DOCTOR SUBTILIS ET MARIANI

IOANNIS DUNS SCOTI

ORDINIS FRATRUM MINORUM

OPERA OMNIA

Ordinatio

PROLOGUS

FIRST PART

ON THE NECESSITY OF REVEALED DOCTRINE

QUESTION SOLE

Vol. I, pp. 1-58

IUSSU ET AUCTORITATE Rmi P. PACIFICI M. PERANTONI

TOTIUS ORDINIS FRATRUM MINORUM MINISTRI  GENERALIS

STUDIO ET CURA COMMISSIONIS SCOTISTICAE

AC FIDEM CODICUM EDITA

PRAESIDE

P. CAROLO BALIĆ

TYPIS POLYGOTTIS VATICANIS

MCML

English Translation by

The Franciscan Archive

http://www.franciscan-archive.org

PROLOGUS PARS PRIMA	PROLOGUE FIRST PART
DE NECESSITATE DOCTRINAE REVELATAE	ON THE NECESSITY OF REVEALED DOCTRINE
QUAESTIO UNICA	QUESTION SOLE
UTRUM HOMINI PRO STATU ISTO SIT NECESSARIUM ALIQUAM DOCTRINAM SUPERNATURALITER INSPIRARI	WHETHER FOR MAN FOR HIS PRESENT STATE IT BE NECESSARY THAT ANY DOCTRINE SUPERNATURALLY INSPIRE HIM
1.  [Q. 1]  Quaeritur^a utrum homini pro statu isto sit necessarium aliquam doctrinam specialem supernaturaliter inspirari, ad quam videlicet non posset attingere lumine naturali intellectus^1.	1.  [Q. 1]*  It is asked^a whether for man for his (present) state it be necessary that any special doctrine supernaturally inspire (him), to which he could not attain by the natural light of the intellect.^1
Et quod non, arguo sic:	And that (it is) not (so), I argue thus:
Omnis^b potentia habens aliquod commune pro primo obiecto, potest naturaliter in quodlibet contentum sub ipso sicut in per se obiectum naturale.	Every^b power [potentia] having anything common for its first object, can naturally (act) upon [in] anything contained under it just as upon a per se natural object.
^a Praemittitur textus interpolatus:  Cupientes aliquid^2 etc.  Circa prologum primi libri quaeruntur quinque.  Primum est de necessitate huius doctrinae:  utrum necessarium sit homini pro statu isto aliquam doctrinam sibi supernaturaliter inspirari^3.  Secundum spectat ad genus causae formalis eiusdem, et est:  utrum cognitio supernaturalis necessaria viatori tradita sit sufficienter in Scriptura sacra^4.  Tertium pertinet ad genus causae materialis, et est:  utrum theologia sit de Deo tamquam de subiecto primo^5.  Quartum et quintum pertinet ad genus causae finalis, et est quartum:  utrum theologia sit practica^6; quintum:  utrum ex ordine ad praxim ut ad finem dicatur per se scientia practica^7.	^a An interpolated text prefaces this commentary:  Desiring to show something etc..^2  About the prologue of the First Book five questions are asked.  The first concerns the necessity of this doctrine:  whether it be necessary for man for his (present) state that any doctrine supernaturally inspire him.^3  The second looks at the genus of the formal cause of the same, and is:  whether a necessary supernatural cognition has been sufficiently handed on to the wayfarer in Sacred Scripture.^4 The third pertains to the genus of the material cause, and is:  whether theology concerns God as its first subject.^5  The fourth and fifth pertain to the genus of the final cause, and the fourth is:  whether theology is practical;^6 the fifth:  whether from its order to praxis as to its end it is called a per se practical science.^7
^b Textus a Duns Scotus signatur littera: a^8.	^b The text is marked here by Duns Scotus with the letter: a^8
^1 Cf. Duns Scotus, Lectura prol. pars 1 q. unicus.;  Rep. A prol q. 3.  ^2 Cf. Lombardus, Sent. prol. (ed. Claraq. I 1).  ^3 Cf. supra n. 1.  ^4 Cf. infra n. 95.  ^5 Cf. infra n. 24.  ^6 Cf. infra n. 217.  ^7 Cf. infra n. 233.  ^8 Cf. infra p. 2, 16-3,19.	*  Text within square [ ] brackets has been added for clarity in the case of headings and citations by the editors of the Critical edition.  In the translation words supplied by the context are in round ( ) brackets, and references to the original Latin text in square [ ] brackets. Paragraph numbers are according to the Critical Edition.

P. 2

Hoc probatur per exemplum de primo objecto visus et aliis contentis sub illo, et ita inductive in aliis obiectis primis et potentiis.  Probatur etiam per rationem, quia primum obiectum dicitur quod est adaequatum cum potentia; sed si in aliquo esset ratio eius, scilicet primi obiecti, circa quod non posset potentia habere actum, non esset potentia adaequata, sed obiectum excederet potentiam.  Patet igitur maior.  Sed primum obiectum intellectus nostri naturale est ens inquantum ens;  ergo intellectus noster potest naturaliter habere actum circa quodcumque ens, et sic circa quodcumque intelligibile non-ens, quia negatio cognoscitur per affirmationem^1.  Ergo etc.  Probatio minoris, Avicenna I Metaphysicae cap. 5:  « Ens et res prima impressione in animam imprimuntur, nec possunt manifestari ex aliis »; si autem esset aliquid aliud ab istis primum obiectum, ista possent manifestari per rationem eius; sed hoc est impossibile^2a.	This is proven through the example of the first object of sight and the other things contained under it, and thus inductively in the other first objects and powers.  It is also proven through reason, because a first object is said to be that which is adequate with the power;  but if in anything there be a reckoning of this, that is of a first object, about which a power could not have an act, it would not be an adequate power, but the object would exceed the power.  The major is therefore clear.  But the first natural object of our intellect is a being inasmuch as it is a being [ens inquantum ens];  therefore our intellect can naturally have an act about whatever being, and thus about whatever intelligible not-being, because negation is cognized through affirmation.^1  Ergo etc..  Proof of the minor,  Avicenna in his First Book on the Metaphysics, chapter 5 [chapter 6 (72rb)] (says):  « Being [ens] and thing by a first impression are impressed upon the soul, nor can they be made manifest from others »;  if, however, anything other than these would be the first object, those could be manifested through a reckoning of it; but this is impossible.^2a
^a Adnotatio Duns Scoti:  In ista quaestione nota a, b, c^3 ad principale; item pro difficultatibus, d, e, f, g^4; factae sunt in quaestione secunda^5.  Nota, a valet distinctione 3^6 et c quaestione 1^7; b et sequens, communiter in supernaturalibus; d, e quaestione de scientia theologiae nobis^8.	^a Duns Scotus’ footnote:  In this question notes a, b and c^3 (refer) to the principle (argument);  likewise for the difficulties, d, e, f and g;^4  have been dealt with in the second question.^5  Note, a refers to distinction 3^6 and c question 1^7; b and the following, commonly (pertain) to the supernatural (aspects);  d and e to the question concerning our science of theology.^8
^1  Cf. Aristot., Anal. Post. I c. 24 [t. 40] (A. C. 25, 86b 34-35):  « per affirmativam enim negativa nota est »;  De interpr. II. C. 2 (c. 14, 24b 3);  « affirmationi contraria quidem negatio est »; Metaph. IV t. 16 (III c. 4, 1008a 17-18):  « notior utique erit dictio quam opposita negatio »;  Avicenna, Metaph. I c. 6 (73ra):  « esse vero notius est quam non esse ».  ^2 Pro n. 1 cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 1 q. 2. 3. 11. 12; a. 3 q. 1. 3. 4. 5; a. 19 q. 1; a. 21 q. 2.  ^3 a cf. supra p. 1, 23; b cf. infra p. 3, 20; c cf. infra p. 5, 20.  ^4 Cf. infra p. 7, 15; e cf infra p. 25, 19; f cf. Infra p. 6, 15; g cf infra p. 22, 22.  ^5 Cf. infra n. 95.  ^6 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 3 pars 1.  ^7 Cf. Ib. Q. 1-2.  ^8 Cf. Infra n. 124.	^1  Cf. Aristot., Posterior Analytics I c. 24 [t. 40] (A. C. 25, 86b 34-35):  « for through an affirmative statement the negative is known »;  On Interpretation II. C. 2 (c. 14, 24b 3);  « to an affirmation the contrary is indeed the negation »; Metaphysics IV t. 16 (III c. 4, 1008a 17-18):  « indeed, a saying will be more known than its opposite negation »;  Avicenna, Metaphysics. I c. 6 (73ra):  « ‘being’ [esse] on the other hand is more known than ‘non being’ ».

