DOCTOR SUBTILIS ET MARIANI

 

IOANNIS DUNS SCOTI

 

ORDINIS FRATRUM MINORUM

 

 

 

OPERA OMNIA

 

 

 

Ordinatio

 

PROLOGUS

 

FIRST PART

 

ON THE NECESSITY OF REVEALED DOCTRINE

 

QUESTION SOLE

 

Vol. I, pp. 1-58

 

 

IUSSU ET AUCTORITATE Rmi P. PACIFICI M. PERANTONI

 

TOTIUS ORDINIS FRATRUM MINORUM MINISTRI  GENERALIS

 

 

 

 

STUDIO ET CURA COMMISSIONIS SCOTISTICAE

AC FIDEM CODICUM EDITA

 

PRAESIDE

P. CAROLO BALIĆ

 

 

 

TYPIS POLYGOTTIS VATICANIS

MCML

 

English Translation by

 

The Franciscan Archive

http://www.franciscan-archive.org

PROLOGUS

 

PARS PRIMA

PROLOGUE

 

FIRST PART

DE NECESSITATE DOCTRINAE REVELATAE

ON THE NECESSITY OF REVEALED DOCTRINE

QUAESTIO UNICA

QUESTION SOLE

UTRUM HOMINI PRO STATU ISTO SIT NECESSARIUM ALIQUAM DOCTRINAM SUPERNATURALITER INSPIRARI

WHETHER FOR MAN FOR HIS PRESENT STATE IT BE NECESSARY THAT ANY DOCTRINE SUPERNATURALLY INSPIRE HIM

1.  [Q. 1]  Quaeritura utrum homini pro statu isto sit necessarium aliquam doctrinam specialem supernaturaliter inspirari, ad quam videlicet non posset attingere lumine naturali intellectus1.

1.  [Q. 1]*  It is askeda whether for man for his (present) state it be necessary that any special doctrine supernaturally inspire (him), to which he could not attain by the natural light of the intellect.1

Et quod non, arguo sic:

And that (it is) not (so), I argue thus:

Omnisb potentia habens aliquod commune pro primo obiecto, potest naturaliter in quodlibet contentum sub ipso sicut in per se obiectum naturale.

Everyb power [potentia] having anything common for its first object, can naturally (act) upon [in] anything contained under it just as upon a per se natural object.

a Praemittitur textus interpolatus:  Cupientes aliquid2 etc.  Circa prologum primi libri quaeruntur quinque.  Primum est de necessitate huius doctrinae:  utrum necessarium sit homini pro statu isto aliquam doctrinam sibi supernaturaliter inspirari3.  Secundum spectat ad genus causae formalis eiusdem, et est:  utrum cognitio supernaturalis necessaria viatori tradita sit sufficienter in Scriptura sacra4.  Tertium pertinet ad genus causae materialis, et est:  utrum theologia sit de Deo tamquam de subiecto primo5.  Quartum et quintum pertinet ad genus causae finalis, et est quartum:  utrum theologia sit practica6; quintum:  utrum ex ordine ad praxim ut ad finem dicatur per se scientia practica7.

a  An interpolated text prefaces this commentary:  Desiring to show something etc..2  About the prologue of the First Book five questions are asked.  The first concerns the necessity of this doctrine:  whether it be necessary for man for his (present) state that any doctrine supernaturally inspire him.3  The second looks at the genus of the formal cause of the same, and is:  whether a necessary supernatural cognition has been sufficiently handed on to the wayfarer in Sacred Scripture.4 The third pertains to the genus of the material cause, and is:  whether theology concerns God as its first subject.5  The fourth and fifth pertain to the genus of the final cause, and the fourth is:  whether theology is practical;6 the fifth:  whether from its order to praxis as to its end it is called a per se practical science.7

b Textus a Duns Scotus signatur littera: a8.

 b  The text is marked here by Duns Scotus with the letter: a8

1 Cf. Duns Scotus, Lectura prol. pars 1 q. unicus.;  Rep. A prol q. 3.  2 Cf. Lombardus, Sent. prol. (ed. Claraq. I 1).  3 Cf. supra n. 1.  4 Cf. infra n. 95.  5 Cf. infra n. 24.  6 Cf. infra n. 217.  7 Cf. infra n. 233.  8 Cf. infra p. 2, 16-3,19.

*  Text within square [ ] brackets has been added for clarity in the case of headings and citations by the editors of the Critical edition.  In the translation words supplied by the context are in round ( ) brackets, and references to the original Latin text in square [ ] brackets. Paragraph numbers are according to the Critical Edition.

 

 

 


P. 2

Hoc probatur per exemplum de primo objecto visus et aliis contentis sub illo, et ita inductive in aliis obiectis primis et potentiis.  Probatur etiam per rationem, quia primum obiectum dicitur quod est adaequatum cum potentia; sed si in aliquo esset ratio eius, scilicet primi obiecti, circa quod non posset potentia habere actum, non esset potentia adaequata, sed obiectum excederet potentiam.  Patet igitur maior.  Sed primum obiectum intellectus nostri naturale est ens inquantum ens;  ergo intellectus noster potest naturaliter habere actum circa quodcumque ens, et sic circa quodcumque intelligibile non-ens, quia negatio cognoscitur per affirmationem1.  Ergo etc.  Probatio minoris, Avicenna I Metaphysicae cap. 5:  « Ens et res prima impressione in animam imprimuntur, nec possunt manifestari ex aliis »; si autem esset aliquid aliud ab istis primum obiectum, ista possent manifestari per rationem eius; sed hoc est impossibile2a.

This is proven through the example of the first object of sight and the other things contained under it, and thus inductively in the other first objects and powers.  It is also proven through reason, because a first object is said to be that which is adequate with the power;  but if in anything there be a reckoning of this, that is of a first object, about which a power could not have an act, it would not be an adequate power, but the object would exceed the power.  The major is therefore clear.  But the first natural object of our intellect is a being inasmuch as it is a being [ens inquantum ens];  therefore our intellect can naturally have an act about whatever being, and thus about whatever intelligible not-being, because negation is cognized through affirmation.1  Ergo etc..  Proof of the minor,  Avicenna in his First Book on the Metaphysics, chapter 5 [chapter 6 (72rb)] (says):  « Being [ens] and thing by a first impression are impressed upon the soul, nor can they be made manifest from others »;  if, however, anything other than these would be the first object, those could be manifested through a reckoning of it; but this is impossible.2a

a  Adnotatio Duns Scoti:  In ista quaestione nota a, b, c3 ad principale; item pro difficultatibus, d, e, f, g4; factae sunt in quaestione secunda5.  Nota, a valet distinctione 36 et c quaestione 17; b et sequens, communiter in supernaturalibus; d, e quaestione de scientia theologiae nobis8.

a  Duns Scotus’ footnote:  In this question notes a, b and c3 (refer) to the principle (argument);  likewise for the difficulties, d, e, f and g;4  have been dealt with in the second question.5  Note, a refers to distinction 36 and c question 17; b and the following, commonly (pertain) to the supernatural (aspects);  d and e to the question concerning our science of theology.8

1  Cf. Aristot., Anal. Post. I c. 24 [t. 40] (A. C. 25, 86b 34-35):  « per affirmativam enim negativa nota est »;  De interpr. II. C. 2 (c. 14, 24b 3);  « affirmationi contraria quidem negatio est »; Metaph. IV t. 16 (III c. 4, 1008a 17-18):  « notior utique erit dictio quam opposita negatio »;  Avicenna, Metaph. I c. 6 (73ra):  « esse vero notius est quam non esse ».  2 Pro n. 1 cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 1 q. 2. 3. 11. 12; a. 3 q. 1. 3. 4. 5; a. 19 q. 1; a. 21 q. 2.  3 a cf. supra p. 1, 23; b cf. infra p. 3, 20; c cf. infra p. 5, 20.  4 Cf. infra p. 7, 15; e cf infra p. 25, 19; f cf. Infra p. 6, 15; g cf infra p. 22, 22.  5 Cf. infra n. 95.  6 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 3 pars 1.  7 Cf. Ib. Q. 1-2.  8 Cf. Infra n. 124. 

1  Cf. Aristot., Posterior Analytics I c. 24 [t. 40] (A. C. 25, 86b 34-35):  « for through an affirmative statement the negative is known »;  On Interpretation II. C. 2 (c. 14, 24b 3);  « to an affirmation the contrary is indeed the negation »; Metaphysics IV t. 16 (III c. 4, 1008a 17-18):  « indeed, a saying will be more known than its opposite negation »;  Avicenna, Metaphysics. I c. 6 (73ra):  « ‘being’ [esse] on the other hand is more known than ‘non being’ ».


P. 3

2.  Praetereaa, sensus non indiget aliqua cognitione supernaturali pro statu isto;  ergo nec intellectus.  Antecedens patet.  Probatio consequentiae:  « Natura non deficit in necessariis »,  III  De anima;  et si in imperfectis non deficit, multo magis nec in perfectis;  ergo si non deficit in potentiis inferioribus quantum ad necessaria earum  propter actus suos habendos et finem earum consequendum, multo magis nec deficit in necessariis potentiae superiori ad actum suum et finem consequendum.  Ergo etc.1

2.  Moreover,a sense does not need any supernatural cognition for the (present) state; therefore neither the intellect.  The antecedent is clear.  The Proof of the consequent:  « Nature is not deficient in necessaries »,  De anima, Book III [t. 45];  and if in things imperfect it is not deficient, much more neither in things perfect;  therefore if it is not deficient in inferior powers as much as regards those things necessary for them for their acts to be had and to completely attain their end, much more neither it is deficient in those things necessary for a superior power as regards its act and to completely attain its end.  Ergo etc..1

3.  Praeterea, si aliqua talis doctrina sit necessaria, hoc est quia potentia in puris naturalibus est improportionata obiecto ut sic cognoscibili; ergo oportet quod per aliquid aliud a se fiat ei proportionata.  Illud aliud aut est naturale, aut supernaturale;  si naturale, ergo totum est improportionatum primo obiecto;  si supernaturale, ergo potentia est improportionata illi, et ita per aliud debet proportionari, et sic in infinitum.  Ergo cum non sit procedere in infinitum, II Metaphysicae, oportet stare in primo, . . .

3.  Moreover, if any such doctrine be necessary, this is because a power in purely natural things is disproportionate to its object that (it be) in this manner cognizable; therefore it is opportune that through something other than itself it be made proportionate to it.  That  other is either natural, or supernatural;  if natural, therefore the whole is disproportionate to its first object;  if supernatural, therefore the power is disproportionate to the same, and thus through another ought to be proportioned, and thus unto infinity.  Therefore, since there is not proceeding unto infinity, Metaphysics, Book II, [t. 5-13], it is opportune to stand still in the first, . . .

a Textus a Duns Scotus signatur littera: b2.

a  The text is marked here by Duns Scotus with the letter: b.2

Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 1 q. 4 arg. 2. 4 (I f. 11 A); q. 2 in corp. (f. 4B);  Thomas, De veritate q. 14 a. 10 arg. 4. 13 (ed. Parmen. IX 242b-243a. 243b).  2  Cf. supra p. 2, 16-3, 19.

 

 


p. 4

...dicendo, quod potentia intellectiva sit proportionata omni cognoscibili et secundum omnem modum cognoscibilis.  Ergo etc.1

. . . by saying, that the intellective power is proportionate to every cognizable and (is) according to every manner of the cognizable.  Ergo etc..1

4.  Ad oppositum:

 

Tim. 3:  Omnis doctrina divnitius inspirata utilis est ad arguendum etc.

 

4.  Opposed to this:

 

Timothy, chapter 3, [v.16]:  Every divinely inspired doctrine is useful for putting (things) in clear light etc..

Praeterea, Bar. 3 de sapientia dicitur:  Non est qui possit scire vias eius, sed qui scit universa novit eam;  ergo nullus alius potest habere eam nisi a sciente universa.  Hoc quantum ad necessitatem eius.  De facto autem subdit:  Tradit eam Iacob puero suo et Israel dilecto suo, quantum ad Vetus Testamentum; et sequitur:  Post haec in terris visus est et cum hominibus conversatus est, quantum ad Novum Testatmentum.

Morevoer, in Baruch chapter 3, [vv. 31-32] there is said of wisdom:  There is not one who can know Her ways, but He who knows all knew Her;  therefore no other can have Her except by a universal knower.  This (is said) as much as regards its necessity.  Moreover of the fact (the Prophet) adds [ibid. V. 37]:  Jacob passed Her on to his son and Israel to his beloved, as much as regards the Old Testament; and there follows [v. 38]:  After these (days) among the lands He is seen, and He has conversed with men, as much as regards the New Testament.

[I.  Controversia inter Philosophos et Theologos]

I.  The Controvery among Philosophers and Theologians

5.  In ista quaestione videtur controversia inter philosophos et theologos.  Et tenent philosophi perfectionem naturae, et negant perfectionem supernaturalem;  theologi vero cognoscunt defectum naturae et necessitatem gratiae et perfectionem supernaturalema.

 

5.  On this question there seems to be a controvery among philosophers and theologians.  And philosophers hold that the perfection of nature, and deny supernatural perfection; on the other hand theologians recognize the defect of nature and the necessity of grace and supernatural perfection.a

a  Sequitur textus interpolatus:  et ideo eam magis honorant.

a  There follows an interpolated text:  and for that reason they honored Her more.

1  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 3 q. 5 arg. 2 (I f. 29S).

 

 


P. 5

[A. Opinio Philosophorum]

A.  The Opinion of Philosophers

Diceret igitur philosophus quod nulla est cognitio supernaturalis homini necessaria pro statu isto, sed quid omnem cognitionem sibi necessariam posset acquirere ex actione causarum naturalium1.  ­—  Ad hoc adducitur simul auctoritas et ratio Philosophi ex diversis locis.

A philosopher, therefore, would say that there is no supernatural cognition necessary to man in his (present) state, but that every cognition necessary for him he can acquire from the action of natural causes.1  —  For this there is adduced together the authority and reckoning of the Philosopher from diverse passages.

6.  Primo illud III De anima, ubi dicit quod « intellectus agens est quo est omnia facere, et possibilis est quo est omnia fieri ».  Ex hoc arguo sic:  activo naturali et passivo simul approximatis et non impeditis sequitur actio necessario2, quia non dependet essentialiter nisi ex eis tamquam ex causis prioribus; activum autem respectu omnis intelligibilis est intellectus agens, et passivum est intellectus possibilis, et haec sunt naturaliter in anima, nec sunt impedita.  Patet.  Ergo virtute naturali istorum potest sequi actus intelligendi respectu cuiuscumque intelligibilis3.

6.  First that of De anima, Book III, [t. 18], where he says that « the agent intellect is that by which it makes all things, and the possible is that by which it becomes all things ».  From this I argue thus:a  to an active and a passive natural (virtue) together approximate and not impeded there follows action necessarily,2 because it does not depend essentially except from these as from prior causes;  moreover the active in respect to every intelligible is the agent intellect, and the passive is the possible intellect, and these naturally are in the soul, and they are not impeded.  This is clear.  Therefore by their natural virtue an act of understanding can follow in respect to whatsoever intelligible.3

7.  Confirmatur ratione :  omni potentiae naturali passivae correspondet aliquod activum naturale, alioquin videretur potentia passiva esse frustra in natura si per nihil in natura posset reduci ad actum ; sed intellectus possibilis est potentia passiva respectu quorumque intelligibilium ; . . .

7.  It is confirmed by reason:  to every natural passive power there corresponds some active natural, otherwise the passive power would seem to be in vain [frustra] in the nature if by means of nothing in the nature it could be reduced to act;  but the possible intellect is a passive power in respect to whatever intelligibles ; . . .

a  Textus a Duns Scotus signatur littera:  c4.

The text is marked by Duns Scotus with the letter c.4

1  Cf. Averroes, Metaphy. II. Com 1;  De an. III com. 36.  — Cf. etiam Henricus Gand., Summa a. 4 q. 5 in corp. (I f. 33E. 32B).  2  Cf. Aristot., Metaphy. IX t. 10 (Theta, c. 5, 1048a 5-7):  « Tales quidem potentias [irrationales] necesse, quando ut possunt activum et passivum appropinquat, hoc quidem facere, illud vero pati ».  3  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 1. q. 5 ad 2 (f. 15F); a. 3 q. 2 arg. 1 et in corp. (F. 28E-F).  4 Cf. supra p. 2, 16-3, 19.

2  Cf. Aristot., Metaphysics. IX t. 10 (Theta, c. 5, 1048a 5-7):  « It is indeed necessary that the [irrational] powers be such that, when the active and the passive drawn near to one other, as they are able, the former indeed works, the other indeed suffers ». 

 

 


P. 6

. . . ergo correspondet sibi aliqua potentia activa naturalis1.  Sequitur igitur propositum.  Minor patet, quia intellectus possibilis naturaliter appetit cognitionem cuiuscumque cognoscibilis; naturaliter etiam perficitur per quamcumque cognitionem; igitur est naturaliter receptivus cuiuscumque intellectionis.

. . . therefore some active natural power corresponds to it.1  The proposition, therefore, follows.  The minor is clear, because the possible intellect naturally desires [appetit] the cognition of whatsoever cognizable; it is also naturally perfected though whatsoever cognition;  therefore it is naturally receptive of whatsoever intellection.

8.  Praetereaa, VI Metaphysicae distinguitur habitus speculativus in mathematicam, phyiscam et metaphysicam; et ex probatione eiusdem, ibidem, non videtur possibile esse plures habitus esse speculativos, quia in istis consideratur de toto ente, et in se et quoad omnes partes.  Sicut autem non posset esse aliqua speculativa alia ab istis, sic nec posset esse aliqua alia practica a practicis acquisitis activis et factivis.  Ergo scientiae practicae aquisitae sufficiunt ad perficiendum intellectum speculativum2.

8.  Besides,a in Metaphysics, Book VI, [t. 2], there is distinguished the speculative habit in mathematics, physics and metaphysics; and from the proof of the same, in the same place [t. 1-2], it does not seem that it is possible that there are many speculative habits, because in them there is a consideration of [consideratur de] the whole being, both in itself and in regard [quoad] all its parts.  However, just as there cannot be any speculative (habit) other than these, so neither can there be any other practical (habit) than the active and factitive acquired practical (ones).  Therefore the acquired practical sciences suffice to perfect the speculative intellect.2

a  Textus a Duns Scotus signatur littera: f3.

a  The text is marked here by Duns Scotus with the letter: f.3

 

1  Cf. Aristot., De an. III t. 17 (III c. 5, 430a 10-14); Metaph. V t 17 (IV c. 12, 1019a 15-1019b 15); De caelo I t. 32 ( I c. 4, 271a 32-33);  Averroes, Metaphy. II com. 1.  —  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 3 q. 4 arg. 2 (I f. 29 O); a. 35 q. 2 in corp. (f. 223Y)).  2 Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 2 q. 3 in corp. (f. 24M); a. 3 q. 3 in corp. et arg. 2 (f. 29L.K).  —  Thomas, De Veritate q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3 (ed. Parmen. IX 242b).  3  Cf. supra p. 2, 16-3, 19).

 

 


P. 7

 

9.  Praetereaa, potens naturaliter intelligere principium, potest naturaliter cognoscere conclusions inclusas in principio.  Hanc conclusionem probo, quia scientia conclusionum non dependet nisi ex intellectu principii et deductione conclusionum ex principio, sicut patet ex definitione ‘scire’ I Posteriorum; sed deductio est ex se manifesta, sicut patet ex syllogismi perfecti definitione I Priorum, quia « nullius est indigens ut sit vel appareat evidenter necessarius »; igitur si principia intelligantur, habentur omnia quae sunt necessaria ad scientiam conclusionis.  Et sic patet maior.

9.  Besides,a being able naturally to understand a principles, it can naturally cognize the conclusions included in the principle.  This conclusion I prove (thus), because the knowledge [scientia] of conclusions does not depend (on anything) but the understanding of the principle and the deduction of the conclusions from the principle, just as is clear from the definition of ‘knowing’ [‘scire’] in Posterior Analytics, Book I, [c. 2 t. 5]; but deduction is of itself manifest, just as is clear from the definition of the perfect syllogism in Prior Analytics, Book I, [c. 1],  because «  it is lacking in nothing that is and/or appears evidently necessary »;  therefore if the principles are understood, all things which are necessary for the knowledge of the conclusion are had.  And thus the major is clear.

