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Magistri Petri Lombardi |
Master Peter Lombard |
Sententiarum Quatuor Libri |
The Four Books of Sentences |
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LIBER SECUNDUS SENTENTIARUM.
DE RERUM CREATIONE ET
FORMATIONE CORPORALIUM ET SPIRITUALIUM |
THE SECOND BOOK OF THE SENTENCES
ON THE CREATION AND FORMATION OF THINGS CORPORAL AND SPIRITUAL AND MANY OTHERS PERTAINING TO THIS |
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DISTINCTIO XXXVII. |
DISTINCTION 37 |
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Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, |
Latin
text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, |
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Cap. I.
Quod aliqui putant, malos actus nullo modo esse a Deo. |
Chapter I. That some think, that evil acts are in no manner from God. |
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Sunt autem et alii plurimi, longe aliter de peccato et de actu sentientes; asserunt enim, voluntatem malam et actum malum peccata esse et nulla ratione bona, nec secundum aliquam rationem ex Deo auctore esse, quia sine Deo fiunt. Sine eo namque, ut ait Evangelista, factum est nihil, id est peccatum, quod dicitur esse nihil, non quia non sit actio, vel voluntas mala, quae aliquid est, sed quia a vero esse separat homines et ad malum trahit, et sic ad non-esse deducit. « Qui enim a summi boni participatione recedunt, quod solum vere ac proprie est, merito non esse dicuntur ».1 Ideoque Augustinus dicit super Ioannem,2 « peccatum nihil esse, nihilque fieri homines, cum peccant ». Hac igitur ratione astruunt, peccatum nihil esse, quia a vero esse hominem elongat; voluntatemque malam atque actionem, sive locutionem malam peccatum esse dicunt, quia praevaricatio et inobedientia haec sunt et contra legem Dei fiunt; quae tamen sunt, sed ab homine, vel a diabolo, non a Deo. Nullatenus enim haec a Deo esse dicunt, sive in quantum sunt, sive alio modo. |
Moreover there are also very many others, thinking far otherwise concerning sin and concerning (its) act; for they assert, that the evil will and evil act are sins and good by no reckoning, and that they are not out of God as author according to any reckoning, because they are done without God. For indeed, without him, as the Evangelist says, nothing has been made, that (nothing) is sin, which is said to be nothing, not because it is not the action, and/or evil will, which is something, but because it separates men from the true and draws them to evil, and thus leads (them) forth to not-to-be [non-esse]. « For they who recede from participation in the Most High Good, which alone truly and properly is, are deservedly said not to be ».1 And for that reason (St.) Augustine says On John,2 « that sin is nothing, and that men become nothing, when they sin ». Therefore according to this reckoning they construe [astruunt], that sin is nothing, because it distances [elongat] man from true being [a vero esse]; and that the evil will and action, or evil speech [locutionem] they say is a sin, because these are also a prevarication and disobedience [inobedientiam] and are done against the law ofGod; which, however, they are, but by man, and/or by a devil, not by God. For to no extent do they say that these are from God, either inasmuch as they are, or in any manner. |
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Illa quoque Augustini verba, quibus dicit, omne quod est, in quantum est, bonum esse et Deum habere auctorem, de natura sive de substantia tantum accipienda fore tradunt. Substantiae vero nomine atque naturae dicunt significari substantias ipsas, et ea quae naturaliter habent, scilicet, quae concreata sunt eis, sicut anima naturaliter habet intellectum et ingenium et voluntatem et huiusmodi; quod ex verbis Augustini praemissis colligitur, ubi bonum4 hominem appellat bonam naturam, et malum hominem malam naturam. Secundum hanc ergo assertionem vel acceptionem mali actus non sunt naturae, vel substantiae, nec etiam boni actus; quod utique videtur Augustinus innuere in libro primo Retractationum,5 distinguens inter substantias sive naturas, et bonas actiones sive malas. Aperiens enim, quomodo intelligendum sit quiddam in libro de Vera Religione ab eo traditum, ait: « Hoc de substantiis atque naturis dictum est. Inde enim disputabatur, non de bonis actionibus atque peccatis ». Aperte hic videtur dividere inter naturas sive substantias, et actiones sive peccata. Ideoque asserunt praefati doctores, actiones interiores vel exteriores non esse naturas vel substantias, quae, si malae sunt, peccata sunt neque a Deo sunt. Quod vero mali actus non sint naturae, Augustinus videtur notare in prima responsione contra Pelagianos,6 ita dicens: « Opera diaboli, quae vitia dicuntur, actus sunt, non res ». Item in quarta responsione: « Omne malum natura non est, sed actus, accidens alicui ex defectu boni. Quam ob rem quod natura non est Deus non fecit, quia natura est omne quod fecit ». Item: « Omne quod natura bonum est, Deus ex nihilo fecit, non diabolus ». |