P. 3

2.  Praeterea^a, sensus non indiget aliqua cognitione supernaturali pro statu isto;  ergo nec intellectus.  Antecedens patet.  Probatio consequentiae:  « Natura non deficit in necessariis »,  III  De anima;  et si in imperfectis non deficit, multo magis nec in perfectis;  ergo si non deficit in potentiis inferioribus quantum ad necessaria earum  propter actus suos habendos et finem earum consequendum, multo magis nec deficit in necessariis potentiae superiori ad actum suum et finem consequendum.  Ergo etc.^1	2.  Moreover,^a sense does not need any supernatural cognition for the (present) state; therefore neither the intellect.  The antecedent is clear.  The Proof of the consequent:  « Nature is not deficient in necessaries »,  De anima, Book III [t. 45];  and if in things imperfect it is not deficient, much more neither in things perfect;  therefore if it is not deficient in inferior powers as much as regards those things necessary for them for their acts to be had and to completely attain their end, much more neither it is deficient in those things necessary for a superior power as regards its act and to completely attain its end.  Ergo etc..^1
3.  Praeterea, si aliqua talis doctrina sit necessaria, hoc est quia potentia in puris naturalibus est improportionata obiecto ut sic cognoscibili; ergo oportet quod per aliquid aliud a se fiat ei proportionata.  Illud aliud aut est naturale, aut supernaturale;  si naturale, ergo totum est improportionatum primo obiecto;  si supernaturale, ergo potentia est improportionata illi, et ita per aliud debet proportionari, et sic in infinitum.  Ergo cum non sit procedere in infinitum, II Metaphysicae, oportet stare in primo, . . .	3.  Moreover, if any such doctrine be necessary, this is because a power in purely natural things is disproportionate to its object that (it be) in this manner cognizable; therefore it is opportune that through something other than itself it be made proportionate to it.  That  other is either natural, or supernatural;  if natural, therefore the whole is disproportionate to its first object;  if supernatural, therefore the power is disproportionate to the same, and thus through another ought to be proportioned, and thus unto infinity.  Therefore, since there is not proceeding unto infinity, Metaphysics, Book II, [t. 5-13], it is opportune to stand still in the first, . . .
^a Textus a Duns Scotus signatur littera: b^2.	^a The text is marked here by Duns Scotus with the letter: b.^2
^1Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 1 q. 4 arg. 2. 4 (I f. 11 A); q. 2 in corp. (f. 4B);  Thomas, De veritate q. 14 a. 10 arg. 4. 13 (ed. Parmen. IX 242b-243a. 243b).  ^2  Cf. supra p. 2, 16-3, 19.

p. 4

...dicendo, quod potentia intellectiva sit proportionata omni cognoscibili et secundum omnem modum cognoscibilis.  Ergo etc.^1	. . . by saying, that the intellective power is proportionate to every cognizable and (is) according to every manner of the cognizable.  Ergo etc..^1
4.  Ad oppositum: Tim. 3:  Omnis doctrina divnitius inspirata utilis est ad arguendum etc.	4.  Opposed to this: Timothy, chapter 3, [v.16]:  Every divinely inspired doctrine is useful for putting (things) in clear light etc..
Praeterea, Bar. 3 de sapientia dicitur:  Non est qui possit scire vias eius, sed qui scit universa novit eam;  ergo nullus alius potest habere eam nisi a sciente universa.  Hoc quantum ad necessitatem eius.  De facto autem subdit:  Tradit eam Iacob puero suo et Israel dilecto suo, quantum ad Vetus Testamentum; et sequitur:  Post haec in terris visus est et cum hominibus conversatus est, quantum ad Novum Testatmentum.	Morevoer, in Baruch chapter 3, [vv. 31-32] there is said of wisdom:  There is not one who can know Her ways, but He who knows all knew Her;  therefore no other can have Her except by a universal knower.  This (is said) as much as regards its necessity.  Moreover of the fact (the Prophet) adds [ibid. V. 37]:  Jacob passed Her on to his son and Israel to his beloved, as much as regards the Old Testament; and there follows [v. 38]:  After these (days) among the lands He is seen, and He has conversed with men, as much as regards the New Testament.
[I.  Controversia inter Philosophos et Theologos]	I.  The Controvery among Philosophers and Theologians
5.  In ista quaestione videtur controversia inter philosophos et theologos.  Et tenent philosophi perfectionem naturae, et negant perfectionem supernaturalem;  theologi vero cognoscunt defectum naturae et necessitatem gratiae et perfectionem supernaturalem^a.	5.  On this question there seems to be a controvery among philosophers and theologians.  And philosophers hold that the perfection of nature, and deny supernatural perfection; on the other hand theologians recognize the defect of nature and the necessity of grace and supernatural perfection.^a
^a Sequitur textus interpolatus:  et ideo eam magis honorant.	^a There follows an interpolated text:  and for that reason they honored Her more.
^1  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 3 q. 5 arg. 2 (I f. 29S).