10.  Sed naturaliter intelligimus prima principia, in quibus virtualiter includuntur omnes conclusiones; ergo naturaliter possumus scire omnes conclusiones scibiles.

10.  But naturally we understand the first principles, in which there are included all conclusions;  therefore naturally we can know all knowable conclusions.

Probatio primae partis minoris:  quia termini principiorum primorum sunt communissimi, igitur illos naturaliter possumus intelligere, . . .

The proof of the first part of the minor:  because the terms of the first principles are most common, therefore we can naturally understand them, . . .

a  Textus a Duns Scotus signatur littera: d1.

a  The text is marked by Duns Scotus with the letter: d.1

1  Cf. supra p. 2, 16-3,19.

 

 


P. 8

 

. . ., quia ex I Physicorum communissima primo intelliguntura; « principia autem cognoscimus et intelligimus in quantum terminos cognoscimus », I Posteriorum; ergo prima principia possumus naturaliter cognoscere1.

. . ., because from Physics, Book I, [t. 3],  the things most common are understood first;a  «  but we cognize and understand principles inasmuch as we cognize (their) terms », Posterior Analytics, Book I, [c. 3 t. 6];  therefore we can naturally cognize the first principles.1

11.  Probatio secundae partis minoris: quia termini primorum principorum sunt communissimi, igitur quando distribuuntur, distribuuntur pro omnibus conceptibus inferioribus;  accipiuntur autem tales termini universaliter in primis principiis, et ita extendunt se ad omnes conceptus particulares, et per consequens ad extrema omnium conclusionum specialiumb.

11.  The proof of the second part of the minor:  because the terms of the first principles are most common, therefore when they are distributed, they are distributed on behalf of all the inferior concepts;  but such terms are accepted universally in the first principles, and thus they extends themselves to all particular concepts, and consequently [per consequens] to the extremes of all special conclusions.b

a  Loco igitur (p. 7, 14)  —  intelliguntur (p. 8,1) textus a Duns Scoto cancellatus:  igitur naturaliter illos cognoscimus, quia sunt sicut ianua in domo, II Metaphysicae2; loco igitur (p. 7,14)  —  intelliguntur (p. 8,1) et igitur (p. 8, 12)  —  Metaphysicae (p. 8, 13) textus interpolatus:  igitur illos possimus naturaliter intelligere, quia ex I Physicorum3 communissima primo intelliguntur a nobis, etiam quia sunt sicut ianua in domo, II Metaphysicae4.

b  Sequitur textus interpolatus:  Et ita est haec pars minoris secunda probata.

a  In place of therefore (p. 7, final sentence) . . . . are understood (p. 8, first sentence) stood this text cancelled by Duns Scotus:  therefore we naturally cognize them, because they are as the door in the house, II Metaphysics, Book II;2  in place of the same and of therefore (p. 8, 12) . . . Metaphysics (p. 8, 13) was the interpolated text:  therefore we can naturally understand them, because from Physics, Book I,3 the things most common are understood by us first, also because the are as the door in the house, Metaphysics, Book II.4

b  There follows the interpolated text:  And thus has this second part of the minor been proved.

1  Pro n. 9-10 cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 6 q. 1 arg. 1 (I f. 42A); a. 1 q. 2 in corp. (f. 4B); q. 5 in corp. (f. 15B); q. 12 in corp. (f. 22L); a. 13 q. 3 arg. 2 (f. 91A).  2 Aristot., Metaph. II t. 1 (I c. 1, 993b 4-5).  —  cf. etiam Henricus Gand., Summa a. 1 q. 10 in corp. (f. 20G); a. 22 q. 1 in corp. (f. 130L).  3  Cf. ad lin. 1.  4 Cf. ad lin. 12-13.

 

 


P. 9

 

[ B.  Improbatio Opinionis Philosophorum]

B.  The Reproof of the Opinion of Philosophers.

12.  Contra istam positionem tripliciter potest argui.

12.  Against this position on can argue in a threefold manner:

Nota, nullum supernaturale potest ratione naturali ostendi inesse viatori, nec necessario requiri ad perfectionem eius; nec etiam habens potest cognoscere illud sibi inesse.  Igitur impossibile est hic contra Aristotelem uti ratione naturali:  si arguatur ex creditis, non est ratio contra philosophum, quia praemissam creditam non concedet.  Unde istae rationes hic factae contra ipsum alteram praemissam habent creditam vel probatam ex credito; ideo non sunt nisi persuasiones theologicae, ex creditis ad creditum.

Note, no supernatural can be shown by natural reason to belong to [inesse] the wayfarer, nor to be required necessarily for his perfection; nor even can one having it cognize that it belongs to him.  Therefore it is impossible here to use natural reason against Aristotle:  if one argue from things believed, this is not a reason against the philosopher, because he does not concede the believed premise.  Whence these reasons of mine made here against him have another believed and/or proven premise from what is believed; for that reason they are not but theological persuasions, from things believed for that which is believed.

13.  [Prima ratio principalis]  —   Primo sic:  omni agenti per cognitionem necessaria est distincta cognitio sui finis1.  Hanc probo, quia omne agens propter finem agit ex appetitu finis2; omne per se agens agit propter finem3; igitur omne per se agens suo modo appetit finem.  Igitur sicut agenti naturali est necessarius appetitus finis propter quem debet agere, ita agenti per cognitionem — quod etiam est per se agens, ex II Physicorum — necessarius est appetitus sui finis propter quem debet agere4.  Patet ergo maior.

13.  [The first principal reason]  —  First in this manner:  to everyone acting through cognition there is necessary a distinct cognition of one’s own end.1  This I prove, because everything acting on account of an end acts out of an appetite for the end;2 every per se agent acts on account of an end;3  therefore every per se agent in its own manner has an appetite [appetit] for its end.  Therefore just as to a natural agent there is a necessary appetite of its end for the sake of which it ought to act, so to one acting through cognition — which is also a per se agent,  from Physics, Book II [t. 49] — there is a necessary appetite of its own end for the sake of which it ought to act.4  Ergo the major is clear.

1  Cf. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I q. 1 a. 1 in corp. (IV 6b); De Veritate q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3 (ed. Parmen. IX 242b)  2 Cf. Aristot., Metaph. II t. 8 (I c. 2, 994b 13-14).  3 Cf. Aristot., Physic. II t. 49 (II c. 5, 196b 17-22).  4 Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 4 q. 3 in corp. (I f. 31N-32O).

 

 


P. 10

 

Sed homo non potest scire ex naturalibus finem suum distincte; igitur necessaria est sibi de hoc aliqua cognitio supernaturalis1.

But man cannot know [scire] his own end distinctly from natural (things);  therefore there is necessary for him some supernatural cognition concerning this.1

14.  Minor patet:  primo, quia Philosophus sequens naturalem rationem aut ponit felicitatem esse perfectam in cognitione acquisita substantiarum separatarum, sicut videtur velle I et X Ethicorum, aut si non determinate asserat illam esse supremam perfectionem nobis possibilem, aliam ratione naturali non concludit, ita quod soli naturali rationi innitendo vel errabit circa finem in particulari vel dubius remanebita; unde I Ethicorum dubitando ait:  « Si quod est deorum donum, rationabile est felicitatem esse »2.

14.  The minor is clear:  first, because the Philosopher, following natural reason, either posits felicity to be perfect in the acquired cognition of separated substances, must as he seems to want in the Nicomachian Ethics, Books I [c. 9] and X [c. 8 and 10], or if he does not determinately assert that to be the supreme perfection possible for us, he does not draw another conclusion [aliam non concludet], so that by supporting himself by natural reason alone he will err about his end in particular and/or will remain doubtful;a  whence doubting in the Nicomachian Ethics, Book I, [c. 13], he says:  « If that is a gift of the gods, it is reasonable that there is a felicity (for man) ».2

15.  Secundo probatur eadem minor per rationem, quia nullius substantiae finis proprius cognoscitur a nobis nisi ex actibus eius nobis manifestis ex quibus ostenditur quod talis finis sit conveniens tali naturaeb; nullos actus experimur nec cognoscimus inesse . . .

15.  Second, the minor is proven by the same reckoning, because of no substance is the end more properly cognized by us unless out of its acts manifested to us from which it is shown that such an end is convenient to such a nature;b  we experience no acts nor do we cognized them to belong to . . .

a  Adnotatio Duns Scoti:  Hoc est creditum3.

b  Sequitur textus interpolatus:  Hoc patet de descensu gravis deorsum, qui est actus gravis respectu centri et finis.

a  Duns Scotus’ note:  This is (something) believed.3

b  There follows the interpolated text:  This is clear from the descent of a weight downwards, which is an act of weight in respect of its center and end.

1   Cf. Thomas, Summa Theologicae I q. 1. a. 1 in corp. (IV 6b);  Henricus Gand., Summa a. 4. q. 5 in corp. (I f. 32B-33E).  2 Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 1 q.12 in corp. (f. 21 I); a. 4. q. 5 in corp et ad 5 (f. 33B.I); a. 3 q. 3 in corp. (f 29L).  3 Cf. Supra n. 12.

 

 


P. 11

 

... nostrae naturae pro statu isto ex quibus cognoscamus visionem substantiarum separatarum esse convenientem nobis;  igitur non possumus naturaliter cognoscere distincte quod ille finis sit conveniens naturae nostrae1.

. . . our nature for this (our present) state out of which we cognize the vision of separated substances to be fitting [convenientem] for us;  therefore we cannot naturally cognize distinctly that that end is fitting to our nature.1

16.  Hoc saltem certum est quod quaedam condiciones finis propter quas est appetibilior et ferventius inquirendus non possunt determinate cognosci ratione naturali.  Etsi enim daretur quod ratio sufficeret ad probandum quod visio Dei nuda et fruitio est finis hominis, tamen non concludetur quod ista perpetuo convenient homini perfecto, in anima et corpore, sicut dicetur in IV distinctione 432.  Et tamen perpetuitas huiusmodi boni est condicio reddens finem appetibiliorem quam si esset transitorium.  Consequi enim hoc bonum in natura perfecta est appetibilius quam in anima separata, sicut patet per Augustinum XII Super Genesim.  Istas igitur et similes condiciones finis necesssarium est nosse ad efficaciter inquirendum finem, et tamen ad eas non sufficit ratio naturalis; igitur requiritur doctrina supernaturaliter tradita.

16.  This at least is certain, that certain conditions of (our) end, on account of which it is to be more desirably [appetibilior] and fervently inquired after, cannot be cognized in a determinate manner by natural reason.  For even if it be given that reason would suffice to prove that the unencumbered [nuda] vision  and fruition of God is the end of man, nevertheless it would not come to the conclusion [concludetur] that these (acts) of (enjoying) God perpetually befit the perfect man, in soul and body, just as is said in  Book IV, Distinction 43.  And nevertheless the perpetuity of this manner of good is the condition rendering (his) end more desirable than if it were transitory.  For to completely attain this good in a perfected nature is more desirable than in a separated soul, just as is clear through (the testimony of St.) Augustine, On Genesis, Book XII, [c. 35, n. 68].  Therefore these and the similar conditions of (his) end it is necessary to know to efficaciously inquire into (his) end, and nevertheless for these natural reason is not sufficient;  therefore there is required a doctrine supernaturally transmitted [tradita].

17.  [Secunda ratio principalis]  —  Secundo sica:  . . .

17.  [The second principle reason]  —  Second (I prove) in this manner:a

a  Adnotatio Duns Scoti:  Haec procedit de contingentibus;  ergo non de scibilibus.

a  Duns Scotus’ note:  This proceeds from contingents; therefore not from knowables.

1  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 4. q. 5 in corp. (I f. 32B-33D).  2 Duns Scotus, Ordinatio IV d. 43 q. 2 n. [32].

 

 


P. 12

 

... omni cognoscenti agenti propter finem necessaria est cognitio quomodo et qualiter acquiratur talis finis; et etiam necessaria est cognitio omnium quae sunt ad illum finem ncessaria; et tertio necessaria est cognitio quod omnia illa sufficiunt ad talem finem.  Primum patet, quia si nesciat quomodo et qualiter finis acquiratur, nesciet qualiter ad consecutionem ipsius se disponet.  Secudum probatur, quia si nesciat omnia ncessaria ad ipsum, propter ignorantiam alicuius actus necessarii ad ipsum poterit a fine deficere.  Sit etiam, quantum ad tertium, nesciantur illa necessaria sufficere, ex dubitatione quod ignoret aliquid necessarium, non efficaciter prosequetur illud quod est necessarium.

. . . for every agent cognizing for the sake of its end there is a necessary cognition (of) how and in what kind of way [quomodo et qualiter] such an end is acquired; and there is also a necessary cognition of all things which are necessary for that end; and third there is a necessary cognition that all those things suffice for such an end.  The first is clear, because if one does not know how and in what kind of way his end is acquired, he will not know in what kind of way he will dispose himself to the attainment of it.  The second is proven, because if one does not know all the things necessary for it, on account of the ignorance of any necessary act for it he will not be able to attain his end [poterit a fine deficere].  It may also be, as much as regards the third, that those things necessary are not known to be sufficient, out of a doubting that ignores something necessary, one does not efficaciously pursue that which is necessary.

18.  Sed haec tria non potest viator naturali ratione cognoscere.  Probatio de primo1, quia beatitudo confertur tamquam praemium pro meritis quae Deus acceptat tamquam digna tali praemio, et per consequens non naturali necessitate sequitur ad actus nostros qualescumque sed contingenter datur a Deo, actus aliquos in ordine ad ipsum tamquam meritorios acceptante2a.  Istud non est naturaliter scibile, . . .

18.  But these three a wayfarer cannot cognize by natural reason.  Proof of the first,1 because beatitude is conferred as a reward for the merits which God accepts as worthy of such a reward, and consequently not by a natural necessity does it follow after our acts, whatever kind (they may be), but it is given contingently by God, accepting some acts in order to it as meritorious.2a  That is not naturally knowable, . . .

a  Adnotatio Duns Scoti:  Hoc est creditum3

a  Duns Scotus’ note:  This is (something) believed.3

1  Cf. supra n. 17.  2 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 17 pars 1 q. 3 n. [24-25]; Quodl. Q. 17 n. [3-6].  3 Cf. supra n. 12.

 

 

 


P. 13

 

. . .ut videtur, quia hic etiam erabant philosophi, ponentes omnia quae sunt a Deo immediate esse ab eo necessario1.  Saltem alia duo membra2 sunt manifesta:  non enim potest sciri naturali ratione acceptatio voluntatis divinae utpote tamquam contingenter acceptantis talia vel talia digna vita aeterna, et quod etiam illa sufficiant; dependet mere ex voluntate divina circa ea ad quae contingenter se habet; igitur etc.

. . . as it seems, because in this even the philosophers used to err [cf Aristotle, Physics, VIII t. 4-9, 13-15, 53;  Metaphysics, IX, t. 17, XII t. 30;  Averroes, in h.1; Epitome on the Books of Metaphysics, tr. 4;  Destruction of the destructions of the Philosophy of Algazel, disp. 1; Avicenna, Metaphysics, VI, ch. 2; IX ch. 1; Metaphysics compendium, I, part 3, tr. 1, ch. 3], positing all things which are from God immediately to be necessarily from Him.1  At least the other two members (of the argument)2 are manifest:  for there cannot be known by natural reason the acceptance of the Divine Will, understood as of one contingently accepting such (acts) and/or such (acts) as worthy of eternal life, and that these also suffice;  it depends merely on the Divine Will about these, to which It holds itself contingently;  therefore etc..

19.  [Instantiae contra duas rationes principales]  —  Contra istas duas rationes3 instatur.  Contra primam4 sic:  omnis natura creata essentialter dependet a qualibet per se causa eius, et propter talem dependentiam ex causato cognito potest sciri demonstratione quia5 et cognosci quaelibet eius per se causa; igitur cum natura hominis sit homini naturaliter cognoscibilis, quia non est potentiae eius cognitivae improportionalis, sequitur quod ex ista natura cognita possit naturaliter cognosci finis illius naturae6a.

19.  [Instances against the two principle reasons]  —  Against those two reasons3 let (the argument) be pursued.  Against the first1 in this manner:  every created nature essentially depends from whatever per se cause of it, and on account of such a dependence, from the thing caused having been cognized, by a demonstration quia it can be known and whatever (is) the per se cause of it (can) be cognized; therefore since the nature of man is to man naturally cognizable, because there is nothing improportional to his cognitive power, it follows that from this nature of his having been cognized there can be naturally cognized the end of that nature.6a

a  Adnotatio Duns Scoti:  Concedo, finis qui est causa finalis, et hoc sub ista ratione sub qua est causa finalis et similiter sicut cognoscitur efficiens sub ratione quae necessario requiritur ut sit efficiens primum7.

a  Duns Scotus’ note:  I concede (that there is) an end which is the final cause, and this under that reckoning of it under which it is a final cause and similarly just as the efficient cause is cognized under a reckoning of what is required necessarily that it be the first efficient (cause).7

1  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 29 q. 5 in corp (I f. 174I); a 30 q. 4 ad 1 (f. 181E-182K).  2 Cf. supra n. 17.  3 Cf. supra n. 13-18.  4 Cf. supra n. 13-16.  5 Cf Aristot., Anal. Post., I c. 13 [t. 30] (I c. 13, 78a 22-78b 34),  6  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 4 q. 8 in corp. (f. 34V-35X).  7 Cf. infra n. 29.

 


P. 14

 

20. Confirmatur ratio:  si enim ex natura inferiori cognita cognoscatur eius finis, non hoc minus est possibile in proposito, quia nec minor dependentia in proposito finiti ad suum finem est quam in aliis1.

20.  It is confirmed by reason:  for if from a inferior nature having been cognized there is cognized its end, this is no less possible in the proposed (argument), because neither is there a lesser dependence in the proposed (argument) of the finite to its own end than in other (finites).1

21.  Ex hac etiam ratione videtur quod falsa sit propositio ‘finis substantiae non cognoscitur nisi ex eius actibus’2, quia ex cognitione naturae in se potest eius finis cognosci demonstratione quia.

21.  Also from this reckoning it seems that the proposition ‘the end of a substance is not cognized except from its own acts’ is false, because from a cognition of a nature in itself there can be cognized its end by a demonstration quia.

22.  Quod si dicatur quod ratio concludit hominem posse naturaliter cognoscere suum finem naturalem, non autem de fine supernaturali, contra, Augustinus libro De praedestinatione sanctorum:  « Posse habere fidem, sicut posse habere caritatem, naturae est hominum, quamvis habere fidem, sicut habere caritatem, gratiae sit fidelium ».  Si ergo natura hominis est naturaliter cognoscibilis homini, naturaliter est etiam cognoscibilis illa potentia ut est talis naturae, . . .

22.  Wherefore if it be said that reason concludes that man can naturally cognize his own natural end, not however (is this so) concerning his supernatural end, on the contrary, (St.) Augustine in his book On the Predestination of the Saints (says):  « To be able to have faith, just as to be able to have charity, belongs to the nature of men, though to have faith, just as to have charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful ».  If, therefore, the nature of man is naturally cognizable to man, there is also naturally cognizable that power that belongs to such a nature, . . .

1  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 4. q. 8 cin corp. (I f. 34V-35V).  2  Cf. ibid. Ad 1 et 2 (f. 35Y.Z).  —  Cf. supra n. 15.

 

 


P. 15

. . . et per consequens ordinabilitas talis naturae ad finem ad quem fides et caritas disponit.

. . . and consequently the ordinability of such a nature to the end to which faith and charity dispose it.

23.  Item, homo naturaliter appetit finem illum quem dicis supernaturalem;  igitur ad illum finem naturaliter ordinatur1; igitur ex tali ordinatione potest concludi finis ille ut ex cognitione naturae ordinatae ad ipsum.

23.  Likewise, man naturally desires that end which you call supernatural;  therefore to that end he is naturally ordained;1 therefore out of such an ordination that end can be concluded to as out of the cognition of a nature ordained to it.

24.  Item, naturaliter est cognoscibile primum obiectum intellectus esse ens, secundum Avicennam2, et naturaliter cognoscible est in Deo perfectissime salvari rationem entis; finis autem cuiuscumque potentiae est optimum eorum quae continentur sub eius obiecto primo, quia in illo solo est perfecta quietatio et delectatio3, ex X Ethicorum*; ergo naturaliter cognoscibile est hominem ordinari secundum intellectum ad Deum tamquam ad finem.

