disputes [ambigit] — it has been imposed by something dominating man.  Furthermore, because it belongs to the demented to doubt about [de] God’s Omnipotence5 and Justice, this punishment is just and is handed down [impenditur] for some sin.  For no one unjustly dominating man could either pilfer (him), as if with God ignoring (this), or extort (him) unwilling, as one less strong [invalidiori], to torment [cruciaret] man with an unjust punishment.  There is left, therefore, that this just punishment comes from man’s condemnation [damnation] ».  —  By these and several other testimonies there is taught, that certain sins are also punishments for sins, essentially.

Cap. VI.

 

De quibusdam, quae indubitanter peccata sunt et poenae, et in quantum eis patimus, peccata non sunt.

Chapter VI.

On certain (acts), which are undoubtedly sins and punishments, and inasmuch as we suffer by them, are not sins.

Praeterea, nullatenus ambigendum est, quaedam peccata absque ullo scrupulo poenas esse, ut invidia, quae est dolor alieni boni, et ira, quae etiam, non in quantum poenae sunt, peccata sunt; ita etiam de cupiditate et timore et aliis huiusmodi sentiendum est.  Unde Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum6 ait:  « Omnis pertubatio passio; omnis cupiditas perturbatio:  omnis ergo cupiditas passio.  Omnis vero passio cum est in nobis, ipsa passione patimur.  Omnis igitur cupiditas cum est in nobis, ipsa cupiditate patimur,7 et in quantum cupiditas est, patimur.  Omnis autem passio, in quantum ipsa patimur, non est peccatum; ita et de timore.  Non enim consequens est, ut, si patimur timorem, ideo non sit peccatum, quia multa sunt peccata, quae patimur, sed non in quantum patimur eis ».

Besides, to no extent is it to be disputed, that certain sins without any scruple are punishments, such as envy, which is sorrow at the good of another, and wrath, which, not inasmuch as they are punishments, are also sins; thus too must it be thought of cupidity and fear [timore] and others of this kind.  Wherefore (St.) Augustine in the book Of Eighty-Three Questions6 says:  « Every perturbation (is) a suffering [passio]; every cupidity a perturbation:  therefore every cupidity a suffering.  But every passion when it is in us, we suffer by the same passion.  Therefore every cupidity when it is in us, we suffer by the same cupidity, and inasmuch as it is a cupidity, we suffer. 7  But every passion, inasmuch as we suffer by it, is not a sin; thus also concerning fear.  For the consequent is not, that, if we suffer fear, it is for that reason not a sin, because there are many sins, which we suffer, but not inasmuch (as they are sin) do we suffer by them ».

Illud autem diligenter est annotandum, quod supra8 positis verbis Augustini dicentis, quaedam necessitate facta esse improbanda et mala, videtur obviare quod Hieronymus ait in Explanatione fidei;9 quod licet supra sit positum, tamen, ut perfectius sciatur, iterare non piget.  « Exsecramur, inquit, eorum blasphemiam, . . .

This, however, must be diligently noted in addition [annotandum], that the above8 posited words of (St.) Augustine, saying, that certain (things) done by necessity are not to be approved and evil, seems to obviate what (St.) Jerome says in (his) Explanation of the Faith;9 which though it has been placed above, yet, so that it might be known more perfectly, it is not noisome to reiterate.  « Let us execrate », he says, « the blasphemy of those, . . .

1  Libr. V. contra Iulian. c. 3. n. 10.  Seq. locus est ibi et aliqua ex parte I. Contra Adversarium Legis et Prophet. c. 24. n. 51, ubi alluditur ad  Rom. 1, 26.  —  Pro iustissimi Dei edd. 1, 8 iustissimo Dei, contra originale, et infra pro enumerat codd. A B C E meminerat.

2  Hilarius, IV. de Trin. n. 14.

3  Dist. XXXV. c. 3.  —  Supra pro praeiudicium fieri Vat. cum multis edd. praeiudicium factum, refragantibus codd. et edd. 1, 8.

4  Cap. 9. n. 5.  Cfr. etiam III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 51.   —  Loci Scripturae sunt Rom. 7, 15, et Gal. 5, 17.

5  Codd. potentia, contra edd. et originale.

6  Quaest. 77.

7  Edd., excepta 6, addunt ea, refragantibus codd. A B C E et originali.

8  Hic c. 5.

9  Symboli explanatio ad Damasum (inter opera Hieronymus); vide supra d. XXVIII. c. 4.

1  Against Julian, Bk. V, ch. 3, n. 10.  The following passage is there and partly from Against the Adversary of the Law and Prophets, Bk. I, ch. 24, n. 51, where there is an allusion to Rom. 1:26.  —  For by the judgment of a most just [iustissimi Dei] editions 1 and 8 have by a most just judgment [iustissimo Dei], contrary to the original, and below for numbers [enumerat] codices A B C E have remembered [meminerat].

2  (St.) Hilary (of Poitiers), On the Trinity, Bk. IV, n. 14.

3  Distinction XXXV, ch. 3.  —  Above for to be a prejudice done [praeiudicium fieri] the Vatican edition, together with many editions, has (to be) a prejudice done [praeiudicium factum], breaking with the codices and editions 1 and 8.