P. 5

[A. Opinio Philosophorum]	A.  The Opinion of Philosophers
Diceret igitur philosophus quod nulla est cognitio supernaturalis homini necessaria pro statu isto, sed quid omnem cognitionem sibi necessariam posset acquirere ex actione causarum naturalium^1.  —  Ad hoc adducitur simul auctoritas et ratio Philosophi ex diversis locis.	A philosopher, therefore, would say that there is no supernatural cognition necessary to man in his (present) state, but that every cognition necessary for him he can acquire from the action of natural causes.^1 —  For this there is adduced together the authority and reckoning of the Philosopher from diverse passages.
6.  Primo illud III De anima, ubi dicit quod « intellectus agens est quo est omnia facere, et possibilis est quo est omnia fieri ».  Ex hoc arguo sic^a:  activo naturali et passivo simul approximatis et non impeditis sequitur actio necessario^2, quia non dependet essentialiter nisi ex eis tamquam ex causis prioribus; activum autem respectu omnis intelligibilis est intellectus agens, et passivum est intellectus possibilis, et haec sunt naturaliter in anima, nec sunt impedita.  Patet.  Ergo virtute naturali istorum potest sequi actus intelligendi respectu cuiuscumque intelligibilis^3.	6.  First that of De anima, Book III, [t. 18], where he says that « the agent intellect is that by which it makes all things, and the possible is that by which it becomes all things ».  From this I argue thus:^a  to an active and a passive natural (virtue) together approximate and not impeded there follows action necessarily,^2 because it does not depend essentially except from these as from prior causes;  moreover the active in respect to every intelligible is the agent intellect, and the passive is the possible intellect, and these naturally are in the soul, and they are not impeded.  This is clear.  Therefore by their natural virtue an act of understanding can follow in respect to whatsoever intelligible.^3
7.  Confirmatur ratione :  omni potentiae naturali passivae correspondet aliquod activum naturale, alioquin videretur potentia passiva esse frustra in natura si per nihil in natura posset reduci ad actum ; sed intellectus possibilis est potentia passiva respectu quorumque intelligibilium ; . . .	7.  It is confirmed by reason:  to every natural passive power there corresponds some active natural, otherwise the passive power would seem to be in vain [frustra] in the nature if by means of nothing in the nature it could be reduced to act;  but the possible intellect is a passive power in respect to whatever intelligibles ; . . .
^a Textus a Duns Scotus signatur littera:  c^4.	^aThe text is marked by Duns Scotus with the letter c.^4
^1  Cf. Averroes, Metaphy. II. Com 1;  De an. III com. 36.  — Cf. etiam Henricus Gand., Summa a. 4 q. 5 in corp. (I f. 33E. 32B).  ^2  Cf. Aristot., Metaphy. IX t. 10 (Theta, c. 5, 1048a 5-7):  « Tales quidem potentias [irrationales] necesse, quando ut possunt activum et passivum appropinquat, hoc quidem facere, illud vero pati ».  ^3  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 1. q. 5 ad 2 (f. 15F); a. 3 q. 2 arg. 1 et in corp. (F. 28E-F).  ^4 Cf. supra p. 2, 16-3, 19.	^2  Cf. Aristot., Metaphysics. IX t. 10 (Theta, c. 5, 1048a 5-7):  « It is indeed necessary that the [irrational] powers be such that, when the active and the passive drawn near to one other, as they are able, the former indeed works, the other indeed suffers ».

P. 6

. . . ergo correspondet sibi aliqua potentia activa naturalis^1.  Sequitur igitur propositum.  Minor patet, quia intellectus possibilis naturaliter appetit cognitionem cuiuscumque cognoscibilis; naturaliter etiam perficitur per quamcumque cognitionem; igitur est naturaliter receptivus cuiuscumque intellectionis.	. . . therefore some active natural power corresponds to it.^1  The proposition, therefore, follows.  The minor is clear, because the possible intellect naturally desires [appetit] the cognition of whatsoever cognizable; it is also naturally perfected though whatsoever cognition;  therefore it is naturally receptive of whatsoever intellection.
8.  Praeterea^a, VI Metaphysicae distinguitur habitus speculativus in mathematicam, phyiscam et metaphysicam; et ex probatione eiusdem, ibidem, non videtur possibile esse plures habitus esse speculativos, quia in istis consideratur de toto ente, et in se et quoad omnes partes.  Sicut autem non posset esse aliqua speculativa alia ab istis, sic nec posset esse aliqua alia practica a practicis acquisitis activis et factivis.  Ergo scientiae practicae aquisitae sufficiunt ad perficiendum intellectum speculativum^2.	8.  Besides,^a in Metaphysics, Book VI, [t. 2], there is distinguished the speculative habit in mathematics, physics and metaphysics; and from the proof of the same, in the same place [t. 1-2], it does not seem that it is possible that there are many speculative habits, because in them there is a consideration of [consideratur de] the whole being, both in itself and in regard [quoad] all its parts.  However, just as there cannot be any speculative (habit) other than these, so neither can there be any other practical (habit) than the active and factitive acquired practical (ones).  Therefore the acquired practical sciences suffice to perfect the speculative intellect.^2
^a Textus a Duns Scotus signatur littera: f^3.	^a The text is marked here by Duns Scotus with the letter: f.^3
^1  Cf. Aristot., De an. III t. 17 (III c. 5, 430a 10-14); Metaph. V t 17 (IV c. 12, 1019a 15-1019b 15); De caelo I t. 32 ( I c. 4, 271a 32-33);  Averroes, Metaphy. II com. 1.  —  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 3 q. 4 arg. 2 (I f. 29 O); a. 35 q. 2 in corp. (f. 223Y)).  ^2 Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 2 q. 3 in corp. (f. 24M); a. 3 q. 3 in corp. et arg. 2 (f. 29L.K).  —  Thomas, De Veritate q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3 (ed. Parmen. IX 242b).  ^3  Cf. supra p. 2, 16-3, 19).

P. 7

9.  Praeterea^a, potens naturaliter intelligere principium, potest naturaliter cognoscere conclusions inclusas in principio.  Hanc conclusionem probo, quia scientia conclusionum non dependet nisi ex intellectu principii et deductione conclusionum ex principio, sicut patet ex definitione ‘scire’ I Posteriorum; sed deductio est ex se manifesta, sicut patet ex syllogismi perfecti definitione I Priorum, quia « nullius est indigens ut sit vel appareat evidenter necessarius »; igitur si principia intelligantur, habentur omnia quae sunt necessaria ad scientiam conclusionis.  Et sic patet maior.	9.  Besides,^a being able naturally to understand a principles, it can naturally cognize the conclusions included in the principle.  This conclusion I prove (thus), because the knowledge [scientia] of conclusions does not depend (on anything) but the understanding of the principle and the deduction of the conclusions from the principle, just as is clear from the definition of ‘knowing’ [‘scire’] in Posterior Analytics, Book I, [c. 2 t. 5]; but deduction is of itself manifest, just as is clear from the definition of the perfect syllogism in Prior Analytics, Book I, [c. 1],  because «  it is lacking in nothing that is and/or appears evidently necessary »;  therefore if the principles are understood, all things which are necessary for the knowledge of the conclusion are had.  And thus the major is clear.
10.  Sed naturaliter intelligimus prima principia, in quibus virtualiter includuntur omnes conclusiones; ergo naturaliter possumus scire omnes conclusiones scibiles.	10.  But naturally we understand the first principles, in which there are included all conclusions;  therefore naturally we can know all knowable conclusions.
Probatio primae partis minoris:  quia termini principiorum primorum sunt communissimi, igitur illos naturaliter possumus intelligere, . . .	The proof of the first part of the minor:  because the terms of the first principles are most common, therefore we can naturally understand them, . . .
^a Textus a Duns Scotus signatur littera: d^1.	^a The text is marked by Duns Scotus with the letter: d.^1
^1  Cf. supra p. 2, 16-3,19.