24.  Likewise, it is naturally cognizable that the first object of the intellects is being, according to Avicenna [Metaphysics, I ch. 6],2 and it is naturally cognizable that in God there is most perfectly conserved [salvari] the reckoning of being;  but the end of whatsoever power is the best of those things which are contained under its first object, because in that alone is there a perfect resting and delectation,3 from the  Nicomedian Ethics, Book X [c. 4]*; therefore it is naturally cognizable that man is ordained according to his intellect to God as to his End.

25.  Confirmatur ratio, quia cui naturaliter cognoscibilis est potentia aliqua, ei naturaliter cognoscibile est quid sit eius primum obiectum, et ulterius, potest cognoscere in quo salvatur ratio illius primi obiecti et quod perfectissimum tale est finis potentiae; . . .

25.  (This) reckoning is confirmed, because to that for which there is (an end) naturally knowable by some power, that which is its first object is naturally knowable, and further, it can cognize in what the reckoning of its first object is conserved and what most perfect (thing) as such is the end of the power; . . .

*  « Sensus omnis ad sensibile operantis, perfecte attrahere dispositi ad publcherrimum sub sensu iactentium; tale enim maxime esse videtur perfecta operatio . . . Haec autem utique perfectissima erit et delectabilissima.  Secundum omnem enim sensum est delectatio; similiter autem et intellectum et speculationem.  Delectabilissima autem perfectissima; perfectissima autem quae bene habentis ad studiosissimum eorum quae sub ipsam ».

*  « (This belongs) to every sense of the one operating according to the sensible, having been disposed, to perfectly draw near to the most beautiful (thing) of those (things) lying under the sense;  for such most of all seems to be the perfect operation . . . This, however, will indeed be most perfect and most delectable.  For according to every sense there is a delectation;  moreover similarly both an understanding and a outward-looking vision [speculationem].  Moreover the most delectable (operation is) the most perfect; but the most perfect (operation) is that which belongs to the (power) holding (itself) well to that which is most to be studied [studiosissimum] of those (things) which are under it ».

1  Pro n . 22-23 cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 8 q. 2 ad 1 ( I f. 65N); a. 4 q. 5 in corp. Et ad 1 (f. 33C-F). 

2  Cf. ibid., a. 3 q. 4 arg. 1 (f. 29 O); a. 7 q. 3 ad 4 (f. 51L); a. 19 q. 1 in corp. (f. 115B). — Cf. supra n. 1.  3 Cf. ibid., a. 4 q. 9 in corp. (f. 35B-D).

P. 16

 

. . . mens autem nota est sibi, secundum Augustinum De Trinitate; igitur sibi est notum quod sit eius primum obiectum1.  Et novit Deum non excedi a ratione illius primi obiecti, quia tunc nullo modo esset ab ipsa mente intelligibilis2; ergo novit Deum esse optimum in quo salvatur ratio sui obiecti, et ita ipsum novit esse finem potentiae.

 

 

. . . but the mind is known [nota] to itself, according to (St.) Augustine in De Trinitate [IX, c. 11-12 n. 16.18];  therefore to itself is known what is its first object.1  And it knows that God is not exceeded by the reckoning of its first object, because then in no manner would He be intelligible by the mind itself;2  therefore it knows that God is the best thing in which the reckoning of its object is conserved, and thus it knows Him to be the end of its power.

26.  Contra secundam rationem3 arguitur sic:  si per unum extremum cognoscitur aliud extremum, ergo et media;  sed necessaria ad consecutionem finis sunt media inter naturam et finem suum consequendum4; igitur cum ex cognitione naturae possit finis cognosci, secundum prius probata5, videtur quod similiter media ad finem necessaria possunt cognosci.

26.  Against the second reason it is argued in this manner:  if by means of one extreme there is cognized the other extreme, therefore also the means;  but the necessaries for the attainment of an end are the means between the nature and its own end to be attained;4 therefore since from the cognition of the nature the end can be cognized, according to the things previously proven,5 it seems that similarly the means necessary to the end can be cognized.

27.  Confirmatur ratio:  ita enim in proposito videtur esse necessaria conexio entium ad ipsum finem sicut est in aliis;  sed propter talem conexionem in aliis ex fine cognoscuntur alia, sicut per rationem sanitatis concluditur talia et talia requiri ad sanitatem; igitur etc.6

27.  (This) reckoning is confirmed:  for thus in the proposed (argument) there seems to be a necessary connexion of beings to that end just as there is among the other (ends);  but on account of such a connexion among the other (ends) other things are cognized from the end,just as through the reckoningof health there is concluded that such and such are required for health; therefore etc..6

28.  [Responsio ad instantias]  —  Ad primum7 istorum dico quod licet . . .

28.  [Reponse to the instances] —  To the first7 of these I say that though . . .

1  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 40 q. 7 arg. 2 et in corp. (I f. 259G.H).  2 Cf, ibid. a. 4 q. 5 in corp. (f. 33C).  3 Cf. supra n. 17-18).  4  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 4 q. 9 in corp. (f. 35B).  5 Cf. supra n. 19)  6 Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 3 q. 3 arg. 1 (f. 28K).  7 Cf. supra n. 19-21.

 

 


P. 17

 

. . . procedat de fine qui est causa finalis et non de fine attingendo per operationem — quorum finium distinctio dicetur infra1 — potest tamen dici ad illud, et ad sequens de Augustino2, et ad tertium de potentia et primo obiecto3, unica responsione, quod omnia accipiunt naturam nostram vel potentiam intellectivam esse nobis naturaliter cognoscibilem; quod falsum est, sub illa ratione propria et speciali sub qua ad talem finem ordinatur, et sub qua capax est gratiae consummatae, et sub qua habet Deum pro perfectissimo obiecto.  Non enim cognoscitur anima nostra a nobis nec natura nostra pro statu isto nisi sub aliquo ratione generali, abstrahibili a sensibilibus, sicut patebit infra distinctione 34.  Et secundum talem generalem rationem non convenit sibi ordinari ad illum finem, nec posse capere gratiam, nec habere Deum pro obiecto perfectissimo.

. . . it proceeds from the end which is the final cause and not from the end being attained through operation — of which ends the distinction will be discussed below1 — nevertheless there can be said according to that (argument), and according to what follows from (St.) Augustine,2 and according to the third (argument) concerning the power and its prime object,3 in a single response, that all (these arguments) accept our nature and/or intellective power to be naturally cognizable by use; which is false, under that reckoning proper and special under which it is ordained to such an end, and under which it is capable of the consummate grace, and under which it has God for its most p4erfect Object.  For our soul is not cognized by us nor by our nature in this present state except under some general reckoning, abstractible from sensibles, just as will be clear below in Distinction 3.4  And according to such a general reckoning it does not find it agreeable [non convenit sibi] to be ordained to that end, nor to be able to receive [capere] grace, nor to have God for its most perfect Object.

29.  Tunc ad formam.  Cum dicitur quod ex ente ad finem potest demonstrari finis demonstratione quia5, dico quod non est verum nisi cognito ente ad finem sub illa ratione propria sub qua habet finem illum.  Sic minor est falsa.  —  Et cum probatur per proportionem6, dico quod licet mens sit eadem sibi, non tamen pro statu isto . . .

29.  Next according to the form (of the argument).  When it is said that from (something) being for an end the end can be demonstrated by a demonstration quia,5 I say that it is not true except having cognized it being for and end under that proper reckoning under which it has that end.  Thus the minor is false.  —  And since it is proved through a proportion,6 I say that though the mind is the same to itself, it is nevertheless not in this present state . .

. 1  Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 1 pars 1 q. 1 n. [5].  2 Cf. supra n. 22.  3 Cf. supra n. 24.  4 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 3 pars 1 q. 3 n. [24].  5 Cf. supra n. 19.  6 Cf. ibidem.

 


P. 18

 

. . . est sibi proportionalis tamquam objectum nisi secundum rationes generales quae possunt abstrahi ab imaginabilibus.

. . . proportional to itself as an object except according to general reckonings which can be abstracted from imaginables.

30.  Ad confirmationem1 dico quod nec aliarum substiantiarum fines proprii cognoscuntur, qui scilicet sunt earum secundum rationes proprias, nisi sint aliqui actus manifesti ex quibus concludatur ordo earum ad talem finem.

30.  For a confirmation (of this argument)1 I say that the proper ends of other substances are also not cognized, which namely belong to these according to proper reckonings, unless they are of some manifest act out of which there is concluded their order to such an end.

31.  Et ex hoc patet ad illud quod additur2 contra probationem minoris, quod illa propositio non est falsa, ‘non cognoscitur a nobis finis proprius substantiae nisi per actum eius manifestum’3; non enim accipit propositio quod non posset aliter finis cognosci.  Bene enim verum est quod si substantia cognosceretur sub propria ratione, ex ipsa sic cognita posset eius per se causa cognosci.  Sed non sic cognoscitur a nobis nunc aliqua substantia, et ideo nunc nullum finem possumus concludere proprium substantiae nisi per actum evidentem de illa substantia ut nota in universali et confuse.  In proposito deficit utraque via; sed probatio minoris4 tangit unam, de ignoratia actus, supponendo aliam, de ignorantia scilicet naturae in se.

31.  And from this it is clear regarding that which is added2 against the proof of the minor, that that proposition is not false, ‘the proper end of a substance is not cognized by us except through its manifest act’;3 for the proposition does not accept that the end could be otherwise cognized.  For well is it true that if a substance would be cognized under its proper reckoning, from it being cognized in this manner the per se cause of it could be cognized.  But not so is any substance now cognized by us, and for that reason now we can conclude to no proper end of a substance except through and evident act from that substance as (it is) known in a universal and confused (manner).  In the proposed (argument) each way is lacking; but the proof of the minor4 touches the one concerning the ignorance of the act, by substituting another, namely (that) concerning the ignorance of the nature in itself.

32.  Ad secundum de Augustino5 dico quod illa potentia habendi caritatem ut ipsa est dispositio respectu Dei in se sub propria ratione amandi, . . .

32.  To the second (argument) from (St.) Augustine5 I say that that potency of having charity, as it is a disposition in respect to God in itself under a proper reckoning of loving, . . .

1  Cf. supra n. 20.  2 Cf. supra n. 21.  3 Cf. supra n. 15.  4 Cf. ibidem.  5 Cf. supra n. 22.

 


P. 19

 

. . . convenit naturae hominis secundum ratinoem specialem, non communem sibi et sensibilibus;  ideo non est illa potentialitas naturaliter cognoscibilis pro statu isto de homine, sicut nec homo cognoscitur sub illa ratione sub qua eius est haec potentiaa.  Ita respondeo ad istud in quantum adduci potest ad conclusionem principalem1, scilicet oppositam minori rationis primae2.  Sed in quantum adducitur contra illam responsionem de fine supernaturali et naturali3, respondeo:  concedo Deum esse finem naturalem hominis, sed non naturaliter adipiscendum sed supernaturaliter4.  Et hoc probat ratio sequens de desiderio naturali5, quam concedo.

. . . befits the nature of man according to a special reckoning, not common to himself and sensibles; for that reason that potentiality is not naturally cognoscible in this present state of man, just as neither is man cognized under that reckoning under which this potency belongs to him.a  Thus I respond to that (argument) of theirs inasmuch as it can be lead to a principle conclusion,1 namely the opposite of the minor of the first reckoning.2  but inasmuch as it is lead against that response concerning the supernatural and natural end, I respond:  I concede that God is the natural end of man, but obtained [adipiscendum] not naturally, but supernaturally.4  And the reckoning, which I concede, following from natural desire,5 also proves this.

33.  Ad aliud6 negandum est illud quod assumitur, quod scilicet naturaliter cognoscitur ens esse primum obiectum intellectus nostri, et hoc secundum totam  indifferentiam entis ad sensibilia et insensibilia, et quod hoc dicit Avicenna quod sit naturaliter notum7.  Miscuit enim sectam suam — quae fuit secta Machometi — . . .

33.  To the other6 there must be denied that which is assumed, namely that being is naturally cognized to be the prime object of our intellect, and this according to the total [totam] indifference of being to sensibles and insensibles, and this which Avicenna says, that it is naturally known.7  For he mixed up his own sect — which was the sect of Mohammed — . . .

a  Sequatur textus interpolatus:  Vel vult Augustinus quid in natura est potentia ad recipiendum.  Non tamen potest reduci ad actum per naturam8.

a  There follows the interpolated text:  And/or (St.) Augustine wants that in nature there is a power to receive it.  However it cannot be reduced to act through nature.8

1  Cf. supra n. 19-20.  2 Cf. supra n. 14-15.  3 Cf. supra n. 22.  4 Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 13 q. 2 in corp (I f. 91T-X); a. 8 q. 2 in corp. (f. 64H).  5 Cf. supra n. 23.  6 Cf. supra n. 24.  7 Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 21 q. 3 in corp. (f. 126D-E); q. 2 ad e (f. 124P); a. 19 q. 1 ad 3 et r (f. 115k-116L); a. 7 q. 6 ad 2 (f. 56R-S); q. 2 ad 2 (f. 118F); a. 26 q. 2 ad 1 (f. 159T).  —  Cf. infra n. 92.  8 Cf. ib. A. 35. q. 4 in corp. (f. 224O-225O) et Aristot., Metaph. V t. 17 (IV c. 12, 1919a 15-1929a 6), pro lec. Var. Ad lin. 17-18.

 

 

 


P. 20

 

. . . philosophicis, et quaedam dixit ut philosophica et ratione probata, alia ut consona sectae suae:  unde expresse ponit libro IX Metaphysicae cap. 7a animam separatam cognoscere substantiam immaterialem in se, et ideo sub obiecto primo intellectus habuit ponere substantiam immaterialem contineri1.  Non sic Aristoteles; sed secundum ipsum, primum obiectum intellectus nostri est vel videtur esse quiditas sensibilis, et hoc vel in se sensibilis vel in suo inferiori; et haec est quiditas abstrahibilis a sensibilibusb.

. . . with philosophical (arguments), and said certain things as proven by philosophy and reason, others as consonant with his own sect:  whence he expressly posits in his Metaphysics, Book IX [c. 7], that a separated soul cognizes immaterial substance in itself, and for that reason he had to posit that immaterial substance is contained under the first object of the intellect.  Not so Aristotle [De Anima, III t. 26]; rather according to him, the first object of our intellect is and/or seems to be the quiddity of the sensible, and this sensible in itself and/or in its inferior;  and this is a quiddity abstractible from sensibles.b

34.  Quod autem dicitur in confirmatione illius rationis de Augustino2, respondeo:  dico quod dictum Augustini debet intelligi de actu primo, sufficiente omnino ex se respectu actus secundi, sed tamen nunc impedito; propter quod impedimentum . . .

34.  But because there is said in the confirmation of that reckoning from (St.) Augustine, I respond:  I say that the saying of (St.) Augustine ought to be understood of the first act, entirely sufficient of itself in respect to the second act, but nevertheless now impeded;  on account of which impediment . . .

a  Loco IX et 7  a Duns Scoto relinquitur spatium vacuum.

b Sequitur textus interpolatus:  Sed si ad hoc opponitur quod si quiditas materialis sit primum et adaequatum obiectum potentiae intellectivae quod intellectus intelligere non poterit aliquid de substantiis separatis, quia obiectum adaequatum vel virtualiter vel formaliter includit omne illud in quod potest potentia ferri — se quiditas materialis nec virtualiter nec formaliter continet substantias separatas, ergo etc. — dico quod assumptum non est verum, quia quinque sensibilia communia, puta numerus, figura, etc., sentiuntur a sensu visus per se, quae nec formaliter nec virtualiter continentur sub colore vel luce3; sufficit enim aliqua continentia concomitantiae.

a  In place of IX and 7 a blank space is left by Duns Scotusb  There follows the interpolated text:  But if to this there is opposed that if material quiddity be the first and adequate object of the intellective power because the intellect cannot understand anything concerning separated substances, because an adequate object virtually and/or formally includes every thing [illud] unto which the power can be brought to bear [ferri] — if material quiddity neither virtually nor formally contains separated substances, ergo etc.. —  I say that the assumption is not true, because the five common sensibles, that is number, figure, etc., are sensed by the sense of sight per se, which neither formally nor virtually are contained under color and/or light;3 for it suffices that some contain others concomitantly [aliqua continentia concomitantiae].

1  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 22 q. 5 in corp. (I f. 134B-135F).  2 Cf. supra n. 25.  3 Cf. Aristot., De anima II t. 64 (II c. 6, 418a 17-29).

 

 


P. 21

 

. . . actus secundus non elicitur nunc ex primo actu.  De hoc amplius infra1.

. . . the second act is not now elicited from the first act.  Concerning this more (will be said) below.1

35.  Si obiciatur contra istud quod homo in statu naturae institutae potuit cognoscere naturam suam, ergo et finem naturae, ex deductione primae rationis2; ergo illa cognito non est supernaturalis.

35.  If it is objected against this that man in the state of nature instituted could cognize his own nature, therefore also the end of his nature, from a deduction of the first reason;2 therefore that cognition is not supernatural.

36.  Item, contra responsionem3 ad ultimam rationem:  si ideo non cognoscitur quid sit obiectum primum intellectus, quia non cognoscitur intellectus sub omni ratione propria sub qua respicit tale obiectum, igitur non potest cognosci de quocumque quod ipsum sit intelligibile, quia non cognoscitur potentia sub omni ratione propria sub qua respicit quodcumque ut obiectum intelligibile.

36.  Likewise, against the response3 to the last reckoning:  if for that reason that which is the first object of the intellect is not cognized, because it is not cognized under every proper reckoning of the intellect under which (the intellect) looks back to such an object, therefore it cannot be cognized from anything whatsoever that it is intelligible, because is not cognized under every proper reckoning under which it looks back to anything whatsoever as an intelligible object.

37.  Respondeo:  ad primum4 requireret dici, qualis fuit cognitio hominis instituti, quod usque alias differatur5.  Saltem tamen respectu viatoris pro statu isto est dicta cognitio supernaturalis, quia facultatem eius naturalem excedens; naturalem, dico, secundum statum naturae lapsae.

37.  I respond:  as regards the first (argument)4 it would require that there be said [requireret dici], what kind of cognition was (that) of the man instituted, to make it differ from the others [usque alias differatur].  Nevertheless at least in respect to the wayfarer in this state it is said to be a supernatural cognition, because it exceeds his natural faculty;  natural, I say, according to the state of fallen nature.

38.  Ad secundum6 concedo quod non habetur modo cognitio de anima vel aliqua eius potentia ita distincta quod ex ipsa possit cognosci quod aliquod obiectum intelligibile sibi correspondeat; sed ex ipso actu quem experimur concludimus potentiam et naturam . . .

38.  As regards the second6 I concede that now cognition by the soul and/or any other power of is not had so distinctly that from it there can be known that any intelligible object corresponds to it; but from this act itself which we experience we conclude that the power and nature . . .

1  Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 3 pars 1 q.3 n. [24-25].  2 Cf. supra n. 19.  3 Cf. supra n. 33.  4 Cf. supra n. 35.  5 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio IV d. 1 pars 2 q. 2 n. [7]  6 Cf. supra n. 36.

 

 


P. 22

 

. . . cuius est ille actus illud respicere pro obiecto quod percipimus attingi per actum, ita quod obiectum potentiae non concludimus ex cognition potentiae in se sed actus quem experimur.  Sed de obiecto supernaturali neutram cognitionem possumus habere; et ideo ibi deficit utraque via cognoscendi finem proprium illius naturae.

. . . to which that act belongs looks back to it as the object which we perceive to be attained through the act, so that we do not conclude to the object of the power from the cognition of the power in itself but (from the cognition) of the act which we experience.  But concerning a supernatural object we can have neither cognition; and for that reason there each way of cognizing the proper end of that nature fails.

39.  Ad argumentum1 contra secundam rationem patet, quia supponit quoddam2 iam negatum3.  —  Ad confirmationem4 illius rationis dico quod quando finis sequitur naturaliter ea quae sunt ad finem et naturaliter praeexigit illa, tunc ex fine possunt concludi ea quae sunt ad finem; hic autem non est consecutio naturalis, sed tantum acceptatio voluntatis divinae, compensantis ista merita tamquam digna fine tali.

39.  As regards the argument1 against the second reckoning, it is clear that it supposes something2 already denied.3  —  For a confirmation4 of this reckoning I say that when an end follows naturally those things which are for the end and naturally requires them beforehand, then from the end those things which are for the end can be concluded; but here there is no natural consequence, but only an acceptance of the Divine Will, compensating those merits of his as worthy of such an end.