That those words, too, of (St.) Augustine, by which he says, that everything which is, inasmuch as it is, is good and has God as (its) author, they hand down must be accepted only of the nature or of the substance. But by the name of substance and of nature they say there is signified the substances themselves, and those which they have naturally, that is, which were co-created with them, just as the soul naturally has an intellect and a genius and a will and (powers) of this kind; which is gathered from the aforementioned words of (St.) Augustine, where he names the good4 man a good nature, and an evil man an evil nature. According to this assertion and/or acceptation, therefore, evil acts are not natures and/or substances, nor (are) even good acts; which (St.) Augustine indeed seems to indicated in (his) first book of Retractations,5 distinguishing between substances or natures, and good or evil actions. For clarifying [Aperiens], in what manner a certain (saying) handed down by him in (his) book On the True Religion is to be understood, he says: « This has been said concerning substances and natures. For the disputation was of this, not of good actions and sins ». Here he seems to divide between natures or substances, and actions or sins. And for that reason the aforesaid doctors (of theology) assert, that interior and/or exterior actions are not natures and/or substances, which, if they are evil, are sins and are not from God. But that evil acts are not natures, (St.) Augustine seems to note in the first response against the Pelagians,6 saying thus: « The works of a devil, which are called vices, are acts, not things ». Likewise in the fourth response: « Every evil is not a nature, but an act, acceding [accidens] to something out of a defect of a good. On account of which, what is not according to nature,* God has not made, because everything which He made is a nature ». Likewise: « Everything which is good according to nature, God, not the Devil, made out of nothing ». |
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Ex quo colligitur, res aliquas esse, quae a Deo non sunt, eisque homines mali sunt. Quod nihilominus et ipsi concedunt, innitentes verbis Augustini superius positis, qui in Enchiridio,7 determinans illa verba Prophetae: Vae! his qui dicunt bonum malum, dicit, « de ipsis rebus, quibus homines mali sunt, non de hominibus hoc esse intelligendum ». Sunt ergo aliquae res, quibus homines mali sunt. Id autem, quo homo fit deterior, a Deo non est, quia, ut ait Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum,8 « Deo auctore non fit homo deterior ». Non est igitur Deus auctor rerum, quibus homo deterior fit; at sunt aliquae res, ut dictum est, quibus homines mali fiunt: sunt igitur aliquae res, quae a Deo non sunt, quia peccata ipsae sunt. Ideoque Scriptura in pluribus contestatur locis,9 Deum non esse auctorem malorum, id est eorum, quae peccata sunt. |
From which it is gathered, that there are some things, which are not from God, and by them men are evil. Which, nevertheless, they also concede, supporting (themselves) upon the words of (St.) Augustine posited further above, who in (his) Enchridion,7 determining those words of the Prophet: Woe! to those who call good evil, says, « this must be understood of the very things, by which men are evil, not of men (themselves) ». Therefore there are some things, by which men are evil. But that, by which a man becomes worse, is not from God, because, as (St.) Augustine says in (his) book Of Eighty-Three Questions,8 « With God as author man does not become worse ». Therefore, God is not the author of the things, by which a man becomes worse; but there are some things, as has been said, by which men do become evil: therefore there are some things, which are not from God, because these are sins. And for that reason Scripture contests in several places,9 that God is not the author of evils, that is of those (acts), which are sins. |
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Cap. II.