P. 8

. . ., quia ex I Physicorum communissima primo intelliguntur^a; « principia autem cognoscimus et intelligimus in quantum terminos cognoscimus », I Posteriorum; ergo prima principia possumus naturaliter cognoscere^1.	. . ., because from Physics, Book I, [t. 3],  the things most common are understood first;^a  «  but we cognize and understand principles inasmuch as we cognize (their) terms », Posterior Analytics, Book I, [c. 3 t. 6];  therefore we can naturally cognize the first principles.^1
11.  Probatio secundae partis minoris: quia termini primorum principorum sunt communissimi, igitur quando distribuuntur, distribuuntur pro omnibus conceptibus inferioribus;  accipiuntur autem tales termini universaliter in primis principiis, et ita extendunt se ad omnes conceptus particulares, et per consequens ad extrema omnium conclusionum specialium^b.	11.  The proof of the second part of the minor:  because the terms of the first principles are most common, therefore when they are distributed, they are distributed on behalf of all the inferior concepts;  but such terms are accepted universally in the first principles, and thus they extends themselves to all particular concepts, and consequently [per consequens] to the extremes of all special conclusions.^b
^a Loco igitur (p. 7, 14)  —  intelliguntur (p. 8,1) textus a Duns Scoto cancellatus:  igitur naturaliter illos cognoscimus, quia sunt sicut ianua in domo, II Metaphysicae^2; loco igitur (p. 7,14)  —  intelliguntur (p. 8,1) et igitur (p. 8, 12)  —  Metaphysicae (p. 8, 13) textus interpolatus:  igitur illos possimus naturaliter intelligere, quia ex I Physicorum^3 communissima primo intelliguntur a nobis, etiam quia sunt sicut ianua in domo, II Metaphysicae^4. ^b Sequitur textus interpolatus:  Et ita est haec pars minoris secunda probata.	^a In place of therefore (p. 7, final sentence) . . . . are understood (p. 8, first sentence) stood this text cancelled by Duns Scotus:  therefore we naturally cognize them, because they are as the door in the house, II Metaphysics, Book II;^2 in place of the same and of therefore (p. 8, 12) . . . Metaphysics (p. 8, 13) was the interpolated text:  therefore we can naturally understand them, because from Physics, Book I,^3 the things most common are understood by us first, also because the are as the door in the house, Metaphysics, Book II.^4 ^b There follows the interpolated text:  And thus has this second part of the minor been proved.
^1  Pro n. 9-10 cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 6 q. 1 arg. 1 (I f. 42A); a. 1 q. 2 in corp. (f. 4B); q. 5 in corp. (f. 15B); q. 12 in corp. (f. 22L); a. 13 q. 3 arg. 2 (f. 91A).  ^2 Aristot., Metaph. II t. 1 (I c. 1, 993b 4-5).  —  cf. etiam Henricus Gand., Summa a. 1 q. 10 in corp. (f. 20G); a. 22 q. 1 in corp. (f. 130L).  ^3  Cf. ad lin. 1.  ^4 Cf. ad lin. 12-13.

P. 9

[ B.  Improbatio Opinionis Philosophorum]	B.  The Reproof of the Opinion of Philosophers.
12.  Contra istam positionem tripliciter potest argui.	12.  Against this position on can argue in a threefold manner:
Nota, nullum supernaturale potest ratione naturali ostendi inesse viatori, nec necessario requiri ad perfectionem eius; nec etiam habens potest cognoscere illud sibi inesse.  Igitur impossibile est hic contra Aristotelem uti ratione naturali:  si arguatur ex creditis, non est ratio contra philosophum, quia praemissam creditam non concedet.  Unde istae rationes hic factae contra ipsum alteram praemissam habent creditam vel probatam ex credito; ideo non sunt nisi persuasiones theologicae, ex creditis ad creditum.	Note, no supernatural can be shown by natural reason to belong to [inesse] the wayfarer, nor to be required necessarily for his perfection; nor even can one having it cognize that it belongs to him.  Therefore it is impossible here to use natural reason against Aristotle:  if one argue from things believed, this is not a reason against the philosopher, because he does not concede the believed premise.  Whence these reasons of mine made here against him have another believed and/or proven premise from what is believed; for that reason they are not but theological persuasions, from things believed for that which is believed.
13.  [Prima ratio principalis]  —   Primo sic:  omni agenti per cognitionem necessaria est distincta cognitio sui finis^1.  Hanc probo, quia omne agens propter finem agit ex appetitu finis^2; omne per se agens agit propter finem^3; igitur omne per se agens suo modo appetit finem.  Igitur sicut agenti naturali est necessarius appetitus finis propter quem debet agere, ita agenti per cognitionem — quod etiam est per se agens, ex II Physicorum — necessarius est appetitus sui finis propter quem debet agere^4.  Patet ergo maior.	13.  [The first principal reason]  —  First in this manner:  to everyone acting through cognition there is necessary a distinct cognition of one’s own end.^1  This I prove, because everything acting on account of an end acts out of an appetite for the end;^2 every per se agent acts on account of an end;^3  therefore every per se agent in its own manner has an appetite [appetit] for its end.  Therefore just as to a natural agent there is a necessary appetite of its end for the sake of which it ought to act, so to one acting through cognition — which is also a per se agent,  from Physics, Book II [t. 49] — there is a necessary appetite of its own end for the sake of which it ought to act.^4  Ergo the major is clear.
^1  Cf. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I q. 1 a. 1 in corp. (IV 6b); De Veritate q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3 (ed. Parmen. IX 242b)  ^2 Cf. Aristot., Metaph. II t. 8 (I c. 2, 994b 13-14).  ^3 Cf. Aristot., Physic. II t. 49 (II c. 5, 196b 17-22).  ^4 Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 4 q. 3 in corp. (I f. 31N-32O).

P. 10

Sed homo non potest scire ex naturalibus finem suum distincte; igitur necessaria est sibi de hoc aliqua cognitio supernaturalis^1.	But man cannot know [scire] his own end distinctly from natural (things);  therefore there is necessary for him some supernatural cognition concerning this.^1
14.  Minor patet:  primo, quia Philosophus sequens naturalem rationem aut ponit felicitatem esse perfectam in cognitione acquisita substantiarum separatarum, sicut videtur velle I et X Ethicorum, aut si non determinate asserat illam esse supremam perfectionem nobis possibilem, aliam ratione naturali non concludit, ita quod soli naturali rationi innitendo vel errabit circa finem in particulari vel dubius remanebit^a; unde I Ethicorum dubitando ait:  « Si quod est deorum donum, rationabile est felicitatem esse »^2.	14.  The minor is clear:  first, because the Philosopher, following natural reason, either posits felicity to be perfect in the acquired cognition of separated substances, must as he seems to want in the Nicomachian Ethics, Books I [c. 9] and X [c. 8 and 10], or if he does not determinately assert that to be the supreme perfection possible for us, he does not draw another conclusion [aliam non concludet], so that by supporting himself by natural reason alone he will err about his end in particular and/or will remain doubtful;^a  whence doubting in the Nicomachian Ethics, Book I, [c. 13], he says:  « If that is a gift of the gods, it is reasonable that there is a felicity (for man) ».^2
15.  Secundo probatur eadem minor per rationem, quia nullius substantiae finis proprius cognoscitur a nobis nisi ex actibus eius nobis manifestis ex quibus ostenditur quod talis finis sit conveniens tali naturae^b; nullos actus experimur nec cognoscimus inesse . . .	15.  Second, the minor is proven by the same reckoning, because of no substance is the end more properly cognized by us unless out of its acts manifested to us from which it is shown that such an end is convenient to such a nature;^b  we experience no acts nor do we cognized them to belong to . . .
^a Adnotatio Duns Scoti:  Hoc est creditum^3. ^b Sequitur textus interpolatus:  Hoc patet de descensu gravis deorsum, qui est actus gravis respectu centri et finis.	^a Duns Scotus’ note:  This is (something) believed.^3 ^b There follows the interpolated text:  This is clear from the descent of a weight downwards, which is an act of weight in respect of its center and end.
^1   Cf. Thomas, Summa Theologicae I q. 1. a. 1 in corp. (IV 6b);  Henricus Gand., Summa a. 4. q. 5 in corp. (I f. 32B-33E).  ^2 Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 1 q.12 in corp. (f. 21 I); a. 4. q. 5 in corp et ad 5 (f. 33B.I); a. 3 q. 3 in corp. (f 29L).  ^3 Cf. Supra n. 12.