40.  [Tertia ratio principalis]  —  Itema tertio arguitur contra opinionem philosophorum principaliter.  VI Metaphysicae:*  cognitio substantiarum separatarum est nobilissima, quia circa nobilissimum genus5; igitur cognitio eorum quae sunt propria eis est maxime scibilia quam illa in quibus conveniunt cum sensibilibus.  Sed illa propria non possumus cognoscere ex puris naturalibus tantum.  Primo, quia si in aliqua scientia modo possibili inveniri traderentur talia propria,  . . .

40.  [The third principle reason]  —  Likewisea in the third one argues principally against the opinion of the philosophers.  Metaphysics, Book VI, [t. 2]:*  the cognition of separated substances is the most noble, because (it is) about the most noble genus (of being);5 therefore the cognition of those which are proper to them is much more [maxime] knowable than those in which they convene with sensibles.  But those proper we cannot cognize from pure naturals only.  First, because if in any science now possible there are discovered [inveniri traderentur] such proper (objects), . . .

a Textus a Duns Scotus signatur littera: g6.

 

*  «  honorabilissimam scientiam oportet circa honorabilissimum genus esse; ergo theoricae aliis scientiis desiderabiliores sunt; haec autem [id est thoelogia] de theoricis ».

a  The text is marked by Duns Scotus with the letter:  g.6

* « it is opportune that the most honorable science be about the most honorable genus;  therefore the theoretical are more desirable than the other sciences; but this [that is, theology] concerns theoreticals ».

1  Cf. supra n. 26.  2 Cf. supra n. 19.  3 Cf. supra n. 28-29.  4 Cf. supra n. 27.  5 Cf.etiam Henricus Gand., Summa a. 7 q. 3 in corp. (I f. 50E).  6 Cf. supra p. 2, 16-3, 19.

 

 


P. 23

 

. . . hoc esset in metaphysica; sed ipsa non est possibilis a nobis naturaliter haberi de propriis passionibus istarum substantiarum separatarum, ut pateta.  Et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus I Metaphysicae, quod oportet sapientem omnia cognoscere aliqualiter, et non in particulari; et subdit:  « Qui enim novit universalia, novit aliqualiter omnia subiecta ».  ‘Sapientem’ vocat ibi metaphysicum, sicut metaphysicam vocat ibi ‘sapientiam’1.

. . . this would be in metaphysics; but it is not naturally possible that this (science) of the proper passions of those separated substances be had by us, as is clear.a  And this is what the Philosopher says in Metaphysics, Book I [c. 2], that it is opportune that the wise man cognize in some manner all things, and not in particular; and he adds:  «  For he who knows [novit] universals, knows in some manner all subjects ».  There he calls the ‘wise man’ the metaphysician, just as there he calls metaphysics ‘wisdom’.1

41.  Secondo probo idem, quia non cognoscuntur ista propria cognitione propter quid nisi cognita sint propria subiecta, quae sola includunt talia propter quid; sed propria subiecta eorum non sunt a nobis naturaliter cognoscibilia; ergo etc.

41.  Second I prove the same thing, because those proper (objects) are not cognized by a cognition propter quid unless they be cognized as proper subjects, which include such (objects) alone propter quid; but the proper subjects of these are not naturally cognizable by us;  ergo etc..

Nec cognoscimus ista eorum propria demonstratione quia et ex effectibus.  Quod probatur:  nam effectus vel reliquunt intellectum . . .

Nor do we cognize those proper (objects) of these by a demonstration quia and from their effects.  Which is (thus) proved:  for effects leave the intellect . . .

a  Sequitur textus a Duns Scoto cancellatus:  quia ista non includuntur virtualiter in primo subiecto metaphysicae, scilicet ente.

a  There follows the text cancelled by Duns Scotus:  because these are not included virtually in the first subject of metaphysics, namely being.

1  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 3 q. 3 in corp. (I f. 29L); a. 7 q. 3 arg. 4 (f. 49A).

 


P. 24

 

. . . dubium quoad ista propria, vel abducunt illum in errorem.  Quod apparet de proprietatibus primae substantiae immaterialis in se; proprietas enim eius est quod sit communicabilis tribus; sed effectus non ostendunt istam proprietatem, quia non sunt ab ipso in quantum trino.  Et si ab effectibus arguatur ad causam, magis deducunt in oppositum et in errorem, quia in nullo effectu invenitur una natura nisi in uno supposito1.  Proprietas etiam istius naturae ad extra est contingenter causare; et ad oppositum huius magis effectus ducunt, in errorem, sicut patet per opininem philosophorum, ponentium primum necessario causare quiquid causata.  De proprietatibus etiam aliarum substantiarum  patet idem, quia . . .

. . . doubtful in regard to those proper (objects), and/or lead it away into error.  Which appears from the properties of the first immaterial Substance in Itself; for Its property is that It be communicable to the Three; but the effects do not show this property (of God), because they are not from Him inasmuch as (He is  Triune).  And if from effects one argue to the cause, they lead forth more unto the opposite and unto error, because in no effect is there found one nature except in one supposit.1  It  is the property of that Nature also to contingently cause ad extra;  and the effects of this lead more toward the opposite, into error, just as is clear through the opinion of the philosophers, positing the First (Being) to cause whatever it causes necessarily.a  Concerning the properties of the other substances the same is also clear, because . . .

a  Sequitur textus interpolatus:  Diceret philosophus ad istam rationem quod illud quod est impossibile a nobis cognosci, non est necesssarium a nobis cognosci; sed impossibile est a nobis aliquam cognitionem haberi de propriis substantiarum separatarum, sive per naturam sive per infusione, nisi sicut modo habetur — et ideo non est necesssarium scientiam infundi ad cognitionem propriorum substantiarum separatarum2.

a  There follows the interpolated text:  A philosopher would said to this reckoning that that which is impossible to be cognized by us, is not necessarily cognized by us; but it is impossible that there by had by us any cognition of the proper (objects) of separated substances, either through nature or through an infusion (of divine knowledge), unless just as is had now — and for that reason it is not necessary that science be infused for a cognition of the things proper to separated substances.2

1  Cf. Bonaventura, Sent. I d. 3. q. 4 arg. 2 in opp. (I 76a).  2 Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 8 q. 2 arg. 1 (I f. 64F).

 

 


P. 25

 

. . . effectus magis ducunt in sempiternitatem et necessitatem earum quam in contingentiam et novitatem, secundum eos1.  Similiter videntur etiam philosophi ex motibus concludere quod numerus illarum substantiarum separatarum sit secundum numerum motuum caelestium2.  Similiter quod istae substantiae sunt naturaliter beatae et impeccabiles.  Quae omnia sunt absurdaa.

. . . the effects lead more unto their sempiternity and necessity than unto their contingency and novelty, according to them [cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book XII, t. 42-50].1  Similarly the philosophers also seem to conclude from the motions (of the heavens) that the number of those separated substances is according to the number of celestial movements [cf. Averroes, in h. 1; Epitome on the Books of Metaphysics, tr. 4].2  Similarly that those substances are naturally blessed and impeccable [cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics, Book IX, chs. 2, 3, 4; Metaphysics compendium, Book I, part 4, tr. 1 ch. 1, and tr. 2, ch. 1].  All of which are absurd.a

42.  [Instantia contra tertiam rationem principalem]  —  Contra istam rationem arguo quod quaecumque necessaria de substantiis separatis cognoscantur a nobis nunc per fidem sive per communem revelationem, possint cognosci cognitione naturali.  Et hoc sicb:  quorum necessariorum cognoscimus terminos naturaliter, et illa possumus naturaliter  comprehendere; sed omnium necessariorum revelatorum terminos naturaliter cognoscimus; ergo etc.3

42.  [Instances against the third principle reason]  —  Against this reckoning of theirs I argue that whatsoever necessaries concerning separated substances may be cognized by us now through faith or through the common revelation, may be cognized by natural cognition.  And this (I prove) in this manner:b  we naturally cognize the terms of these necessaries, and we can naturally comprehend them; but we naturally cognize the terms of all necessary revealed (doctrines);  ergo etc..3

43.  Probatio maioris:  illa necessaria sunt mediata, aut immediata; si immediata, ergo cognoscuntur cognitis terminis, I Posteriorum; . . .

43.  Proof of the major:  those necessaries are mediated, or not mediated; if not mediated, therefore they are cognized when their terms are cognized [cognitis terminis], (as is had in) Posterior Analytics, Book I, [c. 3] . . .

a  Sequitur textus interpolatus:  Item ex motu caeli contingit angelos movere perpetuo4, nec caelum possit esse maius, propter laborem angeli moventis — ut si apponatur una stella, non posset movere, etc.5 

b Textus a  Duns Scotus signatur littera: e6.

a There follows the interpolated text:  Likewise from the motion of the sky it happens that Angels move it perpetually,4 nor could the sky be greater, on account of the labor of the moving Angel — so that if it approached a single start,  it could not move, etc..5 

b The text is marked by Duns Scotus with the letter: e.6

1  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 25 q. 3 in corp. (I f. 154H).  2 Cf. ibid. (f. 154H-I).  3 Cf. ibid. a. 13. q. 3 arg 2 (f. 91A).  4 Cf. supra p. 24, 11-25,6.  5 Cf. Aristot., De caelo II t. 3 (II c. 1, 284a 14-18). — Cf. Duns Scotus, Lectura prol. N. 15.  6 Cf. supra p. 2, 16-3, 19.

 


P. 26

 

. . . si mediata, ergo cum possumus cognoscere extrema, possumus concipere medium inter illa.  Et coniungendo illud medium cum utroque extremo, aut habentur praemissae mediatae, aut immediatae; si immediatae, idem quod prius;  si mediatae, procedetur cognoscendo medium inter extrema et coniungendo cum extremis, quousque veniamus ad immediata.  Ergo tandem deveniemus ad necessaria immediata, quae intelligimus ex terminis ex quibus sequuntur omnia necessaria mediata; ergo illa mediata per immediata scire poterimus naturaliter1.

. . . if mediated, therefore when we can cognize the extremes, we can conceive the means among them.  And in conjoining that mean with each extreme, either there are had mediated premises, or not mediated ones; if not mediated, the same as before; if mediated, one proceeds by cognizing the means among the extremes and by conjoining it with the extremes, until we come to the non mediated ones.  Therefore at last we shall come down to the necessary non mediated ones, which we understand from the terms from which all necessary mediated ones follow;  therefore those mediated through the non mediated we will be able to know [scire] naturally.1

44.  Probatio minoris principalis, quia habens fidem et non habens contradicentes sibi invicem, non contradicunt de nominibus tantum sed de conceptibus, sicut patet cum philosophus et theologus contradicunt sibi invicem de ista ‘Deus est trinus’, ubi non tantum idem nomen sed eundem conceptum unus negat et alius affirmat; igitur omnem conceptum simplicem quem habet ille habet iste2.

44.  The proof of the minor of the principle, that having faith and not having it contradict one another, do not contradict (one another) concerning only nouns, but concerning concepts, just as is clear when the philosopher and the theologian contradict one another concerning this (doctrine) ‘God is triune’, where not only the same noun but the same concept the one denies and the other affirms; therefore every simple concept which the one has, the other has (likewise).2

45.  [Responsio ad instantiam]  —  Ad istud respondeo.  De substantiis separatis sunt aliquae veritates immediatae.  Accipio tunc aliquam veritatem talem primam et immediatam, et sit a.  In illa includuntur . . .

45.  [Response to the instance]  —  To this (argument) I respond.  From separate substances there are some immediate truths.  I accept next that some such truth (is) first and immediate, and let it be (called) a.  In that there are included . . .

1  Cf. Henricus Gand., Quodl. VIII q. 14 in corp. (f. 325K).  2 Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 13 q. 3 ad 3 (I f. 92L).

 


P. 27

 

. . . multae veritates mediatae, puta omnes quae enuntiant particulariter communia ad praedicatum de communibus ad subiectum; dicantur b, c. Ista vera mediata non habent evidentiam nisi ex aliquo mediato.  Igitur non sunt natae sciri nisi ex isto immediato intellecto.  Si igitur aliquis intellectus possit intelligere terminos b et componere eos ad invicem, non autem possit intelligere terminos a nec per consequens ipsum a, b erit intellectui suo propositio neutra, quia nec nota ex se nec ex immediata, quia illa, per positum, non est nota.  Ita est de nobis, quia conceptus quosdam communes habemus de substantiis materialibus et immaterialibus, et illos possumus ad invicem componere; sed istae complexiones non habent evidentiam nisi ex veris immediatis quae sunt de illis quiditatibus sub ratione earum propria et speciali, sub qua ratione non concipimus illas quiditates, et ideo nec scimus illas veritates generales de conceptibus generalibus.

. . . many mediate truths, such as all those which enunciate in particular those common to the predicate from those common to the subject;  let them be called b, c.  Those mediated true (propositions) are not evident [non habent evidentiam] except from some mediated one.  Therefore they are not bound to be known [scire] except from that one mediated having been understood.  If therefore any intellect can understand the terms of b and compose them one with another, it cannot however understand the terms of a nor consequently a itself, b will be to its understanding a neutral proposition, because it is neither made known [nota] of itself nor from what is immediate, because that, through what is posited, is not known.  Thus it is concerning us, because we have certain common concepts concerning material and immaterial substances, and those we can compose one with another; but those combinations of these are not evident except from the non mediated true (propositions), which concerning those quiddities under a proper and special reckoning of them, under which reckoning we do not conceive those quiddities, and for that reason neither do we know [scimus] those general truths concerning general concepts.

46.  Exemplum:  si impossibile esset alicui concipere triangulum sub propria ratione, posset tamen abstahere a quadrangulo rationem figurae et eam concipere, impossibile esset etiam sibi concipere . . .

46.  An example:  if it were impossible for anyone to conceive a triangle under its proper reckoning, he could nevertheless abstract from a quadrangle the reckoning of the figure (of a triangle) and conceive it, (and) it would be also impossible for him to conceive . . .

 


P. 28

 

. . . primitatem ut est propria passio trianguli, qiua sic non concipitur nisi ut abstahitur a triangulo; posset tamen primitatem abstrahere ab aliis primitatibus, put in numeris.  Isteintellectus licit posset formare compositionem hanc ‘aliqua figura est prima’, quia terminos eius potest apprehendere, tamen illa compositio formata erit sibi neutra, quia ista est mediata, inclusa in ista immediata ‘triangulus est sic primus’; et quia hanc immediatam non potest intelligere, quia nec terminos eius, ideo non potest mediatam scire, quae ex hac immediata trantum habet evidentiam.

. . . its primacy as the proper passion of the triangle, because it is not conceived in this manner except as abstracted from the triangle;  nevertheless he could abstract the primacy from the other primacies, such as in numbers.  This intellect of his though it could form this composition ‘some figure is first’, because it could apprehend the terms of this, nevertheless that formed composition will be for it neutral, because it is mediated, enclosed in that immediate (composition) ‘the triangle is in this manner first’; and because he cannot understand this immediate (composition), because (he can) neither (understand) the terms of it, for that reason he cannot know a mediated one, which is only evident from this immediate one.

47. Per hoc ad argumentum1:  nego maiorem; ad probationem2 dico quod illa necessaria sunt mediata.  —  Et cum dicis ‘igitur possumus concipere medium inter extrema’, nego consequntiam, quia medium inter extrema quandoque est essentialiter ordinatum, puta quod quid est alterius extremi3 vel passio prior respectu passionis posterioris; et tale est medium ad universaliter concludendum extremum de extremo.  Concedo igitur quod quicumque potest intelligere extrema, potest intelligere tale medium inter extrema, quia intellectus eius includitur in altero extremo vel est idem alteri.  Si autem medium sit particulare, contentum sub altero extremo . . .

47.  Through this to the argument:1  I deny the major; for a proof2 I say that those things necessary are mediated.  —  And when you say ‘therefore we can conceive the means between the extremes’, I deny the consequence, because the mean between the extremes, whenever it is essentially ordered, such as that which belongs to the other extreme3 and/or the prior passion in respect to that of the posterior passion;  and such is the means to conclude universally an extreme from an extreme.  I concede, therefore, that whosoever can understand the extremes, can understand such a mean between the extremes, because the understanding of it is included in the other extreme and/or is the same as that of the other.  But if the mean be particular, contained under the other extreme . . .

1  Cf. supra n. 42. — Cf.Henricus Gand., Summa a. 13 q. 3 ad 2 (I f. 92H).  2 Cf. supra n. 43.  3 Cf. Aristot., Anal. Post. II c. 9 [t. 10] (II, c. 10, 94a 11-14); c. 16 [t. 25] (c. 17, 99a 3-4); c. 17 [t. 25] (c. 17 99a 21-22).

 


P. 29

 

. . . et non essentialiter inter extrema, tunc non oportet quod potens concipere extrema generalia, possit concipere medium particulare ad illa extrema.  Ita est hic.  Nam quiditas sub ratione propria et particulari habens passionem aliquam immediate sibi inhaerentem, est medium inferius ad conceptum communem de quo dicitur illa passio in communi concepta; et ideo non est medium univeraliter inferens passionem de communi, sed tantum particulariter.  Hoc patet in exemplo illo1, quia non oportet quod potens concipere figuram in communi et primitatem in communi, possit concipere triangulum in particulari, quia triangulus est medium, contentum sub figura; medium, inquam, ad concludendum primitatem de figura particulariter.

. . . and not essentially between the extremes, then it is not opportune that the one with the power [potens] to conceive the general extremes, be able to concept the particular mean as regards those extremes.  Thus is it here.  For quiddity under a proper and particular reckoning, having itself some inherent passion immediately, is an inferior means to the common concept of which that passion is said to have been conceived in common;  and for that reason it is not a means universally inferring ‘passion’ from the common (concept), but only particularly.  This is clear in that example,1 because it is not opportune that one with the power to conceive a figure in common and its primacy in common, be able to conceive a triangle in particular, because a triangle is a means, contained under figure;  a means, I say, to conclude the primacy from the figure in particular.

48.  Haec tertia ratio2 potissime concludit de prima substantia immateriali, quia eius tamquam objecti beatifici potissime est cognitio necessaria.  Et tunc responsio ad obiectionem3 contra ipsam:  supponit videlicet quod naturaliter nunc non concipimus Deum nisi in conceptu sibi communi et sensibilibus, quod inferius in 1 quaestione distinctionis 3 exponetur4.  Si etiam negetur istud suppositum, adhuc oportet dicere conceptum qui postest fieri de Deo virtute creaturae esse imperfectum;  qui autem fieret virtute . . .

48.  This third reason2 most ably concludes from the first immaterial substance, because to It as the Beatific Object belongs a necessary cognition.  And next the response to the objection3 against it:  suppose, let us say, that we do not now naturally conceive God except in His common concept and in sensibles, which below in the first question of Distinction 3 is explained.4  If this supposition be also denied, still it is opportune to say that the concept which can be formed of God by virtue of the creature is imperfect; but that which would be formed by virtue . . .

1  Cf. supra n. 46.  2 Cf. supra n. 40.  3 Cf. supra n. 42.  4 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 3 part 1 q. 1 n. [5-10].

 


P. 30

 

. . . ipsius essentiae in se, esset perfectus.  Sicut igitur dictum est de conceptu generali et speciali1, ita dicatur secundum aliam viam2 de perfecto conceptu et imperfecto.

. . . of the essence of it in itself, would be perfect.  Therefore, just as has been said concerning the general and special concept,1 so may be said according to another way2 concerning the perfect and imperfect concept.

49.  [Quarta ratio principalis]  —  Quarto sic arguitur:  ordinatum ad aliquem finem ad quem est indispositum, necesse est paulative promoveri ad dispositionem illius finis; homo ordinatur ad finem supernaturalem, ad quem ex se est indispositus; igitur indiget paulative disponsi ad habendum illum finem.  Hoc fit per cognitionem aliquam supernaturalem imperfectam, qualis ponitur necessaria; igitur etc.

49. [The fourth principle reason]  —  Fourth, it is argued thus:  it is necessary that (that which has) been ordained to some end to which it is indisposed, be moved forward toward a disposition to its end little by little; man is ordained to a supernatural end, to which of himself he is indisposed;  therefore he needs to be disposed little by little to have that end.  This is done through some imperfect, supernatural cognition, of the kind that is reckoned [ponitur] as necessary;  therefore etc..