Ex quo sensu dictum sit: Deus non est auctor mali. |
Chapter II. Out of what sense has it been said: God is not the author of evil? |
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In hoc autem verbo superiorum sententiae recte opponitur, qui dicunt, Deum non esse auctorem eorum, quae mala sunt, in quantum mala sunt, sed in quantum sunt; et in quantum mala sunt, dicunt, ea nihil esse. Quid igitur mirum, si Deus dicitur non esse auctor eorum, in quantum nihil sunt, cum nihil nullus auctor existere queat? Ideoque, cum dicitur Deus esse auctor omnium quae sunt, bonorum isti subintelligi . . . |
Moreover in this verse there is rightly opposed the sentence of the above (doctors), who say, that God is not the author of those, which are evil, inasmuch as they are evil, but inasmuch as they are; and inasmuch as they are evil, they say, those are nothing. Therefore, what a wonder, if God is said not to be the author of those, inasmuch as they are nothing, since no author of nothing [nihil nullus auctor] is able to exist? And for that reason, when God is said to be the author of all which are, they want that (this) be understood [subintelligi] / of those (who) are good. . . . |
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1 Gregor., XIV. Moral. c. 18. 22. Superius respicitur Ioan. 1, 2. 2 Tract. 1. n. 13. 3 Vide d. XXXV. c. 3. 4 Dist. XXXIV. c. 4. Immediate post solummodo codd. omittunt hic bonum, et iterum bonam. 5 Cap. 13. n. 8, ubi agitur de loco ex libro de Vera Relig. c. 41. n. 78. 6 Libr. I. Hypognost. c. 5. n. 7. Seq. locus ibid. IV. c. 1. n. 1; tertius ibid. paulo superius. 7 Cap. 19. n. 6, ubi respicitur Isai. 5, 20. Vide d. XXXIV. c. 5. 8 Quaest. 3. 9 Cfr. Deut. 32, 4; Isai. 53, 8. |
1 (Pope St.) Gregory (the Great), Morals on the Book of Job, Bk. IV, chs. 18, 22. Above there is a reference to John 1:2. 2 Tractates on the Gospel of St. John, tract 1, n. 13. 3 See d. XXXV, ch. 3. 4 Distinction XXXIV, ch. 4. Immediately after this only the codices omit the good [bonum], and then the following good [bonam]. 5 Chapter 13, n. 8, where he deals with the passage from (his) book On the True Religion, ch. 41, n. 78. 6 Hypogrnosticon, Bk. I, ch. 5, n. 7. The following passage is ibid., Bk. IV, ch. 1, n. 1; the third is ibid., a little above this. 7 Chapter 19, n. 6, where there is reference to Isaiah 5:20. See d. XXXIV, ch. 5. 8 Question 3. 9 Cf. Deut. 32:4; Isaiah 53:8. |
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* [Trans. note: Here the Latin of St. Augustine is equivocal, the phrase rendered as what is not according to nature [quod natura non est] can also be read just as well as what is not a nature; but considering the sentence which follows the because and the following proposition quoted from Augustine, in which good according to nature must be the reading of natura bonum, what is not according to nature seems the more appropriate reading here. St. Bonaventure commenting on this passage (Sent., Bk. II, d. 37, doubt 2, p. 876), also seemingly understands it in this sense.] |
p. 860
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volunt. Bona autem illa esse dicunt, quae naturaliter sunt; ea vero naturaliter esse dicunt, non solum quae substantiae sunt, vel concreata1 substantiis, qualiter supra acceperunt, sed et omnia quae naturam non privant bono. Et ita secundum eosdem multiplex in Scripturis fit intelligentia, ubi de natura sive substantia, vel de his quae naturaliter sunt, sermo occurit. Sed super illum locum Psalmi: Non est substantia, ita Augustinus2 de substantia disseruit, ut praemissae sententiae videatur consentire, dicens: « Substantia intelligitur illud quod sumus, quidquid sumus, homo, pecus, terra, sol; omnia ista substantiae dicuntur; nam quod nulla est substantia nihil omnino est: substantia ergo est aliquid esse ». « Deus fecit hominem substantiam, sed per iniquitatem lapsus est homo a substantia, in qua factus est; iniquitas