P. 11

... nostrae naturae pro statu isto ex quibus cognoscamus visionem substantiarum separatarum esse convenientem nobis;  igitur non possumus naturaliter cognoscere distincte quod ille finis sit conveniens naturae nostrae^1.	. . . our nature for this (our present) state out of which we cognize the vision of separated substances to be fitting [convenientem] for us;  therefore we cannot naturally cognize distinctly that that end is fitting to our nature.^1
16.  Hoc saltem certum est quod quaedam condiciones finis propter quas est appetibilior et ferventius inquirendus non possunt determinate cognosci ratione naturali.  Etsi enim daretur quod ratio sufficeret ad probandum quod visio Dei nuda et fruitio est finis hominis, tamen non concludetur quod ista perpetuo convenient homini perfecto, in anima et corpore, sicut dicetur in IV distinctione 43^2.  Et tamen perpetuitas huiusmodi boni est condicio reddens finem appetibiliorem quam si esset transitorium.  Consequi enim hoc bonum in natura perfecta est appetibilius quam in anima separata, sicut patet per Augustinum XII Super Genesim.  Istas igitur et similes condiciones finis necesssarium est nosse ad efficaciter inquirendum finem, et tamen ad eas non sufficit ratio naturalis; igitur requiritur doctrina supernaturaliter tradita.	16.  This at least is certain, that certain conditions of (our) end, on account of which it is to be more desirably [appetibilior] and fervently inquired after, cannot be cognized in a determinate manner by natural reason.  For even if it be given that reason would suffice to prove that the unencumbered [nuda] vision  and fruition of God is the end of man, nevertheless it would not come to the conclusion [concludetur] that these (acts) of (enjoying) God perpetually befit the perfect man, in soul and body, just as is said in  Book IV, Distinction 43.  And nevertheless the perpetuity of this manner of good is the condition rendering (his) end more desirable than if it were transitory.  For to completely attain this good in a perfected nature is more desirable than in a separated soul, just as is clear through (the testimony of St.) Augustine, On Genesis, Book XII, [c. 35, n. 68].  Therefore these and the similar conditions of (his) end it is necessary to know to efficaciously inquire into (his) end, and nevertheless for these natural reason is not sufficient;  therefore there is required a doctrine supernaturally transmitted [tradita].
17.  [Secunda ratio principalis]  —  Secundo sic^a:  . . .	17.  [The second principle reason]  —  Second (I prove) in this manner:^a
^a Adnotatio Duns Scoti:  Haec procedit de contingentibus;  ergo non de scibilibus.	^a Duns Scotus’ note:  This proceeds from contingents; therefore not from knowables.
^1  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 4. q. 5 in corp. (I f. 32B-33D).  ^2 Duns Scotus, Ordinatio IV d. 43 q. 2 n. [32].

P. 12

... omni cognoscenti agenti propter finem necessaria est cognitio quomodo et qualiter acquiratur talis finis; et etiam necessaria est cognitio omnium quae sunt ad illum finem ncessaria; et tertio necessaria est cognitio quod omnia illa sufficiunt ad talem finem.  Primum patet, quia si nesciat quomodo et qualiter finis acquiratur, nesciet qualiter ad consecutionem ipsius se disponet.  Secudum probatur, quia si nesciat omnia ncessaria ad ipsum, propter ignorantiam alicuius actus necessarii ad ipsum poterit a fine deficere.  Sit etiam, quantum ad tertium, nesciantur illa necessaria sufficere, ex dubitatione quod ignoret aliquid necessarium, non efficaciter prosequetur illud quod est necessarium.	. . . for every agent cognizing for the sake of its end there is a necessary cognition (of) how and in what kind of way [quomodo et qualiter] such an end is acquired; and there is also a necessary cognition of all things which are necessary for that end; and third there is a necessary cognition that all those things suffice for such an end.  The first is clear, because if one does not know how and in what kind of way his end is acquired, he will not know in what kind of way he will dispose himself to the attainment of it.  The second is proven, because if one does not know all the things necessary for it, on account of the ignorance of any necessary act for it he will not be able to attain his end [poterit a fine deficere].  It may also be, as much as regards the third, that those things necessary are not known to be sufficient, out of a doubting that ignores something necessary, one does not efficaciously pursue that which is necessary.
18.  Sed haec tria non potest viator naturali ratione cognoscere.  Probatio de primo^1, quia beatitudo confertur tamquam praemium pro meritis quae Deus acceptat tamquam digna tali praemio, et per consequens non naturali necessitate sequitur ad actus nostros qualescumque sed contingenter datur a Deo, actus aliquos in ordine ad ipsum tamquam meritorios acceptante^2a.  Istud non est naturaliter scibile, . . .	18.  But these three a wayfarer cannot cognize by natural reason.  Proof of the first,^1 because beatitude is conferred as a reward for the merits which God accepts as worthy of such a reward, and consequently not by a natural necessity does it follow after our acts, whatever kind (they may be), but it is given contingently by God, accepting some acts in order to it as meritorious.^2a  That is not naturally knowable, . . .
^a Adnotatio Duns Scoti:  Hoc est creditum^3	^a Duns Scotus’ note:  This is (something) believed.^3
^1  Cf. supra n. 17.  ^2 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 17 pars 1 q. 3 n. [24-25]; Quodl. Q. 17 n. [3-6].  ^3 Cf. supra n. 12.

P. 13

. . .ut videtur, quia hic etiam erabant philosophi, ponentes omnia quae sunt a Deo immediate esse ab eo necessario^1.  Saltem alia duo membra^2 sunt manifesta:  non enim potest sciri naturali ratione acceptatio voluntatis divinae utpote tamquam contingenter acceptantis talia vel talia digna vita aeterna, et quod etiam illa sufficiant; dependet mere ex voluntate divina circa ea ad quae contingenter se habet; igitur etc.	. . . as it seems, because in this even the philosophers used to err [cf Aristotle, Physics, VIII t. 4-9, 13-15, 53;  Metaphysics, IX, t. 17, XII t. 30;  Averroes, in h.1; Epitome on the Books of Metaphysics, tr. 4;  Destruction of the destructions of the Philosophy of Algazel, disp. 1; Avicenna, Metaphysics, VI, ch. 2; IX ch. 1; Metaphysics compendium, I, part 3, tr. 1, ch. 3], positing all things which are from God immediately to be necessarily from Him.^1  At least the other two members (of the argument)^2 are manifest:  for there cannot be known by natural reason the acceptance of the Divine Will, understood as of one contingently accepting such (acts) and/or such (acts) as worthy of eternal life, and that these also suffice;  it depends merely on the Divine Will about these, to which It holds itself contingently;  therefore etc..
19.  [Instantiae contra duas rationes principales]  —  Contra istas duas rationes^3 instatur.  Contra primam^4 sic:  omnis natura creata essentialter dependet a qualibet per se causa eius, et propter talem dependentiam ex causato cognito potest sciri demonstratione quia^5 et cognosci quaelibet eius per se causa; igitur cum natura hominis sit homini naturaliter cognoscibilis, quia non est potentiae eius cognitivae improportionalis, sequitur quod ex ista natura cognita possit naturaliter cognosci finis illius naturae^6a.	19.  [Instances against the two principle reasons]  —  Against those two reasons^3 let (the argument) be pursued.  Against the first^1 in this manner:  every created nature essentially depends from whatever per se cause of it, and on account of such a dependence, from the thing caused having been cognized, by a demonstration quia it can be known and whatever (is) the per se cause of it (can) be cognized; therefore since the nature of man is to man naturally cognizable, because there is nothing improportional to his cognitive power, it follows that from this nature of his having been cognized there can be naturally cognized the end of that nature.^6a
^a Adnotatio Duns Scoti:  Concedo, finis qui est causa finalis, et hoc sub ista ratione sub qua est causa finalis et similiter sicut cognoscitur efficiens sub ratione quae necessario requiritur ut sit efficiens primum^7.	^a Duns Scotus’ note:  I concede (that there is) an end which is the final cause, and this under that reckoning of it under which it is a final cause and similarly just as the efficient cause is cognized under a reckoning of what is required necessarily that it be the first efficient (cause).^7
^1  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 29 q. 5 in corp (I f. 174I); a 30 q. 4 ad 1 (f. 181E-182K).  ^2 Cf. supra n. 17.  ^3 Cf. supra n. 13-18.  ^4 Cf. supra n. 13-16.  ^5 Cf Aristot., Anal. Post., I c. 13 [t. 30] (I c. 13, 78a 22-78b 34),  ^6  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 4 q. 8 in corp. (f. 34V-35X).  ^7 Cf. infra n. 29.