50.  Si autem instetur quod agens perfectum potest statim removere imperfectionem et statim agere, respondeo:  quod si posset de potentia absoluta, tamen perfectius est communicare creaturae activitatem respectu suae perfectionis consequendae quam non communicare; potest autem homo habere aliquam activitatem respectu suae perfectionis finalis; igitur perfectius est quod hoc sibi communicetur.  Quod non potest sine aliqua cognitione imperfecta praecedente illam cognitionem perfectam ad quam finaliter ordinatur.

50.  But if one insist that the perfect agent can suddenly remove the imperfection and act suddenly, I respond:  that if it could (be done) by an absolute power, nevertheless it is more perfect to communicate to a creature an activity in respect to its perfection to be attained, which (it cannot under these circumstances) communicate;  moreover man can have some activity in respect to his final perfection;  therefore it is more perfect that this be communicated to him.  Wherefore he cannot without some imperfect cognition preceding that perfect one to which he is finally ordained.

1 Cf. supra n 47.  2 sc. viam Henrici, cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 13 q. 3 ad 2 (I f. 92H).

 


P. 31

 

51.  [Quinta ratio principalis]  —  Quinto arguitur sic:  omne agens utens instrumento in agendo, non potest per illud instrumentum in actionem aliquam quae excedit naturam illius instrumenti; lumen autem intellectus agentis est instrumentum quo anima utitur nunc in intelligendo naturaliter;  igitur non potest per illud lumen in aliquam actionem quae excedat illud lumen.  Sed illud de se est limitatum ad cognitionem habitam per viam sensitivam et viam sensuum; igitur anima non potest in cognitionem aliquam quae non potest haberi per viam sensus.  Sed multorum aliorum cognitio est necesssaria pro stato isto; ergo etc.

51.  [The fifth principle reason]  —  Fifth, it is argued thus [Henry of Gent, Summa, a. 3, q. 4 in corp. (I f. 29P)]:  every agent using an instrument in acting, cannot (act) through that instrument in any action which exceeds the nature of that instrument;  but the light of the agent intellect is an instrument which the soul uses now in understanding naturally;  therefore it cannot (act) through that light in any action which exceeds that light.  But that (light) of itself is limited to the cognition had through the sensitive way and through the way of the senses;  therefore the soul cannot (use it) in any cognition which cannot be had through the way of the senses.  But the cognition of many other things is necessary for this (present) state (of man); ergo etc..

52.  Haec ratio videtur concludere contra eum qui fecit eam.  Secundum enim deductionem istam lux increata non poterit uti intellectu agente ut instrumento ad cognitionem alicuius sincerae veritatis, quia talis secundum eum non potest haberi via sensuum, sine speciali illustratione.  Et ita sequitur quod in cognitione sincerae veritatis lumen intellectus agentis nullo modo habeat aliquam actionem;  quod videtur inconveniens, quia ista actio est perfectior omni intellectione:  et per consequens illud quod est perfectius in anima in quantum intellectiva, debet concurrere aliquo modo ad illam actionem.

52.  This reason seems to conclude against him who authored it.  For according to that deduction of his uncreated light will not be able to use the agent intellect as an instrument for the cognition of any sincere truth, because such according to him [ibid., a. 1 q. 2, ad 1 in opp. et in corp. (f. 8S 4B-8M); q. 3 in corp. (f. 9F-10G); a. 2 q. 1 in corp. (f. 23B); a. 24, q. 8 ad 2 (f. 145R)] cannot be had by way of the senses, without a special illumination [illustratione].  And thus it follows that in the cognition of sincere truth the light of the agent intellect in no manner has any action;  which seems inconvenient, because that action of it is more perfect than every intellection:  and consequently that which is more perfect in the soul inasmuch as (the soul is) intellective, ought to concur in some manner with that action.

 

 


P. 32

 

53.  [Ad rationem quartam et quintam]  —  Istae duae ultimae rationes1 non videntur quam plurimum efficaces.  Prima enim esset efficax si esset probatum quod homo ordinatur finaliter ad cognitionem supernaturalem (cuius probatio est pertinens ad quaestiones de beatitudine2), et si cum hoc ostenderetur cognitionem naturalem non suficienter disponere pro statu isto ad cognitionem supernaturalem consequendam.  Secunda ratio duo petit, scilicet aliquorum cognitionem esse necesssariam quae non possunt cognosci per viam sensuum, et quod lumen intellectus agentis est ad talia cognoscibilia limitatum.

53.  [Reply to the fourth and fifth reasons]  —  These last two reasons1 do not seem very efficacious.  For the first would be efficacious if it were proven that man is ordained finally to a supernatural cognition (the proof of which is pertinent to the questions concerning beatitude),2 and if with this there would be shown that a natural cognition did not sufficiently dispose (man) in this (present) state for the attainment of a supernatural cognition.  The second reason begs two, namely, that there is a necessary cognition of some things which cannot be cognized through the way of the senses, and that the light of the agent intellect is limited to such cognizables.

54.  Tres primae rationes3 probabiliores apparent.

54.  The three first reasons3 appear more probable.

Quod autem nulla talis cognitio sit necessaria ad salutem, proboa b:

Moreover that no such cognition is necessary for salvation, I prove (in this manner):a b

a  Sequitur adnotatio Duns Scoti: ‘Pone, aliquis non baptizatus’ etc., quaere supra ad tale signum 0 ≠ 0 .4 

b  Loco Quod (12) — probo (13) textus a Duns Scoto cancellatus5:  Sed contra hoc posset sic argui rationec

c  Loco Sed (16) — ratione (17) textus interpolatus:  Sed contra conclusionem principalem, quod scilicet cognitio supernaturalis non sit homini necessaria ad salutem, posset sic argui.

a  There follows the note of Duns Scotus:  ‘Posit someone not baptized’ etc., ask above at such a sign 0 ≠ 0 .4 

b  In place of Moreover that no such . . . I prove (in this manner) there is this text cancelled out by Duns Scotus:5  But against this it could be argued by reason in this manner.c 

c  In place of But against this it could be argued by reason in this manner there is this interpolated text:  But against the principle conclusion, namely, that a supernatural cognition be not necessary to man for salvation, it could be argued in this manner.

1  Cf. supra n. 49. 51.  2 Cf. Duns  Scotus, Ordinatio VI Suppl., d. 49 q. 7 n. [2-7].  3 Cf. supra n. 13. 17. 40.  4 Idem signum repetit supra ‘Pone’ (p. 33, 1).  5 Cancellatus virute textus ‘Quod — probo’ (lin. 12-13).

 

 

 

 

 


P. 33

 

Pone, aliquis est non baptizatus:  cum sit adultus, non habeat aliquem docentem, habet bonos motus quales potest habere, conformes rationi rectae naturali, et caveat illa quae ratio naturalis ostendit sibi esse mala.

Posit ‘someone is not baptized’:  since he is an adult, he does not have any teacher, he has good motives of the kind one can have, conformable to right, natural reason, and he is wary of those things which natural reason shows him to be evil.

Licet Deus de lege communi talem visitaret, docendo per hominem vel per angelum — sicut cornelium visitavit — tamen pone quod non docetur ab aliquo, ille salvabitur.  Similiter licet postea doceatur, tamen prius est iustus, et ita dignus vita aeterna, quia per bona velle praecedentia doctrinam meretur gratiam qua est iustus1; et tamen non habet theologiam, etiam quantum ad prima credibilia, sed tantum cognitionem naturalem.  Ergo nihil theologiae est simpliciter necessarium ad salutem.

Though God from the common law (of nature) would visit such a one, by teaching through a man and/or through an angel [Acts 10:1-48] — nevertheless posit that he is not taught by anyone, (and that) he will be saved.  Similarly though afterwards he be taught, nevertheless first he is just, and thus worthy of eternal life, because through willing the good (works) preceding doctrine he merits the grace by which he is just;1 and nevertheless he does not have theology, even inasmuch as regards the first credibles, but only a natural cognition.  Therefore nothing of theology is simply necessary for salvation.

55.  Posset dici quod ille per bona velle ex genere meretur de congruo iustificari ab originali, et Deus non subtrahit liberalitatis suae munus2:  ergo dat primam gratiam sine sacramento, quia non est alligatus sacramentis;  gratia non datur sine habitu fidei3; itaque habet habitum theologiae, licet non possit in actum, sicut nec baptizatus nisi intruatur.  Et licet non sit contradictio gratiam dari . . .

55.  It could be said that he through willing good (works) merits out of a kind of de congruo to be justified by the original (law of nature), and God does not withdraw the gift of His liberality:2  therefore He gives the first grace without a Sacrament, because He is not bound to the Sacraments; grace is not give without the habit of faith;3 and thus he has the habit of theology, though he cannot (put it) into act, just as neither the baptized unless he be instructed.  And though it is not a contradiction that grace be given . . .

1  Cf. Henricus Gand., Quodl. V q. 20 in corp. (f. 195V-196V. 196Y. 196B-197B).  2 Cf. ibidem.  3 Cf. ibiden q. 21 arg. in opp. Et in corp. (f. 197C. 198 H).

 

 

 

 


P. 34

 

. . . sine fide1, cum sint habitus distincti, et in aliis potentiis2, tamen sicut in baptismo ponitur simultas in infusione, ita propter idem potest poni simultas in casu isto.  Non enim minus gratiosus est Deus illi quem propter meritum de congruo iustificat sine sacramento quam illi quem sine omni merito proprio iustificat in susceptione sacramenti.  Itaque possibile est Deo de potentia absoluta quemlibet salvare, et etiam facere quod mereatur gloriam sine fide infusa si sine illa det gratiam qua habens bene utatur quantum ad velle quod potest habere secundum naturalem rationem et fidem acquisitam, vel sine omni acquisita si doctor desit, licet de potentia ordinata non detur sine fidei habitu praecedente, quia sine illa non ponitur gratia infundi3; non propter indigentiam, quasi gratia sine illa non sufficeret, sed propter liberalitatem divinam quae totum reformat; minus etiam perfecte esset homo dispositus quantum ad assensum verorum quorumdam sine fide infusa.

. . . without faith,1 since they are distinct habits, and in other powers,2 nevertheless just as in Baptism there is posited a simultaneity in infusion, so on account of the same a simultaneity can be posited in this case.  For no less gracious is God to him whom on account of merit de congruo He justifies without a Sacrament than to him whom without any merit of his own He justifies in undertaking a Sacrament.  And thus it is possible for God by His absolute power to save anyone at all, and even to decree [facere] that he merit glory without infused faith if without that He gives the grace by which he who has it uses it well as much as regards the willing that one can have according to natural reason and acquired faith, and/or without any acquired (faith) if a teacher is lacking, though by ordinary power [potentia ordinata] it is not given without the preceding habit of faith, because without that there is not posited the grace to be infused;3 not on account of indigence, as if grace without that would not suffice, but on account of the divine liberality which reforms the whole (man); even less perfectly would man be disposed as much as regards the assent to certain truths without infused faith.

56.  Et sicut hic, ita dico proportionaliter de habitu theologiae, qui perfectus exsistens includit fidem infusam et acquisitam articulorum et aliorum revelatorum a Deo in Scriptura, ita quod non est tantum haec infusa fides nec tantum illa acquisita sed simul ambae.  Est ergo necessaria theologia, verum est loquendo de potentia ordinata et loquendo de principaliori habitu sive priori pertinente ad theologiam, qui scilicet est fides infusa, et hoc generaliter, quantum ad omnes; non sic quantum ad secundum habitum . . .

56.  And just as in this (argument), thus I say proportionally concerning the habit of theology, which when existing perfectly [perfectus exsistens] includes infused faith and that acquired from the articles and the other things revealed by God in Scripture, such that there is not only this infused faith nor only that acquired but both together.  Theology, therefore, is necessary, but yet it belongs to speaking from the ordinary power and to speaking from the more principle habit or the more prior pertaining to theology, which, namely, is infused faith, and this generally, as much as regards all (habits);  not so as much as regards the second habit . . .

1  Cf. Henricus Gand., Quodl. V q. 21 in corp. (f. 198H).  2 Cf. ibid. arg. in opp. et in corp. (f. 197C. 198G-H).  3 Cf. ibid. in corp. (f. 198H).

 

 


P. 35

 

. . . quem includit, qui est fides acquisita, sed forte de necessitate ordinata est necessaria in adulto potente habere doctorem et eum intelligere, et hoc quantum ad aliquorum generalium fidem acquisitam.

. . . which it includes, which is acquired faith, perhaps from ordinary necessity it is necessary in the adult able to have a teacher and to understand him, and this as much as regards the faith acquired from the other general (sources).

[II. — Solutio Quaestionis]

[II.  —  Solution of the Question]

57.  Ad quaestionem igitur respondeo, primo distinguendo quomodo aliquid dicatur supernaturalea.  Potentia enim receptiva comparatur ad actum quem recipit, vel ad agentem a quo recepit.  Primo modo ipsa est potentia naturalis, vel violenta, vel neutra.  Naturalis dicitur si natualiter inclinetur, violenta si sit contra naturalem inclinationem passi, neutra si neque inclinetur naturaliter ad illam formam quam recepit neque ad oppositam1.  In hac autem comparatione nulla est supernaturalis.  Sed comparando receptivum ad agens a quod recipit formam, tunc est naturalitas quando receptivum comparatur ad tale agens quod natum est naturaliter imprimere talem formam in tali passo, supernaturalitas autem quando comparatur ad agens quod non est naturaliter impressivum illius formae in illud passum.

57.  To the question, therefore, I respond, first by distinguishing in what manner anything be said (to be) supernatural.a  For a receptive power is compared to the act which it receives, and/or to the agent from which it receives.  In the first manner it is a natural power, either violent, or neutral.  It is said (to be) natural if it be inclined naturally, violent if it be contrary to the natural inclination of the patient [passi], neutral if it be neither inclined naturally to that form which it receives, nor to its opposite.1  But in this comparison there is nothing supernatural.  But by comparing the receptive to the agent from which it receives form, there is naturality when the receptive is compared to such an agent which is bound naturally to impress such a form in such a patient, but supernaturality when it is compared to an agent which is not naturally impressive of that form in that patient.

58.  Antequam haec distinctio ad propositum applicetur, contra istud arguitur multipliciter:  tam quod distinctio ‘naturalis’ et . . .

58.  Before this distinction be applied to the proposed (argument), it can be argued against in a manifold manner:  both because the distinction of the ‘natural’ and . . .

a  Sequitur textus interpolatusvide append. A.

a  There follows the interpolated text contained in appendix A.

1  De naturali, violento et neutro cf. Aristot., Physic. VI t. 67 (IV c. 8, 215a 1-6); De caelo I t. 9-10 (I c. 2, 269a 7-15); De gener. et corupt. II t. 43 (II c. 6, 333b 26-30); Eth. Ad Nic. III c. 1 (III c. 1 1110a 1-4).

 

 


P. 36

 

. . . ‘violenti’ sumitur ex comparatione passi ad agens et non tantum ex comparatione eius ad formam, quam quod distinctio ‘naturalis’ et ‘supernaturalis’ sumatur ex comparatione passi ad formam et non tantum ex respectu eius ad agens1.  Quae argumenta non ponuntur hic2.

. . . of the ‘violent’ is taken from a comparison of the patient to the agent and not only from the comparison of it to the form, and that the distinction of the ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ be taken from a comparison of the patient to the form and not only from its respect [ex resepectu] to the agent.1  Which arguments are not posited here.2

59.  Sed solutio rationabilis apparet, quia illud est per se causa alicuius, quo posito, circumscripto vel variato quocumque alio, sequitur effectus3.  Nunc autem licet forma contra quam inclinatur receptivum non inducatur nisi per agens violentans passum, nec agens supernaturale agat supernaturaliter nisi inducendo formam, tamen per se ratio ‘violenti’ est ex habitudine passi ad formam4, et per se ratio ‘supernaturalis’ est ex habitudine passi ad agens5.  Probatur, quia passo et forma manentibus in sua ratione (puta quod forma sit receptibilis, contra tamen inclinationem passi), quomodocumque varietur agens, passum violenter recipit6; similiter, passo et agente sic se habentibus quod solum agens non naturaliter activum transmutet passum (solum, inquam, ita quod agens naturale non disponat), quamcumque formam inducet erit supernaturalis respectu passi7.

59.  But the solution appears reasonable, because it is a per se cause of something, whereby when posited, circumscribed and/or varied in any other manner, the effect follows.3  But now though the form against which the receptive (being) is inclined is not induced except through the agent violating the patient, and (though) the supernatural agent does not act supernaturally except in inducing the form, nevertheless the reckoning of ‘violent’ per se is from the habit of the patient to the form,4 and the reckoning of ‘supernatural’ per se is from the habit of the patient to the agent.5  This is proven, because with the patient and the form being maintained in their reckoning (such that the form be receivable, nevertheless against the inclination of the patient), in whatsoever manner the agent be varied, the patient violently receives;6 similarly, with the patient and agent holding themselves thus that only the non naturally active agent transmutes the patient (only, I say, such that the natural agent doest not dispose it), whatever form it induce shall be supernatural in respect to the patient.4

1  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 19 q. 3 ad 1 (I f. 76C-D).  2 Ponuntur in Duns Scotus, Ordinatio IV d. 43 q. 4 n. [4-5].  3 De causa per se et per accidens cf. Aristot., Physic. II t. 32-33 (II c. 3, 195a 27-195b 3); t. 59 (c. 5, 196b 24-29):  « Sicut enim et quod est, aliud quidem per seipsum est, aliud autem secundum accidens, sic et causam contingit esse:  ut domus quidem per seipsam causa esse aedificativa, secundum accidens autem album aut musicum.  Per se quidem igitur causa finita est, secundum accidens autem infinita:  infinita autem uni accidunt ».  4 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio IV d. 43 q. 4 n. [4].  5 Cf. ibid. n. [5].  6 Cf. ibid. n. [4].  7 Cf. ibid. n. [5].

3 Concerning per se and per accidens causes cf. Aristot., Physic. II t. 32-33 (II c. 3, 195a 27-195b 3); t. 59 (c. 5, 196b 24-29):  « For just as also that which it is, is one thing indeed through its very self, another however accidentally [secundum accidens], so also does it happen that a cause is:  as the house indeed (happens) to be through its very self an edifying cause, but accidentally flat-white and decorative [musicum].»


P. 37

 

Hoc sic probatur secundo quia non tantum in ‘induci’ sed in ‘permanere’:  aliqua forma violenter permanet in passo sine actione extrinseca licet non diu, aliqua naturaliter et diu; aliqua manet naturalis, aliqua supernaturalis, propter agens tantum, ita quod circumscribendo agens a quo fit non posset dici supernaturalis; posset autem dici naturalis, quia perficit naturaliter, comparando formam ad receptivum tantum1.

Thus it is proved second that not only (is it supernatural) in ‘being induced’ but in ‘perduring’ [permanere]:  one form violently perdures in a patient without extrinsic action though not for long, another naturally and for a long time; one remains [manet] natural, another supernatural, on account of the agent only, so that by circumscribing the agent by which it comes to be it could not be called supernatural;  but it could be called natural, because it perfects naturally, in comparing the form to the recipient only.1

60.  Ad propositum igitur applicando, dico quod comparando intellectum possibilem ad notitiam actualem in se nulla est sibi cognitio supernaturalis, quia intellectus possibilis quacumque cognitione naturaliter perficitur et ad quamcumque cognitionem naturaliter inclinatur.  Sed secundo modo loquendo2, sic est supernaturalis quae generatur ab aliquo agente quod non est natum movere intellectum possibilem ad talem cognitionem naturaliter.

60.  By applying, therefore, (this) to the proposed (argument), I say that by comparing the possible intellect to the actual knowledge [notitiam] in itself it has no supernatural cognition, because the possible intellect is naturally perfected by any cognition whatsoever and  is naturally inclined to any cognition whatsoever.  But speaking in the second manner,2 thus it is a supernatural which is generated by any agent which is not bound to move the possible intellect to such a cognition naturally.

61.  Pro statu autem isto, secundum Philosophum, intellectus possibilis natus est moveri ad cognitionem ab intellectu agente et phantasmate, igitur sola illa cognitio est ei naturalis quae ab istis agentibus imprimitur.

61.  But for this (present) state, according to the Philosopher [Aristotle, De anima, Book III, t. 2-3. 18. 30. 39], the possible intellect is bound to be moved to cognition by the agent intellect and the fantasy, therefore that cognition alone is natural to it which is impressed by those agents.

Virtute autem istorum potest haberi omnis cognitio incomplexi quae secundum legem communem habetur a viatore, sicut patet in instantia3 contra rationem tertiam principalem.  Et ideo licet Deus possit per revelationem specialem cognitionem alicuius incomplexi causare, . . .