quippe ipsa non est substantia. Non enim iniquitas est natura, quam formavit Deus, sed iniquitas est perversio, quam fecit homo ». « Naturae omnes per ipsum factae sunt; iniquitas per ipsum facta non est, quia iniquitas non est substantia. In illo hymno trium puerorum universa creatura laudans Deum commemoratur. Laudant enim omnia Deum, sed quae fecit Deus. Laudat ibi serpens Deum, sed non avaritia. Omnia reptilia ibi nominata sunt, sed non aliqua vitia. Vitia enim ex nobis et ex nostra voluntate habemus, et vitia non sunt substantia ». Intendant diligenter his verbis praemissarum assertores sententiarum, et percipere poterunt rationem et causam dictorum, ubi Scriptura de natura vel substantia mentionem facit. Illarum vero sententiarum iudicium prudentis lectoris, cui utriusque sententiae notitiam plenarie dedimus, arbitrio reliquimus, ad ea quae adhuc nobis supersunt tractanda festinantes. |
be understood [subintelligi] / of those (who) are good. But they say that those (things), which naturally are, are good; but they say that those naturally are, not only those which are substances, and/or co-created1 with substances, in the kind of manner they accepted (this) above, but also all those (things) which do not deprive a nature of the good. And thus according to the same (doctors) there comes to be a multiple understanding in Scripture, where a discourse occurs concerning a nature or substance, and/or concerning those (things) which are naturally. But on that passage of the Psalm: There is no substance, (St.) Augustine2 spoke in an orderly manner of substance, so as to seem to consent to the aforementioned sentence, saying (as he does): « A substance is understood (to be) that which we are, whatever we are, man, sheep, the Earth, the Sun; all these are said (to be) substances; for what is no substance, is entirely nothing: therefore a substance is being something [aliquid esse] ». « God made man a substance, but through iniquity man lapsed from the substance, in which he was made; indeed iniquity itself is not a substance. For iniquity is not a nature, which God formed, but iniquity is a perversion, which man wrought ». « All natures where made through Him; iniquity was not made through Him, because iniquity is not a substance. In that Hymn of the Three Boys each and every creature is commemorated as praising God. For all praise God, but (only all) which God made. In that (hymn) the snake praises God, but not avarice. All reptiles are named there, but not any vice. For vices we have out of ourselves and our of our will, and vices are not a substance ». They intend diligently to these words the assertors of the aforementioned sentences, and they were able to perceive the reason and cause of the sayings, where Scripture makes mention of nature and/or substance. But we leave the judgment of those sentences to the decision [arbitrio] of the prudent reason, to whom we have given fully the knowledge [notitiam] of each sentence, as we make haste to treat of those which still remain for us. |
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Cum igitur in hoc omnes consentiant catholici tractatores, scilicet quod Deus non est auctor malorum; cavendum est tamen, ne malorum nomine poenas, sicut peccata, generaliter includas. Poenarum enim Deus auctor est, sicut ipse per Prophetam3 ait: Non est malum in civitate, quod Dominus non fecerit. Item alibi ex persona sua ait: Ego sum Deus, creans malum et faciens bonum. Ecce hic dicitur creasse et fecisse malum; sed mali nomine poena intelligitur, non peccatum; sicut e converso, cum dicitur Deus non esse auctor malorum, nomine mali peccata intelliguntur. Ideoque Augustinus, qui dixerat in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum,4 quod Deus auctor mali non sit, in primo libro Retractationum, quomodo id intelligendum sit, aperit dicens: « Videndum est, ne male intelligatur quod dixi: Deus auctor mali non est, qui et