P. 14

20. Confirmatur ratio:  si enim ex natura inferiori cognita cognoscatur eius finis, non hoc minus est possibile in proposito, quia nec minor dependentia in proposito finiti ad suum finem est quam in aliis^1.	20.  It is confirmed by reason:  for if from a inferior nature having been cognized there is cognized its end, this is no less possible in the proposed (argument), because neither is there a lesser dependence in the proposed (argument) of the finite to its own end than in other (finites).^1
21.  Ex hac etiam ratione videtur quod falsa sit propositio ‘finis substantiae non cognoscitur nisi ex eius actibus’^2, quia ex cognitione naturae in se potest eius finis cognosci demonstratione quia.	21.  Also from this reckoning it seems that the proposition ‘the end of a substance is not cognized except from its own acts’ is false, because from a cognition of a nature in itself there can be cognized its end by a demonstration quia.
22.  Quod si dicatur quod ratio concludit hominem posse naturaliter cognoscere suum finem naturalem, non autem de fine supernaturali, contra, Augustinus libro De praedestinatione sanctorum:  « Posse habere fidem, sicut posse habere caritatem, naturae est hominum, quamvis habere fidem, sicut habere caritatem, gratiae sit fidelium ».  Si ergo natura hominis est naturaliter cognoscibilis homini, naturaliter est etiam cognoscibilis illa potentia ut est talis naturae, . . .	22.  Wherefore if it be said that reason concludes that man can naturally cognize his own natural end, not however (is this so) concerning his supernatural end, on the contrary, (St.) Augustine in his book On the Predestination of the Saints (says):  « To be able to have faith, just as to be able to have charity, belongs to the nature of men, though to have faith, just as to have charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful ».  If, therefore, the nature of man is naturally cognizable to man, there is also naturally cognizable that power that belongs to such a nature, . . .
^1  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 4. q. 8 cin corp. (I f. 34V-35V).  ^2  Cf. ibid. Ad 1 et 2 (f. 35Y.Z).  —  Cf. supra n. 15.

P. 15

. . . et per consequens ordinabilitas talis naturae ad finem ad quem fides et caritas disponit.	. . . and consequently the ordinability of such a nature to the end to which faith and charity dispose it.
23.  Item, homo naturaliter appetit finem illum quem dicis supernaturalem;  igitur ad illum finem naturaliter ordinatur^1; igitur ex tali ordinatione potest concludi finis ille ut ex cognitione naturae ordinatae ad ipsum.	23.  Likewise, man naturally desires that end which you call supernatural;  therefore to that end he is naturally ordained;^1 therefore out of such an ordination that end can be concluded to as out of the cognition of a nature ordained to it.
24.  Item, naturaliter est cognoscibile primum obiectum intellectus esse ens, secundum Avicennam^2, et naturaliter cognoscible est in Deo perfectissime salvari rationem entis; finis autem cuiuscumque potentiae est optimum eorum quae continentur sub eius obiecto primo, quia in illo solo est perfecta quietatio et delectatio^3, ex X Ethicorum*; ergo naturaliter cognoscibile est hominem ordinari secundum intellectum ad Deum tamquam ad finem.	24.  Likewise, it is naturally cognizable that the first object of the intellects is being, according to Avicenna [Metaphysics, I ch. 6],^2 and it is naturally cognizable that in God there is most perfectly conserved [salvari] the reckoning of being;  but the end of whatsoever power is the best of those things which are contained under its first object, because in that alone is there a perfect resting and delectation,^3 from the  Nicomedian Ethics, Book X [c. 4]*; therefore it is naturally cognizable that man is ordained according to his intellect to God as to his End.
25.  Confirmatur ratio, quia cui naturaliter cognoscibilis est potentia aliqua, ei naturaliter cognoscibile est quid sit eius primum obiectum, et ulterius, potest cognoscere in quo salvatur ratio illius primi obiecti et quod perfectissimum tale est finis potentiae; . . .	25.  (This) reckoning is confirmed, because to that for which there is (an end) naturally knowable by some power, that which is its first object is naturally knowable, and further, it can cognize in what the reckoning of its first object is conserved and what most perfect (thing) as such is the end of the power; . . .
*  « Sensus omnis ad sensibile operantis, perfecte attrahere dispositi ad publcherrimum sub sensu iactentium; tale enim maxime esse videtur perfecta operatio . . . Haec autem utique perfectissima erit et delectabilissima.  Secundum omnem enim sensum est delectatio; similiter autem et intellectum et speculationem.  Delectabilissima autem perfectissima; perfectissima autem quae bene habentis ad studiosissimum eorum quae sub ipsam ».	*  « (This belongs) to every sense of the one operating according to the sensible, having been disposed, to perfectly draw near to the most beautiful (thing) of those (things) lying under the sense;  for such most of all seems to be the perfect operation . . . This, however, will indeed be most perfect and most delectable.  For according to every sense there is a delectation;  moreover similarly both an understanding and a outward-looking vision [speculationem].  Moreover the most delectable (operation is) the most perfect; but the most perfect (operation) is that which belongs to the (power) holding (itself) well to that which is most to be studied [studiosissimum] of those (things) which are under it ».
^1  Pro n . 22-23 cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 8 q. 2 ad 1 ( I f. 65N); a. 4 q. 5 in corp. Et ad 1 (f. 33C-F).	2  Cf. ibid., a. 3 q. 4 arg. 1 (f. 29 O); a. 7 q. 3 ad 4 (f. 51L); a. 19 q. 1 in corp. (f. 115B). — Cf. supra n. 1.  3 Cf. ibid., a. 4 q. 9 in corp. (f. 35B-D).