Moreover in virtue of these every cognition of the non-complex can be had which according to the common law (of nature) is had by the wayfarer, just as it clear in the instance3 against the third principle reason.  And for that reason though God can through a special revelation cause a non-complex cognition of anything, . . .

1 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio IV d. 43 q. 4 n. [4].  2 Cf. supra n. 57.  3

 

 

 


P. 38

 

. . . sicut in raptu, non tamen talis cognitio supernaturalis est necessaria de lege communi.

. . . as in rapture, nevertheless such a supernatural cognition is not necessary from the common law (of nature).

62.  De complexis autem veritatibus secus est, quia, sicut ostensum est per tres primas rationes contra primam opinionem adductas1, posita tota actione intellectus agentis et phantasmatum, multae complexiones remanebunt nobis ignotae et nobis neutrae quarum cognitio est nobis necessaria.  Istarum igitur notitiam necesse est nobis supernaturaliter tradi, quia nullus earum notitiam potuit naturaliter invenire et eam aliis docendo tradere, quia sicut uni ita et cuilibet ex naturalibus erant neutrae2.  Utrum autem post primam doctrinae de talibus traditionem possit alius ex naturalibus assentire doctrinae traditae, de hoc in III libro distinctione 23 3.  Haec autem prima traditio talis doctrinae dicitur revelatio, quae ideo est supernaturalis, quia est ab agente quod non est naturaliter motivum intellectus pro statu isto.

62.  But concerning complex truths it is otherwise, because, just as has been shown through the three first reasons brought forward against the first opinion, with the whole action of the agent intellect and fantasies posited, many complex (truths) will remain unknown [ignotae] to us and neutral to us, whose cognition is necessary for us.  Therefore of these it is necessary that the knowledge be handed on [notitiam . . . tradi] to us supernaturally, because no one could naturally find knowledge of them and by teaching hand it on to others, because just as they were neutral to one from natural causes  [ex naturalibus], so also to anyone.2  But whether after the first tradition of the doctrine of such (truths) another could from natural (causes) assent to the doctrine handed on, (more is said) of this in Book III, Distinction 23.3  Moreover this first tradition of such a doctrine is called revelation, which for that reason is supernatural, because it is from an agent which is not naturally motive of the intellect in this (present) state.

63.  Aliter etiam posset dici actio vel notitia supernaturalis quia est ab agente supplente vicem obiecti supernaturalis.  Nam obiectum natum causare notitiam huius ‘Deus est trinus’, et similium, est essentia divina sub propria ratione cognita; ipsa sub tali ratione cognoscibilis est obiectum supernaturale4.  Quodcumque ergo agens . . .

63.  In another manner it also could be called a supernatural action and/or knowledge because it is from an agent taking the place [supplente vicem] of a supernatural object.  For the object bound to cause the knowledge of this, (that) ‘God is triune,’ and of similar (truths), is the Divine Essence cognized under Its proper reckoning;  That cognizable under such a reckoning is the Supernatural Object.4  Whatever agent, therefore, . . .

1  Cf. supra n. 13-18. 40-41.  2 Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 13 q. 3 in corp. (I f. 91B-92F).  3 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio III Suppl. D. 23 q. Unicus n. [4-5].  4 Cf.ibid. I d. 3 part 1 q. 2 n. [16].

 

 


P. 39

 

. . . causat notitiam aliquam veritatum quae per tale obiectum sic cognitum natae essent esse evidentes, illud agens in hoc supplet vicem illius obiecti.  Quod si ipsum agens causaret perfectam notitiam illarum veritatum qualem obiectum in se cognitum causaret, tunc perfecte suppleret vicem obiecti; pro quanto imperfecta notitia quam facit, virtualiter continetur in illa perfecta cuius obiectum  in se cognitum esset causa.

. . . causes some knowledge of truths which through such an object cognized in this manner would be bound to be evident, that agent in this takes the place of that object.  Wherefore if that agent would cause the perfect knowledge of those truths, it would cause such an object in itself (to be) cognized, then it would perfectly take the place of the object;  as much as it is imperfect [pro quanto imperfecta] the knowledge, that it does cause [facit], is virtually contained in that perfect (knowledge) of which the object cognized in itself would be the cause.

64.  Ita est in proposito.  Nam revelans hanc ‘Deus est trinus’ causat in mente aliquam notitiam huius veritatis, licet obscuram, quia de obiecto sub ratione propria non cognito, quod obiectum si esset sic cognitum, natum esset causare perfectam et claram notitiam illius veritatis.  Pro quanto ergo est haec notitia obscura et in illa clara includitur eminenter, sicut imperfectum in perfecto, pro tanto revelans hanc obscuram, vel causans, supplet vicem obiecti, illius clarae notitiae causativi, praecipue cum non possit notitiam alicuius veritatis causare nisi ut supplens vicem alicuius obiecti; nec veritatem talium de  isto obiecto notitiam causare possit ut supplet vicem obiecti alicuius inferioris naturaliter motivi intellectus nostri, . . .

64.  Thus it is in the proposed (argument).  For the one revealing this (truth), ‘God is triune,’ causes in the mind some knowledge of this truth, obscure though (it be), that concerns the object not cognized under its proper reckoning, which object if it would be cognized in this manner, would be bound to cause a perfect and clear knowledge of that truth.  Therefore, just as much as this knowledge is obscure and included eminently in that clear (knowledge), as the imperfect in the perfect, so much does the one revealing this obscure (knowledge), and/or causing it, take the place of the object, causative of that clear knowledge, especially since it could not cause knowledge of any truth except as one taking the place of another object; nor could it cause the truth of such (aspects) of this object to be known, as it takes the place of any inferior object naturally motive of our intellect, . . .

 


P. 40

 

. . . quia nullum tale virtualiter includit aliquam notitiam veritatum illarum, nec claram etiam nec obscuram; igitur oportet quod in causando etiam  illam obscuram suppleat aliqualiter vicem obiecti supernaturalis.

. . . because no such (object) virtually includes any knowledge of those truths, neither clear nor even obscure;  therefore it is opportune that in causing even that obscure (knowledge) it in some manner take the place of the supernatural object.

65.  Differentia istorum duorum modorum ponendi supernaturalitatem notitiae revelatae patet, separando unum ab alio.  Puta, si agens supernaturale causaret notitiam obiecti naturalis, ut si infuderet geometriam alicui, ista esset supernaturalis primo modo1, non secundo2 (hoc esta utroque modo, quia secundus infert primum licet non e converso).  Ubi autem est primus tantum, ibi non est necesse quod sit supernaturalis quin naturaliter possit haberi; ubi est secundus modus, necessitas est ut supernaturaliter habeatur, quia naturaliterhaberi non potest3.

65.  The difference of those two manners of positing the supernaturality of revealed knowledge is clear, by separating the one from the other.  For example, if a supernatural agent would cause the knowledge of a natural object, as if it would infuse geometry into someone, that (knowledge) would be supernatural in the first manner,1 not in the second2 (that isa in either manner, because the second infers the first though not conversely).  But where there is only the first, there it is not necessary that it be supernatural, if that could be had naturally; where there is the second manner, there is the necessity that the supernatural be had, because it cannot be had naturally.3

a Loco hoc  est textus interpolatus:  sed si aliqua est supernaturalis secondo modo, supernaturalis estb.

b  Loco sed (14) — est (15) textus interpolatus:  si autem infunderet notitiam huius ‘Deus est triunus’, vel similium, haec supernaturalis esset.

a  In place of  that there is the interpolated text:  but if some (knowledge) is supernatural in the second manner, it is supernatural.b

b  In place of this interpolated text, is this other interpolated text:  but if it would infuse knowledge of this, ‘God is triune’, and/or of similar things, this would be supernatural.

1  Cf. supra n. 60.  2 Cf. supra n. 63.  3 Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 13 q. 3 ad 2 (I. F. 92H).

 

 


P. 41

 

[III.  —  Circa Tres Rationes Principales Contra Philosophos]

III.  —  About the Three Principle Reasons against the Philosophers

66.  Tres rationes quibus innititur ista solutio confirmantur per auctoritates.  Prima1 per auctoritatem Augustini XVIII De civitate cap. 11:*  « Philosophi, nescientes ad quem finem essent ista referenda, inter falsa quae locuti sunt verum videre potuerunt »2 etc.

66.  The three reasons by which this solution of mine is hinted at are confirmed through authorities.  The first1 through the authority of (St.) Augustine, De civitate Dei, Book XVIII, ch. 11:*  « Philosophers, not knowing to which end these would be referred, could see a truth among the false things which they spoke »2 etc..

67.  Secunda3 confirmatur per Augustinum XI De civitate cap. 2:+  « Quid prodest nosse quo eundum sit, si ignoratur via qua eundum sit? »  In hoc errabant philosophi, qui etsi aliqua vera de virtutibus tradiderunt, tamen falsa miscuerunt, secundum auctoritatem praecedentem Augustini4, et patet ex eorum libris.  Improbat enim Aristoteles politias a multis aliis dispositas, II Politicae.  Sed nec ipsa politia Aristotelis est irreprehensibilis:

67.  The second3 is confirmed through (St.) Augustine, De civitate Dei, Book XI, ch. 2:+  « What profit is there to know where one is to go, if one ignores the way by which one is to go? »  In this the philosophers used to err, who, even if they handed on some truths concerning the virtues, nevertheless mixed in falsehoods, according to the preceding authority from (St.) Augustine,4 even as is clear from their books.  For Aristotle disproves of the political theories [politias] set forth by many others, in his Politics, Book II.  But neither is that political theory of Aristotle irreprehensible:

*  August., De civ. Dei XVIII, c. 41 n. 3 (PL 41, 602; CSEL XL pars II 334, 22-335, 3): « Quidquid philosophi quidam inter falsa, quae opinati sunt, verum videre potuerunt, et laboriosis disputationibus persuadere moliti sunt quod mundum istum fecerit Deus, eumque ipse providentissimus administret, de honestate virtutum, de amore patriae, de fide amicitae, de bonis operibus atque omnibus ad mores probos pertinentibus rebus, quamvis nescientes ad quem finem et quonam modo essent ista omnia referenda, propheticis, hoc est divinis vocibus, quamvis per homines, in illa civitate populo commendata sunt, non argumentationum concertationibus inculcata; ut non hominis ingenium, sed Dei eloquium contemnere formidaret, qui illa cognosceret ».

*  August., De civ. Dei XVIII, c. 41 n. 3 (PL 41, 602; CSEL XL pars II 334, 22-335, 3):  «  Whatever truth certain philosophers could see among the falsehoods, which they opined, they also struggled to persuade (others of) by laborious disputations:  that God made this world of ours, and that He administered it most providently, of the honesty of the virtues, of the love of one’s country, of the faith of friendship, of good works and all things pertaining to approved morals, although not knowing to which end and whither now all those things would be referred, (these truths) were committed to the care of the people in that city as prophecies, that is as from divine voices, although (they came) through men, not inculcated by the conferences of argumentation; so that one would not dare to contemn, not the genius of men, but the speech of God, who knew these things ».

+  August., De civ. Dei XI, c. 2 (PL 41, 318; CSEL XL pars I 513, 12-15):  « Quoniam si inter eum qui tendit et illud quo tendit via media est, spes est perveniendi; si autem desit aut ignoretur qua eundum sit, quid prodest nosse quo eundum sit? »

 

+  August., De civ. Dei XI, c. 2 (PL 41, 318; CSEL XL pars I 513, 12-15):  «  Since if between him who tended and that by which he tended there is a middle way, there is hope of arriving; but if there is lacking or is ignored that by which one must go, what profit is there to know where one must go?»

1  Cf. supra n. 13-16.  2 Cf. etiam Henricus Gand., Summa a. 7 q. 6 in corp (I f. 55 O).  3 Cf. supra n. 11-18. 

4 Cf. supra n. 66; August., De civ. Dei XVIII c. 41 n. 2 (PL 51, 601; CSEL XL pars II 334, 1-2):  « Ubi etsi aliqua vera dicebantur, eadem licentia dicebantur et falsa ».


P. 42

 

. . . VII enim Politicae cap. 7* docet deos esse honorandos (« Decet enim », inquit, « honorem exhibere diis »), et ibidem cap. 5 « lex nullum orbatum » tradit « nutrire »!

. . . for in Politics, Book VII, ch. 7* he teaches that the gods are to be honored (« For it is fitting », he says, « to show honor to the gods »), and in the same place, ch. 5, he hands down « the law to nurture no one orphaned »!.

68.  Tertia ratio1 confirmatur per Augustinum XI De civitate cap.3:  «  Ea quae remota sunt a sensibus nostris, quoniam testimonio nostro scire non possumus, aliorum testimonio requirimus »2.  Et hoc confirmat totam solutionem principalem3.  Quia enim complexiones illae de quibus argutum est4 nobis ex se neutrae sunt, nullus potest testimonio suo credere de ipsis, sed oportet testimonium supernaturale requirere alicuius superioris tota specie humana.

68.  The third reason1 is confirmed through (St.) Augustine, De civitate Dei, Book XI, ch. 3:  « Those things which are removed from our senses, since we cannot know them by our own testimony, we require the testimony of others ».2  And this confirms the whole principle solution.3 For because those complex (truths) concerning which it was argued by us are of themselves neutral, no one can on his own testimony believe (anything) concerning them, but it is opportune that one require supernatural testimony of anyone superior to the whole human species.

69.  Qualiter autem prima traditio sive revelatio talis doctrinae potuerit fieri et facta fuerit, dubium est, — an scilicet locutione interiore, an exteriore, cum aliquibus signis adhibitis, sufficientibus ad causandum assensum;  ad propositum sufficit, quod utroque modo . . .

69.  But in what manner the first tradition or revelation of such doctrine could come about and was made, there is a doubt, — whether, namely, by an interior locution, or an exterior one,  with any employed signs, sufficient to cause assent;  for the proposed argument it suffices that in each manner . . .

*  Aristot., Polit. VII [c. 16] (eta c. 16, 1335b 19-25):  « De reservatione autem et alimento genitorum sit lex:  nullum orbatum nutrire.  Propter multitudinem autem puerorum ordo gentium prohibet nihil reservari genitorum.  Oportet enim determinatam essse multitudinem puerorum procreationis; si autem aliquibus fiant propter hoc combinatis [plures pueri], antequam sensus insit et vita, fieri oportet aborsum ».

*  Aristotle, Politics, Book VII [ch. 15] (eta ch. 16, 1335b 19-25):  « But of the reservation and nutrition of offspring let there be this law:  to nourish no one orphaned.  Moreover on account of a multitude of children the order of the nations prohibits that none of the offspring are to be saved.  For it is opportune that the multitude of children to be born [procreationis] be determined; but if any come to be by any (parents), before they partake of [insit] sense and life, it is opportune that they be terminated [aborsum].

1  Cf. supra n. 40-41.  2 Cf. etiam Henricus Gand., Summa a. 13 q. 3 in corp. (I f. 91C).  3 Cf. supra n. 57-65.  4  Cf. supra n. 40-41; cf. etiam n. 62.

 

 

 

 


P. 43

 

. . . potuit supernaturaliter talis doctrina revelari1, sed neutro modo sine errore potuit ab homine tradi primo2.

. . . such a doctrine could be supernaturally revealed,1 but in neither manner without error could it be handed on by the first man.2

70.  Contra istas tres rationes simul instatur quod seipsas destruant, quia quod ostenditur esse necesssario cognoscendum, hoc ostenditur esse verum, quia nihil scitur nisi verum3; ergo quiquid istae rationes ostendunt necessarium esse cognosci (puta quod fruitio Dei in se est finis hominis, quoad primam4, — via deveniendi ad ipsam, est merita quae Deus acceptat  ut digna tali praemio, quoad secundam5, — quod Deus est trinus et contingenter causat, et huiusmodi, quoad tertiam6), totum illud ostenditur esse verum.  Vel igitur istae rationes non sunt nisi ex fide, vel ex ipsis concluditur oppositum illius quod probant.

70.  Against these three reasons it is simultaneously insisted that they destroy themselves, because that which is shown to be to be cognized necessarily, this is shown to be true, because nothing is known unless (it be) true;3 therefore whatever these reasons show to be necessary to cognize (for example that the fruit of God is in itself the end of man, as regards the first,4 — the way of coming to that, is the merits which God accepts as worthy of such a reward, as regards the second,5 — that God is triune and contingently causes, and (is) of this kind, as regards the third),6  the whole of this is shown to be true.  Therefore, these reasons are not but from the faith [ex fide],  and/or from them the opposite of that which they prove is concluded.

71.  Respondeo:  naturali ratione ostenditur necessarium esse scire alteram partem determinate huius contradictionis ‘fruitio est finis, fruitio non est finis’, hoc est, quod intellectus non est mere dubius vel neuter in hoc problemate ‘an fruitio sit finis’, quia talis dubitatio vel ignoratia impediret inquisitionem finis; non autem ostenditur . . .

71.  I respond:  by natural reason it is shown that it is necessary to know the other part of this contradiction, ‘the fruition (of God) is the end, the fruition (of God) is not the end’, in a determinate manner, that is, that the intellect is not merely doubtful and/or neutral in this problem ‘whether or not fruition be the end’, because such a doubting and/or ignorance would impede the seeking out the end [inquisitionis finis]; moreover it is not shown . . .

1  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 14 q. 1 ad 1 (I. F. 100H).  2 Cf. ibid. a. 8 q. 4 in corp. (f. 66C-67F ).  3 Cf. Aristotle, Anal. Poster. I c. 2 [t. 5] (I c. 2, 71b 25-26):  « Verum quidem igitur oportet esse, quoniam non est scire quod non est »; August., De diversis quaest. 83 q. 9 (PL 40, 13): « nihil percipi potest nisi quod a falso discernitur ». — Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 1 q. 1 arg. 2 (f. 1A); q. 2 in corp. (f. 4C); q. 12 in corp. (f. 22L).  4 Cf. supra n. 13-16.  5 Cf. supra n. 40-41.

3 Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, c. 2 [t. 5] (I c. 2, 71b 25-26):  « Truly indeed, it is therefore opportune that it be, since there is no knowing that which is not »; (St.) Augustine, De diversis quaest. 83, q. 9 (PL 40, 13): « nothing can be perceived except that which is discerned from the false ».

 


P. 44

 

. . . naturali ratione quod haec pars sit necessario cognoscenda.  Et hoc modo rationes praedictae ut sunt naturales concludunt de altera parte contradictionis, hac vel illa; non determinate de hac nisi ex creditis tantum1.

. . . by natural reason that this part is to be cognized necessarily.  And in this manner the aforesaid reasons, as they are natural, conclude concerning the other part of the contradiction, the former or the latter [hac vel illa];  not in a determinate manner concerning the former except (in) as much as from things believed.1

[IV.  —  Ad Argumenta Philosophorum]

IV.  Regarding the Arguments of the Philosophers

72.  Ad argumenta2 pro opinione Aristotelis3.  Ad primum4 dico quod cognitio dependet ab anima cognoscente et obiecto cognito5, quia secundum Augustinum, IX De Trinitate cap. Ultimo, « a cognoscente et cognito paritur notitia »6.  Licet igitur anima habeat sufficiens activum et passivum intra pro quanto actio respectu cognitionis convenit animae, tamen non habet sufficiens activum intra se pro quanto actio convenit obiecto, quia sic est ut tabula nuda, ut dicitur III De anima*7.  Est igitur intellectus agens quo est omnia facere, verum est in quantum ‘factio’ respectu cognitionis convenit animae, non in quantum obiectum est activum.

72.  Regarding the arguments2 on behalf of the opinion of Aristotle.3  Regarding the first4 I say that cognition depends upon the cognizing soul and the cognized object,5 because according to (St.) Augustine, De Trinitate, Book IX, last chapter, [ch. 12, n. 18] « from the cognizing and the cognized is born knowledge [notitia] ».6  Therefore, though the soul may have a sufficient active and passive (intellect) within (itself) as much as the action in respect to cognition is fitting [convenit] to the soul, nevertheless it does not have a sufficient active (intellect) within itself as much as the action is fitting to the object, because in this manner it is as a blank tablet [tabula nuda], as is said in De anima, Book III.*7  Therefore it is the agent intellect by which it is that it does all, however (this) is inasmuch as the ‘doing’ in respect to cognition is fitting to the soul, not inasmuch as the object is active.