4  Chapter 9, n. 5.  Cf. also On Free Will, Bk. III, ch. 18, n. 15.  —  The passages of Scripture are Rom. 7:15 and Gal. 5:17.

5  The codices have Power [potentia], contrary to the editions and the original.

6  Question 77.

7  The editions, except edition 6, add by it [ea], breaking with codices A B C E and the original.

8  Here in ch. 5.

9  Explanation of the Creed to Damasus, (among the works of St. Jerome); see above d. XXVIII, ch. 4.

 

p. 842

 

qui dicunt, impossibile aliquid homini a Deo esse praeceptum, et mandata Dei non a singulis, sed ab omnibus in commune posse servari ».  Et paulo post:  « Et tam illos errare dicimus, qui cum Manichaeo dicunt, hominem peccatum vitare non posse, quam illos qui cum Ioviniano asserunt, hominem non posse peccare ».  —  Ecce Hieronymus dicit, errorem esse, si quis dicat, hominem vitare peccatum non posse.  Qui autem dicit, quaedam necessitate fieri, quaedam dicit non posse vitari.  Cum ergo id Augustinus dicat, videtur aut erroris esse quod tradit, aut non esse verum quod Hieronymus ait.

who say, that man has been precepted something impossible by God, and that God’s commandments can be kept not by each one [a singulis], but by all in common ».  And a little afterwards:  « And we say that they err as much, who say with Mani, that man cannot avoid sin, as those, who assert with Jovinian, that man cannot sin ».  —  Behold (St.) Jerome says, that it is an error, if one says, that man cannot avoid sin.  But he who says, that certain (things) are done by necessity, says that certain (things) cannot be avoided.  Therefore, since (St.) Augustine says that, it seems that either that what he hands down belongs to error, or what (St.) Jerome says is not true.

Ad quod dici potest, quia Augustinus secundum statum huius miseriae — ad quam pertinet ignorantia et difficultas, ut idem ait in libro de Libero Arbitrio,1 quae ex iusta damnatione descenderunt — illud traddidit, ubi et venialia peccata inclusit.  Hieronymus vero tantum de mortalibus peccatis loquitur, quae unusquisque, gratia illuminatus, vitare valet; vel de homine secundum statum liberi arbitrii ante peccatum illud ait.

To which it can be said, that (St.) Augustine handed down that according to the state of this misery — to which (misery) pertains (our) ignorance and difficulty, as the same says in the book On Free Will, which (afflictions) descended out of (man’s) just condemnation [damnatione] — where he also included venial sins.  But (St.) Jerome speaks only of the mortal sins, which each one, illumined by grace, prevails to avoid; and/or of man according to the state of (his) free will before that sin.

Satis diligenter eorum posuimus sententiam, qui dicunt, omnes actus naturas2 esse, et in quantum sunt, bonas esse.  In quo tractatu quaedam interseruimus, quae non ex eorum tantum persona accipienda sunt, quia ab omnibus catholice sapientibus absque haesitatione tenentur; atque auctoritatum testimoniis et rationibus eorundem traditionem munivimus, qui dicunt, omnes actus essentia sui, id est, in quantum sunt, esse bonos, quosdam vero, in quantum inordinate fiunt, peccata esse.  Addunt quoque, quosdam non tantum essentia, sed etiam genere bonos esse, ut reficere esurientem, qui actus est de genere operum3 misericordiae; quosdam vero actus absolute ac perfecte bonos dicunt, quos non solum essentia vel genus, sed etiam causa et finis commendat, ut sunt illi qui ex bona voluntate proveniunt et bonum finem metiuntur.

We have posited in a sufficiently diligent manner the sentence of those, who say, that all acts are2 natures, and inasmuch as they are, that they are good.  In which tract we have inserted certain (things), which are to be accepted not in their name [ex eorum persona] only, because they are held without hesitation by (those) wise in the Catholic Faith [catholice sapientibus]; and we have also fortified with testimonies and reasons the tradition of the same authorities, who say, that all acts by their own essence, inasmuch as they are, are good, but that certain ones, inasmuch as they are done inordinately, are sins.  They also add, that certain (acts) are good not only according to essence, but also according to genus, such as to refresh the hungry [reficere esurientem], which act concerns the genus of the works3 of mercy; on the other hand they say that certain acts are absolutely and perfectly good, which not only the essence and/or genus, but even the cause and the end commend, such as are those which come forth out of good will and aim for [metiuntur] a good end.

1  Cap. 18. n. 51; de Dono perseverant. c. 11. n. 27; I. Retract. c. 9. n. 5.

2  Vat. et edd. 1, 8 cum cod. C addunt bonas.  —  De hac re actum est supra d. XXXV. c. 3.

3  Codd. omnes operis.

1  Chapter 18, n. 51; On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 11, n. 27; Retractations, Bk. I, ch. 9, n. 5.

2  The Vatican edition and editions 1 and 8, together with codex C add good [bonas].  —  This matter has been dealt with above in d. XXXV, ch. 3.

3 All the codices have  a genus of the work [operis] for the genus of the works [operum].

This English Translation and the digitization of the Latin and English texts, the HTML markup,  all emendations and corrections of the Latin text, and all notes by the Translator, are © 2010 by Br. Alexis Bugnolo.  The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator.
Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.