P. 16

. . . mens autem nota est sibi, secundum Augustinum De Trinitate; igitur sibi est notum quod sit eius primum obiectum^1.  Et novit Deum non excedi a ratione illius primi obiecti, quia tunc nullo modo esset ab ipsa mente intelligibilis^2; ergo novit Deum esse optimum in quo salvatur ratio sui obiecti, et ita ipsum novit esse finem potentiae.	. . . but the mind is known [nota] to itself, according to (St.) Augustine in De Trinitate [IX, c. 11-12 n. 16.18];  therefore to itself is known what is its first object.^1  And it knows that God is not exceeded by the reckoning of its first object, because then in no manner would He be intelligible by the mind itself;^2  therefore it knows that God is the best thing in which the reckoning of its object is conserved, and thus it knows Him to be the end of its power.
26.  Contra secundam rationem^3 arguitur sic:  si per unum extremum cognoscitur aliud extremum, ergo et media;  sed necessaria ad consecutionem finis sunt media inter naturam et finem suum consequendum^4; igitur cum ex cognitione naturae possit finis cognosci, secundum prius probata^5, videtur quod similiter media ad finem necessaria possunt cognosci.	26.  Against the second reason it is argued in this manner:  if by means of one extreme there is cognized the other extreme, therefore also the means;  but the necessaries for the attainment of an end are the means between the nature and its own end to be attained;^4 therefore since from the cognition of the nature the end can be cognized, according to the things previously proven,^5 it seems that similarly the means necessary to the end can be cognized.
27.  Confirmatur ratio:  ita enim in proposito videtur esse necessaria conexio entium ad ipsum finem sicut est in aliis;  sed propter talem conexionem in aliis ex fine cognoscuntur alia, sicut per rationem sanitatis concluditur talia et talia requiri ad sanitatem; igitur etc.^6	27.  (This) reckoning is confirmed:  for thus in the proposed (argument) there seems to be a necessary connexion of beings to that end just as there is among the other (ends);  but on account of such a connexion among the other (ends) other things are cognized from the end,just as through the reckoningof health there is concluded that such and such are required for health; therefore etc..^6
28.  [Responsio ad instantias]  —  Ad primum^7 istorum dico quod licet . . .	28.  [Reponse to the instances] —  To the first^7 of these I say that though . . .
^1  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 40 q. 7 arg. 2 et in corp. (I f. 259G.H).  ^2 Cf, ibid. a. 4 q. 5 in corp. (f. 33C).  ^3 Cf. supra n. 17-18).  ^4  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 4 q. 9 in corp. (f. 35B).  ^5 Cf. supra n. 19)  ^6 Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 3 q. 3 arg. 1 (f. 28K).  ^7 Cf. supra n. 19-21.

P. 17

. . . procedat de fine qui est causa finalis et non de fine attingendo per operationem — quorum finium distinctio dicetur infra^1 — potest tamen dici ad illud, et ad sequens de Augustino^2, et ad tertium de potentia et primo obiecto^3, unica responsione, quod omnia accipiunt naturam nostram vel potentiam intellectivam esse nobis naturaliter cognoscibilem; quod falsum est, sub illa ratione propria et speciali sub qua ad talem finem ordinatur, et sub qua capax est gratiae consummatae, et sub qua habet Deum pro perfectissimo obiecto.  Non enim cognoscitur anima nostra a nobis nec natura nostra pro statu isto nisi sub aliquo ratione generali, abstrahibili a sensibilibus, sicut patebit infra distinctione 3^4.  Et secundum talem generalem rationem non convenit sibi ordinari ad illum finem, nec posse capere gratiam, nec habere Deum pro obiecto perfectissimo.	. . . it proceeds from the end which is the final cause and not from the end being attained through operation — of which ends the distinction will be discussed below^1 — nevertheless there can be said according to that (argument), and according to what follows from (St.) Augustine,^2 and according to the third (argument) concerning the power and its prime object,^3 in a single response, that all (these arguments) accept our nature and/or intellective power to be naturally cognizable by use; which is false, under that reckoning proper and special under which it is ordained to such an end, and under which it is capable of the consummate grace, and under which it has God for its most p4erfect Object.  For our soul is not cognized by us nor by our nature in this present state except under some general reckoning, abstractible from sensibles, just as will be clear below in Distinction 3.^4  And according to such a general reckoning it does not find it agreeable [non convenit sibi] to be ordained to that end, nor to be able to receive [capere] grace, nor to have God for its most perfect Object.
29.  Tunc ad formam.  Cum dicitur quod ex ente ad finem potest demonstrari finis demonstratione quia^5, dico quod non est verum nisi cognito ente ad finem sub illa ratione propria sub qua habet finem illum.  Sic minor est falsa.  —  Et cum probatur per proportionem^6, dico quod licet mens sit eadem sibi, non tamen pro statu isto . . .	29.  Next according to the form (of the argument).  When it is said that from (something) being for an end the end can be demonstrated by a demonstration quia,^5 I say that it is not true except having cognized it being for and end under that proper reckoning under which it has that end.  Thus the minor is false.  —  And since it is proved through a proportion,^6 I say that though the mind is the same to itself, it is nevertheless not in this present state . .
.^1  Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 1 pars 1 q. 1 n. [5].  ^2 Cf. supra n. 22.  ^3 Cf. supra n. 24.  ^4 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 3 pars 1 q. 3 n. [24].  ^5 Cf. supra n. 19.  ^6 Cf. ibidem.

P. 18

. . . est sibi proportionalis tamquam objectum nisi secundum rationes generales quae possunt abstrahi ab imaginabilibus.	. . . proportional to itself as an object except according to general reckonings which can be abstracted from imaginables.
30.  Ad confirmationem^1 dico quod nec aliarum substiantiarum fines proprii cognoscuntur, qui scilicet sunt earum secundum rationes proprias, nisi sint aliqui actus manifesti ex quibus concludatur ordo earum ad talem finem.	30.  For a confirmation (of this argument)^1 I say that the proper ends of other substances are also not cognized, which namely belong to these according to proper reckonings, unless they are of some manifest act out of which there is concluded their order to such an end.
31.  Et ex hoc patet ad illud quod additur^2 contra probationem minoris, quod illa propositio non est falsa, ‘non cognoscitur a nobis finis proprius substantiae nisi per actum eius manifestum’^3; non enim accipit propositio quod non posset aliter finis cognosci.  Bene enim verum est quod si substantia cognosceretur sub propria ratione, ex ipsa sic cognita posset eius per se causa cognosci.  Sed non sic cognoscitur a nobis nunc aliqua substantia, et ideo nunc nullum finem possumus concludere proprium substantiae nisi per actum evidentem de illa substantia ut nota in universali et confuse.  In proposito deficit utraque via; sed probatio minoris^4 tangit unam, de ignoratia actus, supponendo aliam, de ignorantia scilicet naturae in se.	31.  And from this it is clear regarding that which is added^2 against the proof of the minor, that that proposition is not false, ‘the proper end of a substance is not cognized by us except through its manifest act’;^3 for the proposition does not accept that the end could be otherwise cognized.  For well is it true that if a substance would be cognized under its proper reckoning, from it being cognized in this manner the per se cause of it could be cognized.  But not so is any substance now cognized by us, and for that reason now we can conclude to no proper end of a substance except through and evident act from that substance as (it is) known in a universal and confused (manner).  In the proposed (argument) each way is lacking; but the proof of the minor^4 touches the one concerning the ignorance of the act, by substituting another, namely (that) concerning the ignorance of the nature in itself.
32.  Ad secundum de Augustino^5 dico quod illa potentia habendi caritatem ut ipsa est dispositio respectu Dei in se sub propria ratione amandi, . . .	32.  To the second (argument) from (St.) Augustine^5 I say that that potency of having charity, as it is a disposition in respect to God in itself under a proper reckoning of loving, . . .
^1  Cf. supra n. 20.  ^2 Cf. supra n. 21.  ^3 Cf. supra n. 15.  ^4 Cf. ibidem.  ^5 Cf. supra n. 22.