73.  Ad confirmationem8 rationis.  Ad maiorem dico quod natura . . .

73.  For the confirmation8 of the reckoning.  Regarding the major, I say that nature . . .

*  Aristot., De anima III t. 14 (III, c. 4, 429b 30-430a):  « potentia quodammodo est intelligibilia intellectus, sed actu nihil antequam intelligat.  Oportet autem sic, sicut in tabula nihil est actu scriptum:  quod quidem accidit in intellectu ».

*  Aristotle, De anima, Bk. III, t. 14 (III, c. 4, 429b 30-430a):  «  the power in a certain manner is an understanding of intelligibles, but in act (is) nothing before it understands.  Moreover, it is opportune (that it act) in this manner, just as on a tablet there is nothing actually written:  which indeed happens in the intellect ».

1  Cf. supra n. 12.  2 Cf. supra n. 6-11.  3 Cf. supra p. 5, 2-6.  4 Cf. supra n. 6.  5 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 3 pars 3 q. 2 n. [29]; Quodl. Q. 15 n. [7].   6 Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 40 q. 7 in corp. (I f. 259H); Quodl V q. 14 in corp. (f. 175C).  7  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 1 q. 10 arg. 1 in opp. (f. 19E).  8  Cf. supra n. 7.

 


P. 45

 

. . . quandoque accipitur pro principio intrinseco motus vel quietis — prout describitur II Physicorum* — quandoque pro principio activo naturaliter,  prout natura distinguitur contra artem sive contra propositum propter oppositum modum principiandi, sive sit intrinsecum sive non, dummodo sit naturale1.  Primo modo maior non est vera, quia non correspondet omni passivo naturaliter principium activum intrinsecum quod sit natura, quia multa sunt naturaliter receptiva alicuius actus, cuius non habent principium activum intrinsecum.  Secundo etiam modo propositio maior est falsa in quibusdam, quando videlicet natura propter sui excellentiam ordinatur natualiter ad recipiendum perfectionem ita eminentem, quae non possit subesse causalitati agentis naturalis secundo modo.  Ita est in proposito.

. . . whenever it is accepted as and intrinsic principle of motion and/or resting — insofar as it is described in Physics, Book II* — whenever as a naturally active principle, insofar as nature is distinguished against art or against a proposition for the sake of the opposite manner of beginning (the argument), or (insofar as nature) be intrinsic or not, so long as it be natural.1  In the first manner the major is not true, because there does not correspond to every passive (power) a naturally active, intrinsic principle which is of the nature, because there are many, naturally receptive of some act, of which they do not have an intrinsic, active principle.  In the second manner, also, the major of the proposition is false on certain points [in quibusdam], when, namely, the nature on account of its own excellence is ordained naturally to receive a perfection so eminent, that it cannot be subject [subesse] to the causality of a natural agent in the second manner.  Thus it is in the proposed.

74.  Cum probatur maior2,  dico quod potentia passiva non est frustra in natura, quia etsi per agens naturale non possit principaliter reduci ad actum, tamen potest per tale agens dispositio ad ipsum induci, et potest per aliquod agens in natura — id est tota coordinatione essendi vel entium — puta per agens primum vel supernaturale complete reduci ad actum.

74.  When the major is proven,2 I say that a passive power is not in nature as a trick [frustra], because even if through a natural agent it cannot be reduced principally to act, nevertheless a disposition to it can through such an agent be induced, and it can through any agent in nature — that is by an entire coordination of being and/or of beings [essendi vel entium] — for example as (it can) through a prime and/or supernatural agent completely be reduced to act.

75.  Et si obicitur quod istud vilificat naturam quod ipsa non possit . . .

75.  And if it be objected that this vilifies nature because it cannot . . .

*  Aristot., Physic. II t. 3 (II c. 1, 192b 20-23):  « Est igitur natura principium alicuius et causa movendi et quiescendi in eo in quo est primum et per se, et non secundum accidens »; t. 11 (193b 31-33): « Sicut enim ars dicitur quod est secundum artem et artificiosum, sic et natura quod secundum naturam dicitur et quod naturale »; t. 49 (c. 5, 196b 17-22): « Eorum autem quae fiunt, alia quidem propter hoc fiunt, alia quidem non.  Horum autem alia quidem secundum propositum, alia vero non secundum propositum, ambo autem sunt in his quae sunt propter hoc . . . Sunt autem propter hoc quaecumque ab intellectu utique aguntur et quaecumque a natura ».

*  Aristotle, Physics Bk. II, t. 3 (II c. 1, 192b 20-23):  « Nature, therefore, is a principle of some and a cause of moving and of resting in that in which it is first and per se, and not according to accident »;  t. 11 (193b 31-33): « For just as art it said (to be) that which is according to art and artifice, so also nature is said (to be) that which (is) according to nature and that which is natural »; t. 49 (c. 5, 196b 17-22): « Moreover of these which come to be, some indeed come to be on account of this, other indeed not so.  But of these some indeed according to the proposed, but others not according to the proposed, however both are among these which are on account of this . . . But there on account of this whatever are indeed done by the intellect and whatever by nature ».

1  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 1 q. 4 ad 1 et q.

6 in corp. (f. 13G. 16C).  2 Cf. supra n. 7.


P. 46

 

. . . consequi perfectionem suam ex naturalibus1, cum natura minus deficiat in nobilioribus, ex II De caelo et mundo, respondeo:  si felicitas nostra consisteret in speculatione suprema ad qualem possumus nunc naturaliter attingere, non diceret Philosophus naturam deficere in necessariis2.  Nunc autem illam concedo posse haberi naturaliter, et ultra, dico aliam eminentiorem posse recipi naturaliter.  Igitur in hoc magis dignificatur natura, quam si suprema sibi possibilis poneretur illa naturalis; nec est mirum quod ad maiorem perfectionem sit capacitas passiva in aliqua natura quam eius causalitas activa se extendat.

. . . arrive at its own perfection out of (its) natural (powers),1 since nature is less deficient in those things more noble, from (Aristotle’s) De caelo et mundo, Bk. II [t. 50], I respond:  if our felicity would consist in a supreme speculation to which we can now naturally attain, the Philosopher would not say that nature was deficient in things necessary [Aristotle, De anima, Bk. III, t. 45 (III, ch. 9, 432b 21-22)].2  But now I concede that it can be had naturally, and beyond this, I say that another more eminent one can be naturally received.  Therefore in this nature is more dignified, than if the supreme possible to it would  be posited as that natural one; nor is it to be wondered at that there be a passive capacity in any nature for a greater perfection than (that to which) its active causality extends itself.

76.  Illud quod adducitur de II Caeli et mundi non est ad propositum, quia Philosophus loquitur ibi de organis correspondentibus potentiae motivae si ipsa inesset stellis.  Et concedo quod universaliter cui datur potentia quae nata est esse organica, ei datur a natura organum, in non-orbatis dico.  Sed in proposito data est potentia, sed non organica; non tamen data sunt naturaliter omnia alia praeter potentiam concurrentia ad actum.  A Philosopho . . .

76.  That which is adduced concerning De caelo et mundo, Bk. II, does not regard the proposed (argument), because the Philosopher speaks there of organs corresponding to motive power, if that be in the stars.  And I concede that universally that to which is given a power which is bound to be organic, is given by nature an organ, (that is) I say in those not deprived (of organs).  But in the proposed a power has been given, but not an organic one; nevertheless not all the other things, besides the power, concurrent to the act have been given naturally.  From the Philosopher . . .

1  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 1 q. 2 in corp. (I f. 4B).  2 Cf. ibid. q. 4 ad 2 (f. 13H).

 


P. 47

 

. . . igitur ibi haberi potest quod natura ordinabilis ad aliquem actum vel obiectum naturaliter habet potentiam ad illud, et organum si potentia est organica; sed non sic de posterioribus requisitis ad actum1.

. . . therefore, in that passage [ibi] there can be understood that nature ordainable to some act and/or object naturally has a power for that, and an organ, if the power is organic; but not so concerning the posterior things required to act [ad actum].1

77.  Aliter posset dici ad maiorem2 quod ipsa est vera loquendo de potentia passiva naturali ut passiva comparatur ad activam, non autem ut passiva comparatur ad actum receptum.  Differentia membrorum patet in principio solutionis istius quaestionis3.

77.  In another way it could be said regarding the major2 that it itself is true speaking of the passive, natural power as passive compared to the active, not however as passive compared to the act received.  The difference of the members is clear in the beginning of the solution of that question.3

78.  Minor4 autem est vera secundo modo, non primo modo5.  Posset etiam tertio modo faciliter dici ad minorem, negando, quia licet absolute intellectus possibilis sit naturaliter receptivus talis intellectionis, non tamen pro statu isto.  De causa autem huius dicetur inferius distinctione 36.

78.  The minor,4 however, is true in the second manner, not so in the first manner.5  It could also in a third manner be easily said regarding the minor, by denying, that though absolutely the possible intellect is naturally receptive of such intellection, (it is) not, however, so in this (present) state.  But one will speak of the cause of this below in distinction 3.6

79.  Ad rationem tertiam7 quaere responsionem Thomae in Summa, I parte Summae quaestione 1, ubi respondet sic, quod . . .

79.  Regarding the third7 reason seek the response of (St.) Thomas in the Summa, the First part of the Summa, question 1 [a. 1 ad 2 (IV 7ab)], where he responds in this manner, that . . .

1  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 24 q. 1 in corp. (I f. 137E).  2 Cf. supra n. 7.  3 Cf. supra n. 57.  4  Cf. supra n. 7.  5 Cf. supra n. 57.  6 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 3 pars 1 q. 2 n. [16]; q. 3 n. [2. 25-26]; cf. etiam Quodl. q. 14 n. [10-12].  7 Cf. supra n. 8.

 


P. 48

 

. . . « diversa ratio cognoscibilis diversitatem scientiarum inducit.  Eandem enim conclusionem demonstrat astrologus per medium mathematicum, id est a materia abstractum, (puta quod terra est rotunda), et naturalis per medium circa materiam consideratum.  Unde nihil prohibet de eisdem rebus de quibus philosophicae disciplinae tractant secundum quod sunt cognoscibilia lumine rationis naturalis etiam aliam scientiam tractare secundum quod cognoscuntur lumine divinae revelationis ».*

. . .« a diverse reckoning of the cognizable induces a diversity of sciences.  For the same conclusion does the astrologer demonstrate through the medium of mathematics, which is abstracted from matter, (for example that the Earth is round), and the physicist [naturalis] through the medium concerned with matter. Whence of these same subjects [rebus] of which the philosophical disciplines treat according to which they are cognizable by the light of natural reason, nothing prohibits that another science also treat according to which they are cognized by the light of divine revelation ».*

Contra:  si de cognoscibilibus in theologia est cognitio tradita vel possibilis tradi in aliis scientiis, licet in alio lumine, ergo non est necessaria cognitio theologica de eisdem.  Consequentia patet in exemplo eius, quia cognoscens terram esse rotundam per medium physicum, non indiget cognitione per medium mathematicum, tamquam simpliciter necessaria.

On the Contrary:  if of cognizables in theology there is a cognition handed down and/or able to be handed down in other sciences, though under another light, therefore a theological cognition of them is not necessary.  The consequence is clear in his example, because the one cognizing that the Earth is round through the medium  of physics, does not need the cognition through the medium of mathematics, as (something) necessary simply speaking.

80.  Dicta tamen responsio ad tertium exponitur sic, quod scilicet . . .

80.  Nevertheless the response given to the third (reason) is expounded in this manner, that, namely . . .

*  (St.) Thomas, Summa theologiae I-II q. 54 a. 2 in corp. (VI 342ab):  « Respondeo dicendum quod habitus et est forma quaedam, et est habitus.  Potest ergo distinctio habituum secundum speciem attendi aut secundum communem modum quo formae specie distinguuntur, aut secundum proprium modum distinctionis habituum.  Distinguuntur siquidem formae ad invicem secundum diversa principia activa »; ibid. ad 2 (VI 343ab):  « Ad secundum dicendum quod terram esse rotundam per aliud medium demonstrat naturalis, et per aliud astrologus:  astrologus enim hoc demonstrat per media mathematica . . . naturalis vero hoc demonstrat per medium naturale . . . Tota autem virtus demonstrationis . . . dependet ex medio.  Et ideo diversa media sunt sicut diversa principia activa, secundum quae habitus scientiarum diversificantur ».

*  (St.) Thomas, Summa theologiae I-II q. 54 a. 2 in corp. (VI 342ab):  « I respond, that it must be said, that a habit is both a certain form, and is a habit.  There can be, therefore, a distinction of habits according to the species to be attained or according to the common manner by which forms are distinguished by species, or according to the proper manner of the distinction of habits.  If indeed the are distinguished as forms according to diverse active principles »; ibid. ad 2 (VI 343ab):  « To the second it must be said ‘that the Earth is round’ the physicist [naturalis] demonstrates through one medium, and the astrologer through another:  for the astrologer demonstrates this through the media of mathematics . . . but the physicist demonstrates this through the medium of nature [medium naturale] . . .Moreover, the whole virtue of demonstration . . . depends on the medium.  And for that reason the diverse media are as diverse, active principles, according to which the habits of the sciences are diversified ».

 


P. 49

 

. . . habitus et est habitus et est forma; in quantum habitus, habet distinctionem ab obiecto, sed in quantum forma, potest distingui a principio activo.  Respectu autem habitus scientifici principia sunt causae effectivae.  Licet igitur ubi est idem scibile (puta quod terra est rotunda) non sit distinctio per obiecta, tamen est distinctio per principia quibus mathematicus et physicus hoc ostendunt: et ita erit distinctio habituum in quantum sunt formae et non in quantum sunt habitus.

. . . a habit is both a habit and is a form; inasmuch as a habit, it has its distinction from its object, but inasmuch as a form, it can be distinguished by its active principle.  Moreover, in respect to scientific habits the principle are the effective causes.  Therefore, though where there is the same knowable (for example that the Earth is round) there may not be a distinction (of sciences) through objects, nevertheless there is a distinction through the principles by which the mathematician and the physicist [physicus] show this:  and thus there will be a distinction of habits inasmuch as they are forms and not inasmuch as they are habits.

81.  Contra:  forma est communis ad habitum; sed impossibile est aliqua esse distincta in ratione superioris et indistincta in ratione inferioris; ergo impossibile est aliqua esse distincta per rationem formae unde forma et tamen esse indistincta in ratione habituum (hoc enim esset ac si aliqua essent distincta in ratione animalis et indistincta in ratione hominis).  Praeterea, supponit etiam quod principia sunt distinctiva habitus in alio genere causae quam ut principia effectiva, quod falsum est, quia si aliquam rationem causae distinctivae habeant ad habitus, non habent rationem nisi causae efficientis.  Praeterea, semper stat ratio quia quantumcumque possent poni habitus distincti cognitivi, tamen non salvatur necessitas unius, quasi alias cognitio sit impossibilis, ponendo possibilitatem alterius habitus undecumque distincti.

82.  On the contrary:  form  is common to habit; but it is impossible that there be some distinct according to the reckoning of (something) superior and indistinct according to the reckoning of (something) inferior;  therefore it is impossible that there be some distinct through a reckoning of the form from which the form (came to be) and nevertheless that there be (some) indistinct according to the reckoning of habits (for this would be as if some were distinct according to the reckoning of animal and indistinct according to the reckoning of man).  Besides, it also supposes that principles are distinctive of a habit in some genus of cause rather than as effective principles, which is false, because if distinctive causes have any reckoning according to habit, they do not have a reckoning except as an efficient cause.  Besides, the reckoning always remains the same [stat], because however so much there can be posited distinct, cognitive habits, nevertheless the necessity of one is not saved, by positing the possibility of another habit whence-so-ever [undecumque] distinguished.

 


P. 50

 

82.  Ideo ad argumentum respondeo quod in illis scientiis speculativis etsi tractetur de omnibus speculabilibus, non tamen quantum ad omnia cognoscibilia de eis, quia non quantum ad propria eorum, sicut patuit prius in tertia ratione1 contra primam opinionem (quaere supra g2).

82.  For that reason I respond to the argument that in those speculative sciences even if one treats of all things able to be speculated [speculabilibus], nevertheless not as much as regards all things cognizable from them, because not as much as regards what are  proper to them, just as was clear before in the third reason1 against the first opinion (see above g).2

83.  Ad quartum3 respondetur sic, quid principia prima non possunt applicari ad conclusiones aliquas nisi sensibiles:  tum quia termini eorum sunt abstracti a sensibilibus, et ita sapiunt naturam eorum, tum quia intellectus agens, per quem debet fieri applicatio, limitatur ad sensibilia.

83.  To the fourth3 one responds in this manner [Henry of Ghent, Summa, a. 3, q. 4, ad 1], that the first principles cannot be applied to any conclusions except sensible ones:  both because their terms are abstracted from sensibles, and thus known their nature, and because the agent intellect, through which the application ought to come to be, is limited to sensibles.

84.   Contra:  certum est intellectui ista prima principia esse vera non tantum in sensibilibus, sed etiam in insensibilibus; non enim dubitat magis intelletus quod contradictoria non sunt simul vera de immateriali quam de materiali.  Et quod dicitur quod terminus primi principii est ens quod divitur in decem genera, et illud non extendit se ad obiectum theologicum, hoc nihil valet; non enim magis dubitamus quod contradictoria non sunt simul vera de Deo (ut quod Deus est beatus et non-beatus, et huiusmodi) quam de albo.

84.    On the contrary:  it is certain that for the intellect those first principles are true not only among sensibles, but also among insensibles; for the intellect does not doubt more that contradictories are not simultaneously true of the immaterial than of the material.  And because it is said [ibid., a. 24, q. 6 in corp.] that the terminus of the first principle is being, which is divided in the ten genera, and that it does not extend itself to the theological object, this has no value; for we do not doubt more that contradictories are not simultaneously true of God (such as that God is blessed and non-blessed, and (statements) of this kind), than of (the color) white.

1  Cf. supra n. 40-47.  2 Cf. supra p. 22, 22.  3 Cf. supra n. 9.

 

 


P. 51

 

85.  Alia datur responsio, quod ex solis maioribus non sequutur conclusiones, sed cum minoribus adiunctis; nunc autem minores non sunt naturaliter manifestae quae deberent illis adiungi1.

85.  Another response is given, that from only the majors (of arguments) do conclusions follow, but with the minors adjoined; but now the minors are not naturally manifested which ought to be adjoined to them.1

Contra:  minores summendae sub primis principiis praedicant de sumptis ‘sub’ terminos subiectos primorum principiorum; sed notum est terminos primorum principiorum dici de quocumque, quia sunt communissimi; igitur etc.

On the contrary: the minors to be taken up under the first principles predicate the subject terms of the first principles concerning those (terms) assumed ‘under’ (them); but it is known that the terms of the first principles are said of (anything) whatever, because they are most common; therefore etc..

86.  Ideo respondeo quod secunda pars minoris est falsa, haec videlicet quod in primis principiis ‘includuntur virtualiter omnes conclusiones scibiles’2.  Ad probationem dico quod sicut termini subiecti sunt communes, ita et termini praedicati.  Quando igitur termini subiecti, quia distribuit, accipiuntur pro omnibus, non accipiuntur pro omnibus nisi respectu terminorum praedicatorum qui sunt communissimi, et per consequens virtute talium principiorum non sciuntur de inferioribus nisi praedicata communissima3.

86.  For that reason I respond that the second part of the minor is false, this, namely, that in the first principles ‘are included virtually all knowable conclusions’.2  For the proof (of which) I say that just as the terms of a subject are common, so also the terms of the predicate.  Therefore when the terms of the subject, that distributes, are accepted for all, they are not accepted for all except in respect to the terms of predicates which are most common, and consequently in virtue of such principles there are not known (any conclusions) of inferiors except the most common predicates.

87.  Hoc patet ratione, quia medium non potest esse ‘propter quid’ respectu alicuius passionis nisi quae passio includitur virtualiter in ratione illius medii; in ratione autem subiecti principii communissimi non includitur ‘propter quid’ aliqua passio particularis, sed tantum passio communissima; ergo illud subiectum non potest esse medium vel ratio cognoscendi aliqua nisi sub illa ratione communissima. . . .

87.  This is clear by the reckoning, that a medium cannot be ‘propter quid’ in respect to any passion except the passion which is included virtually in the reckoning of that medium; but in the reckoning of the subject of the most common principle there is not included ‘propter quid’ any particular passion, but only the most common passion; therefore that subject cannot be a medium and/or reason for cognizing anything except under that most common reckoning. . . .