omnium quae sunt auctor est, quia in quantum sunt, in tantum bona sunt; et ne hinc putetur, non ab illo esse poenam malorum, quae utique malum est his qui puniuntur. Sed hoc ita dixi, sicut dictum est: Deus mortem non fecit, cum alibi scriptum sit: Mors et vita a Domino est. Malorum ergo poena, quae a Deo est, malum est quidem malis, sed in bonis Dei operibus est, quoniam iustum est, ut mali puniantur; et utique bonum est omne quod iustum est ». Sic ergo dicitur Deus non fecisse mortem, quia non fecit illud, pro quo mors infligitur, id est peccatum. Audisti, lector, causam dictorum, ex qua sana intelligentia firmatur,5 cum dicitur: Deus non est auctor mali, et: Deus mortem non fecit. |
Therefore, though all catholic writers [tractatores] consent in this, that is, that God is not the author of evils; yet one must beware, lest by the name of evils you include punishments generally, such as sins (are sometimes called). For God is the author of punishments, just as He Himself says through the Prophet:3 There is no evil in the city, which the Lord has not made. Likewise in another place He says in His own person: I am God, creating evil and making good. Behold here it is said that He has created and made evil; but by the name of evil there is understood a punishment, not a sin; just as vice versa, when God is said not to be the author of evils, by the name of evil there are understood sins. And for that reason (St.) Augustine, who said in the book Of Eighty-Three Questions,4 that God is not the author of evil, clarifies [aperit] in the first book of Retractations, in what manner that is to be understood, saying: « It must be seen, lest what I have said be understood badly: God is not the author of evil, who is the author also of all which are, because inasmuch as they are, in so much are the good; and lest it be thought from this, that the punishment of evils is from Him, which (punishment) indeed is an evil to those who are punished. But I said that thus, just as there was said: God did not make death, since there was written in another place: Death and life is from the Lord. Therefore the punishment of evils, which is from God, is indeed evil to the wicked, but it is among the good works of God, since it is just, that the wicked be punished; and certainly everything which is just is good ». Therefore God is said to not have made death thus, that He did not make that, for which death is inflicted, that is, sin. You have heard, o reader, the cause of the sayings, out of which a sane understanding is strengthened,5 when there is said: God is not the author of evil, and: God did not make death. |
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1 Codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 concreta. 2 Enarrat. serm. 1. n. 5. supra Ps. 68, 3, ubi etiam duo seqq. loci. Hymnus trium puerorum est Dan. 3, 24. seqq. 3 Amos 3, 6; seq. locus Isai. 45, 6. 7. Vulgata: Ego Dominus, et non est alter, formans lucem et creans tenebras, faciens pacem et creans malum. 4 Quaest. 21; alius locus est I. Retract. c. 26. Duo loci Scripturae sunt Sap. 1, 13, et Eccli. 11, 14. 5 Ed. 1 formatur. |
1 The codices and editions 1, 2, 3, 7, and 8, read have grown together [concreta] for co-created [concreata]. 2 Enarrations on the Psalms, sermon 1, n. 5, on Ps. 68:3, where the following two passages (are) also (found). The hymn of the three boys is Dan. 3:24, ff.. 3 Amos 3:6; the following passage is Isaiah 45:6-7. The Vulgate reads: I the Lord, and there is no other, forming light and creating darkness, making peace and creating evil [Ego Dominus, et non est alter, formans lucem et creans tenebras, faciens pacem et creans malum]. 4 Question 21; the other passage is RetractationsΈ Bk. I, ch. 26. The two passage of Scripture are Wisdom 1:13, and Ecclesiasticus 11:14. 5 Edition 1 has is formed [formatur] for is strengthened [firmatur]. |
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