P. 19

. . . convenit naturae hominis secundum ratinoem specialem, non communem sibi et sensibilibus;  ideo non est illa potentialitas naturaliter cognoscibilis pro statu isto de homine, sicut nec homo cognoscitur sub illa ratione sub qua eius est haec potentia^a.  Ita respondeo ad istud in quantum adduci potest ad conclusionem principalem^1, scilicet oppositam minori rationis primae^2.  Sed in quantum adducitur contra illam responsionem de fine supernaturali et naturali^3, respondeo:  concedo Deum esse finem naturalem hominis, sed non naturaliter adipiscendum sed supernaturaliter^4.  Et hoc probat ratio sequens de desiderio naturali^5, quam concedo.	. . . befits the nature of man according to a special reckoning, not common to himself and sensibles; for that reason that potentiality is not naturally cognoscible in this present state of man, just as neither is man cognized under that reckoning under which this potency belongs to him.^a  Thus I respond to that (argument) of theirs inasmuch as it can be lead to a principle conclusion,^1 namely the opposite of the minor of the first reckoning.^2  but inasmuch as it is lead against that response concerning the supernatural and natural end, I respond:  I concede that God is the natural end of man, but obtained [adipiscendum] not naturally, but supernaturally.^4  And the reckoning, which I concede, following from natural desire,^5 also proves this.
33.  Ad aliud^6 negandum est illud quod assumitur, quod scilicet naturaliter cognoscitur ens esse primum obiectum intellectus nostri, et hoc secundum totam  indifferentiam entis ad sensibilia et insensibilia, et quod hoc dicit Avicenna quod sit naturaliter notum^7.  Miscuit enim sectam suam — quae fuit secta Machometi — . . .	33.  To the other^6 there must be denied that which is assumed, namely that being is naturally cognized to be the prime object of our intellect, and this according to the total [totam] indifference of being to sensibles and insensibles, and this which Avicenna says, that it is naturally known.^7  For he mixed up his own sect — which was the sect of Mohammed — . . .
^a Sequatur textus interpolatus:  Vel vult Augustinus quid in natura est potentia ad recipiendum.  Non tamen potest reduci ad actum per naturam^8.	^a There follows the interpolated text:  And/or (St.) Augustine wants that in nature there is a power to receive it.  However it cannot be reduced to act through nature.^8
^1  Cf. supra n. 19-20.  ^2 Cf. supra n. 14-15.  ^3 Cf. supra n. 22.  ^4 Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 13 q. 2 in corp (I f. 91T-X); a. 8 q. 2 in corp. (f. 64H).  ^5 Cf. supra n. 23.  ^6 Cf. supra n. 24.  ^7 Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 21 q. 3 in corp. (f. 126D-E); q. 2 ad e (f. 124P); a. 19 q. 1 ad 3 et r (f. 115k-116L); a. 7 q. 6 ad 2 (f. 56R-S); q. 2 ad 2 (f. 118F); a. 26 q. 2 ad 1 (f. 159T).  —  Cf. infra n. 92.  ^8 Cf. ib. A. 35. q. 4 in corp. (f. 224O-225O) et Aristot., Metaph. V t. 17 (IV c. 12, 1919a 15-1929a 6), pro lec. Var. Ad lin. 17-18.

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. . . philosophicis, et quaedam dixit ut philosophica et ratione probata, alia ut consona sectae suae:  unde expresse ponit libro IX Metaphysicae cap. 7^a animam separatam cognoscere substantiam immaterialem in se, et ideo sub obiecto primo intellectus habuit ponere substantiam immaterialem contineri^1.  Non sic Aristoteles; sed secundum ipsum, primum obiectum intellectus nostri est vel videtur esse quiditas sensibilis, et hoc vel in se sensibilis vel in suo inferiori; et haec est quiditas abstrahibilis a sensibilibus^b.	. . . with philosophical (arguments), and said certain things as proven by philosophy and reason, others as consonant with his own sect:  whence he expressly posits in his Metaphysics, Book IX [c. 7], that a separated soul cognizes immaterial substance in itself, and for that reason he had to posit that immaterial substance is contained under the first object of the intellect.  Not so Aristotle [De Anima, III t. 26]; rather according to him, the first object of our intellect is and/or seems to be the quiddity of the sensible, and this sensible in itself and/or in its inferior;  and this is a quiddity abstractible from sensibles.^b
34.  Quod autem dicitur in confirmatione illius rationis de Augustino^2, respondeo:  dico quod dictum Augustini debet intelligi de actu primo, sufficiente omnino ex se respectu actus secundi, sed tamen nunc impedito; propter quod impedimentum . . .	34.  But because there is said in the confirmation of that reckoning from (St.) Augustine, I respond:  I say that the saying of (St.) Augustine ought to be understood of the first act, entirely sufficient of itself in respect to the second act, but nevertheless now impeded;  on account of which impediment . . .
^a Loco IX et 7  a Duns Scoto relinquitur spatium vacuum. ^b Sequitur textus interpolatus:  Sed si ad hoc opponitur quod si quiditas materialis sit primum et adaequatum obiectum potentiae intellectivae quod intellectus intelligere non poterit aliquid de substantiis separatis, quia obiectum adaequatum vel virtualiter vel formaliter includit omne illud in quod potest potentia ferri — se quiditas materialis nec virtualiter nec formaliter continet substantias separatas, ergo etc. — dico quod assumptum non est verum, quia quinque sensibilia communia, puta numerus, figura, etc., sentiuntur a sensu visus per se, quae nec formaliter nec virtualiter continentur sub colore vel luce^3; sufficit enim aliqua continentia concomitantiae.	^a In place of IX and 7 a blank space is left by Duns Scotus.  ^b There follows the interpolated text:  But if to this there is opposed that if material quiddity be the first and adequate object of the intellective power because the intellect cannot understand anything concerning separated substances, because an adequate object virtually and/or formally includes every thing [illud] unto which the power can be brought to bear [ferri] — if material quiddity neither virtually nor formally contains separated substances, ergo etc.. —  I say that the assumption is not true, because the five common sensibles, that is number, figure, etc., are sensed by the sense of sight per se, which neither formally nor virtually are contained under color and/or light;^3 for it suffices that some contain others concomitantly [aliqua continentia concomitantiae].
^1  Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 22 q. 5 in corp. (I f. 134B-135F).  ^2 Cf. supra n. 25.  ^3 Cf. Aristot., De anima II t. 64 (II c. 6, 418a 17-29).

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. . . actus secundus non elicitur nunc ex primo actu.  De hoc amplius infra^1.	. . . the second act is not now elicited from the first act.  Concerning this more (will be said) below.^1
35.  Si obiciatur contra istud quod homo in statu naturae institutae potuit cognoscere naturam suam, ergo et finem naturae, ex deductione primae rationis^2; ergo illa cognito non est supernaturalis.	35.  If it is objected against this that man in the state of nature instituted could cognize his own nature, therefore also the end of his nature, from a deduction of the first reason;^2 therefore that cognition is not supernatural.
36.  Item, contra responsionem^3 ad ultimam rationem:  si ideo non cognoscitur quid sit obiectum primum intellectus, quia non cognoscitur intellectus sub omni ratione propria sub qua respicit tale obiectum, igitur non potest cognosci de quocumque quod ipsum sit intelligibile, quia non cognoscitur potentia sub omni ratione propria sub qua respicit quodcumque ut obiectum intelligibile.	36.  Likewise, against the response^3 to the last reckoning:  if for that reason that which is the first object o