1  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 9 q. 3 arg 1 (I f. 72O); Hervaeus Natalis, Sent. Prol. Q. 1 in corp. (2va).  2 Cf. supra n. 10.  3 Cf. supra n. 11.

 


P. 52

 

Sed praeter passiones communissimas sunt multae aliae passiones scibiles, ad quas passiones non possunt passiones primorum principiorum esse media, quia non includunt illas.  Igitur multae sunt veritates scibiles quae non includuntur in primis principiis.

But besides the most common passions there are many other knowable passions, regarding which passions there cannot be passions that are media of the first principles, because they do not include them.  Therefore there are many knowable truths which are not included in the first principles.

Hoc patet in exemplo, quia ista ‘omne totum est maius sua parte’ etsi includat istam ‘quaternarius est maior binario’, et alias similes de eodem praedicato, non includit tamen istas:  ‘quaternarium est duplus ad binarium’, ‘ternarius se habet in proportione sexquialtera ad dualitatem’, nam ad ista praedicata oporteret quod habet specialia media includentia ipsa.

This is clear in the example, because this ‘every whole is greater than its part’ even if it includes this other ‘a four-fold (number) is greater than a two-fold’, and others similar concerning the same predicate, it does not include, however, theses:  ‘a four-fold is double the binary,’ ‘a three-fold holds itself in a one-and-a-half proportion to a duality,’ for regarding these predicates it would be opportune that one have a special means including them.

88.  Tertia probatio1, logica, est quia licet contingat descendere sub subiecto universalis affirmativae, non tamen sub praedicato; multa autem praedicata contenta sub praedicatis primorum principiorum sunt scibilia de inferioribus ad subiecta illorum; igitur illa praedicata per prima principia non sciuntur de illis subiectis.

88.  The third proof,1 the logical one, is that though it happens to descend under the subject of a universal affirmative, not however under a predicate; moreover many predicates contained under the predicates of the first principles are knowable from inferiors as  their subjects;  therefore those predicates are not known through the first principles concerning these subjects.

89.  Contra istud obicitur:  ‘de quolibet affirmatio vel negatio et de nullo eodem ambo’2; sequitur ‘igitur de hoc album vel . . .

89.  Against this it is objected:  ‘concerning anything (there is) an affirmation or [vel] negation and concerning nothing (there is) in the same manner both’;2 there follows ‘therefore of this (one says that it is) white or [vel] . . .

1  Prima n. 86, secunda n. 87.  2 Aristot., Topic. VI c. 7 (Z c. 6, 143b 15-16):  « de omni aut affirmatio aut negatio vera est»;  Anal. Post. I c. 11 [t. 27] (I c. 11, 77a 30):  «Omne autem affirmare aut negare »;  De interpr. I [c. 6] (c. 9, 18a 28-29):  « In his ergo et quae sunt et quae facta sunt, necesse est affirmationem vel negationemm veram vel falsam esse ».  — Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 1 q. 12 in corp. (I f. 22L).

2 Aristotle, Topics VI ch. 7 (Z ch. 6, 143b 15-16):  « concerning everything, either the affirmation or [aut] the negation is true »;  Posterior Analytics I ch. 11 [t. 27] (I ch. 11, 77a 30):  «Moreover one is to affirm or [aut] deny everything »;  On interpretation I [ch. 6] (c. 9, 18a 28-29):  « Among these, therefore, both what is and what has been made, it is necessary that the affirmation or [vel] the negation be true or [vel] false ».

 

 


P. 53

 

. . . non-album’1, ita quod licet ibi descendere sub praedicato et sub subiecto2.

. . . not white,’1 such that there it is allowed to descend under the predicate and under the subject.2

Respondeo:  istud principium ‘de quolibet affirmatio vel negatio’ etc., valet istam ‘de quolibet cuiuslibet contradictionis altera pars est vera et altera falsa’3, ubi est duplex distributio, et sub utroque distributo licet descendere ‘ergo de hoc huius contradictionis’ etc.; sed sub praedicato stante confuse tantum non licet descendere, quia non sequitur ‘de quolibet cuiuslibet contradictionis altera pars, ergo haec pars’.  Ita est in aliis principiis; semper praedicatum universalis affirmativae stat confuse tantum, sive sint ibi duae distributiones in subiecto sive una.

I respond:  that principle ‘of anything (there is) an affirmation or [vel] negation’ etc., is equal to this [valet istam] ‘of anything one part of whatever contradiction is true and the other false,’3  where there is a two-fold distribution, and under each distribute it is allowed to descend ‘therefore of this (one part) of this contradiction’ etc.; but under a predicate remaining only in a confused manner it is not allowed to descend, because there does not follow ‘of anything the one part of whatever contradiction, therefore this part.’  Thus it is in the other principles; the predicate of an universal affirmative always remains only in a confused manner, either there are there two distributions in the subject, or one.

Et in proposito exemplo adhuc patet propositum.  Quia de homine scibile est quod est risibilis, numquam per hoc principium ‘de quolibet’ etc. potest plus inferri nisi ‘igitur de homine risibile vel non-risibile’.  Altera igitur pars praedicati disiuncti numquam . . .

And in the proposed example the proposed is still clear.  Because concerning man it is a knowable that he is risible, never through this principle ‘of anything’ etc. can (anything) be further inferred except ‘therefore concerning man (he is) risible or [vel] not risible.’  Therefore one part of the disjoined predicate is never . . .

1  Cf. Aristot., De interpr. I [c. 6] (c. 9, 18a 34-18b 5):  « si omnis affirmatio vel negatio vera vel falsa est, et omne necesse est vel esse vel non esse . . . Nam si verum est dicere quoniam est album vel non album, necesse est album esse vel non esse . . Quare necesse est aut affirmationem aut negationem veram essse vel falsam »; Metaphy. IV t. 15-16 (III c. 4, 1007b 29-1008a 25).  2 Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 26 q. 2 arg. 1 (I f. 158L).  3 Cf. Aristot., Metaphy. IV t. 29 (III c. 8, 1012b 10-13): « Est enim necesse contradictionis partem alteram esse veram . . . Altera namque  pars contradictionis est falsa »; De interpr. I [c. 5] (c. 7, 17b 26-28):  «Quaecumque igitur contradictionis universalium sunt universaliter, necesse est alteram esse veram, alteram falsam, et quaecumque in singularibus sunt ».

1  Cf. Aristotle, On interpretation I [ch. 6] (ch. 9, 18a 34-18b 5):  « if every affirmation or [vel] negation is true or [vel] false, it is also necessary that everything be or [vel] not be . . . For if it is true to say that it is white or [vel] not white, it is necessary that it be white or [vel] not be . . . Wherefore it is necessary that either the affirmation or the negation be true or [vel] false ».  3 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics IV t. 29 (III c. 8, 1012b 10-13): « For it is necessary that one part of a contradiction be true . . . For the other part of the contradiction is false »;  On interpretation I [ch. 5] (c. 7, 17b 26-28):  « Whatsoever, therefore, belong to a contradiction of universals universally, it is necessary that one be true, the other false, and whatsoever be among singulars ».

 


P. 54

 

. . . scietur de subiecto per hoc principium, sed requiritur aliud principium speciale, ut definitio subiecti vel passionis, quod quidem est medium et ratio ad sciendum ‘risibile’ determinate de homine.

. . . known from the subject through this principle, but another special principle is required, such as the definition of the subject and/or of the passion, which indeed is the medium and the reason for knowing ‘risible’ in a determinate manner concerning man.

[V.  —  Ad Argumenta  Principalia]

V.  —  Regarding the Principle Arguments

90.    Ad argumenta principalia.  —  Ad primum1 distinguo de obiecto naturali.  Potest enim accipi obiectum natural vel pro illo ad quod naturaliter sive ex actione causarum naturaliter activarum potest potentia attingere, vel pro illo ad quod naturaliter inclinatur potentia, sive possit attingere naturaliter illud obiectum sive non.  —  Posset igitur maior negari intelligendo ‘naturale’ primo modo, quia obiectum primum est adaequatum potentiae, et ideo abstractum ab  omnibus illis circa quae potest potentia operari;  non autem oportet quod si intellectus possit naturaliter intelligere tale commune, quod possit naturaliter intelligere quodcumque contentum sub illo, quia intellectio alicuius contenti multo excellentior est intellectione confusa talis communis; sic, concessa minore2 in utroque sensu, conclusio intenta non habetur, scilicet de naturaliter attingibili, quia sic maior fuit falsa.

90.  (Reply) to the principle arguments.  — Regarding the first1 I make a distinction [distinguo] concerning the natural object.  For a natural object can be accepted [cf. Henry of Ghent, Summa, a. 3 q. 4 ad 2] for that to which naturally or from an action of active causes naturally the power can attain, and/or for that to which the power is naturally inclined, or may be able to attain naturally that object or not.  —  Therefore the major could be denied by understanding ‘natural’ in the first manner, because the first object is adequate to the power, and for that reason abstracted from all those (things) about which the power can operate; but it is not opportune that if the intellect can naturally understand such a common (being), that it can naturally understand whatever (is) contained under It, because the intellection of anything contained (under It) is much more excellent that a confused intellection of such a common (object); in this manner, having conceded the minor in each sense, the intended conclusion is not had, that is concerning the naturally attainable, because in this manner the major was false.

1  Cf.  supra n. 1.  2 Cf. ibidem.

 

 


P. 55

 

91.  Contra hanc responsionem arguo quod destruit seipsam.  Primum enim obiectum est adaequatum potentiae, per ipsum, et verum est, hoc est, quod nihil respicit potentia pro obiecto nisi in quo est ratio illius primi, et in quocumque est ratio illius primi illud respicit potentia pro obiecto;  igitur impossibile est aliquid esse primum naturaliter quin sit quodlibet contentum sic per se obiectum naturaliter.  Da enim oppositum, et tunc non est adaequatum naturaliter sed excedens, et aliquod eo inferius est adaequatum, et ita primum.

91.  Against this response I argue that it destroys itself.   For the first object is adequated to the power, through itself, and it is true, that is, that the power regards nothing as an object except that in which there is a reckoning of that first (object), and in whatsoever there is a reckoning of that first one that the power regards as an object;  therefore it is impossible that anything be first naturally that be not something naturally contained in this manner as a per se object.  For grant the opposite, and then there is no naturally adequated (object) but (only) one exceeding (the power), and anything inferior to it is adequated, and thus (is) the first (object).

Ratio autem quae adducitur pro responsione1 fallit secundum figuram dictionis2.  Licet enim ens ut est quid intellligibile uno actu (sicut homo est intelligibilis una intellectione) sit naturaliter intelligibile (illa enim unica intellectio entis ut unius obiecti est naturalis), non tamen potest ens poni primum obiectum naturaliter attingibile, quia est primum obiectum ut includitur in omnibus per se obiectis, et ut sic non est naturaliter attingibile nisi quodlibet illorum sit naturaliter attingibile.  Commutat igitur hic ‘hoc aliquid’ . . .

Moreover the reason which is adduced for the response1 fails according to its form of diction.2  For though being, as something intelligible by one act (such as man is intelligible by one intellection) is naturally intelligible (for that unique intellection of being as of one object is natural), nevertheless being cannot be posited as the first, naturally attainable object, because the first object is such as is included in all per se objects, and in this manner [ut sic] it is not naturally attainable unless anyone of them is naturally attainable.  Therefore it commutes this ‘this anything’ . . .

1  Cf. supra p. 54, 11-19.  2 Cf. Aristot., Soph. Elenchi. I c. 2 (c. 4, 166b 10-14):« Quae autem secundum figuram sunt dictionis, accidunt quando non idem interpretatur similiter, ut masculinum feminam, vel feminium masculinum, vel quod inter haec est alterum horum; vel responsum quale quantum, vel quantum quale; vel facies patiens; vel dispositum facere, et alia ».

2 Cf. Aristotle, Soph. Elenchi. I c. 2 (c. 4, 166b 10-14):« Moreover those (errors) which are according to the form of diction, happen when the same (term) is not interpreted similarly, as (for example) the masculine as the feminine, and/or the feminine as the masculine, and/or that among these there is another of them; and/or the response ‘which as much’, and/or ‘as much as which’; and/or ‘he will do it suffering’; and/or ‘a disposed doing’, and other (such) statements ».

 


P. 56

 

. . . in ‘quale quid’ cum arguit ‘ens est naturaliter intelligibile, igitur ens ut est primum obiectum intellectus, hoc est adaequatum, est attingibile naturaliter’, quia antecedens est verum ut ens est unum singulare intelligibile, sicut album, sed consequens concludit de ente ut includitur in omni intelligibili, non ut seorsum ab illis intelligitur.

. . . into ‘that something’ when it argues that “being is naturally intelligible, therefore being as it is the first object of the intellect, that is adequate, is attainable naturally,” because the antecedent is true, as being is one singular intelligible, just as white (is), but the consequent concludes concerning being as included in every intelligible, not as understood apart from them.

92.  Ad argumentum1 igitur est alia responsio, realis, quod videlicet minor est falsa de obiecto naturali, id est naturaliter attingibili, — vera alio modo, ad quod scilicet naturaliter inclinatur vel ordinatur potentia2.  Et ita debet intelligi auctoritas Avicennae.  Quid autem sit ponendum obiectum primum naturaliter attingibile, de hoc infra distinctione 33.  Confirmatur responsio per Anselmum De libero arbitrio cap. 4:*  « Nullam», inquit, « ut puto, habemus potestatem, quae sola sufficiat ad actum ».  ‘Potestatem’ vocato quod nos communiter vocamus ‘potentiam’4; patet per exemplum eius de visu.+  Non est igitur inconveniens potentiam esse naturaliter ordinatam ad obiectum ad quod non potest naturaliter ex . . .

92.  Regarding the argument,1 therefore there is another response, the real one, that namely the minor is false concerning the natural object, that is naturally attainable, — true in the other manner, to which, that is, the power is naturally inclined and/or ordained.2  And thus ought the authority of Avicenna be  understood.  Moreover that one must posit a first, naturally attainable, object, concerning this (more is said) below in distinction 3.3  The response is confirmed through (St.) Anselm, De libero arbitrio, ch. 4:*  « No power, » he said, « as I think of it, do we have, which alone suffices for an act ».  ‘Power’ [potestatem] is called that which we commonly call a ‘power or potency’ [potentiam];4 this is clear through his example concerning sight.+  It is not, therefore, inconvenient that a power is naturally ordained to the object to which it cannot naturally . . .

*  Ansel., De libero arb. c. 3 (PL 158, 494; ed. Schmitt I, 212): « Nullam namque potestatem habemus, ut puto, quae sola sibi sufficiat ad actum ».

+  Ibidem (ed. Schmitt I, 213):  « Quod ut in multis animadvertas, in uno tibi monstrabo:  Nullus visum habens dicitur nullatenus posse videre montem ».

*  (St.) Anselm, De libero arbitrio, c. 3 (PL 158, 494; ed. Schmitt I, 212):  « For no power do we have, as I think of it, which alone suffices for an act ».

+  Ibid. (ed. Schmitt I, 213):  « That which, for example, you advert to in many things, I will show you in one:  No one having sight is said to be able to no extent to see a mountain ».

1 Cf. supra n. 1.  2 Cf. supra p. 54, 7-10.  3  Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 3 pars 1 q. 3 n. [8-12].  4 Cf. supra p. 19 nota 8.

 

 


P. 57

 

. . . causis naturalibus attingere, sicut quaelibet ex se sola ordinatur et tamen non potest sola attingere1.

. . . attain from natural causes, just as any (power) is ordained alone of itself [ex se] and nevertheless is not able alone to attain (its object).1

93.  Ad secundum argumentum2 nego consequentiam.  —  Ad probationem3 patet ex dictis in responsione4 data ad secundum argumentum pro opinione Philosophi, quia superiora ordinantur ad perfectionem maiorem passive recipiendam quam ipsa active possunt producere, et per consequens istorum perfectio non potest produci nisi ab aliquo agente supernaturali.  Non sic est de perfectione inferiorum, quorum perfectio ultima potest subesse actioni inferiorum agentium.

93.  Regarding the second argument2 I deny the consequence.  —  For the proof (of which)3 it is clear from what has been said in the response4 given to the second argument in favor of the opinion of the Philosopher, that superiors are ordained to receive a greater perfection passively than they can actively produce, and consequently their perfection cannot be produced except by some supernatural agent.  Not so is it concerning the perfection of superiors, the ultimate perfection of which can be under the action of inferior agents.

94.  Ad tertium5 dico quod veritati complexae alicui firmiter tenendae intellectus possibilis est improportionatus, id est, non est proportionale mobile talium agentium quae ex phantasmatibus et ex lumine naturali intellectus agentis non possunt cognosci.

94.  Regarding the third5 I say that the possible intellect is improportioned to any complex truth that is to be firmly held, that is, there is no mobile proportional of such agents which cannot be cognized out of fantasies and the natural light of the agent intellect.

Quando arguis ‘ergo fit proportionalis per aliud’6, concedo — et ‘per aliud’ in ratione moventis, quia per movens supernatuale-revelans assentit illi veritati, — et ‘per aliud’ in ratione formae, quia . . .

When you argue ‘therefore, let it be proportional through something else,’6 I concede — both ‘through something else’ in the reckoning of the one moving, because through the one moving the supernatural-revealer assents to that truth, — and ‘through something else’ in the reckoning of form, because . . .

1  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 8 q. 2 in corp. Et ad 4 (I f. 64H. 65Q).  2 Cf. supra n. 2.   3 Cf. ibidem.  4 Cf. supra n. 73-78.  5 Cf. supra n. 3.  6 Cf. ibidem.

 

 


P. 58

 

. . . per illum assensum factum in ipso, qui est quasi quaedam inclinatio in intellectu ad istud obiectum, proportionans illum isti.

. . . through that assent wrought in this, which is a certain quasi-inclination in the intellect toward this object, proportioning it to this.

Cum ultra de illo ‘alio’ quaeris ‘an sit naturale vel supernaturale’, dico quod supernatuale, sive intelligas de agente sive de forma.

When beyond this ‘something else’ your ask ‘whether it be natural and/or supernatural,’ I say that (it is) supernatural, understand it as you may, of the agent or of the form.

Cum infers ‘ergo intellectus est improportionatus ad illud, et per aliud proportionatur’, dico quod ex se est in potentia oboedientiali ad agens1, et ita sufficienter proportionatur illi ad hoc ut ab ipso moveatur.  Similiter, ex se est capax illius assensus causati a tali agente, etiam naturaliter capax2; non oportet igitur ipsum per aliud proportionari ipsi assensui recipiendo.

When one infers ‘therefore the intellect is improportioned to it, and through something else is proportioned (to it),’ I say that of itself it is in an obediential potency to the agent,1 and thus is sufficiently proportioned to it for this that it be moved by it.  Similarly,  of itself it is capable of that assent caused by such an agent, even naturally capable;2 it is not opportune, therefore, that it be proportioned through another by receiving that assent.

Statur igitur in secondo, non in primo3, quia veritas ista revelata sufficienter non est inclinativa intellectus ad assentiendum sibi, et ita improportionale agens, et passum sibi improportionale; sed agens supernaturale est sufficienter inclinativum intellectus ad istam veritatem, causando in ipso assensum quo proportionatur huic veritati4, ita quod non oportet intellectum per aliud proportionari tali agenti, nec formae ab ipso impressae, sicut oportet ipsum proportionari tali obiecto per aliud duplici modo praedicto5.

(The truth of the proposition) stands in the second (argument), not in the first, 3 because that revealed truth is not sufficiently inclinative of the intellect for it to assent by itself, and thus (there is) an improportional agent, and a patient improportional to itself;  but the supernatural agent is sufficiently inclinative of the intellect to that truth, by causing in it the assent whereby it is proportioned to this truth,4, so that it is not opportune that the intellect be proportioned through something else to such an agent, nor to a form impressed by it, just as it is opportune that it be proportioned to such an object through something else in the twofold, aforesaid manner.5

1  Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio III d. 1 q. 2 n [7]; q. 4 n. [2]; Quodl. Q. 19 n. [15].  2  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 3 q. 5 ad 2 (I f. 30Y)  3 Cf. supra n. 3.  4 Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 13 q. 3 in corp. (f. 91D-92D).  5 Cf. supra n. 94.

 

 

 The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The . . . symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appeared on the subsequent page of the critical edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation that that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets are Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s) and/or notes added by trans..